



博士文库
BOSHI WENKU

重读费尔巴哈

——论费尔巴哈的感性人学及其意义

舒永生 著

BOSHI WENKU
BOSHI WENKU
BOSHI WENKU

华中师范大学出版社

重读费尔巴哈

——论费尔巴哈的感性人学及其意义

To Re-comprehend Feuerbach

——On Feuerbach's Humanism of Feeling and



华中师范大学出版社

2003年·武汉

(鄂) 新登字 11 号

图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

重读费尔巴哈——论费尔巴哈的感性人学及其意义/舒永生 著.

—武汉：华中师范大学出版社，2003.10

(博士文库)

ISBN 7-5622-2795-0/B·72

I. 重… II. 舒… III. 费尔巴哈, L.A. (1804—1872) — 哲学思想 — 研究 IV. B516.36

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字 (2003) 第 077773 号

重读费尔巴哈——论费尔巴哈的感性人学及其意义

© 舒永生 著

华中师范大学出版社出版发行

(武昌桂子山 邮编：430079 电话：027-67861321)

新华书店湖北发行所经销

湖北恒吉印务有限公司印刷

责任编辑：刘曦涛

封面设计：罗明波

责任校对：罗少琳

督 印：姜勇华

开本：850mm×1168mm 1/32

印张：8.25 字数：180千字

版次：2003年10月第1版

2003年10月第1次印刷

印数：1—1000

定价：18.00元

本书如有印装质量问题，可向承印厂调换。

谨以此书纪念我的祖母。

内容摘要

本书的目的在于重新理解费尔巴哈，揭示费尔巴哈和马克思对传统形而上学的颠覆。作者认为，费尔巴哈从本体的意义上理解感性，认为近代认识论哲学是感性存在的遗忘，是以人与自然的割裂为前提的。费尔巴哈从本体的意义上理解人，把德国古典哲学中主体与客体的对立统一转变为人的存在与本质的对立统一。费尔巴哈试图从本原的意义上把感性与人统一起来，这表明费尔巴哈已经超越传统形而上学对“人是什么？”的提问，而建构自己的新哲学。但是费尔巴哈最终没有能够完成感性与人在本原意义上的统一，所以对传统形而上学的颠覆是不彻底的，马克思对费尔巴哈的超越就在于对这种不彻底性的批判。但是，我们依然要看到费尔巴哈哲学的现代性，看到费尔巴哈哲学是从传统哲学向现代哲学过渡的环节。基于这样的理解，本书分为五个部分。

第一部分论述了费尔巴哈颠覆传统形而上学的原则。在费尔巴哈之前，人们把感性等同于感受性，认为感性就是感觉经验，这是认识论上的感性。认识论感性的基本特征是：主客二分为前提，感性要么成为了主体与客体联系的桥梁，要么成为了主体与客体割裂的屏障，不论怎样，总是假定了主体与客体的独立存在。在分析和批判感性认识论的局限性的基础上，费尔巴哈提出感性本体论：即把感性作为存在本身、作为本体来进行探讨，这是费尔巴哈对前人的真正超越之所在。在他这里，感性是人与自然的原初统一，感性就是人本身，就是人的感性存在。在费尔巴

哈之前，思想家们把人作为实体来考察，认为人是物质实体、精神实体或二者的统一。把人与动物等同起来，把人当作一个东西来考察，或把人提升为神，都是丧失了现实的人的主动和自由。把人是机器之感性的内容内化在精神之中，从精神内部发展人的自由，这是德国古典唯心主义哲学。人是德国古典唯心主义哲学的潜在原则，把精神与自由归还给人本身，则是费尔巴哈的人本主义。人本主义是德国古典唯心主义哲学发展的必然结论，最能体现费尔巴哈人本主义的论断是“人是人的最高本质”。

