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军事英语报刊选读

任培楠 马致媛 李 竞◎编

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前言

《军事英语报刊选读》是为大学以上水平以及具有同等水平的英语学习者编写的军事英语阅读材料，旨在扩大军事英语人才和英语爱好者的词汇量，提高英语阅读能力。同时，通过英文阅读，帮助读者了解当今世界军事最新发展态势，拓展读者的知识面。

本书注重文章选材的权威性和时效性，所选文章均摘自国外权威军事英文报刊、杂志和网站，多以最近 1 年内发生的重大军事事件为选材依据，内容新颖，时效性强。本书题材多样、内容丰富，涉及了 10 个军事领域的最新发展动态。选文既包含了世界军事最新动态，又包括了当代军事科学技术的最新发展成果，具有一定的代表性。在此谨向本书所引用资料的作者表示敬意和感谢。

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编　者

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目 录

Unit 1 Conventional Weapon

Passage one

Offensive Language: USN Sets Out Surface Firepower Strategy

The leadership of the US Navy's surface warfare community has articulated the concept of "distributed lethality" as a new operational strategy. Richard Scott reports.

The end of the Cold War, and subsequent implosion of the Soviet fleet, left the US Navy (USN) out on its own as the world's only maritime superpower. There was no longer a credible sea denial threat and so, with control of the seas assured, the focus of the naval service switched to power projection from the sea.

According to Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden, commander of US Naval Surface Forces, that strategic shift has, over a quarter of a century, had a dramatic effect on the way that the US surface fleet is configured and how it goes about its business. "The navy that stood down the Soviets was a well-balanced force, was capable of sustained combat operations across the depth and breadth of naval missions." he said on the Surface Navy Association (SNA) annual symposium in Arlington, Virginia, on 13 January 2015. "It was a navy that was equally adept at sea control as it was at strike. And it was a navy in which carrier strike group missions were distributed broadly among the assets available, with surface ships capable of targeting and destroying enemy ships over-the-horizon, prosecuting submarines scores of miles from the main body and controlling the outer air battle in conjunction with airborne early warning and F-14 Tomcats.

"Also keep in mind the land attack capabilities that we in surface warfare came to prize so strongly after the Berlin Wall, was originally to be integrated into the balanced fleet in deterring, and if necessary, fighting the Soviets."

However, once the Berlin Wall had fallen, the world was left with what Vice Adm. Rowden described as "one dominant naval power, unchallenged at sea, and unstoppable as a power protection machine… because no-one could challenge our dominance at sea we valued some

missions higher than others… we got really good at TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile strikes, we got really good at VBSS Visit, Board, Search and Seizure and anti – piracy, because there was no real threat to our sea control."

He continued, "we got rid of S – 3s Viking long – range anti – submarine warfare aircraft on aircraft carriers, we stopped building ships with long – range ASuW anti – surface warfare weapons, and we moved to a paradigm where we would move the aircraft carrier off the hostile's coast, and then we would generate as many strike sorties as the crew could handle."

So today the fleet architecture is very different in the Cold War era. This reflects many factors: the absence of a peer threat on the high seas, a natural desire to target investment in the most pressing and relevant mission areas, and campaign analysis and planning that made broad assumptions (given the lack of any significant maritime threat) on continued freedom of the seas.

There was also an underlying assumption, said Vice Adm. Rowden, that all force elements would be employed together "such that aircraft carrier battle groups would operate in close proximity to surface action groups and amphibious readiness groups… mutually supported by land – based maritime patrol aircraft.

"While this scheme is effective at identifying gaps it sees in capabilities across the entire ensemble, it presupposes that the entire ensemble will be in place, and ready to fight when the fighting starts. And since there was no real maritime foe to seek out and destroy when the surface force wasn't supplementing the striking power of the air wing with TLAM, it was devoted primarily to defensive operations in the vicinity of the aircraft carrier or other high – value units."

And the end result? "In the navy of efficiency and cost savings the surface force got out of the offensive surface warfare game, and the mission migrated almost exclusively to our air wing," observed by Vice Adm. Rowden, adding that "this approach makes sense in a relatively unchallenging maritime environment, and when the force fights in close proximity".

The corollary has been that as the focus moved towards power projection, core sea control skills in anti – submarine warfare (ASW) and ASuW have eroded. Furthermore, the posture and mindset of the surface warfare community has become implicitly defensive in nature.

