

HITLER ATTACKS PEARL HARBOR

WHY

THE UNITED STATES

DECLARED WAR ON

GERMANY

RICHARD F. HILL

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Declared War on Germany

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1

Introduction

History is written by the victors.

—Jawaharlal Nehru

The first casualty of war is truth.

—Senator Hiram Johnson

This book seeks to explain why the United States decided to escalate from a limited to a total war against Germany in December 1941, which plunged the United States into World War II in Europe. The traditional postwar explanation has been that the United States declared war on Germany on December 11, 1941, as a reaction to that day's German declaration of war on the United States.¹ This virtually unanimous historiographical explanation argues, therefore, that the predominant reason the Roosevelt administration and Congress sent an American Expeditionary Force (AEF) to Europe was the provocations inherent in Hitler's declaration of war.² This traditional explanation has been supported by the fact that until December 11, the U.S. military had been officially confined to the Atlantic Ocean, but afterward it was officially ordered to prepare to invade Europe, and to conquer and occupy Germany.

This study, however, challenges that traditional consensus by arguing that the German declaration was actually of little or no real importance in deciding U.S. foreign policy in December 1941. Rather, it was decided by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. That event convinced a majority of Americans to escalate to total war against Germany; most Americans believed that Germany was either an accomplice or the political master of Japan, thus making Hitler at least as guilty as Japan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The attack on Pearl Harbor was the defining event for U.S. entrance into World War II, not only as it regarded the Pacific theater, but also the European theater.

U.S. military contingency plans may have existed prior to December 1941. Many historians have recognized that U.S. political and public support for total war with Germany simply did not exist prior to December 1941. But what no historian has recognized is that this galvanizing of U.S. public and political support did not materialize as a result of Hitler's December 11 declaration of war, but rather came as a direct result of the events of December 7. The evidence is clear that the United States went to war with Germany for reasons far more compelling than the German declaration of war: a speech and a note.³

I argue that the political explanation is paramount in understanding the reason for this momentous U.S. decision to enter World War II. Therefore this book is based on evidence concerning the role of public political opinion, its perceptions of reality, and its importance in determining the policy implemented. Rather than retrace the steps of countless earlier historians and focus on the declassified records of the government, I focus on the public political discourse of the president, the Congress, and the press, and draw extensively on the speeches and statements of President Roosevelt, the *Congressional Record*, public opinion polls, and newspapers and magazines from across the nation.⁴

Contrary to the traditional historiography, which points to the German declaration of war on December 11 as the key factor behind the change in U.S. policy, this study reveals that President Roosevelt, most members of Congress, most Americans, and most of the press blamed Germany for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7. Had Hitler not declared war first, the evidence demonstrates that the United States would have declared war on Germany anyway, because of the strong and widespread belief in German culpability for Pearl Harbor. Indeed, this study is apparently the first to reveal that on December 12 the German government denied that it had declared war on the United States the day before. That this denial was acknowledged by the U.S. public and accepted as a virtual retraction of Hitler's declaration of war is amply demonstrated by the sources cited by this study.⁵

In short, historians have ignored this evidence. While most have also been aware that Germany was actually not involved in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, they have ignored evidence that contemporaries believed this to be true, as they then based their actions on these mistaken but widespread beliefs. The traditional historiography does not adequately explain the events of December 1941, when U.S. policy changed from one of limited war with Germany to one of total war. The only adequate explanation of this change is to be found in the public political discourse of the president, the Congress, the polls, and the press. In addition to capturing the historical motives behind U.S. actions, this finding answers the question of how a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could have brought the United States into war against Germany.

The evidence indicates that the conventional consensus historiography has been wrong to emphasize both the balance of power in Europe and the

German declaration of war as being the primary reasons why the United States entered a total war against Germany. The contemporary evidence indicates that these two conventional explanations played no significant role in the decision by a majority of Americans and their political representatives in December 1941 to declare war on and invade Germany. The contemporary evidence does indicate, however, that the primary reason was actually a U.S. charge of conspiracy against Germany for the attack on Pearl Harbor. This charge is similar to many others voiced throughout U.S. history, with perhaps the most familiar analog being the Cold War charge against an international Communist conspiracy.

