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2010

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Public Participation in China Diplomacy and its Influence: Three Case Studies From 2003
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Contents

Continuity and Change in the International System <i>Qin Yaqing</i>	1
A Longitudinal Study of Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China <i>Niu Jun</i>	21
On the "People First" Diplomacy in China <i>Jin Canrong & Liu Shiqiang</i>	46
Public Participation in China's Diplomacy and its Influence: Three Case Studies From 2003 <i>Wang Cungang</i>	63
The Olympic Games and the Internationalization of Beijing: Understanding the Interaction between China and the International System <i>Zhu Liqun & Lin Minwang</i>	96
China's Economic Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities <i>Jiang Ruiping</i>	116
The Gaming of the Copenhagen Climate Summit and China's Redefinition of its Identity <i>Zhuang Guiyang</i>	139
New Challenges and a New Agenda for China's Arms Control <i>Sun Xiangli</i>	154

Continuity and Change in the International System

Qin Yaqing

Abstract This paper presents an analytical framework for changes in the international system. The author argues that an ontological change of the international system is marked by a change in the nature of its composing units, and that internal changes in the international system are reflected through the changes in three key elements, namely, the systemic structure, the institutional structure and the ideational structure. The author argues that the international system has not yet witnessed any ontological change despite signs of changes in the system itself. However, the internal changes within the international system are relatively conspicuous. The systemic structure has not reached the turning point of power transfer although the only superpower is experiencing a relative decline and other major powers are in shift. International institutions have been conspicuously inadequate in either efficacy or efficiency in dealing with global security challenges. Institutional reform will be tuned towards the management of new security threats. As far as the international ideational structure is concerned, there has been increasing consensus, decreasing confrontational elements, and a growing dialogue in the international community despite competition between ideas.

Key words international system; ontological change; systemic elements

The global financial crisis that started in the United States and quickly spread to the whole world led to the most serious economic recession since the end of World War II and showed explicitly the development trend of the post-Cold War world. Although the G20 Summit was designed to deal with the current economic problems that bothering the whole world, the participating parties, agenda-setting and proceeding measures sent out new signals. The international system is always in a state and process involving both continuity and change. This paper attempts to discuss two questions. First, has there been ontological change in the international system? Second, what changes have taken place regarding the internal structure and the key elements of the international system? To answer these two questions, we will, on the basis of existing IR theories, provide an analytical framework for examining a change of the system itself and for examining the changes in the internal elements of the system. And then, looking into reality after the global financial crisis, we will discuss continuity and change in the international system.

Qin Yaqing, Professor of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University.

Theories on System Change

Two kinds of theories have been invented for the study of change in the international system. One deals with an ontological change of the system and the other studies changes in key systemic elements. The former refers to a change of the system itself, while the latter refers to changes in the internal structure of the system. We will first of all review literature on these two kinds of changes and propose a practical framework for analysis on the basis of existing theories and arguments. In this case, we will not merely make some common-sense judgments on the transformation of the contemporary international system, but also make some observations and reflections in a systematic way.

Ontological Change of a System

A system is an integral whole composed of many units with distinctive features in continuing interaction. A change of the system itself refers to a situation where the nature of the system has changed and a new system has come into being. Although western international relations theories have regarded the establishment of the Westphalia System and the norm of sovereignty in 1648 as the starting point of the modern international system, human history has witnessed systemic change many times, including the change in China from the co-existence and competition of pre-Qin Kingdoms to the unification of the Qin Dynasty, the change of Europe from a medieval system to a modern international system, and the possible change being discussed now from Westphalia to a post-modern system. Here we adopt the definition of systemic change in a broad sense. We will discuss, first of all, the theories on the above-mentioned three important system changes so as to examine the most fundamental elements in system change and establish a basic parameter for ontological change in the international system.