A2/AD challenges

However, times have changed. In the Pacific, the USN now finds itself confronted with a qualitatively improving and regionally powerful Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy which, according to US Congressional Research Service naval affairs analyst Ronald O'Rourke, now embodies "a modest but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China's near – seas

region".

O'Rourke added, "China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programmes, including anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR systems. China's naval modernisation effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises".

What this boils down to is a growing concern within the USN's leadership as to the service's ability to ensure sea control in the face of China's emerging anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This comes at a time when the service is facing up to harsh budget realities in the Pentagon.

The response of the surface warfare community has been to conceive of a radically different operational strategy in which the surface fleet will be re-equipped, reconfigured, and repurposed to assume a more overtly 'offensive' posture. This emergent concept of 'distributed lethality' is about trying to find a new way to balance the operational imperatives on the frontline, and counter the new A2/AD challenge, within the resources available to the navy.

"The world has changed, and with it so must our assumptions and our preconceptions," Vice Adm. Rowden explained. "We are adapting to a changed environment, we are responding to national strategic imperatives, and we are going on the offensive."

The coin has two sides: one architectural, the other operational.

"From the fleet architecture standpoint, 'distributed' means we're going to up-gun as many existing platforms as we can to achieve more total lethality from a given size and composition," Vice Adm. Rowden said. "From the operational standpoint, it means taking these now more lethal platforms and combining and operating them in new and novel ways; ways that threaten things the adversaries value both ashore and afloat, whilst simultaneously adding complexity to their surveillance and their targeting problem."

This is driving an innovative, if not altogether new, approach to arming the fleet. Vice Adm. Rowden added that "the picture I'm painting is one of a surface force bristling with offensive capability".

Upgrade opportunities

From the perspective of force architecture, the USN is thinking hard about available options to equip more ships for an offensive role. "We are actively looking around the fleet to target lethality upgrades wherever that makes sense," said Vice Adm. Rowden.

What stands out is a new mindset that is looking at the fleet—both at unit level and as a force—through a wide angle lens. While the USN accepts that it must largely work within the

limits of what it has got, or is going to get, it does perceive scope for refitting additional combat capabilities. "What we are doing differently today is… looking closely at the fleet as a system in identifying where the fruit is, low - hanging or otherwise, so that we can harvest it, irrespective of ship size or type, by adding weapons and sensors." explained Vice Adm. Rowden. "This is a smart plan irrespective of the 1evel of resourcing we receive, but especially important against the backdrop of flat defence budgets."

The service is looking beyond "traditional" surface combatants. Vice Adm. Rowden has suggested considering the potential for fitting an anti - surface weapon on board large amphibious vessels, noting the imperative "to look at the benefits and trade - offs associated with putting an ASuW weapon on these ships".

He has also raised the idea of putting offensive weapons on Combat Logistics Force(CLF) ships. "I realise there are legal implications associated with that and we have probably got to work at that, but… if you think about the logistics force you've got to have in order to be able to fight, I think they're going to be right in our enemy's wheelhouse, going right after them. Why don't we give them something more to think about other than simply taking out the logistics ship?"

At the same time, distributed lethality is also a response to budget reality, according to Rear Admiral Peter Fanta, director, Surface Warfare (N96) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) . Speaking at the same SNA event, he observed that this new thinking was pragmatism with large. "Distributed lethality is taking the budget that we have and making everything out there that floats more lethal. Making the trades we need to make, and making the surface navy of the next 10years, or the next 20 years, the most lethal we can."

Declining budgets have forced the USN to adapt to new fiscal circumstances, and consider how to strike the right balance between capability and capacity. "I will tell you that at 20% budget reductions… we no longer strictly live in the 'upper right' quadrant of high - end capability and high ship numbers."

One option, which had support in many parts of the navy, was to go "upper left" and reduce the number of hulls, but make each unit exceptionally capable and technologically advanced. "This is the Star wars 'Death Star' analogy," said Rear Adm. Fanta.

However, he said this course had been ruled out. "If I go 'upper left' and take force structure down, and ships down, and try to make them perfect, where do I end up? If I ever hit a conflict historical trends suggest the USN will fight a major war once every 20 years I can't build my way out of this. It takes an average of l7 years to build a new ship from a design concept to something at sea.

"I can't get to the upper right if I guess wrong here. So we're going to distributed lethality … in the bottom right. Sufficient numbers of platforms to do the mission. And then put things together that make sense; make every cruiser, destroyer, amphib, LCS Littoral Combat Ship, CLF a thorn in somebody else's side. If it floats, it fights. That's distributed lethality."