In December 1941 the United States charged that Germany was guilty of complicity in an Axis conspiracy against the United States, which was said to have been made manifest at Pearl Harbor. This was the primary and most enduring U.S. charge against Germany during World War II, and it was emphasized by all of this study's sources, including the public opinion polls as well as the most important source, the speeches of President Roosevelt. Ultimately, this study explains the origins of the permanent U.S. security commitment to Europe, which endured throughout the Cold War and beyond.

The United States initiated its permanent military security commitment to Europe in December 1941. Until then, U.S. military policy toward Europe had been strictly confined to policing the Atlantic Ocean. U.S. policy was to deliver shipments of Lend-Lease materials to Britain and Russia, by means of convoys protected by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Army Air Force. Until December 1941, the United States had decidedly rejected expanding that military role to the continent of Europe. But the United States reversed its decision that month and did indeed expand its military commitment to the continent of Europe, and to a land war there.

The overwhelming consensus of historians since World War II has been that the United States decided to declare war on Germany and invade Europe because Hitler declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941. That historiographical explanation, however, is wrong and is a concoction that originated only after 1945, when the captured Axis records revealed that the U.S. wartime rationale had been based on a misconception—the conspiracy charge. This book examines the predominant reasons given by U.S. contemporaries during World War II, especially at the outset of the total U.S. commitment in December 1941. The evidence from that period is both overwhelming and clear as to why the United States decided to go to war against Germany by invading Europe. It demonstrates that Hitler's declaration of war was of virtually no importance to the U.S. decision. Rather, the most important reason was U.S. blame of Germany for the attack on Pearl Harbor. Immediately after that attack, a vast majority of Americans repeatedly charged that Germany was guilty because it was either an accomplice of Japan or the political master of Japan.

U.S. political and public opinion on this issue can be understood by examining the speeches of President Roosevelt, the public opinion polls, the *Congressional Record*, and the national press. The most important indicator of public opinion was the speeches of Roosevelt, who, as historians have agreed, was exceptionally skilled in representing a majority of Americans regarding national policy and its rationale. Second, the national public opinion polls from this period all demonstrate that 64 to 68.5 percent of Americans, at the very least, agreed with Roosevelt's policy rationale against Germany—its guilt for Pearl Harbor.⁶ Third, the *Congressional Record* demonstrates that a vast majority of U.S. political representatives also predominantly justified the U.S. escalation to total war against Germany in December 1941 because of Pearl Harbor. Last, a vast majority of the nation's press both echoed and explained in detail the U.S. justification for war against Germany based on the attack of Pearl Harbor. The most historically and politically important segment of this national press lay in the Midwest, the region that had been most opposed to any conflict with Germany in the period before Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, this book pays particular attention to the midwestern press, whose views after Pearl Harbor were virtually identical to the views of the press in the rest of the United States.

These four pillars of public opinion are the best way to understand what motivated U.S. foreign policy against Germany during and after December 1941. Public opinion was decisive because of the nature of the issue; indeed, foreign policy against Germany was the most important public issue at that time. Thus the methodology of this study is based on the documents that reveal public opinion, as well as declassified internal U.S. government documents, none of which contradicts the thesis of this study.

The evidentiary examination of when and why the United States decided to declare war on and invade Germany begins in Chapter 2, which asks and answers the most obvious question: If it was indeed the attack on Pearl Harbor that persuaded the United States to declare war on Germany, then why did the United States wait until after Hitler declared war on the United States on December 11? The answer is that President Roosevelt was apparently waiting for Hitler's expected declaration because it could only increase the number of votes in Congress for a U.S. declaration of war on Germany. But the most important point is that it was Pearl Harbor that caused an unprecedented majority of Americans to favor a declaration of war on Germany. Before Pearl Harbor, a vast majority of Americans had opposed such a declaration. But immediately after Pearl Harbor, all the evidence demonstrates that this opinion reversed itself, and for the first time a majority of Americans favored a declaration of war on Germany—after December 7 and before December 11. The evidence indicates that Roosevelt waited for the expected German declaration in order to expand his already unprecedented and substantial majority into an even larger supermajority or unanimity in favor of a declaration of war

on Germany. By waiting for the largest majority possible, the president could ensure himself a freer hand in prosecuting the war.