Robert Gilpin made important arguments about international changes. According to him, there are three ideal types of international changes. First, there is systems change, which refers to a change in the nature of actors composing the system. To Gilpin, a systems change involves a major change in the character of the international system itself, which is "identified by its most prominent entities: empires, nation states or multinational corporations."¹ Second, there is systemic change, a change in the

1. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.41.

governance of an international system. Here the focus is “the rise and decline of the dominant states or empires that govern the particular international system.”² Systemic change involves the international re-distribution of power. Third, there is interaction change, a modification in “the interactions and processes among the actors in an international system,” or “changes in the rights and rules embodied in an international system.”³ Gilpin fit these three types into a table:

Table 1 Types of international changes

Type	Factors that change
Systems change	Nature of actors (empires, nation-states, etc.)
Systemic change	Governance of system
Interaction change	Interstate processes

Among these three types, only the first type involves an ontological change of an international system, while the other two refer to internal changes in a system. Gilpin didn’t think it was easy to distinguish among these three types because “system change also involves both systemic and interaction changes. Furthermore, changes at the level of interstate interactions . . . may be the prelude to systemic change and eventually systems change.”⁴ He is correct, because an ontological change of an international system might be a process from quantitative to qualitative changes. In other words, the process nurtures ontological change and the rebirth of the system. However, as an analytical framework or as ideal types, distinctions can still be made among the three and such distinctions are of great significance. First and foremost, Gilpin made a fundamental definition for the change of an international system itself, that is, the change in the nature of units composing the system. “Qualitative change in the nature of units” is a basic criterion for systems change. Empires are totally different units from nation-states because empires are not characterized by sovereign norms and territorial rules. Gilpin pointed out that only “systems change involving a different set of principal actors which means a change in the boundaries of the system.”⁵

After Gilpin hypothesized that a qualitative change in the nature of units is the most significant indicator of systems change, the study of systemic ontological change seemed to consciously or unconsciously apply his theory. Victoria Tin-bor Hui’s study of China’s systems change is a case in point. The

2. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p42.
3. *Ibid.*, p43.
4. *Ibid.*, p40.
5. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p40, note a.

core question in her research is how China transformed from a quasi-international system in pre-Qin times to Grand Unification. Although the research focuses on how that system transformed, the indicators for systems change are the disappearance of quasi-sovereign states—kingdoms—and the establishment of a unified empire.⁶ The system of the Chinese empire was one where “all land under heaven belongs to the King and all people within the boundary are the King’s subjects.” When the norms and principles governing the kingdoms no longer worked, kingdoms naturally disappeared, and administrative regions under centralized rule replaced the previously competing kingdoms.

John Ruggie also discussed the change of the nature of the system units. According to him, a major weakness of Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist theory is that it does not include a logic of transformation. There are only two kinds of changes in Waltzian theory, the change in power distribution (for instance, from bipolar to multi-polar, or from multi-polar to bipolar), and the change from anarchy to rule and authority, which is also a kind of change in power distribution. Waltz didn’t develop a theory of systemic units, and hence he couldn’t theorize on the ontological change of a system. Thus, Ruggie argued that Waltz couldn’t explain the collapse of the Roman Empire or the formation of sovereign states, nor could Waltz explain the change from a medieval international system to a modern international system, or the change from a modern to a post-modern international system.⁷ Ruggie pointed out that the major difference in system units lies in differences in the basic institutions of an international system. According to him, it is the institution of sovereignty that made the establishment of sovereign states possible and hence transformed the medieval European international system into a modern international system.⁸

The basic concern of the English school is international society rather than the international system. However, its study of the transformation of international societies offers inspiration to the study of system transformation. According to Hedley Bull, the international system precedes international society, with nation-states as basic units in both. If a group of states realize that they have shared interests and values and they hence form a society, and if these states believe that the relations among them are constrained by a set of

6. Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insight from Comparing the Ancient China and Early European Systems”, *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp.175—205.

7. John Gerald Ruggie, *Constructing World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*, New York: Routledge, 1998, p.137.

