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Editors' Note

This issue continues the debate over the democratic peace, presenting a warning by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder of Columbia University concerning "Democratization and the Danger of War." Their detailed statistical analysis indicates that, regardless of whether there is a correlation between stable democracies and peace, there is a distinct correlation between states in transition to democracy and war. They caution that U.S. policies meant to foster democratization in the name of peace may have the opposite effect by creating transitional conditions in which war is more, not less, likely.

This issue also forwards the debate between realists, who argue that states base foreign policy choices on self-interest, and institutionalists, who argue that institutions can alter these choices and can, therefore, be a cause of peace. Responding to John Mearsheimer's article, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in the Winter 1994/95 issue of the journal, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin of Harvard's Government Department challenge the "illusory" divide between security and economic issues, examine the question of relative gains, and review the empirical work that supports institutionalists' arguments. They conclude that "institutions sometimes matter" in international relations, and argue that "it is a worthy task of social science to discover how."

Charles A. Kupchan of the Council on Foreign Relations and Georgetown University, and Clifford A. Kupchan, Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to Congressman Harry Johnston, take issue with Mearsheimer's dismissal of the peace-causing potential of collective security. They make the case that "regulated, institutionalized balancing predicated on the notion of all against one provides more stability than unregulated, self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his own."

In a third challenge to Mearsheimer's realist view, Yale University's Alexander Wendt explains two basic claims of critical international relations theory: that the fundamental structures of international politics are social, rather than strictly material as realists argue; and that these social structures shape actors' identities and interests, rather than just their behavior, as rationalists argue.

Columbia University's John Gerard Ruggie discusses the policy implications of Mearsheimer's "anti-institutionalist posture." He argues that realism has "failed to grasp the subtle yet integral role of institutionalist objectives in [postwar] U.S. foreign policy, including security policy." As a result, Ruggie argues, realism "is not only wanting but potentially dangerous as a guide to the post–Cold War world."

Mearsheimer offers a brief realist's reply to these institutionalist arguments.

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 3–4
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Technical advances in satellite remote sensing, which can provide extremely detailed images without the consent or perhaps even the knowledge of those on the ground, are prompting the emergence of a commercial market for images formerly reserved for classified systems of the superpowers. Vipin Gupta of Lawrence Livermore National Lab explains the workings of high-resolution satellite imaging systems that are about to come into use, their commercial context, and the policy implications.

Another technical development offering both economic potential and security challenges is the rapid expansion of the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), by which a combination of satellites and inexpensive hand-held receivers offers precise location information. Irving Lachow of the RAND Corporation explains how GPS works, explores its commercial and military potential, and outlines U.S. policy options for preserving economic advantage and minimizing military risks.

"In 1991," writes Rajan Menon of Lehigh University, "five new Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—arose from the rubble of the Soviet empire." He outlines the determinants of Central Asian security, noting the significance of a potential Russian neo-imperialism, and suggests some implications for U.S. policy.

Finally, in our correspondence section, Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman question some of the points made by historian Paul Schroeder in his Summer 1994 article, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory." Schroeder replies.

NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

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Democratization and the Danger of War

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder

One of the best-known findings of contemporary social science is that no democracies have ever fought a war against each other, given reasonably restrictive definitions of democracy and of war.[1] This insight is now part of everyday public discourse and serves as a basis for American foreign policymaking. President Bill Clinton's 1994 State of the Union address invoked the absence of war between democracies as a justification for promoting democratization around the globe. In the week following the U.S. military landing in Haiti, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake reiterated that "spreading democracy . . . serves our interests" because democracies "tend not to abuse their citizens' rights or wage war on one another."[2]

It is probably true that a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States. However, countries do not become mature democracies overnight. More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite politics, and where democratization suffers reversals. In this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.

Edward D. Mansfield is Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and author of Power, Trade, and War *(Princeton University Press, 1994). Jack Snyder is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. His most recent book is* Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition *(Cornell University Press, 1991).*

The authors thank Sergei Tikhonov for assistance with computer programming; Liv Mansfield for preparing the figures; Richard Betts, Miriam Fendius Elman, David Lake, Bruce Russett, Randall Schweller, David Spiro, Randall Stone, Celeste Wallander, and participants at seminars at Harvard and Columbia for helpful comments; and the Pew Charitable Trusts for financial support.