President Roosevelt and the entire nation were expectantly anticipating the German declaration of war on the United States in the days immediately following December 7. Beyond the public sources of such expectation, Roosevelt had secret U.S. military intelligence that confirmed the public expectation. Nevertheless, in the unlikely event that Hitler might have reversed his promise to Japan by declining to declare war on the United States, Roosevelt had strongly implied to his cabinet and to the nation immediately after December 7 that he was prepared to ask for a declaration of war on Germany, even if Germany would decline to declare war first. In the days between December 7 and December 11, Roosevelt was supported by a vast majority of the public and the Congress. Any German declaration of war made little difference to the United States. This was clearly and overwhelmingly demonstrated by the contemporary evidence both before and after December 7, as well as after December 12, when Germany essentially retracted its declaration of war. This forgotten event is discussed in Chapter 10.

Chapter 3 examines President Roosevelt's speeches, the most important indicator of the reasons that motivated U.S. policy and the public opinion that supported it. His speeches during the month following the attack on Pearl Harbor, or "Pearl Harbor month," repeatedly relied on blaming Germany for Pearl Harbor. But in only one presidential message, that of December 11 itself, did he even mention Hitler's declaration of war. By contrast, Roosevelt not only repeatedly told the nation that German guilt for Pearl Harbor was obvious from all the public sources of information, but he also implied that German guilt was confirmed by secret military intelligence. His only major messages to the nation during Pearl Harbor month were those of December 9, December 15, and January 6.

His predominant theme of German guilt for Pearl Harbor was applauded and echoed across the United States by the overwhelming majority of congressional, polling, and press commentary. Most Americans not only reiterated President Roosevelt's accusations of German complicity in the planning and funding of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but also accused German military forces of actually participating in the war in the Pacific. These accusations came from eyewitnesses on the ground and from highly respected diplomatic, military, and intelligence sources. Their expert knowledge and powers of deduction were afforded extensive coverage and great credibility by the U.S. press. This is why the reports of the Luftwaffe bombing of Pearl Harbor were believed by a substantial portion of Americans both throughout and even after World War II. But these beliefs were strongest during Pearl Harbor week and month, the period when the United States decided and enacted its policy toward Germany.

Chapter 4 continues the examination of the most compelling initial reasons why the United States blamed Germany for Pearl Harbor: the explanation of the major U.S. rationale for total war against Germany. The various reports of German air, land, and naval attacks in the Pacific became a hot news story during December 1941. When questioned by the press, the Roosevelt administration would not deny outright the possible or probable veracity of these reports. By rejecting an outright denial of these reports, the administration was actually tacitly encouraging, to a significant degree, the persistence of these reports. It would not deny these reports during Pearl Harbor month because, as it explained, it could not be absolutely certain of the whereabouts of German military forces, including the powerful German fleet. The official U.S. and British government postwar historians have revealed, however, that the Roosevelt administration actually did know more about the whereabouts of the German fleet in December 1941 than it was willing to publicly admit. These historians have drawn no conclusions, however, about how this might have affected the U.S. *casus belli* against Germany.

The relative silence on the part of the Roosevelt administration allowed these rumors to persist for some time, thus increasing the belligerence of a majority of the U.S. public against Germany. The administration's reticence to make any definitive claim regarding German military forces in the Pacific, however, stood in stark contrast to its main charges against Germany, namely German conspiratorial guilt in the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Pacific. These accusations constituted the predominant publicly stated motivation for the U.S. war against Germany.

The most consistent, enduring, and thus strongest overall U.S. charge against Germany during World War II was that Germany had been a coconspirator with Japan. This charge, examined in Chapter 5, made Germany an accomplice and thus equally guilty with Japan for the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Pacific. Most Americans charged that Germany had been at least equally involved with Japan in the strategic planning and funding of the Pacific offensive. As President Roosevelt had charged, Axis strategy was global in execution and monolithic in conception.