8. John Gerald Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in World Polity”, in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp.131—157.

shared rules and they build common institutions together, then an inter-state society or international society comes into being.⁹ The basic units of international society as defined by Bull are still sovereign states, identical in nature to the basic units composed the modern international system. With the development of the English School, the concept of international society has been expanded and led to the formation of a new term—world society. The key scholar is John Vincent who bases his study on human rights, and focuses his discussions on the tension between human rights and state rights. In Bull's opinion, emphasis on human rights will overthrow the basic norms of international society, i. e., sovereignty and non-interference. However, according to Vincent, when a state infringes upon or violates individual human rights, international society should carry out humanistic intervention and disregard the norms of sovereignty and non-interference. In fact, what Vincent emphasizes is that individuals are the basic units of the system, which is the very idea of world society proposed by the English School. Therefore, Barry Buzan argues that world society is significant in two aspects. First, the basic units composed world society are individuals, non-governmental organizations and even global citizens, which actually goes beyond the state system. Second, in world society, no single kind of units can play a leading role as states do in the current international system; instead, various kinds of units interact and influence one another.¹⁰ So the key to the transformation from international society to world society also lies in the change of the nature of the basic units.

From the discussions above, we can see that a defining indicator for the transformation of a system itself is the change of the nature of the system units. If the basic units composed a system change from empires to nation-states, the system transforms from empire system into state system; if the basic units composed a system change from nation-states to individuals, the system transforms from a state system into a world system. The change of the nature of the system units relates to the norms defining the nature of the units. In an international system composed of nation-states, the norm prescribing the nature of a state, including its rights and obligations, is sovereignty. Therefore, states are defined as units of the international system, which encompasses elements of sovereignty, territory, government, citizens, armies, and so on. However, in a world state composed of individuals, the rights of the individual become the basic norms and principles, and the norms and principles defining the

9. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p.13.

10. Barry Buzan, *From International Society to World Society? English School Theory on the Social Structure of Globalization*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.xviii.

nature of states no longer exist, including the core norms of sovereignty and territory.

Changes in Key Systemic Elements

When no fundamental change happens in the international system, changes in the internal structure of the system will become important in the study of international relations. There have been a lot of discussions regarding the internal changes in a system in various international relations theories, because changes in key systemic elements directly influence systemic stability and the behavior pattern of system units. In Gilpin's study of international changes, he already considered the power distribution and institutional structure of a system. Systemic change, meaning changes in the governing structure of the system, actually reflects change in the degree of power concentration. And processual change within a system refers to the interaction among states, which is quite similar to what Nye defined as international process and state institutions.¹¹ With the rise of constructivism, international culture and shared ideas have become a significant research program, and ideational structure has become another important factor concerning the internal changes of an international system.¹² Therefore, from the system level of international relations theories and the reality of international relations, the internal transformation of a system can be examined in three aspects, namely, systemic structure, systemic institutions and systemic culture.

Systemic structure is one of the key elements of a system. The systemic structure studied here mainly refers to the material structure defined by Waltz, that is, the power distribution in a system. Waltz identifies three defining features of the international system, i.e., anarchy, functional units, and power distribution.¹³ Anarchy is the ordering principle of the international system, which co-exists with the system; states are the basic units composed the system, which have similar functions. Only the power distribution of the system is relatively subject to change, and hence is the most important element for systemic stability and for major units in the system.¹⁴ Therefore, the study of systemic power structure focuses on the influence of structural change on state behavior. The state and changes in power distribution in a system are

11. Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflict: An Introduction to the Theory and History*, New York: Longman, 2002, p.46.

12. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

13. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979, p.88.

14. Qin Yaqing, "Power Politics and Structural Choice", in Qin Yaqing, *Power, Institutions and Culture*, Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2005, pp.26—53.

indeed important factors in foreign strategy-making for a state. No matter how power is distributed among major powers, be it a hegemonic, bipolar or multi-polar system, it works on the members of the system.¹⁵

Institutions are another important element of the international system. International institutions are basic components of the international governance system, and help maintain important rules that members of the system rely on in anarchy. Assuming that the international systemic structure is constant, Robert Keohane and others found that peace or cooperation among members in the system is mainly adjusted or affected by international institutions.¹⁶ This point has been generally accepted by scholars of international political economy, and has been partially proved in densely institutionalized areas. However, neoliberal institutionalists like Keohane haven't explored in depth the issue of institutional change. They accepted the basic assumption that a hegemon would be active in establishing international institutions to maintain systemic stability and for its own interest. Even when the hegemon declines, the states within the system will maintain the established international institutions for their own needs so that international cooperation can be achieved. Nonetheless, institutions evolved with the development of the world and the practice of international relations. Once significant changes occur in the world, and to the major issues of international relations and the interaction of actors, international institutions will experience contingent changes. This is certainly an important part of the study of the international system.

