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ARMS IMPORTATION INTO CHINA

JUN - 21927— N.C.D.N.
Shipments from Germany With-
out Disclosure of Real
Origin

London, May 31.

Replying to a question in the House of Commons to-day, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Locker-Lampson, said that arms valued at Tls. 3,813,644 had been imported into China in 1925 from German ports. This, however, did not prove that the arms had been manufactured in Germany in contravention to the Treaty of Versailles and there was no occasion to refer the matter to the League of Nations. Shipments of arms were still taking place from Hamburg to China, he said, but the real origin of the arms was not certain.—Reuter.

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ARMS SEIZURE AT

JAN 12 1928 KIEL N.C.D.V.

Two Hundred and Fifty Tons of
Munitions Believed Destined
for China

Kiel, Jan. 10.

Two hundred and fifty tons of goods which arrived here to-day in 16 freight cars from Halle for shipment to Oslo on the Norwegian freight-steamer Aker were discovered by Customs officials to be munitions. Their loading on board the vessel has been forbidden pending investigation of their origin.

Shipping circles believe that the munitions were intended for China.—Reuter.

Manila, Jan. 10.

The str. Praga, a Czecho-Slovakian vessel, loaded with fire-arms, has put into Manila for coal. Her destination is uncertain, but her officers say that the ship will touch at Shanghai to unload her cargo of munitions for the Nationalist Government but that her ultimate destination is Chinwangtao.

(Note: This vessel was, until recently, known as str. Hedwig Fischer (1799 tons), then owners Schroder Holken & Fischer, Hamburg. Reported passing Perim on November 25.)—Reuter.

Tientsin, Friday, Jan., 13, 1928

THAT ARMS
EMBARGO P.T.T.

THREE news items which appeared in our last issue reveal the fact that notwithstanding the rupture between Moscow and the Nationalists, and the virtual shutting off of the supply of arms and munitions, overland, from Russia to the Kuominchun, large shipments of weapons and munitions of war continue to be made to China. A large consignment of arms and ammunition, supposedly of German manufacture, was recently imported at Tsingtao by a Norwegian vessel consigned to a Japanese firm. A consignment of 250 tons of munitions has been discovered, and held up, by the German authorities at Kiel, on the eve of shipment to Oslo—and China. And a Czecho-Slovakian steamer, the Praga, loaded with munitions for Shanghai, has had to put into Manila, owing to shortage of coal. The telegram reporting her arrival states that after unloading munitions at Shanghai she will proceed to her ultimate destination—Chinwangtao. It is difficult to believe that this is correct. One can hardly imagine a Czecho-Slovakian vessel bringing out, on the same trip, munitions of war for the Northern and Southern factions, and if the Praga were to unload her entire cargo of war materials

at Shanghai, and subsequently proceed to Chinwangtao, she would be taking a very grave risk of detention by the Northern authorities.

Both the Kiel and the Manila incidents, however, show that notwithstanding the agreement enter-

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ed into between the leading Powers in Treaty relations with China, in 1919, to impose an embargo upon the shipment of arms and munitions of war, and material destined exclusively for their manufacture, the arms traffic with China continues to flourish. At one time large quantities of munitions from various sources, reached China on German ships. Last year, however, the German Government entered into an agreement with German shipping companies, under which the latter undertook not to carry cargoes of munitions of war to this country. It comes as a surprise to find that a vessel sailing under the Czecho-Slovakian flag is now engaged in this traffic. For Czecho-Slovakia is not a maritime, but an inland State, with no direct outlet to the sea, but entitled by the Versailles Treaty to certain wharfage privileges at Hamburg and Stettin. In the areas leased to Czecho-Slovakia in these ports, she enjoys free-port privileges, and, one may assume, immunity from German Customs examination.

The Arms Embargo of 1919 has never worked really satisfactorily. It was only subscribed to by about a dozen States, in all. It did not define the meaning of the phrase "arms and munitions of war and material designed exclusively for their manufacture." And it has been persistently and flagrantly violated—in the spirit, if not in the letter—by the nationals of those Powers upon whom it is supposed to be binding. Arsenal machinery has been imported in large quantities, many of the machines required for making arms being, of course, identical with those required for other engineering works. Iron and steel pipes which by a simple process could be turned into trench-mortars, and the ingredients of various high-explosives, have been freely imported.

