A Course in the Translation of Newspaper Articles

英语时文翻译教程

编著者：林烈城(主编)
陈　慈
曾春莲
审校者：王宗炎
李根洲

北京大学出版社
北　京

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

英语时文翻译教程/ 林烈城主编. - 北京: 北京大学出版社, 1999.8

ISBN 7-301-04290-6

Ⅰ. 英…　Ⅱ. 林…　Ⅲ. 英语-翻译-教材　Ⅳ. H315.9

中国版本图书馆 CIP **数据核字**(1999)**第** 33669 **号**

书　　名: **英语时文翻译教程**
著作责任者: **林烈城　等**
责 任 编 辑: **徐万丽**
标 准 书 号: ISBN 7-301-04290-6/ H · 481
出　版　者: **北京大学出版社**
地　　址: **北京市海淀区中关村北京大学校内**　100871
网　　址: http:// cbs.pku.edu.cn/ cbs.htm
电　　话: **出版部** 62752015　**发行部** 62754140　**编辑部** 62752028
电 子 信 箱: zpup@pup.pku.edu.cn
排　版　者: **兴盛达激光照排中心**
印　刷　者:
发　行　者: **北京大学出版社**
经　销　者: **新华书店**
850 **毫米**×1168 **毫米**　32 **开本**　9.625 **印张**　252 **千字**
1999 **年** 8 **月第一版**　1999 **年** 8 **月第一次印刷**
定　　价: 16.00 **元**

序

看到我们的书名,有人可能要问:“你们这本《英语时文翻译教程》是新编的,新在何处?”

我们这本书不是急就章,而是经过多年的酝酿、筹划、编写、试用、讨论、修订,这才定稿的。在这个过程中,我们对编书工作获得了一些新的认识。

我们认识到,外语教学不光是教外语,还应该以熏陶方式进行素质教育。外语教材应当使受教者在知识、技能、品德各方面都有所进益。

我们认识到,编教材必须从最新的书刊取材,并且开拓视野,注意到政治、经济、文化、教育、科技、商贸、医药卫生各方面,尽可能提供多种行业所需要的知识,因为随着国家的现代化,许许多多部门都需要翻译人才。

我们认识到,理解为翻译之本,写作为翻译之基。尽管只是翻译一句话,我们也要对上下文了解清楚,而且在中英文写作方面必须多下工夫,这才能意到笔随,无钩章棘句之病。

我们还认识到,一本教材的编者和使用者(包括教师和学生)的关系应该是全面合作的伙伴关系。教材要便于使用,购买者要合理地使用教材。所以本书的理解题和翻译题都有参考答案附在书后,其目的是对老师们提供一个思考的基础,对同学们提供一个可比较的样本。当然,大家不要一看见问题就去找现成答案,而要自己先做出答案,再参考我们提出的答案。只有这样,才能开拓思路,提高翻译能力,也能看出本书的不足之处。

此为试读,需要完整PDF请访问: www.ertongbook.com

我们希望，老师们和同学们在试用过本书以后，多提批评和意见，以便进行修订和补充。

王宗炎

1998 年 12 月 7 日

于中山大学回春楼

前　言

高等院校的大学英语是培养各类专业人才的重要课程。在完成了基础阶段的学习后,获取最新信息的能力成了学生在专业上能否赶上世界科学与技术发展的关键。直接从国外出版物获得信息当然最佳，但是在国内，信息的传播还有赖于翻译。因此，获取信息并及时翻译是各类专业高级人才必不可少的本领。

本书以培养获取英语信息并进行翻译的能力为宗旨。全书内容选自 90 年代英、美原版书、报、杂志，读者可以从中触摸到当今世界跳动的脉搏。为了掌握全球信息,学习先进科技,我们必须与外国人交往,也必须读外国书报。但是外国人的言辞和写作,都是有其特定的目标、背景、立场、观点的,我们应该加以研究分析,区别是非。对外国人写的英语文章,我们要学习其语言习惯、措辞方式,但对其内容则应采取正确的态度,不要无故排外,也不要盲从洋人。

书中循序渐进设置练习，书后配备参考答案。

全书共 34 个单元,可供大学非英语专业高年级学生使用。也可供各类院校及程度相当的读者学习之用。

本教材由林烈城、陈慈、曾春莲编著。

由于编著者水平有限，欢迎广大读者提出宝贵意见。

编著者

1997 年 7 月

CONTENTS

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com

Unit 1

CHINA'S CURRENCY

Amidst Asia's financial chaos, the vast Chinese economy has largely stood aloof. The Chinese currency, the yuan, has even strengthened a bit: after starting 1997 at 8.3 to the American dollar, it now trades at 8.28. Some countries might view this record with pride. But an articulate group of manufacturers and academics inside China is arguing that big currency devaluations in places like Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are threatening the competitiveness of China's exports. They are calling for a devaluation of the yuan.