The third key element of the international system is the international ideational structure. The ideational structure means culture, which has a direct influence on the basic form of the international system and the behavior pattern of the members of the system. Alexander Wendt categorized international ideational structures into three types, that is, Hobbesian culture dominated by the jungle principle, Lockean culture dominated by market competition and Kantian culture guided by inter-state friendship. He further defined the dominant culture of the contemporary international system as a Lockean culture which became the guiding ideational structure of the international system after the establishment of the principle of sovereignty, and in which states survive and let others survive despite competition.¹⁷ There are two problems in Wendt's theory. First, he didn't mention the dynamics for

15. Qin Yaqing, *Hegemonic System and International Conflict*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1999; Qin Yaqing, *International System and Chinese Diplomacy*, Beijing: Foreign Affairs Press, 2009.

16. Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

17. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

culture to evolve from one to another;¹⁸ second, the culture he referred to was defined in a broad sense and hence there is no detailed study of the evolution of important ideas in the international system. Later on, with further development of the constructivist agenda, international norms have become an important part of the constructivist research program, for instance, the initiation of norms and its promotion, acceptance, selection, decline or even death.¹⁹ Therefore, the ideational structure of the contemporary international system is mainly a normative structure. For instance, Buzan argues that significant changes have occurred to the fundamental norms of international society, where the norm of sovereignty declines and democracy, human rights and environmentalism become important new norms.²⁰ In short, ideas in the international system are an important factor, which concerns not only institutions, but also power, especially soft power.

An Analytical Framework for System Change

The above discussions can help us formulate a preliminary analytical framework for change in the international system. First, there is the question of an ontological change of the system, which can be observed by determining whether or not a fundamental change has occurred in the nature of the units composing the system. Two dimensions herein are important. On the one hand, we must observe whether or not the units have changed from one social form to another with an entirely different nature, for example from nation states to individual world citizens. On the other hand, we must observe whether or not fundamental changes have occurred to the defining norms of the units, for example from sovereignty to super-sovereignty. If fundamental changes have occurred to the key elements at both dimensions, the system itself has changed. In the system set up by Emperor Qin after he unified China, the composing units differed significantly from those composing the pre-Qin system. The European international system after 1648 also had totally different

18. Qin Yaqing, "Cultural Theory of World Politics: Cultural Structure, Cultural Unit and Cultural Power," in Qin Yaqing, *Power, Institutions and Culture*, pp.168—179.

19. The study of norms has become a major research program of constructivism in recent years. A lot of research has been published on *International Organization* and other academic journals of international relations, such as, Jeffery Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 4, Fall 2005, pp.801—826; Alexander Gitsciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization," *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 4, Fall 2005, pp.973—1012; Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter", *International Organization*, Vol. 58, No. 2, Spring 2004, pp.239—275.

20. Barry Buzan, "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010.

compositional units from those of the European system prior to Thirty Years' War. As far as the contemporary international system is concerned, the criterion for an ontological change of the system is whether or not the composing units of the system have kept their fundamental nature. Of course, when observing a change of the system itself, we will notice some phenomena which might reveal the process-orientation and relational situation of the system. When the phenomena increase and add up to an extent that enables qualitative change among the units composing the system, an ontological change of the system occurs.

Second, we should consider changes of key elements within the system. According to the above hypothesis, we can examine the continuity and change in the international system from three dimensions. First, we must consider the power structure of the system. To do this, we should observe changes in the power distribution among the major actors and the tendencies of such changes, for instance the power of the hegemon when compared with other major powers. Second, we should examine international institutions, which exercise international governance. In this respect, we will investigate the effectiveness and adequacy of institutions. Adequate and effective international institutions can exercise good international governance, dissolve major systemic problems and promote international cooperation. Third, we shall examine the normative structure of the international system. The focus will be on the rationality of existing norms, the growing power of new norms and the compatibility or conflict between the two.

