

高等学校文科教材


英语

6

非英语专业用 哲学分册

南开大学公共外语教学部教材编写组编

ENGLISH



5
商 务 印 书 馆

高等学校文科教材

英 语

(非英语专业用)

第 六 册

(哲 学 分 册)

南开大学公共外语教学部教材编写组编

商 务 印 书 馆

1986年·北京

责任编辑：杨枕旦
封面设计：范贻光

YING YU
英 语
(非英语专业用)
第 六 册
(哲 学 分 册)

南开大学公共外语教学部教材编写组编

商 务 印 书 馆 出 版

(北京王府井大街 36 号)

新华书店北京发行所发行

北京第二新华印刷厂印刷

统一书号：9017·1505

1986 年 5 月第 1 版

开本 850×1168 1/32

1986 年 5 月北京第 1 次印刷

字数 184 千

印数 22,000 册

印长 6 1/4

定价：1.05 元

前 言

本书为高等学校文科英语教材(非英语专业用)第六册(哲学分册),可供大学哲学及其他有关专业三年级下学期使用。

本书共选课文和补充课文各十二篇,共计生词一千个左右。平均3—4学时讲授一课。补充课文不占授课时间。

课文内容侧重哲学基础知识,同时选入少量哲学专著。体裁和风格力求多样,以增加学生的学习兴趣。课文编排以文字难易为主,同时适当照顾内容的深浅。课文中出现的难句、新的语言现象、人物和某些专业术语均有注释。

练习包括课文理解和词语的运用。此外,每课还配有翻译练习,以训练学生翻译专业著作的能力。由于练习量较大,教师可以根据学生的具体情况适当取舍,不一定全做。

本书完稿后,承北京大学(主审)、复旦大学、北京师范大学、华东师范大学、安徽大学、西北大学和西南师范学院等院校的有关同志参加审稿。他们提出了许多宝贵意见。此外,北京大学哲学系王太庆教授在课文选材上提供了有益的帮助。谨此向他们表示衷心的感谢。

本书由周永启、张成祎主编,编写组的其他人员为孟一凡、夏维华和孙静生等。


由于编者水平有限,书中错误与不妥之处一定不少,欢迎使用者批评指正。

编 者

1985年4月

CONTENTS

Lesson One	Logic	3
Lesson Two	Psychology and Philosophy	12
Lesson Three	The Subject Matter of Philosophy	23
Lesson Four	Philosophy and Science	31
Lesson Five	The Wisdom of Socrates	41
Lesson Six	Dewey's Conception of Experience	50
Lesson Seven	The Method of Scientific Investigation.....	60
Lesson Eight	Immanuel Kant	71
Lesson Nine	Socialism and Religion	82
Lesson Ten	Dialectics and Metaphysics	91
Lesson Eleven	Of the Origin of Ideas	103
Lesson Twelve	The Calculus of Happiness	113
Supplementary Readings	124
I.	Logic	124
II.	The Science of Psychology	128
III.	The Nature of Philosophy	133
IV.	What Use Is Philosophy?	137
V.	Death of Socrates	142
VI.	Dewey and "Experience"	147
VII.	The Scientific Method	152
VIII.	Kant's Life and His Philosophy	157
IX.	The Origin and Evolution of Religion	162
X.	From Hegel to Marx	168
XI.	David Hume	174
XII.	Science and Ethics	179
Vocabulary	184



Lesson One

LOGIC

A. A. Luce

Discourse is connected thought, expressed in words. It moves this way and that, like the shuttle in the loom (as Plato said) weaving the fabric of reasoned argument. In discourse with others opinion is formed, knowledge is acquired, and truth attained. What is said by one speaker, combined with what is said by another speaker, may yield a truth, not previously known to either speaker. In that discourse with oneself which is called reflection or meditation, a truth learned today links up with a truth learned yesterday, and the two truths may point the way to some advance or even discovery of tomorrow. From what others have said or from what we ourselves have thought, conclusions and inferences are drawn and they are the special concern of Logic. It is all too easy to draw wrong conclusions and false inferences; and discourse without the discipline of Logic is a fruitful source of false opinion, ignorance and error.

Logic trains the mind to draw the right conclusion, and to avoid the wrong, to make the true inference and not the false. It has formulated rules of inference to govern and guide debate and to promote discovery. Logic has to deal as well with other important elements of discourse, but its main province has always been, and still is, inference.