New tactics

The development of new offensive surface war-fare capabilities, whether through the modification of existing weapons and sensors, or the introduction of all new systems is only one side of the process. "I think we have a tendency to focus on that aspect of it," Vice Adm. Rowden said. "But I think it's important to remember that a significant portion of the execution of distributive lethality has to do with the tactical execution, how we think about it in our forces in new and different ways."

"If I liken it to a chess match… what we are looking at is a change in the rules in the middle of the game."

So alongside fleet architecture, the other side of distributed lethality is a new operational concept. This reflects the realities of a surface force that will be stretched geographically and increasingly likely to be operating outside of the 'top cover' provided by a carrier air wing.

"If our navy is going to adequately respond to… the rebalance to Asia Pacific, we are going to have to get used to the fact that we will have fewer ships and the Pacific is as big as it ever was," pointed out Vice Adm. Rowden. "We have to think about our fleet, and it may in fact be spread more thinly across this maritime expanse. Therefore, every ship in the fleet needs to be prepared to close in and engage adversaries when called upon, and may be required to do without the air cover we typically have when working with a carrier strike group."

He continued, "This is a different world that we are moving into. Our fleet is probably not going to be fully deployed and arrayed in mutually supportive postures. It's going to be spread across thousands of miles of ocean far from the protective cover of F/A-18 Hornets. In order to target, harass, and neutralise an adversary in a large maritime theatre, the surface force will operate in its critical and historic role in defence of the high-value units, such as aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and logistics vessels."

"But it will also be dispersed throughout the theatre with what I refer to as hunter-killer Surface Action Groups SAGs, netted together when those nets exist, but also capable of autonomous, dispersed operations should those overarching networks break down."

These offensive SAGs can create multiple attack axes, and necessarily complicate the counter-targeting problem for any adversary. "It will give us the ability to hold his forces—ashore and at sea—at risk, at distance, which is really what we're trying to do. By multiplying the

pure number of naval activities that he must target, we dilute both the ISR and his available weapons inventory."

SSC Task Force

Evolving the surface force to deploy distributed lethality is going to be a generational task, which its proponents acknowledge, will take time, resources, and significant intellectual effort. Yet there are already some signposts as to the route ahead, with the findings of the Small Surface Combatant (SSC) Task Force providing an early indication of the change in direction.

The Task Force was established after then - defence secretary Chuck Hagel in February 2014 announced that the original 52 - ship LCS acquisition effort would be truncated at 32 hulls. Instead, Hagel directed the navy to study options for a successor small surface combatant "generally consistent with the capabilities of a frigate" that would be both better armed and more survivable.

Having evaluated a broad range of alternative concepts, the Task Force determined that the answer was to evolve modified versions of both LCS design variants for the remaining 20 ships. Hagel approved this recommendation in December 2014; the following month Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus announced that the modified LCS was to be reclassified as a frigate.

Procurement is due to start in fiscal year 2019 and the USN is also exploring options to retrofit certain 'frigate' capabilities into existing LCS sea frames.

Rear Adm. Fanta was one of the co - chairs of the SSC Task Force. "We went and asked all the warfighters what they needed to do. And we asked them all, in both fleets, in all areas, in all parts of the world: what do you want most?"

The responses were. not unexpectedly conditioned in large part by the operating environments. For example, while the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf put less of a premium on range, operators in the Pacific wanted reach and endurance to support ASW missions.

"We looked at the trades, still cost agnostic and platform agnostic," said Rear Adm. Fanta. "Then we went to look at what's possible."

The end result he continued "a more lethal, more survivable small surface combatant that gets the fleet exactly what they want. Something that — one — is capable of handling itself in a fight against an air threat but not to the level of an Aegis destroyer. Two — something that can shoot a surface - to - surface missile a long way to give the enemy a bad time. Three — an anti - submarine capability that knows if there is a submarine threat out there, and if a torpedo is coming at you".

What ultimately won the argument for the modified LCS over a new design was the three - way balance to be struck between overall numbers, individual capability and lead time. For

Rear Adm. Fanta, this led to a simple choice. "Build four – to – six 'exquisite' ships from a brand new scrap of paper… in the next 15 – 20 years, or I can build you 20 modified LCS in half the time, and deploy 10 of them in half the time."