第二部分论述了费尔巴哈借助感性对理性形而上学的颠覆。黑格尔是近代思辨哲学的集大成者，根本上是笛卡儿的思路。费尔巴哈对黑格尔的批判就是对“我思故我在”的批判，批判理性至上，回到感性。他认为，感性是知识、情感和意志的对象化活动。感性必然内含有感性的对象，没有对象的感觉、爱和欲望不是真正的感觉、爱和欲望，对象是感觉、爱和欲望题中应有之义。感性是人的感性，是人的本质力量的体现。动物的“看”与人的“看”的根本差异在于，动物只有“看”，只能“看到”什么；而人则能够看到“看”本身。感性就是人的感性存在，就是人本身。感性为自然与人的存在给予了本体论证明。传统形而上学的基本特征——“我思”，表现为实体主义和本质主义。费尔巴哈的感性本体论，批判了把物质活动与精神活动割裂开来的观点，批判了逻各斯中心。二元论与逻各斯中心是一致的，即二个世界的划分，并认为本质世界高于现象世界，这就是本质高于或先于存在的本质主义。费尔巴哈的感性是“回到事情本身”，是对实体主义与本质主义的批判。

第三部分论述了费尔巴哈对传统神学形而上学的颠覆，即从宗教神学上升到人本主义。宗教是类本质的对象化，人的本质必须在对象的身上才得以体现，对象化是人存在的必然形式。神学是类本质的异化，上帝是人的本质的异化。宗教是人自身的双重

对象化：他把自己的本质对象化为一个独立的人格化的本质，然后，他再把自己即已丧失了自身本质的自我又对象化，转化为那已经对象化的自己本质的对象。把人被异化的本质归还给人，复归到与人的本质相符合的状态，手段是爱的宗教。爱的宗教是无神的宗教，费尔巴哈反对宗教神学，但并不反对宗教本身，反而认为宗教是人的需要。爱是人与自然、“我与你”的对话。对黑格尔辩证法的批判——思辨的独白，把黑格尔的自我意识发展为“我与你”的对话。“我与你”的对话体现并实现了人的本质。真正的对话表现在爱之中，只有在爱（关系）中，才有人与自然的和谐，才有人与人的和谐。在黑格尔看来，理性与信仰是统一的，理性成为了信仰的对象。在黑格尔那里，理性形而上学与神学形而上学是统一的。费尔巴哈人本主义对神学形而上学的颠覆表现为从“人是什么”（本质）向“人是人”（存在与本质的统一）的转向。自然科学与人的科学的统一，所有的科学必将统一为一门科学，那就是人的科学。消除哲学，哲学同样应该受到批判，这里批判的是以“我思”为特征的反思哲学。哲学最高和最后的原则，就是人与人的统一，以人与人的爱来代替哲学。

第四部分论述了费尔巴哈感性人学的建构及其困惑。感性与人也共通的，即本体意义上的感性与本体意义上的人的统一性。感性存在主要指人的现实存在，感性是人的本质的完整体现。费尔巴哈感性哲学与人本学是统一的。不从人本主义的立场来理解感性，就不能真正理解费尔巴哈感性的本体论意义；不从感性的角度来理解人本主义，就不能理解费尔巴哈的人本主义。但是，在本体意义上费尔巴哈那里的感性与本体意义上的人最终没有统一。费尔巴哈的感性是“哲学家的感性”，他的感性与人的统一，是哲学中的统一，一旦从哲学回到现实，则没有能够统一，所以缺少现实性、缺少开放性、缺少历史性、缺少反身性、缺少社会性。费尔巴哈依然是认识世界而不是改造世界；他的感

性人学充满了困惑：人与自然的困惑，能够提出人与自然在感觉意义上的关联，但根本上是思想中的关联，又回到传统哲学，以人与自然的二分为前提。存在与本质的困惑，一方面费尔巴哈试图在存在与本质之间保持一定的张力，另一方面费尔巴哈把本质等同于、归结为存在，把类本质等同于个体的存在，以存在消解本质。主体间困惑，即是类本质的内在矛盾，一方面，类本质是抽象的共性，另一方面，类本质又试图包含现实的个体存在。费尔巴哈虽然提出了人的社会性，但是对社会性的理解却是传统的。先有人，先有男人和女人，才有社会。