Idle talk and trivial conversation do not rank as *discourse* for our purpose. Logic has little to do with the frivolous; its business is with the serious statement which admits truth or falsity. Logic promotes truth; yet we can go far in Logic without knowing or caring much whether a particular statement is true or

LESSON ONE

false, in the ordinary acceptance of those words. By *true* in ordinary speech we mean true to fact, and by *false* we mean the opposite. Now a statement, true to fact, may in its context infringe a rule of Logic; and a statement, false in fact, may in its context conform to the rules of Logic. The logician, as such, is not directly concerned with fact, but is much more concerned with the observance of the rules of Logic, and therefore he uses a pair of technical terms, *valid* and *invalid*, to express, respectively, what conforms to the rules of logic and what does not conform thereto. By the aid of these terms he can set out the rules of reasoning without committing himself as to whether a particular statement is true to fact, or not. *Valid* comes from the Latin, *validus*, strong. A valid passport may make mistakes in fact, but if duly signed and not out of date, it may do its work and get you through the barrier. On the other hand, it may give the colour of the eyes and all the other facts correctly, but if it is out of date, it will not do its work; it is *invalid*. The distinction between truth and validity must be carefully observed. It is illogical and therefore incorrect to speak of a *true* syllogism, if you mean a *valid* syllogism, or of a *valid* conclusion, if you mean a true conclusion.

This distinction is of special importance here; for in the study of the syllogism, as such, Logic concentrates on the form of the reasoning, for the most part, and is not directly concerned with the truth of its contents. If the syllogism complies with the formal rules, it is valid, if not, not. If the conclusion follows from the premisses, the conclusion is valid, even though premiss and conclusion may not be true to fact. Example:

All fish are cold-blooded.

Whales are fish.

∴ Whales are cold-blooded.

The first premiss is true; the second is false; the conclusion is false; but the conclusion is correctly drawn from the premisses, and therefore valid in its syllogism, even though it is not true to fact.

The reverse can happen too. A proposition, true to fact, may appear as the conclusion of an invalid syllogism. Example:

The industrious are prudent.

Ants are prudent.

∴ Ants are industrious.

These examples are warnings against the habit of judging the validity or invalidity of a syllogism by the truth or falsity of the conclusion. As students of Logic our first duty is to look at the *working* of the syllogism, and to judge its validity, or otherwise, by the rules. No good comes of confusing the two sets of terms, as is sometimes done. Truth is truth, and validity is validity, and neither can do duty for the other. The lazy habit of styling a *valid* conclusion true, or a true conclusion *valid*, weakens both our sense of truth and our feeling for Logic.

(from *Teach Yourself Logic*)

Proper Name

Plato ['pleitəu] 柏拉图(人名)

Notes to the Text

1. this way and that: this way and that way; in different ways.

2. all too easy: much too easy, exceedingly easy.

all 此处修饰 too, 起加强语气的作用。又如:

There were *all too* many people in the hall.

大厅里的人实在太多了。

和 all 用法相似的还有 only 和 but, 它们常常加到 too ready,

LESSON ONE

too glad, too true, too good, too happy, too willing 一类词之前以示强调。例如:

What he says is *but* too true.

他说的不幸太对了。

I am *only* too glad to do so.

我太高兴这样做了。

3. do not rank as: do not count as, are not regarded as.

4. which admits truth or falsity: which can be accepted as true or false.

5. Logic promotes truth ... in the ordinary acceptance of those words: 逻辑发扬真理,但是我们可能在讨论中运用了半天逻辑却不知道或不十分关心某一具体的论述从人们通常接受的意义来说是真是谬。

6. Now a statement, true to fact, may ...:

now 此处用来引起读者或听话人的注意。又如:

Now listen to me.

且听我说。

Well now, what are you doing?

呃,你在做什么?

7. The logician, as such: The logician in his capacity of logician, as such: as what has been specified. 比较下列各句:

He is an honest man and is known *as such* to everyone.

他是个诚实的人,这点人人都知道。

He is chairman, and *as such* has to sign the paper.

他是主席,因此(作为主席)他得在文件上签字。

Mere good looks, *as such*, will not take you far.

光凭漂亮的外表并帮不了你多少忙。

8. what does not conform thereto: what does not conform to them

(the rules of logic).

与 *thereto* 用法相似的有 *thereon*, *thereafter* 等。例如:

He read a report and wrote some remarks *thereon* (= on it).

他看了一份报告,并在上面写了批语。

Thereafter (= after that) we heard no more of him.