Ship susceptibility was another big part of the Task Force's assessment. Rear Adm. Fanta pointed out that there were options to "harden" the LCS design by adding armour round the magazine, reinforcing structure, and increasing system redundancy. "But the things that are targeted against an LCS are the things that are also designed to kill an aircraft carrier, or a destroyer," he pointed out, adding that extensive wargaming demonstrated that some LCS would inevitably be lost "in a full – up nation – on – nation war".

Punching at reach

One key requirement identified by the SSC Task Force set up to explore LCS follow – on options was the need for an "over – the – horizon" surface – to – surface missile. The exact requirements for such a weapon are still to be defined in detail, but Vice Adm. Rowden has made clear his belief that equipping the new frigate with a 120 – mile range missile — and potentially back – fitting the same missile to existing LCS hulls — would significantly affect the mindset of any potential adversary.

In this vein, the successful live fire test of a Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from USS Coronado (LCS 4) in September 2014 provided a demonstration of the sort of capability that could be available to the LCS and LCS – derived "frigate". In the demonstration, funded through the Foreign Comparative Testing programme, a single NSM was fired from a launch canister installed on Coronado's flight deck, flying a pre – planned "straight – line" trajectory to a Mobile Sea Target 100 miles away. On arriving in the target area, the missile acquired the target and struck it at a pre – selected hit point.

Offensive role

This proof – of – concept firing delivered a "quick win" for a naval leadership anxious to demonstrate that the LCS has the potential to execute a greater offensive anti – surface warfare role and offset much bad press about the type's lack of firepower. In addition, it gave the USN an insight into the NSM's range, survivability, and lethality (although both the navy and Kongsberg subsequently went on the record to stress that the firing from Coronado was a demonstration and did not indicate that the NSM would be selected if an over – the – horizon missile was to be integrated onto LCS).

In his address to the SNA audience, Vice Adm. Rowden dismissed any notion that this proof – of – concept firing from Coronado was "some kind of a gimmick" and insisted that those who had formed that impression "missed the importance and the point of the exercise".

The origins of the demonstration in fact go back to March 2014, and a wargaming exercise at the Naval War College which hypothesised a "blue" (friendly) force employing a significant number of LCS vessels equipped with a 120 - mile - range missile. "What was interesting to me and what was really eye - opening was the response that we forced from 'red' the enemy force in that game… I think 'red' had a preconceived notion that they could walk in and they didn't have to worry about LCS, they kind of worried about them when they got to them." observed Vice Adm. Rowden.

"It wasn't the case after I put a 120mile range missile on that ship. They had to worry about it all the time because they could do real damage to their fleet… so when I subsequently put that launcher on the fantail of Coronado and we fired it off… what we were really doing was closing the loop on an early step into distributing lethality. Take a good idea, wargame it, and see what you can do."

He added, "the only question I have is if we can do it on LCS, can we do it on other ships? I think the answer is that we can and I think we should".

Indeed, the weapons debate goes well beyond LGS as the requirements for a successor to the current ship - launched Harpoon Block 1 C missile firm up. Vice Adm. Rowden told the SNA audience that "most of you are aware we are actively running a programme to acquire a new offensive anti - surface weapon, one that puts us back on the positive side of the range equation with respect to our potential adversaries. We need to think about this weapon as something we can back fit throughout the DDG fleet starting with DDG 79 and up, which were built without a long - range ASuW capability.

"Perhaps this weapon, or one similar can be both forward fit and back fit on our smaller surface commands, including the LCS. I'm not saying we do it, but I think we need to think about it."

Vice Adm. Rowden also raised the idea of examining the case for "an affordable land attack weapon that fills the gap between surface fires, and the 155 mm Advanced Gun System on the DDG 1000 destroyer, and TLAM. Why couldn't we field a 300 - 500 n mile range missile that could be fired from existing ships? And why not think about putting offensive weapons on our Combat Logistics Force ships?"

That does not necessarily mean a lot of new development programmes. "I think the more important piece is to look at the weapons that we have now, the sensors that we have now, the capabilities we have now, and see what modifications we might be able to make to them," said Vice Adm. Rowden.

NOTES

Vice Admiral Thomas Rowden　美国现任海军水面部队司令、海军中将罗登
CLF　后勤作战力量
Rear Admiral　海军少将
Amphibious　两栖的
A2/AD (anti – access/area denial)　反介入和区域封锁

VOCABULARY

Implosion　内爆
A creditable sea denial threat　可靠的海上威胁阻绝
Configure　使成型,装配
Stand down　退出