The prospect fills Asia with dread. To lower the yuan would be to send Asia's fragile currencies into another spiral of competitive devaluations. It would also threaten the Hong Kong dollar, whose fixed peg to the American dollar has been the region's one certain pillar. But the odds of a Chinese devaluation are small. China has no urgent need to devalue—and pressing reasons not to do so.

It may, in fact, not be so easy for China to devalue. Market forces have been pushing the yuan higher rather than lower. Foreign-investment flows, up 8% this year, and a big trade surplus, $35 billion for the first ten months, have left banks and enterprises flush with dollars and yen. Converting this inflow into yuan might have driven the currency up to 10—20% had the central bank not been buying huge quantities of dollars to relieve pressure on the foreign-exchange market. This has had unfortunate side-effects. In order to keep its currency purchases from flooding the economy with yuan and thus aggravating inflation, the central bank has been forced to tighten credit excessively, slowing the economy at a time when a shot of domestic demand would do much to boost not just China's economy, but the region's too.

Despite exporter's complaints, the devaluations elsewhere are not putting them under intolerable pain. China's exports are still mostly low-end manufactures, such as toys and shoes, which do not usually compete head-on with South-East Asia's higher-end products, such as electronics. Where they do compete, China still has advantages. Its factory wages, at an average $60 a month, are just one-third those of Thailand. Certainly, China will feel some pain, particularly because the economic slump in Japan and Korea will hurt demand for Chinese products. But after estimated growth of 15% this year, export growth may merely halve in 1998. This is far from disastrous.

Two other factors also weigh against a Chinese devaluation over the next year. First, a devaluation would knock the stuffing out of Hong Kong's financial markets, and China's carefully won reputation for keeping its hand off its new territory would be destroyed overnight. Second, devaluation would widen China's trade surplus with the United States, which is likely to exceed $30 billion this year. American politicians already complain that their country's bilateral trade deficit with China is intolerable, and China's leaders know that a trade war with America would be sure to destroy any economic benefit from devaluation.

None of this may calm Asian worries over China's intentions. But a misunderstanding of recent history may have caused those worries to be overdone. Some commentators (including *The Economist*) have contended that China's last devaluation, in 1994, hurt its neighbours' exports, which inexorably led to this year's traumatic devaluations. This analysis, however, ignores the fact that China's devaluation, an impressive 50% on paper, amounted to less in fact. Prior to 1994 China operated two exchange rates; while the official rate was sharply devalued, the rate at which four fifths of China's foreign trade was conducted barely changed at all. So South-East Asia's 1996 export slump cannot be blamed on China's 1994 devaluation. By extension, a modest decline of the yuan back to its original peg of 8.7 to the dollar should not have huge effects on the region's trade.

Some of the upward pressure will come off the yuan next year. Foreign-investment inflows are slowing, and slower export growth will shrink the trade surplus. As a result, the balance of payments is set to worsen. If this happens, Chinese authorities could, conceivably, allow the yuan to weaken a bit. But the market is not demanding devaluation (and, with the yuan still far from easily convertible, is unable to force it). In addition, urgent reforms to China's banking sector and its state-owned enterprises, both priorities of Zhu Rongji, the deputy prime minister, will be far easier if the public has confidence in the yuan. The government may well decide to portray a strong currency as a sign of success, not an unwelcome burden.

LANGUAGE HIGHLIGHTS

chaos *n*. utter confusion
aloof *ad*. away, apart
ar iculate *a*. (of a person) able to put thoughts and feelings into clear speech) **表达清楚的**
devaluation *n*. reduction of value
peg *n*. a stabilized exchange rate
pillar *n*. a post supporting a structure
odds *n*. the chances of probability
flush with having plenty of, rich in (flush *a*.)
shot *n*. stimulus or encouragement
low-end *a*. **低级的**
higher-end *a*. **较高级的**
sl mp *n*. a sharp or sudden decline in trade or business usually bringing widespread unemployment
halve *v*. to reduce by half
knock the stuffing out of to make feeble or weak, to defeat
inexorably *ad*. **无情地**
traumatic *a*. **损伤性的**
conceivably *ad*. **可相信地**
co vertible *a*. (of currency etc.) that may be converted into another form, especially into gold or U.S. dollars

EXERCISES

I. nswer the following guided questions by writing down in the blank the information you have got from the text:

此为试读,需要完整PDF请访问: www.ertongbook.com

1. hy do some manufacturers and academics call for a devaluation of the yuan? (hints: competition in export trade)

2. hat are the main reasons why the yuan is not easily devalued according to the author? (hints: market forces, foreign investment, trade surplus, Hong Kong's financial markets, China's reputation, widen)

3. hat are the advantages of China's exports according to the text? (hints: low-end products, wages)

4. hat conclusion can you draw from the text? (hints: possibility, people's confidence in the yuan)

II. eading comprehension:

1. hat does the author say of the Hong Kong dollar?