So too have aeroplanes, which it would have been grotesque to suggest, under existing conditions, are required for any but military purposes. The embargo has, in fact, only proved effective in preventing the direct importation from the countries which ratified it, of finished weapons, small or large, of home manufacture. There is not, we believe, a single Chinese unit, in any army, that is equipped with American, British, or French, rifles or artillery. Thousands of Russian, German and Japanese weapons are in use, the bulk of which have come from Russia. And American, British, French, German, Russian, Danish and other experts have been assisting various military factions in producing lethal weapons. Morally, and from the practical point of view, there seems little or nothing to choose between supplying the Chinese militarists with arms and munitions, and supervising and directing their manufacture. None of the signatories to the Embargo, however, appears to enjoy the legal authority to prohibit its nationals from participating in the manufacture of war material in China.

It would, unquestionably, be a good thing for China and the world, if it were possible to devise international action whereby both the export of arms and munitions to this country, and foreign supervision of their manufacture, could be prevented. Such action, however, is beyond the scope of practical politics. And this being so it really appears to be open to question whether there is any point in maintaining the fiction that an Arms Embargo is actually in force. Individual States whose Governments feel scruples about the propriety of permitting their nationals to engage in the arms traffic in China, could continue to impose such restrictions as thought fit, Embargo or no Em-

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bargo. It is, however, merely farcical to pretend that their action will prevent the Chinese from getting war supplies if they are able to pay for them. The Embargo, in its existing form merely encourages fraud and hypocrisy, and penalizes the more scrupulous traders. So many contriv-

ances are used in modern warfare—even as practised by Chinese armies—that at a given moment it would be difficult to say whether it was a graver breach of the spirit of the Embargo to supply a Chinese militarist with petrol, motor lorries, steel plate, steel pipes, rails, lead and nickel, than with finished rifles or machine-guns. Commercial firms cannot be expected continuously to discriminate between supplies which are intended to be, or may be, used for purely military purposes, and those which are destined for pacific uses. Firms which endeavour to conform to the spirit as well as the letter of the 1919 Embargo merely lose their trade to less scrupulous competitors. It is, in our opinion, desirable that the pretence that an Embargo exists be abandoned. If Great Britain, or America, or any other Power then likes to prohibit the export from its territories to China or the import into China by its nationals, of finished weapons, or parts thereof, and ammunition, well and good. Merchants will know precisely where they stand. But the restriction against handling "material designed exclusively" for the manufacture of arms and munitions of war, ought to be abandoned. If it could be made effective we should not, to-day see Chinese armies equipped with improved Stokes Mortars, French aeroplanes, tanks, armoured trains, and high-explosive shells, most of which have been imported or manufactured since April 1919. We have no desire to see China flooded with arms and munitions of foreign manufacture. But we consider it grotesque to pretend that any useful purpose can be achieved by maintaining the 1919 Embargo in its present form.

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ARMS FROM EUROPE FOR MARSHAL SUN

From Bohemia in Norwegian
Ship: Nothing Irregular in
the Shipment

Jan 19, 1928. NBT
FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

Peking, Jan. 18.

All previous reports of tentative efforts by the Philippines authorities to prevent the sailing of the Norwegian str. Prada, with arms for the North are known here to be absolutely without foundation, since American officials in Manila have no right to question the character or destination of merchandise in transit. Local Chinese military authorities say the delay at Manila has been caused by the efforts of Nationalist agents to bribe the crew, which explanation generally is accepted in the Legations.

The shipment is from Bohemia via Germany and consists of 40,000 rifles—not 60,000 or 70,000 as reported—whereof a considerable part are for Sun Chuan-fang. Neither the Czechs or the Norwegians are parties to any embargo agreement, wherefore there is nothing irregular in the sale by them of arms to China.

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THOSE MUNITIONS FOR CHINA

JAN 26 1928 N.C.D.N.

Astonishing Revelations by Important German Newspaper:
Allegations Against High Official

DELICATE TASK FOR NEW MINISTER

London, Jan. 24.

The Berlin correspondent of the Daily Telegraph wires that, if the "Berliner Tageblatt" is correctly informed, General von Groener, the new Minister for Defence, will have to explain to the Reichstag an even more delicate scandal than the Phoebe film affair in which his department is involved.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" alleges that a lieutenant on the active list of the Army and a high official of the Naval Transport Department of the Ministry of War are concerned in that "curious transaction," the shipment of seventeen waggons of munitions which the Kiel police stopped when they were about to be shipped to a destination declared to be Oslo but suspected to be China.

The "Berliner Tageblatt" speaks derisively of hints that the Kiel munitions affair should be hushed up "in the interests of national defence." It says "There is no question of the interests of national defence. It was a piece of business in which money was to be made and the question must be cleared up to what purposes this money was to be applied."