Of course such a framework is an ideal type. In the reality of international relations, these elements are interlinked. Under certain conditions, changes in the key internal elements of the system can catalyze an ontological change of the system. Nonetheless, such a framework can help us understand the continuity and change of the international system, observe the development and evolution of its key internal elements, judge the international situation and develop national strategies.

The International System: Ontological Continuity and Elemental Change

According to the analytical framework above, the basic judgment this paper make on the current state of the international system is, ontological continuity and elemental change. In other words, on the one hand, the international system is still an integrated system with sovereign states as compositional units; on the other hand, the key elements of the system are undergoing profound changes.

Ontological Continuity of the International System

Looking at the current international system, we find that the turning point for systemic transformation hasn't been reached but the signs of transformation has shown. In other words, since the establishment of the Westphalian order, no significant changes have occurred to the state system. Nation-states are still the most important actors in the international system, and the principle of sovereignty is still an international norm prescribed by the Charter of the United Nations. This system based on nation-states and sovereignty still plays a dominant role in major international affairs. Therefore, our basic judgment is that there is no quantitative change to the international system and ontological continuity remains a major feature of the contemporary world.

The G20 is a convincing case. The financial crisis started in the United States, but it wasn't state behavior by nature. However, when it swept the world, those who organized and mobilized resources and took major actions to counter it were nation states. The establishment of the G20 shows that states are the leading force in global governance, especially major states, which have played an indispensable role. Another case in point is relative to international norms. A lot of studies have found that political elites and the state apparatus play a critical role in the initiation, development and proliferation of international norms. Non-governmental organizations can propose norms and set agendas, but if norms are to be spread on a large scale, states have to play the key role. As²¹ Keck and Sikkink pointed out, great influence can be produced if transnational advocacy networks can convince and win support from states and international organizations. Besides, the targets of non-states actors are also states. In other words, the main purpose of the transnational advocacy network is to convince states to take certain actions or give up certain policies.²¹ Thus, we conclude that the international system remains ontologically unchanged since there is no qualitative change to its composing units or dominating norms.

However, from another perspective, there have been signs of systemic evolution, which shows that some important changes are occurring to the system itself. Two signs are most conspicuous. The first is the acceleration of regional integration, which has led to regional international communities that are more dynamic than global society. The European Union has sped up its integration after the Cold War. Despite difficulties, it never changed its direction toward integration. The assumption of an office of the EU President and Foreign Minister shows the determination and development trend of European integration. The

21. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Border: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.

goal of EU integration is to create a system beyond sovereign states. The norm of sovereignty has become thinnest among EU countries in comparison with other parts of the world. The territorial status quo norm, wherein no sovereignty claim can be made on disputed territory, has only occurred in and been adopted by EU member states.²² Other regions are also in the process of regional integration, for instance ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, NAFTA, and so on. Whether or not the future world can be “a world of regions” remains a question.²³ However, regional integration is definitely weakening the norm of sovereignty.

The second significant sign is the growth of social forces and the diversification of actors in the international system. International and regional organizations and international civil society have become important forces in international affairs. The European Union has become a member of the G20 itself while some major members of the EU also participate in the G20 as nation-states; the parade outside G20 Summit venues has been a demonstration of social participation. NGOs have played an important role in setting agendas, initiating norms and building transnational networks. These phenomena have not only led to a lot of studies of non-state actors, but also convinced many international relations scholars that the international system has transformed from an international society to a world society. Actually the world today is far from detaching itself from the state system and reaching a world system. But the diversification of actors and loosening of sovereignty has become evident at the global level, and has become an important factor in the strategy-development and policy-implementation of states. Nonetheless, whether or not this is the development trend of the international system remains to be seen.

Elemental Change in the International System

Although there is more continuity than change in the international system itself, the changes in the key internal elements of the system have become clear. Important changes have occurred to the systemic structure, systemic institutions and systemic culture. Some of these changes occurred even before the financial crisis. But the crisis became a facilitator and made the changes conspicuous.

22. Mark Korrkrobt, “Argumentation and Compromise: Ireland’s Selection of Territorial Status Quo Norm”, *International Organization* 61, Winter 2007, pp.69–98.