此后我们再也没有听到他的消息。

9. without committing himself: without giving a definite opinion.

又如:

He refused to *commit* himself on that problem.

他拒绝对那个问题发表意见。

Now that you have *committed* yourself, you will have to go.

既然你已答应,你就得去一次。

10. syllogism: a form of reasoning, consisting of three statements—the major premise, the minor premise, the conclusion drawn necessarily from the former two statements.

11. if not, not: if it does not comply with the formal rules, it is not valid.

12. If the conclusion follows from the premisses: If the conclusion is correctly drawn from the premisses.

follow: happen as a result. 又如:

From different stands there *follow* different attitudes.

立场不同,态度就不同。

Though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not *follow* that it all arises out of experience.

虽然我们的一切知识都始于经验,但不能从而认为一切知识都来自经验。

13. premiss and conclusion: 同列并举的两个名词前不用冠词。又如:
friend and enemy, father and son 等。

LESSON ONE

14. as is sometimes done: as 用作关系代词,指 confusing the two sets of terms.
15. styling a *valid* conclusion true: calling a *valid* conclusion true.

EXERCISES

- I. Decide whether the following statements are true (T) or false (F). Base your answers on the information in the text.
 1. Thinking is also a kind of discourse, discourse with oneself. ()
 2. Discourse will always lead to truth and correct opinion. ()
 3. The task of Logic is to teach us the right way of thinking. ()
 4. The word discourse as understood in Logic means any conversation between two speakers. ()
 5. A statement can be considered as valid as long as it conforms to the rules of Logic. ()
 6. It is the business of a logician to see that the rules of Logic are observed. ()
 7. The terms *valid* and *invalid* are preferable to *true* and *false* because they are more precise in meaning. ()
 8. The validity of a passport depends on the correct description of its holder. ()
 9. A false conclusion is the result of invalid syllogism. ()
 10. The author seems to imply that it is trivial whether an opinion is true or false. ()
- II. Compare the two sentences in each of the following pairs and translate them into Chinese.
 1. Such a proposition may appear like the conclusion of a syllogism.
Such a proposition may appear as the conclusion of a syllogism.

2. He is too happy to speak out.
He is only too happy to speak out.
3. He was concerned with standards of morality.
He was concerned about standards of morality.
4. The conclusion follows the premisses.
The conclusion follows from the premisses.
5. The institute admits students who have passed the entrance examination.
The institute admits that the students have passed the entrance examination.
6. I don't oppose an agreement such as this.
I don't oppose the agreement as such.

III. Rewrite the following sentences, substituting for the words italicized other words or phrases that are opposite in meaning.

1. This statement is *true*.
2. That is a *valid* conclusion.
3. He is *lazy* in mathematics.
4. His opinions are based on *emotion*.
5. This habit *weakens* our sense of truth.
6. That is a *serious* matter.
7. They are *separated* for the time being.
8. The circumstances *hinder* the growth of plants.
9. He *denies* the statement to be true.
10. This statement *infringes* the rules of logic.

IV. Change the construction of the following sentences without altering the sense, substituting the part of speech indicated for each of the italicized words.

Examples:

After a new method was *introduced*, the production was increased. (n.) / After the introduction of a new method, the production was increased.

His ideas found *expression* in his words and acts. (v.) / His ideas are expressed in his words and acts.

1. Logic is specially *concerned* with conclusions and inferences. (n.)

LESSON ONE

2. We do not care much about the *truth* or *falsehood* of a particular statement. (adj.)
3. The *meaning* of "true" in ordinary speech is "true to fact". (v.)
4. The distinction between truth and validity is very *important*. (n.)
5. A student of logic is to see to the *observance* of the rules of logic. (v.)
6. Everyone was thrown into *confusion* by his sudden arrival. (v.)
7. The teacher *warned* him against idling his time. (n.)
8. Equal rights for women are in *conformity* with democratic principles of social organization. (v.)
9. Our task now is to watch how the engine *works*. (n.)
10. His words reveal his complete *ignorance* of the fact. (adj.)