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1. Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). For skeptical views, see David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," *International Security,* Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50–86; and Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security,* Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 5–49. They are rebutted by Bruce Russett, "The Democratic Peace: 'And Yet It Moves'," *International Security,* Vol. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1995), pp. 164–175.
2. "Transcript of Clinton's Address," *New York Times,* January 26, 1994, p. A17; Anthony Lake, "The Reach of Democracy: Tying Power to Diplomacy," *New York Times,* September 23, 1994, p. A35.

International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5–38
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The contemporary era shows that incipient or partial democratization can be an occasion for the rise of belligerent nationalism and war.[3] Two pairs of states—Serbia and Croatia, and Armenia and Azerbaijan—have found themselves at war while experimenting with varying degrees of partial electoral democracy. Russia's poorly institutionalized, partial democracy has tense relationships with many of its neighbors and has used military force brutally to reassert control in Chechnya; its electorate cast nearly a quarter of its votes for the party of radical nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

This contemporary connection between democratization and conflict is no coincidence. Using the same databases that are typically used to study the democratic peace, we find considerable statistical evidence that democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than are mature democracies or stable autocracies. States like contemporary Russia that make the biggest leap in democratization—from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy—are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies. However, reversing the process of democratization, once it has begun, will not reduce this risk. Regimes that are changing toward autocracy, including states that revert to autocracy after failed experiments with democracy, are also more likely to fight wars than are states whose regime is unchanging.

Moreover, virtually every great power has gone on the warpath during the initial phase of its entry into the era of mass politics. Mid-Victorian Britain, poised between the partial democracy of the First Reform Bill of 1832 and the full-fledged democracy of the later Gladstone era, was carried into the Crimean War by a groundswell of belligerent public opinion. Napoleon III's France, drifting from plebiscitary toward parliamentary rule, fought a series of wars designed to establish its credentials as a liberal, popular, nationalist type of empire. The ruling elite of Wilhelmine Germany, facing universal suffrage but limited governmental accountability, was pushed toward World War I by its escalating competition with middle-class mass groups for the mantle of German nationalism. Japan's "Taisho democracy" of the 1920s brought an era of mass politics that led the Japanese army to devise and sell an imperial ideology

3. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1956–1986," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 630, 636; they note that newly created democracies, such as those in Eastern Europe today, may experience conflicts, insofar as their democratic rules and norms are not adequately established. See also Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 134, on post-Soviet Georgia.

with broad-based appeal.[4] In each case, the combination of incipient democratization and the material resources of a great power produced nationalism, truculence abroad, and major war.

Why should democratizing states be so belligerent? The pattern of the democratizing great powers suggests that the problem lies in the nature of domestic political competition after the breakup of the autocratic regime. Elite groups left over from the ruling circles of the old regime, many of whom have a particular interest in war and empire, vie for power and survival with each other and with new elites representing rising democratic forces. Both old and new elites use all the resources they can muster to mobilize mass allies, often through nationalist appeals, to defend their threatened positions and to stake out new ones. However, like the sorcerer's apprentice, these elites typically find that their mass allies, once mobilized, are difficult to control. When this happens, war can result from nationalist prestige strategies that hard-pressed leaders use to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions.[5]

The problem is not that mass public opinion in democratizing states demonstrates an unvarnished, persistent preference for military adventure. On the contrary, public opinion often starts off highly averse to war. Rather, elites exploit their power in the imperfect institutions of partial democracies to create *faits accomplis*, control political agendas, and shape the content of information media in ways that promote belligerent pressure-group lobbies or upwellings of militancy in the populace as a whole.

Once this ideological connection between militant elites and their mass constituents is forged, the state may jettison electoral democracy while retaining nationalistic, populist rhetoric. As in the failure of Weimar and Taisho democracy, the adverse effects of democratization on war-proneness may even heighten after democracy collapses. Thus, the aftershock of failed democratization is at least one of the factors explaining the link between autocratization and war.

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4. Asa Briggs, *Victorian People*, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), chaps. 2–3; Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Alain Plessis, *De la fête impériale au mur des fédérés, 1852–1871* (Paris: Editions du seuil, 1973), translated as *The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852–1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), chaps. 3–5.

5. Hans Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire, 1871–1918* (Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985); Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 259–288.

In developing these arguments, we first present our statistical findings showing that democratizing states have been disproportionately likely to fight wars. We then explain why democratizing states are so war-prone, drawing illustrations from the history of the great powers. Finally, we offer suggestions for reducing the risks of transitions to democracy.