23. Here I borrow the term from Katzenstein, who has taken regions, especially Europe and Asia, as important units of the international system in his analysis. See Peter Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in American Imperium*, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Changes in the Systemic Structure

The power structure of the international system mainly refers to the international arrangement as defined by the distribution of power. A newly universally-accepted definition of the post-Cold War arrangement is “one superpower with several major powers.” The financial crisis has had great influence on the setup of the world. Although no fundamental change occurred to the basic setup—one superpower with several major powers, the distribution of power witnessed the rise of some parties and relative decline of others. At present, the basic feature of the international setup can be summarized as “one superpower in decline and major powers in shift.” Such a summary has connotations in the following three aspects.

First, there has been no fundamental change in the status of the United States as the only superpower. However, its power has experienced relative decline. Since the end of the Cold War, the structure of the international system has been characterized as one superpower with several major powers. The U.S. as the only superpower has surpassed all major powers in overall national strength. China, Russia, Germany, France, Britain and Japan can be called major powers. The financial crisis didn't change the basic international setup and the superpower status of the U.S. was not challenged. The U.S. today is not like Great Britain after World War I. As far as power is concerned, the U.S. remains No.1 in the world. Given the U.S.'s ability to manipulate the international system and the international agenda, traditional talent for self-recovery and innovation, and the high interdependence of the world economy and the deepening of international cooperation, the sole-superpower status of the United States will remain stable. However, both U.S. soft power and hard power are fading towards decline, because the war on terror and the war in Iraq have weakened U.S. resources, the financial crisis has caused a negative impact on overall U.S. national strength, and the international community has started to question the Washington Consensus and U.S. capabilities and leadership after a series of troubling events took place in the post-Cold War world.

Second, the major powers are witnessing a shift of positions in the global hierarchy, the overall strength of the emerging powers are rising. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, the group of major powers was composed of Germany, France, Britain, Japan and other western powers. At that time, China was still in the initial stage of its rise, and the emergence of other economies was in embryo. However, in recent years, a major development in the international setup has been the rise of emerging powers as a group. Emerging powers emerged first of all economically. The outstanding members are the BRICS, i.e., Brazil, Russia, India and China. The rapid development of these countries

concerns not only the international power distribution, but also a systemic transformation from western domination to active non-western participation. The clearest evidence is the fact that emerging economies have become indispensable members of the international economic system. Emerging powers have begun to enter into the core of the international system, and thus significant change have occurred in the center-periphery relationship described by the theory of dependency.²⁴ Although such phenomena didn't change the basic systemic structure of "one superpower with several major powers," it did raise questions regarding to what extent the changes mentioned in the above could lead to the transformation of the international system itself, if social relations and relations of production indeed have an impact on the international system and on the actors involved.²⁵

Third, China is evidently rising and gathering influence. Although the Chinese economy also suffered from the global financial crisis, it realized the targeted stable GDP increase of 8% in 2009 when negative growth in western countries, took the lead in the economic recovery and made its due contribution to the health of the world economy. International organizations including the World Bank raised their expectations about China's economic growth this year. China surpassed Japan and became the world's second largest economy. All the alternatives to the reform of G8 that came up last year included China, for instance the G2, G4, G14, and G20. In addition, IMF reform of the distribution of voting power among its members also demonstrated that significant change has occurred in the power distribution in the international system. China's rise has become an undisputable fact. For the first time since 1840, China entered into the core of the international system and became a real regional power with global influence.

The rise of emerging countries represents obvious change in the power distribution of the international system and the world setup, and reflects substantial multilateralization in embryo. The point has not been reached yet of evolving past the "one superpower with several major powers" status quo, although the trend toward multilateralization is increasingly evident. It is fair to say that the general setup of "one superpower with several major powers" will persist for a relatively long time in history, and will remain as a basic

24. See James Caporaso, "Industrialization in the Periphery: The Evolving Global Division of Labor", in W.L.Hollist and J. Rosnau, eds., *World-System Structure: Continuity and Change*, California: Sage, 1981, pp.140—171; see also Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, New York/San Diego: Academic Press, 1974, 1980, 1989.

25. Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in Robert Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp.204—254.