This theme was echoed and elaborated upon by a vast majority of the Congress and the press after Pearl Harbor, from all sections of the United States, including the former isolationists. Americans pointed to a variety of evidence to support this charge, much of which was based on the observations and deductions of military experts regarding Japanese and German battlefield tactics. One of the most important pieces of evidence pointed to by Americans was the Axis Tripartite Treaty, which had been signed in 1940. The U.S. government demonstrated the seriousness of its charge against the Axis monolith-conspiracy when, beginning December 8, 1941, it began arresting not only Japanese, but also German and Italian aliens in the United States. This wartime charge of German conspiracy with Japan was, however, subsequently

rejected by most historians after the war. These are the same historians who emphasized the primary importance of Hitler's declaration of war.

The most serious U.S. charge against Germany that dominated Pearl Harbor month, and persisted to a diminished but still significant degree throughout World War II, was that Japan was a mere political satellite or puppet of Nazi Germany. This appraisal, the subject of Chapter 6, rendered Germany even more guilty than Japan, when Japanese actions, such as those at Pearl Harbor, were considered by most Americans. This puppetmaster thesis was the essence of the commentary provided by the Roosevelt administration, the Congress, and the national press from December 1941 through early 1942. All sections of the United States voiced this belief, including the former isolationists, and it was confirmed by all the national public opinion polls. Americans said that Hitler the puppetmaster had ordered Japan the puppet to attack Pearl Harbor for the purpose of diverting the United States away from Europe and toward the Pacific. Americans explained that Hitler had desperately needed such a U.S. diversion away from Europe because Germany had begun losing the war, at that time, in the three main theaters: Russia, North Africa, and the Atlantic.

The response of the Roosevelt administration to Hitler's "obvious" stratagem was the new U.S. policy of total war against Germany. The administration explained that this new policy was pragmatically predicated on the calculation that the conquest of Germany would automatically disable Japan, the satellite/puppet of Germany. This Germany-first U.S. policy was also justified on the moral grounds that Germany, as the puppetmaster of Japan, was actually more guilty than Japan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. A great deal of this U.S. belief in the German domination of Japan was conditioned by the racial assumptions that had informed centuries of European imperial domination of Asia. Both the racial assumptions and the puppetmaster thesis have been severely criticized by most postwar historians. But these are again the same historians who have chosen to forget that racial assumptions were what actually motivated the United States to enter total war against Germany. They chose, instead, to retroactively emphasize Hitler's declaration of war.

German domination of Japan was explained quite thoroughly in the U.S. press during December 1941. The explanation, examined in Chapter 7, was that Japan followed German orders because Japan was said to be completely dependent on German arms and expertise to run its war machine. U.S. commentators speculated that some German arms might be reaching Japan through holes in the British blockade. But most German arms were presumed to have reached Japan before Germany had invaded Russia. Since that time, Japan was said to be mostly dependent on German technology and expertise in order to manufacture arms in Japan.

These German experts and technicians, who were said to control Japan from the inside, were yet another example of a German "Fifth Column" that the

United States had long feared was infiltrating and possibly controlling other governments around the globe. German Fifth Column experts were said to control the Japanese military, economy, and government. Indeed, the entire success of Japanese military operations was credited to Japan's German overseers. The U.S. assessment of its new war in the Pacific was characterized essentially as a war between two empires, Germany and the United States, thus dismissing the significance of the Japanese colonial subordinate. This theoretical assessment prefigured a similar U.S. geopolitical/strategic calculation that would later be made during the Cold War against the Soviets and their satellites.

Chapter 8 reveals that Americans, including President Roosevelt, also explained another way Germany controlled Japanese behavior, in addition to the German threat to withdraw its technological expertise from Japan. Germany was also said to pose an even more fearful threat to Japan, a military threat of invasion if Japan disobeyed German orders. Americans said that Germany could conceivably invade Japan once Germany had conquered all of Russia, and that Japan was fearful of this threat and thus had obeyed German orders to attack the United States. The German threat directed against Japan was compelling enough to convince most Americans that Germany was ultimately responsible for the consequence of that threat—the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Americans said that Japan had been intimidated by this German threat not only because Japan was a relatively weak power, but also because it had been duped by Hitler. Americans also said that Japan had taken the German threat seriously despite the contemporary fact that Germany was not winning its war against Russia, before, during, and for some time after December 1941. Americans could easily believe that Japan could be duped by a desperate Hitler, due to the stereotypical notions that Americans had long held about an ignorant, backward, and inferior Japan.