Quantitative Analysis: Definitions, Measures, and Techniques

Much of the research on the democratic peace has relied on statistical tests, which indicate that democracies become involved in wars about as frequently as other states, but that by reasonably restrictive definitions, they have never fought each other. Using similar methods and the same databases (covering the period from 1811 to 1980), we find that *democratizing* states—those that have recently undergone regime change in a democratic direction—are much more war-prone than states that have undergone no regime change, and are somewhat more war-prone than those that have undergone a change in an autocratic direction. In this section, we distinguish between *democratic* and *democratizing* regimes and explain how we set up our statistical tests. We then report our statistical findings.

Definitional issues have been central to the debate on the democratic peace. Even fairly minimal definitions of democracy require periodic elections between candidates who compete fairly for the votes of a substantial portion of the adult population, and whose outcome determines who makes state policy, including foreign and military policy.[6] Thus, the War of 1812 does not count as a war between democracies because Britain's suffrage was too narrow. Conversely, although the German Reichstag of 1914 was elected by universal suffrage with voter turnout over 90 percent, the war between France and Germany is excluded because German cabinet officials were chosen by the Kaiser. Nonetheless, in light of the current enthusiasm about the prospects for promoting peace by encouraging democratization, it is important not simply to discard cases that are not yet mature democracies, but to analyze democratization as a significant category in its own right.

Ted Robert Gurr's Polity II database on regime characteristics is commonly used to study the democratic peace, and is especially well-suited to measuring

6. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy,* 2d ed. (New York: Harper, 1947); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 5–13, esp. p. 6; see also Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace,* pp. 16–18, and Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," esp. p. 1164.

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gradations of regime change toward or away from democracy.[7] Gurr created measures of democracy and autocracy (with values from 0 to 10) based on the competitiveness of political participation, the strength of the rules regulating participation in politics, the competitiveness of the process for selecting the chief executive, the openness of executive recruitment, and the strength of the constraints on the chief executive's power. Bruce Russett has combined these measures to develop a composite index of a state's regime type.[8] Based on this index and following Gurr, Russett distinguishes among democracies, autocracies, and "anocracies," political systems in which democratic and autocratic features are mixed, or in which very little power is concentrated in the hands of public authorities.[9] Some of the anocracies discussed by Russett include Iran under Mossadegh, Indonesia after Sukarno's first election, Goulart's Brazil, and Allende's Chile.[10] Victorian Britain is coded as close to fully democratic on some dimensions, but anocratic on others.[11]

We consider states to be *democratizing* if, during a given period of time, they change from autocracy to either anocracy or democracy, or if they change from anocracy to democracy. Conversely, states are *autocratizing* if they change from democracy to autocracy or anocracy, or from anocracy to autocracy.

We conduct separate analyses based on the composite index of regime change and on three of its components, because we are interested in both their combined and their separate effects on war. The first of these components is the openness of executive recruitment. In Gurr's definition, "recruitment of the chief executive is 'open' to the extent that all the *politically active* population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process."[12] The second component, executive constraints, measures "the insti-

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7. Ted Robert Gurr, *Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, 1800–1986*, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research No. 9263 (1990).

8. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 77; see also Maoz and Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1956–1986." This index is: PCON(DEM – AUT), where DEM is a state's score on the summary measure of democracy, AUT is a state's score on the summary measure of autocracy, and PCON is a measure of the extent to which power in a regime is monopolized by state authorities, which takes on values ranging from 0 to 10. This index therefore takes on values ranging from 100 (maximal democracy) to –100 (maximal autocracy).

9. More specifically, Russett classifies as democracies those states with values of the index of regime type described in footnote 8 ranging from 30 to 100, those with scores ranging from –25 to –100 as autocracies, and those with scores ranging from –24 to 29 as anocracies. See Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 77; and Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, No. 4 (December 1974), pp. 1482–1504.

10. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, pp. 121–122.

11. Gurr, *Polity II*, p. 11.

12. Gurr, *Polity II*, p. 11; emphasis in original. This variable is coded, based on a four-point scale ranging from closed to open. Closed regimes and regimes in which the recruitment of executives

tutionalized constraints that exist on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities."[13] The greater these constraints, the more democratic is the polity.[14] The third component, the competitiveness of political participation, "refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena."[15] The greater the competitiveness, the more democratic is the polity.[16]

Although Gurr's selection of indicators and his classification of cases are not beyond dispute, they are generally considered to be better documented and more discriminating than other compilations.[17] Moreover, by using Gurr's data, we insure that none of the cases included in our analysis were coded with an eye toward confirming the hypothesis that democratization promotes war.