V. Select the word or expression best suited to the context from those in the brackets.

1. Each part of our work must be properly _____ with the other parts.
The two parts of the province are _____ by railways. (connected, linked up)
2. In childhood the mother tongue is gradually _____.
The position is _____ through the help of his teacher. (obtained, acquired)
3. A statement, false in fact, may in its context _____ the rules of Logic.
I regret that I'm unable to _____ your request. (conform to, comply with)
4. A scientist must be very careful in his _____ of the working of the nature.
A logician is much more concerned with the _____ of principles of logic. (observance, observation)
5. There is nothing _____ in today's newspaper.
He has acquired _____ knowledge of a _____ subject. (special, particular)
6. It is a relationship that holds regardless of the truth or

_____ of premises or conclusion.

When he wants to get out of trouble he asks himself whether he should tell the truth or tell a _____. (falsehood, falsity)

7. A moment's _____ made him realize that she was right.
After deep _____ on the theme, the author laid out the plan. (meditation, reflection)
8. His work met with cold _____.
This word is to be understood in its usual _____. (acceptation, acceptance)
9. I didn't see the point of his _____.
The point in the _____ is a political one. (argument, debate)
10. As there was no work to be done, we all sat _____ for an hour.
As he is _____, he will not even prepare himself a meal. (lazy, idle)

VI. Put the following into Chinese.

Logicians have placed much stress upon the syllogism as the typical formulation of an act of thought. The syllogism is composed of three judgments: the major premise, which states a general principle; the minor premise, where the particular object is referred to the general principle of the major premise; and the conclusion. There are many forms of syllogisms, but the following classical illustration may serve as typical of them all:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.

∴ Socrates is mortal.

Any form of argument, any act of thought, can be cast into this form, so that the essential steps in the process are rendered distinct from each other and one is enabled to judge of the correctness of the conclusion. Logic has analyzed and classified the various types of errors under the heading of fallacies. These need not concern us here further than to point out that fallacious reasoning is non-adaptive behavior and as such is a genuine problem in the study of human nature. Not all purposeful sequences of conscious states will aid in the solution of the difficulty, or conflict, in which they arise.

Lesson Two

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

B. R. Bugelski

The term "psyche" is of Greek origin and referred to some presumed nonphysical aspects of the body variously referred to over the centuries as "spirit," "soul," "form," and sometimes "function". The English word "mind" is the most popular current equivalent. The suffix "ology" refers to study, and consequently, "psychology" for centuries past was identified as the study of the mind.

The term "mind" is very useful in common conversation — it is used in many ways, and some degree of communication is obviously established or the term would die out. In talking with our friends we might use the term in such contexts as "Make up your mind," "Are you losing your mind?" "I see it in my mind's eye," "That reminds me," "He's got a fine mind (or a feeble one, or a keen one)," "My mind tells me one thing, my heart tells me another," "It's all in your mind," "He has the mind of a criminal" (or a two-year-old, or a woman), "His mind is far away," and so on. Now, obviously, people who say these things intend to convey some information, and they do. Equally obviously, other words could be used to convey the same information and the term "mind" could be dropped if we decided to drop it. There is no quarrel with popular usage of the term. The trouble comes in at a much higher level when we try to study the mind. To study something we must be able to apply some technique or methodology to it. In studying physical things, we can weigh, measure, touch or feel, or look at the object in direct or indirect ways. When we have to deal indirectly with something,

as with atoms, for example, we have to measure some indirect indicators of the behavior or function of the atom. We have some prejudice in favor of more direct observations if these are possible and rely on indicators only when we have to.

How can we go about studying the mind? It would be necessary to define it in some way and agree upon indicators of the mind's activities. What is it? Can we rely on popular usage and describe the mind as something that can be weak or strong, dull or keen, something that can be made up, that can be expanded, that can be changed, that can be lost, that contains things, that even has eyes or perhaps other senses, that tells us what to do, that is different in children and women. The catalogue is not very helpful. When we forsake popular usage and turn to philosophers, we get little comfort. Philosophers have pretty generally endorsed the proposition that human beings, at least, have in addition to a physical body, some kind of nonphysical equipment or apparatus referred to as the mind. For some philosophers the mind was a kind of an entity, that is, a structure, or thing of no physical substance. The mind's functions were thought of as "mental" in contrast to physical functions of the body. A host of theological and philosophical questions has been considered in the course of time, all of them arising from the assumption of some nonphysical agency which presumably inhabits the body. The basic question, however, has always been: What is the relationship between the mind and the body?

The French philosopher Rene Descartes (1596—1650) is perhaps as responsible as anyone for the trends in thinking about this "mind-body problem" which have continued from his time and before. Descartes firmly declared that man had a dual nature, a mental and physical nature (this position is philosophically identified as "dualism" in contrast to "monism" which is a position that only one kind of substance exists — it