The puppetmaster thesis had been the most important motivator of U.S. policy during Pearl Harbor month, the period when the United States decided to invade Europe. As Chapter 9 demonstrates, in early 1942 the puppetmaster thesis slowly began to recede in importance, due to the gradual U.S. recognition that Japan was evidently accomplishing many military victories without actually seeming to be overly or overtly reliant on Germany. Accordingly, by early spring 1942, most Americans seemed to fall back to the position that Germany had been at least an equal coconspirator with Japan, but not necessarily Japan's puppetmaster. Yet after Pearl Harbor month Americans voiced much uncertainty about the actual nature of the relationship between Germany and Japan.

But most U.S. press commentary after Pearl Harbor month had a tone of "better to be safe than sorry," that it was safer to hold Germany guilty for Pearl Harbor, despite any uncertainty about the exact degree or even the nature of that guilt. At the end of Pearl Harbor month, Americans also devel-

oped another justification for war with Germany: the renewed U-boat offensive that was now coming closer to the Western Hemisphere. But this new U.S. *casus belli* against Germany was not only second chronologically, but also secondary in importance to the original and primary *casus belli* that the United States had developed during Pearl Harbor month. Historians have argued that both the puppetmaster thesis and the coconspirator thesis were so widely accepted by Americans after Pearl Harbor because these theses best explained the humiliating U.S. defeat at the hands of the Japanese, a nation that most Americans regarded as backward and inferior.

In conclusion, Chapter 10 briefly examines some of the larger related issues of why the United States declared war on Germany. Ultimately, this book can be viewed as a supplement to the “revisionist” historiographical dissent regarding U.S. entry into World War II. The revisionist minority have argued that the United States entered the war in Europe in December 1941 via a “backdoor to war” in the Pacific. One major reason why the revisionist argument always lacked persuasive power to later generations was that it never explained how and why a U.S. war with Japan could have actually become a backdoor to war with Germany. This book explains how the backdoor process worked.

Chapter 10 also challenges the historiographical consensus majority, who have argued that U.S. entry into World War II was primarily predicated upon internationalist and not nationalist motivations. The internationalist argument rests upon the primacy of Hitler’s declaration of war, and its implications in international law. It also rests upon an assessment of the international or European balance of power. However, the contemporary evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that it was nationalist and not internationalist considerations that primarily motivated U.S. entry into World War II.

The traditional internationalist explanation has emphasized Hitler’s declaration of war, which was essentially meaningless to the United States in December 1941. The other major traditional internationalist explanation has emphasized the European balance of power even though it had actually become, by November and December 1941, a virtually inconsequential motivator of U.S. policy and opinion. In fact, national considerations had always been the real primary motivator of U.S. policy and opinion ever since World War II had begun in 1939. This meant that the ultimate motivator for U.S. policy and opinion was the fear the German *Luftwaffe* might suddenly strike out across the Atlantic to bomb or invade the Western Hemisphere and the United States. This long-standing fear mushroomed after Pearl Harbor, and it had never depended upon an imbalance of power in Europe, as contemporaries repeatedly explained, in contrast to the arguments of the postwar historiographical consensus.

Nevertheless, the European balance of power had been a major concern of the United States, even if it was never the primary or ultimate concern. This

anxiety began to diminish, however, in autumn 1941, when Germany began to lose the war in its three main theaters: Russia, North Africa, and the Atlantic. Most contemporary commentary pointed out that, beginning in autumn 1941, the previously victorious German military first began to suffer a slowdown in its advances, then its offensive became bogged down, and finally by November and December 1941 it was actually forced into retreat in its three theaters. The Germans did not resume offensives until spring 1942. But Germany never again began “winning” the war against its European enemies. The important point from the U.S. perspective is that, by November and December 1941, the European balance of power had ceased to be a major concern and motivator of U.S. policy and opinion. In fact, the major contemporary U.S. motivation for war against Germany was predicated upon the belief that it was Germany’s very defeats that had prompted its desperate ordering of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The other internationalist argument of the historiographical consensus, Hitler’s declaration of war, was also an inconsequential motivator of U.S. policy and opinion in December 1941. Chapter 10 presents only the essential reasons for this rebuttal, including the fact that Germany essentially retracted its declaration of war the day after it was issued. This subject, as well as the larger but related issues outside the immediate scope of this book, needs to be much more thoroughly examined and discussed.