Like most research on the democratic peace, we rely on the Correlates of War (COW) Project data on war.[18] Most of these studies have focused on wars

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is unregulated were coded autocratic; regimes characterized by hereditary succession and an executive chief minister chosen by either "executive or court selection" or "electoral selection" were coded anocratic; and open regimes were coded democratic. This sometimes leads to counterintuitive coding of cases. Partly for this reason, Britain's composite score remains anocratic until 1922. However, recoding cases piecemeal would be fraught with dangers. Rather than dealing with possible validity problems through recoding, we checked for the impact of any particular coding quirks by running separate tests for the various component indices and for different time periods. The fact that we obtained roughly parallel results from these various tests suggests that possible biases in the coding of specific regimes or the measurement of specific indicators were not decisively influencing our findings.

13. Gurr, *Polity II*, p. 15.

14. Regimes are coded using a seven-point scale. Polities in which executives are vested with unlimited authority and those classified as falling between these regimes and those in which limited constraints exist on the executive are coded autocratic. Polities in which "accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity" (Gurr, *Polity II*, p. 16), and those classified as falling between these regimes and those in which substantial constraints exist on executive authority, are coded democratic. All polities falling between these extremes are coded anocratic.

15. Gurr, *Polity II*, p. 18.

16. The competitiveness of political participation is coded on a five-point scale ranging from "suppressed competition" to "competitive competition." We code the former polities as autocratic, the latter polities as democratic, and all polities in between these extremes as anocratic.

17. We are unaware of any data set that is better suited to our purposes. For example, Michael Doyle's data on democracies emphasize normative features of a polity rather than the institutional features on which we focus. Further, since these data do not distinguish among the regime types of non-democracies, it is not possible to identify countries that underwent periods of democratization but failed to become mature democracies. Arthur Banks's data do not tap the institutional factors emphasized in our analysis as well as the Polity II data developed by Gurr. And, as Russett points out, although measures of regime type based on Gurr's and Banks's data are moderately related to one another, Banks's "simpler categorization, compiled earlier than that of Gurr et al. and less fully documented, is probably less discriminating." See Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, p. 78; Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; and Banks, *Cross-Polity Time-Series Data* (Binghamton: State University of New York, Center for Comparative Political Research, 1986).

18. See Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982).

between states. However, we also assessed whether democratizating states fight non-state actors, as in a colonial war.[19] Consistent with the COW definition, we consider as a war any military conflict that led to at least 1,000 battle fatalities.[20]

Because we view democratization as a gradual process, rather than a sudden change, we analyze whether democratization during periods of one, five, and ten years is associated with involvement in war over subsequent periods of one, five, and ten years, respectively. Insofar as the effects of democratization on domestic coalitions, interest groups, and ideologies might unfold gradually after the initial political opening, the likelihood of war might increase gradually over the following decade. We compare the first and last year of each time period to identify cases of democratization, autocratization, and no regime change. We then examine whether a war involving that state began in the subsequent period. We carry out this analysis for each measure of democratization discussed above, and for both interstate wars and all wars, during the period from 1811 to 1980, the only era common to Gurr's Polity II data and the COW data.[21]

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19. Since the correlation between the COW data sets of interstate wars and all wars is quite modest, the relationship between democratization and all wars need not be similar to that between democratization and interstate wars. See Edward D. Mansfield, *Power, Trade, and War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), chap. 2. Most of the literature on the democratic peace, especially that which focuses on the role of norms, is cast at the dyadic level of analysis and therefore analyzes wars between pairs of states. Thus, it necessarily ignores wars between states and non-state actors. Our tests, however, are not dyadic, but rather address the characteristics of individual states. We will analyze dyadic relationships of democratizing states in a subsequent study.

20. To be counted as a participant, each state involved in an interstate war must have suffered at least 100 fatalities or sent at least 1,000 troops into active combat. States involved in wars against non-state actors must have sustained (in combination with any allies) at least 1,000 deaths in battle during each year of the conflict. On these coding procedures, see Small and Singer, *Resort to Arms*, pp. 55–57.