After stating that the War Department knew nothing whatever about this consignment of munitions, the "Berliner Tageblatt" assumes that General von Groener will end such dealings once for all.

It will be remembered that on January 10 the Customs authorities

at Kiel discovered that 250 tons of goods which had arrived from Halle for shipment to Oslo on the Norwegian str. Aker were munitions, believed to be intended for China. The shipment was detained pending an investigation. Also the Norwegian str. Skule, from Oslo, and another vessel have recently landed large shipments of munitions at Tsingtao while the Czecho-Slovakian str. Praga, which recently left Manila allegedly for Chinwangtao, has a large cargo of arms and ammunition which came from the Czecho-Slovak arms factory at Bruenn.—Reuter.

Berlin, Jan. 24.

Replying to a question asked in the Budget Committee of the Reichstag, Dr. Stresemann, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the Naval Department had assured the Foreign Office that neither it nor any of its officials had anything to do with shipments of arms and munitions to China and the Foreign Office accepted this as a formal denial of the rumours that had been circulated.

The "Lokal-Anzeiger" publishes a telegram from Hongkong stating that the Nanking Government has ordered all the branches of two German firms to be closed and their managers arrested on a charge of rebellion as the firms are accused of supplying Generalissimo Chang Tso-lin with weapons shipped by the Norwegian str. Skule.—Reuter.

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ARMS SHIP ESCAPES CRUISER.

SHOTS EXCHANGED FOR
THREE HOURS.

JAN 30 1928 P.T.T.

Shanghai, Jan. 27.

The *Evening News* publishes a message from Tsingtao that the *Praga* has arrived; despite an attempt by the Nationalist gunboat *Feihu* to hold her up on Wednesday morning off Shantung.

The *Praga* is alleged to have ignored that *Feihu's* signals. The ships exchanged gunfire for three hours before the *Praga* outdistanced the *Feihu*.—*Reuter*.

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ARMS EMBARGO PACT.

GERMANY WILLING TO
ADHERE TO TERMS.

MAR - 9 1928 — P.T.T.

NON-SIGNATORY POWERS TO
BE INCLUDED IN SCOPE.

SOVIET RUSSIA A PROBABLE
STUMBLING BLOCK.

Peking, March 3.

Germany is reported to have expressed her willingness to adhere to the Arms Embargo Pact which binds Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Japan and Holland to forbid their nationals to import arms and munitions into China.

It is stated in local Chinese circles that in view of repeated cases of arms smuggling in which nationals of the non-signatory Powers have been involved, the Powers recently decided to extend the scope of the Pact and ask Russia, Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway to adhere to the Convention. While Germany has already indicated her attitude through her Minister in Peking, the other countries remain reticent. Competent Chinese observers say that it is extremely difficult to get Soviet Russia into line, as she is still treated by the Powers as an outcast from the family of nations and is not likely to take common action with the Powers in China.—Kuo Wen.

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要旨
德國政府於三月三日
表示其願加入
禁運軍火協定
該協定係由
英國、美國、
法國、日本、
荷蘭等國所
締結其目的在
禁止其國民向
中國運送軍火
及彈藥等物
據此間消息
各國政府已
決定將該協定
之範圍擴大
並要求俄國、
德國、捷克斯
拉夫、丹麥、
瑞典及挪威
等國加入該
協定
德國政府已
表示其願加入
該協定
惟其他各國
尚持保留態度
據此間觀察家
之言謂欲使
蘇俄加入該
協定極為困難
因蘇俄目前
仍被各國視為
國際社會之
局外人且其
與各國共同
行動之可能
性甚小

U.S. AND THE ARMS EMBARGO

MAR 13 1928 N.C.D.N.
President Harding's Proclamation Still Effective

Washington, Mar. 11.

In connexion with the request of the Diplomatic Corps, at Peking for a stricter observance of the embargo on the export of arms and ammunition to China, the State Department declares that the United States is faithfully carrying out the terms of the Arms Embargo Agreement. It points out that President Harding's proclamation in 1922, in connexion with the Agreement, is still effective.—Reuter.

キリンダ宣言

疑点

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要米國武器禁輸約束の履行ニ關スル事
（一）米國の武器禁輸約束
（二）米國の武器禁輸約束の履行
（三）米國の武器禁輸約束の履行の状況
（四）米國の武器禁輸約束の履行の今後の見通し

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Flentsin, Thursday, Mar. 16, 1928

THE ARMS 'EMBARGO.