Notes

1. This new U.S. policy of total war against Germany was outlined in President Roosevelt’s first major pronouncement on the subject of Germany after December 11, his January 6, 1942, State of the Union address. See *New York Times*, December 12, 1941, p. 1; Samuel Rosenman, comp., *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, vol. 11, 1942 (New York: Random House, 1950); State of the Union address, January 6, 1942, pp. 39, 42.

2. For the argument that U.S. policy on and after December 11 was in retaliation to Hitler’s declaration of war on that day, see Thomas Bailey and Paul Ryan, *Hitler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War* (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 251, 261; Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–1945* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), p. 506; Anthony Eden, *The Reckoning: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avalon* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 365–366; William Henry Chamberlin, *America’s Second Crusade* (Chicago: Regnery, 1950), p. 147; William Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940–1941* (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1953), pp. 940–941; Robert Divine, *The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), p. 758; Saul Friedlander, *Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939–1941* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), p. 309; H. L. Trefoosse, *Germany and American Neutrality, 1939–1941* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951), pp. 155–156; Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 312; Donald Drummond, *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937–41* (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-

gan Press, 1955), p. 369; T. R. Fehrenbach, *FDR's Undeclared War, 1939–1941* (New York: David McKay, 1967), p. 324; James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), pp. 174–175; Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor—A Study in the Creation of a Foreign Policy* (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), p. 429; Arnold Offner, *American Appeasement: United States Foreign Policy and Germany, 1933–1938* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 203, 279; Arnold Offner, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 245; James Compton, *The Swastika and the Eagle: Hitler, the United States, and the Origins of World War II* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 260; Justus Doenecke and John Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1931–1941*, 2nd ed. (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1991), pp. 176–177; William Kinsella, *Leadership in Isolation: FDR and the Origins of the Second World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1979), p. 205; Richard Ketchum, *The Borrowed Years, 1938–41* (New York: Random House, 1989), pp. 791–792; Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 220; Robert James Maddox, *The United States and World War II* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 98; Warren Kimball, *Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War* (New York: William Morrow, 1997), pp. 123–124; Joseph Lash, *Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership That Saved the West* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), pp. 491–492; Sean Cashman, *America, Roosevelt, and World War II* (New York: New York University Press, 1989), p. 80; Russell Buchanan, *The United States and World War II*, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 78, 441–442; Gary Hess, *The United States at War, 1941–1945* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1986), pp. 23–24; Winston Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 615; Martin Gilbert, *The Second World War* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), p. 277; Richard Norton Smith, *The Colonel: The Life and Legend of Robert R. McCormick, 1880–1955* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 419; Alexander DeConde, ed., *Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1957), p. 156; Ernest May, *American Intervention, 1917 and 1941* (Washington, D.C.: Harvard University Press, Service Center for Teachers of History, 1960), pp. 11–12; Dexter Perkins, *America and Two Wars* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944), p. 155; Allan Nevins and Louis Hacker, eds., *The United States and Its Place in World Affairs, 1918–1943* (Boston: D. C. Heath, 1943), p. 517; Melvin Small, *Was War Necessary? National Security and U.S. Entry into War* (London: Sage, 1980), pp. 257–259; Alton Frye, *Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933–1941* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 177; Warren Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin D. Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 13, 204; Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), pp. 441–442; Warren Kimball, ed., *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the World Crisis, 1937–1945* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973), pp. xv, xvii, 58.

Even though virtually all historians agree that December 11, 1941, was the date the United States officially decided to enter the European war, there is a minority historiographical interpretation that also argues that the Roosevelt administration actually decided to enter the European war before the provocations of December 1941. These “revisionists” are Charles Callan Tansill, *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933–1941* (Chicago: Regnery, 1952); Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); Harry Elmer Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath* (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton, 1953); George Morgenstern, *Pearl Har-*