第五部分论述了马克思对费尔巴哈的超越，只有马克思才完成了对传统形而上学的颠覆。费尔巴哈本体论的感性还不是“事情本身”，没有时间，是在时间之外的，是超时间的，是永恒的。真正的感性是在时间之内的、开放的、历史的、不断超越自身的感性活动。马克思所谓的感性是感性活动，他把费尔巴哈的感性本体论发展为感性生存论，使感性本体论贯彻到底，把费尔巴哈观念中的人与人的关系发展为现实的人的社会中的人与人的关系，把费尔巴哈的类发展为社会，使关系本体论彻底化，是现实的人，是感性与人的真正同一。马克思的人学就是感性人学。在这个基础上马克思提出从认识世界到改造世界的问题，以往的哲学家都是在认识世界，而问题在于改造世界。改造世界就是改造人自身、改造社会。社会、人与自然界根本上是统一的，统一于改造世界和人自身的活动中。这样，自然而然引出了工人运动。马克思认为，工人运动终结了哲学批判。黑格尔通过哲学批判终结了哲学，从而宣称他的哲学是最后的哲学；费尔巴哈通过宗教批判也提出了终结哲学，他以属人的爱的宗教来代替属神的宗教，以人的哲学来代替神的哲学。这一伟大的思想并没有结果，因为他以为说一说，哲学就终结了。马克思则认为，哲学的终结不是语言而是行动，是工人运动。德国工人运动才是德国古典哲

Abstract

The subject of this doctoral dissertation is to re-comprehend Feuerbach's philosophy and to show how Feuerbach and Marx overthrow the traditional metaphysics. The author tries to show that Feuerbach's feeling is not only the category of epistemology, but that of ontology. But in old philosophy, those thinkers consider the feeling as the sensation in epistemology. So the feeling is based on the separation of the human and the nature. The human that Feuerbach has talked about is also the category of ontology. So he turns the contradiction of subject and object in ancient German philosophy into that of man's essence and existence. According to Feuerbach's view, the feeling and the humanism should be united. This is anthropology, his new philosophy, in transcending the traditional metaphysics of asking "what is the human." Although Feuerbach wants to unite the feeling and the humanism, he can't finish it finally. Although he begins to overthrow the traditional metaphysics, he can't do it completely. Marx surpasses Feuerbach here. But we may recognize the modernity of Feuerbach's philosophy. His philosophy is a link from traditional philosophy to modern one. The whole dissertation constitutes of five parts.

In part one, the author discusses two principles of Feuerbach's overthrowing the traditional metaphysics: the feeling and the humanism. Before Feuerbach, people take the feeling as the

sensation and think the feeling is perceptual experience. This is the feeling of epistemology and its character is based on the separation of the subject and the object. The feeling is the bridge of them or the obstruction of them. In analyzing and criticizing the limitation of epistemology, Feuerbach regards the feeling as the union of the human and the nature, and the feeling is united with his humanism. Before Feuerbach, the thinkers regard the human as the substance, such as material substance or immaterial one. So they think of the freedom of human as that of non-human, for example, taking the human as machine to lose freedom of human, or taking the human as God to exaggerate the freedom of human. The German idealism from Kant to Hegel is to study the freedom of human. Humanism is the potential principle of the German idealism. Feuerbach's humanism is to return freedom of God to that of human oneself. So his humanism is the development of the German idealism. "Human is the supreme nature of human being" is his famous judgement.

In part two, the author tries to show Feuerbach's rejection of rational metaphysics based on the feeling. It is well-known that Hegel continues Descartes's idea "I think, I am" to finish the modern philosophy. Feuerbach's critique to Hegel is not only to criticize the philosophy of "I think", but to turn the absolute reason down to the feeling. The feeling is not only action of reason, but also that of emotion and will. The feeling necessarily constitutes of the object of feeling. Without the object, the reason, emotion and will are not actual. So the object is the meaning of reason, emotion and will. Feuerbach's feeling is the feeling of human and reflects the essence of human being. The difference between look of animal and that of human is that animal can only see some other things, but

human can see the look itself. Feuerbach's feeling is identical with his humanism. So the feeling can ensure the existence of the subject and the object ontologically. The characteristic of the traditional metaphysics is "I think", which expresses in substantialism and essentialism based on separation of existence and essence of human being. Feuerbach's feeling is against the idea of division of material and spirit. His feeling is to "return to the thing-itself", i. e. the union of the material action and the spiritual one.