21. The COW data on war cover the period from 1816 to 1980, whereas Gurr's data cover the period from 1800 to 1986. As a result, our analysis based on one-year periods begins in 1815, and our analyses based on five-year and ten-year periods begin in 1811. In the case of five-year periods, the first observation measures democratization between 1811 and 1815 and war between 1816 and 1820. In the case of ten-year periods, the first observation measures democratization from 1811 to 1820 and war from 1821 to 1830. In order to observe the need for statistical independence among the observations, non-overlapping periods are used in each set of analyses. Certain countries were formed during this period (e.g., Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union), whereas others dissolved (e.g., Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Serbia, Germany). Small and Singer agree with Gurr that some countries should be treated separately (Austria-Hungary and Austria; Russia and the Soviet Union; Germany, West Germany, and East Germany; the United Arab Republic and Egypt; Cambodia and Kampuchea; and Tanganyika and Tanzania). We therefore follow this procedure in our analyses. In other cases, however, Small and Singer disagree with Gurr. We analyzed these countries in two ways. First, the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, Sardinia and Italy, Prussia and Germany, and Serbia and Yugoslavia were considered a single country during the period from 1811 to 1980. Second, we treated each country in every pair separately. Since there was little

To assess the strength of the relationship between regime change and war, we construct contingency tables to determine whether democratization and autocratization are each statistically independent of a state's subsequent involvement in war. The null hypothesis is that the probabilities are identical that a democratizing state, an autocratizing state, and a regime with no change will become involved in a war. To test this hypothesis, we calculate the expected frequency of each outcome (democratization and war, democratization and no war, autocratization and war, autocratization and no war, no regime change and war, no regime change and no war) assuming that the probability of war is the same, whether the regime changes or not. We then compare these expected frequencies to the corresponding observed frequencies. A Pearson chi-square statistic (χ^2) is calculated, the value of which indicates the extent of the difference between these frequencies.[22] The greater the value of this statistic, the lower is the probability that regime change and war are statistically independent.[23]

DEMOCRATIZATION AND WAR: STATISTICAL FINDINGS

We found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the probability of war for democratizing states always exceeds that for states undergoing no regime change. On average, democratizing states were about two-thirds more likely to go to war than were states that did not experience a regime change. For example, during any given ten-year period, a state that had not experienced a regime change during the previous decade had about one chance in six of fighting a war; in the decade following democratization, a state's chance of fighting a war was about one in four. The relationship between

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difference in the results based on these two sets of tests, we report the results based on the latter procedure, which is consistent with that of Gurr.

22. More formally, $\chi^2 = \Sigma[(f - e)^2/e]$, where f is the observed frequency for each outcome, e is the expected frequency for each outcome, and sigma (Σ) refers to the summation of this value for all outcomes.

23. The null hypothesis of statistical independence is rejected if $\Sigma[(f - e)^2/e] > \chi^2_{.05}$, if we rely on the .05 level of statistical significance. This statistic has degrees of freedom equal to $(r - 1)(c - 1)$, where r refers to the number of rows and c refers to the number of columns in the contingency table. The use of this statistic is appropriate only if the expected frequency for each outcome exceeds one, a condition which is met in all of the following tests. Indeed, the expected frequency of war usually exceeds five when five-year and ten-year periods are analyzed. On this issue, see Stephen E. Fienberg, *The Analysis of Cross-Classified Categorical Data* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1980), p. 170.




Figure 1. Effect of Regime Change (or No Change) on the Probability of All Wars.

democratization and war was strongest for ten-year periods and weakest for one-year periods.

These findings are not very sensitive to our decision to distinguish autocratizing regimes from those experiencing no change. When we compared the probability of war for democratizing states with that of all countries that were not democratizing (i.e., autocratizing countries and those experiencing no change), democratization gave rise to a higher probability of war than the absence of democratization in every instance. Democratizing states were, on average, about 60 percent more likely to go to war than states that were not democratizing.

Although our results provide strong support for the hypothesis that democratization promotes war, the strength of this relationship differs depending on the measure of democratization used and the length of time that is analyzed.




Figure 2. Effect of Regime Change (or No Change) on the Probability of Interstate Wars.

Based on the composite index, states undergoing democratization were, on average, about one-third more likely to go to war than states experiencing no regime change, regardless of whether all wars or interstate wars are considered. The effects of democratization were somewhat stronger when the three components of regime change (discussed earlier) are analyzed separately. Based on the openness of executive recruitment, the probability of both interstate wars and all wars was, on average, about twice as large for states in the process of democratization as for states undergoing no regime change. Based on the competitiveness of political participation, the probability that democratizing states would fight any type of war was, on average, about 75 percent greater than for states undergoing no regime change. The probability of interstate wars for countries in the process of democratization was, on average, about twice as large as for countries experiencing no regime change. Based on the con-

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