   A. It's the money that doesn't devalue.

   B. ts fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar plays an important role in Asia's finance and economics.

   C. It is closely related to other currencies in Asia.

   D. It is stronger than the U.S. dollar.

2 . he central bank of China has been forced to tighten the credit excessively because

A . t wants to check the inflation and slow the economy at home .

B . it wants to push the yuan up .

C . it doesn't want too much U .S . money .

D . it hopes to boost Asia's economy .

3 . he author suggests that a trade war between China and America would

A . bring no good to China .

B . devalue the yuan .

C . educe China's trade surplus with America .

D . estroy the friendship between the Chinese people and the American people .

4 . hina's devaluation of the yuan in 1994

A . ed to this year's traumatic devaluations in Asia .

B . nly involved the official exchange rate .

C . ad little effect upon China's foreign trade because most of it was conducted at rates barely changed at all .

D . both B and C .

5 . e can infer from the text that

A . devaluation of the yuan may be good for China's economy .

B . merican politicians want the yuan devalued .

C . t present, China's currency is stable and the public has confidence in it .

D . the strong yuan is a sign of success .

III . ranslation from English into Chinese (words in italics need careful attention):

1 . ut *an articulate group of manufacturers and academics* inside China is arguing that big currency devaluations in places like Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are threatening the competitiveness of China's exports .

2 . t would also threaten the Hong Kong dollar, *whose fixed peg* to the American dollar has been the region's *one certain pillar* .

3 . onverting this inflow into yuan might have driven the currency up to 10—20% *had the central bank not been buying* huge quantities of dollars to relieve pressure on the foreign-exchange market .

4 . ertainly, China will feel some pain, particularly because the *economic slump* in Japan and Korea will hurt demand for Chinese products .

5 . irst, a devaluation would *knock the stuffing out of* Hong Kong's financial markets, and China's carefully *won reputation for keeping its hand off its new territory* would be destroyed overnight .

IV . ranslation from Chinese into English with the given words or phrases:

1 . **我们年轻人不应对政治漠不关心。**(aloof)

2 . **新的列车提速后，来往于广州深圳的时间缩短了一半。**(halve)

3 . **这个国家去年货币贬值后，接着便是经济严重衰退。**(slump)

4 . **他吃蚶**(clams)**得了肝炎，那场病使他元气大伤。**(knock the stuffing out of)

5 . **我们的国库券在必要时是可以到银行兑换现金的。**(converti-

ble)

Unit 2

U .S . MICROCHIP MAKERS

With tens of billions of dollars on the line, U .S . chip makers like the look of the Chinese market .

Personal computer use is increasing exponentially . The country is a leading purchaser of used semiconductor-manufacturing equipment, and its research institutions are turning out very talented software developers .

A forecast by Dataquest Inc . of San Jose predicts that China's semiconductor market will balloon some 266 percent to $ 5 .5 billion in 1997 from $ 1 .5 billion in 1993, compared with 46 percent growth in North America and 29 percent in Japan during the period .

Dewey Ballantine says China will be the world's largest market in 10 to 15 years .

" In the long term, anybody who's not looking at the semiconductor industry in China has missed the boat, " said Neil McGlone, spokesman for Dallas-based Texas Instruments .

Still China consumes just a fraction of all chips produced globally .

In 1994, the market totaled $ 109 .4 billion, with the United States absorbing some 40 percent of all computer chips . At the same time, North American manufacturers controlled 41 .1

percent of the market, Japanese competitors held 40.5 percent and South Korean chip makers held 9.2 percent.

China meets roughly 20 percent of its own chip needs. The figure represents chips used in low-end devices such as radios, television sets, refrigerators and washing machines.

"Virtually all sophisticated semiconductors needed by the Chinese electronics firms must be imported, a pattern that will not significantly change over the short run," said the Dewey Ballantine report.

In targeting electronics, China has created several preferred business groups—which it calls 'national champions'—by consolidating state enterprises and channeling investment funds on a preferential basis.

It wants to create its own Silicon Valley and mobilize research institutions toward specific, commercially oriented tasks.

"China seeks to draw on the technology, capital and international market channels of leading semiconductor firms to foster the growth of its own industry," the report said.

"The Ministry of Electronics is developing a plan which is likely to...provide the basis for the eventual displacement of foreign semiconductors in the Chinese market by domestically made devices."

Varian Associates, based in Palo Alto, signed an agreement in 1993 with both the Changsha Research Institute of Equipment for Semiconductor Technologies and the Nanguang Machinery Factory, which made Varian the first non-Chinese semiconductor-equipment company to take part in manufacture of chip-fabrication tools in China.

Last year, Advanced Micro Devices of Sunnyvale signed a memorandum of understanding to develop a 160-square-foot man-