In part three, the author tries to show Feuerbach's overthrowing the theological metaphysics according to his anthropology. According to Feuerbach's view, religion is the self-alienation of human consciousness. The translation into ordinary terms of reflective abstractions of theology is the negation of theology; and the reinstatement of its original religious content in the new self-conscious form of man's knowledge of his own nature, as his own nature. Feuerbach thinks that the religious is the thesis and the theological is antithesis, and the synthesis is his conclusion — namely that theology is anthropology. In religious and theological stages, the human essence is different from human being, but in the anthropological stage, the human essence is united with the human being by the religion of love. The religion of love is religion without God. Feuerbach is against theology, but not against religion, and thinks the religion is the need of human. The love is dialogue of "I and Thou". Feuerbach rejects Hegel's dialectics of monologue and develops Hegel's consciousness itself to the dialectics of dialogue of "I and Thou". The human and the nature are united by the dialogue. The real dialogue shall be in love. The love is the dialogue of man and nature. For Hegel, the reason and the faith

may be integrated and his rational philosophy gives demonstration for the Christian religion. According to Hegel, the rational metaphysics and the theological metaphysics would be the same. Feuerbach's humanism overthrows the traditional theological metaphysics. Firstly, Feuerbach turns "what is the human" into "Human is the nature of human." Secondly, Feuerbach thinks science of nature and science of human would be united to the science of humanism. Thirdly, Feuerbach thinks the philosophy itself would be criticized and dispelled. Certainly the criticized and dispelled philosophy is that philosophy of "I think". Feuerbach tries to take the place of the philosophy by his love of peoples.

In part four, the author discusses the foundation and the confusion of Feuerbach's humanism of feeling. According to Feuerbach, the feeling equals to the humanism, because the feeling of ontology is identical with the human being of ontology. So his feeling belongs to human being of ontology. So his feeling belongs to humanism, and his humanism belongs to feeling. Feeling is therefore with respect to an object taken as a Thou, that is, as a person. Feeling is love, is the dialogue of "I and Thou". So the humanism of feeling is the conclusion of his overthrowing the traditional metaphysics. But Feuerbach's feeling and human is not really feeling and human being because he talks about them from philosopher's viewpoint. So Feuerbach has many problems that can't be solved in his humanism of feeling. There are mainly three problems. One is whether the nature and the human are united really. Sometimes, Feuerbach thinks that the nature and the human must be united in feeling, but some other time, his philosophy bases himself upon either nature or human being. The second is unity of

essence and existence of human being. On the one hand, Feuerbach thinks the essence is existence and existence is essence, so the essence equals to the existence completely; on the other hand, Feuerbach tries to separate the essence and existence and let the existence equal to the essence gradually. The third problem is intersubjectivity. Feuerbach has solved the problem of intersubjectivity by continuing Hegel's consciousness of oneself, i. e. the dialectics of "I and Thou", but he can't understand the society and regards society as love of man and woman. So he can't solve the problem of intersubjectivity. Why can't Feuerbach solve the three problems? In Feuerbach's view, the feeling and humanism are limited to philosopher's conception. So Feuerbach can't come out from this illusion and is far away from actual society.

In part five, the authors exposes Marx's transcending of Feuerbach, holding that it is only Marx who completes the overthrowing of the traditional metaphysics. Marx's critique of Feuerbach is not, therefore, that Feuerbach's intentions are wrong, or that the dialectics is wrongly grounded. Rather, it is the sensibility, which Feuerbach takes as the domain of the dialectics, remains an abstract sensibility. It remains, for all Feuerbach's protestations, a reflected-upon praxis, or a praxis within reflection, a praxis of belief and of thought. It remains philosophy. It needs to become, says Marx, a social and political praxis and preeminently a historical one. In so far as it does, the dialectics is embodied not in consciousness as such, nor in sensibility as such, but in revolutionary praxis, in would-change praxis. So Marx has developed Feuerbach's humanism of feeling, and thinks feeling is the action of peoples in actual society. The feeling and the humanism are

united really. Marx's humanism is his science of feeling. Marx thinks that all thinkers before him (including Feuerbach) only want to understand the world, but not to reform the world. Reforming the world is the union of reforming the nature, reforming the human being and reforming the society. Reforming the society is the movement of workers. The movement of workers completes the critique of philosophy. We know Hegel tries to end philosophy with his critique of philosophy. Feuerbach wants to do it by his religion of love. Marx thinks that ending Philosophy isn't language, but action. Thus, in Marx's view, Feuerbach fails to fulfill his very intentions, by conceiving of this concrete and remaining concern of belief, feeling and awareness of needs as human. So if we say Feuerbach begins to overthrow the traditional metaphysics, Marx has overthrown the traditional metaphysics completely.

In short, the dissertation shows us the meaning of Feuerbach's humanism of feeling and shows us that Feuerbach's humanism of feeling is the link between Hegel's rational humanism and Marx's actual humanism. So Feuerbach's humanism has rejected the old philosophy and overthrown the traditional metaphysics. It shows us that Feuerbach's humanism already has modernity. Recognizing it is useful for us to study the German idealism and Marx's philosophy deeply.

Key Words: the traditional metaphysics Feuerbach feeling species Marx

导 言

我们知道，传统形而上学最主要的特征，就是人与世界、主体与客体的二元对立。柏拉图通过对理念世界和现象世界的划分，奠定了所谓传统形而上学。基督教神学通过对理念世界的进一步神圣化，发展出彼岸世界与现实世界的对立；所以，基督教神学是传统形而上学的继承和发扬。传统形而上学在近代表现为认识论，认识论哲学必须以主体与客体的割裂为前提，这样，从存在中分离出来的主体得以确立（主体性原则），从存在中分离出来的客体得以确立（客体性原则），德国古典哲学就是考察这两个原则的内在统一。在黑格尔那里，人的理性（主体性）超越了人自身，成为无所不包的神，人反而变成无足轻重的存在物。黑格尔的理性哲学就是为基督教神学作论证，理性形而上学与神学形而上学在黑格尔的思辨神学中达到了统一。黑格尔哲学是传统形而上学的完成。

费尔巴哈是第一个真正超出黑格尔体系来批判黑格尔体系的人。费尔巴哈对黑格尔的批判，并不仅仅批判他的唯心主义，而且是对黑格尔思辨哲学的神学本质（理性至上）的揭示。费尔巴哈认为，唯物主义、唯心主义、二元论都不是真理，他要建构一种超越唯物主义、唯心主义和二元论之上的新哲学。他又说，他的新哲学不同于一切以往哲学；他的新哲学不是哲学，而是人类学；他的新哲学是感性的人对人自身的认识。费尔巴哈对黑格尔乃至一切旧哲学的批判，实际上已开始了对传统形而上学的颠覆。基于这样的理解，本书分为五个部分：一、论述了费尔巴哈颠覆传统形而上学的两个原则即感性原则与人本主义原则。费尔

巴哈的感性不同于一切以往的感性，那就是把感性提升到本体的地位进行考察，是感性本体论。费尔巴哈的人本主义也不同于以往对人的理解，而认为“人是人的最高本质”。二、论述了费尔巴哈借助于感性本体论对理性形而上学的颠覆。费尔巴哈以“我欲故我在”来代替“我思故我在”；在他看来，“我思故我在”对人的主体性的确立是虚幻的，而只有“我欲”、“我爱”、“我感”才能确立人的主体性。三、论述了费尔巴哈借助于人本主义对神学形而上学的颠覆。费尔巴哈认为，宗教神学是人的存在与本质的对立；在他看来，只有通过“我”与“你”的对话（爱的宗教）才能实现人的存在与本质的统一，所以，费尔巴哈把理性和信仰都建立在人性的根基之上。四、论述了费尔巴哈感性人学的建构及其困惑。通过对感性原则与人本主义原则的统一性的揭示，说明感性的人是费尔巴哈哲学的出发点，感性人学是费尔巴哈人本主义的真正内涵。同时，也要看到“哲学家眼中”的感性与人是没有现实性的。所以，费尔巴哈对传统形而上学的批判是不彻底的。五、论述了马克思对费尔巴哈感性人学的超越。马克思对费尔巴哈的超越究竟表现在哪里？那就是从“哲学家”的感性到现实的人的感性活动、从“哲学家观念中”的人到社会现实中的人。所以，马克思批判了费尔巴哈颠覆传统形而上学的不彻底性，完成了对传统形而上学的真正颠覆。这是本书的一条明线。

本书批判了国内对费尔巴哈一种根深蒂固的理解，即认为费尔巴哈批判了黑格尔的唯心主义又抛弃了他的辩证法，从而认为费尔巴哈回到了十八世纪法国唯物主义，把费尔巴哈等同于机械唯物主义。笔者认为，这是对费尔巴哈的极大误解：一、这不符合哲学史发展的事实。众所周知，德国古典唯心主义是建立在批判十八世纪法国唯物主义的基础上，而费尔巴哈的人本主义是德国古典唯心主义发展的逻辑结论。把费尔巴哈哲学等同于十八世纪法国唯物主义是不可思议的。二、理解不了列宁表述的“黑格