THE Diplomatic Body at Peking, at a recent meeting, took up the question of the arms traffic with China, and, we are told, addressed identic cables to all the Governments that are parties to the Arms Embargo of 1919 urging that those Powers which have not yet taken any measures to prevent the export of arms to China should be induced to do so as soon as possible. That any effective action will result from this appeal is in the highest degree improbable. The parties to the Arms Embargo are not themselves in agreement as to what constitutes "material destined exclusively" for the manufacture of munitions of war; and they cannot, therefore, reasonably expect other Governments to adhere to so vague and unsatisfactory an agreement as the so-called "Embargo" of 1919. This agreement was, in the first instance, signed only by eight Powers. Three more subsequently adhered to it without, and one—Italy—with, reservations. But in Europe alone, the following States to the best of our belief, have never given their formal approval of the Embargo: Sweden, Norway, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Rumania, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Switzerland, and Russia. Add to these the numerous Central and South American Republics which have incurred no obligations in this matter, and it will be seen that the enforcement of a watertight embargo under existing conditions must be regarded as a hopeless proposition.

There are, in our opinion, only two ways of making an embargo on arms and munitions reasonably effective, and even these would not

entirely restrain Soviet Russia, which, for political ends, has furnished various warring factions in China with enormous supplies of arms and munitions during the past three years—the bulk of them on credit. And either of the measures we suggest presupposes an agreement among the Powers chiefly concerned as to what does, and what does not, constitute actual or potential war-material. At present it appears that aeroplanes which are required and used solely for military purposes, are being freely supplied to the Northern Militarists by one of the countries—France—which is a party to the Arms Embargo. Steel piping, and other materials, intended to be converted into weapons, projectiles or explosives, are also freely exported from countries which recognize the Embargo. And the nationals of certain of these countries, prohibited from exporting arms and munitions from their native lands, are acting as agents for their purchase in other countries. An agreed, and carefully compiled prohibited list is an essential preliminary to the suppression of the arms traffic with China.

When it comes to practical measures for enforcing the embargo, we suggest that one, or both of the following might prove effective. The only country which has recently been willing to furnish China with arms on credit is Soviet Russia, and it may be doubted whether, after the failure of Soviet activities in this country, she is either anxious or willing to make further deliveries. No other persons in a position to supply arms to China are willing to do so without payment in cash. And the militarists—both in North and South China—are only able to raise the necessary money to make these payments by the acquiescence of the Treaty Powers in an orgy of illegal taxation. The Washing-

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But there is another, and more direct method of checking the arms traffic. Aeroplanes, guns, rifles, and ammunition do not swim out to China, and, except in very limited quantities, and with considerable difficulty, cannot be transported overland. The bulk of the arms and munitions reaching China have to be transported from Europe, or elsewhere, by sea. As a rule they are carried on tramp-steamers of comparatively small tonnage, and restricted cruising capacity. The *Praga*, for instance of 1,799 tons gross, is reported to have taken 56 days from Suez to Manila. She had to put into the latter port because of empty bunkers, and it may safely be assumed that she did not make the run from Suez to the Philippines, without coaling at several intermediate ports. No arms-carrying vessel could make the voyage from Europe to China without calling at British, French, Portuguese or Dutch ports, and few would attempt the trip except via Suez. If, therefore, the Powers are really desirous of enforcing the Arms Embargo, the only effective method of doing so appears to be to intercept them *en route* to China. Presumably special legislation would be required to make it possible for arms-carriers to be detained, or to be refused fuelling or other port facilities, while they contained arms or munitions in their holds. A Norwegian or Czecho-Slovakian tramp would be helpless if, on putting into a British, French or Dutch port she was

西武區輸入禁止ヲ有効ニスルニ達シ(PTT)

日協定中、米米不備ノ事アリ材料細目未定ニテ
而モ後トキ米稅ノ差出甚大ニテ資糧ヲ奪フコト
俄國乃チ上告書ヲ發シ俄國之カニ疑懼シ

required to unload her cargo before receiving permission to coal, or take on board provisions or water. The *Praga*, if the British Government had adopted this practice, and applied pressure to Egypt to fall into line, could have been held up, and turned back, at Port Said; and, had she escaped detection there, and the American Government adopted the same procedure, would never have been allowed to leave Manila with arms aboard. Small consignments—a few cases of rifles, pistols or ammunition—might evade detection, if this scheme were adopted, but it would be impossible for ships laden with arms and munitions to deliver their cargoes in China. If the Embargo Signatories agreed upon this procedure, the only danger-spot remaining, other than Soviet Russia, would be the Western

coast of Central and South America. So far as we are aware arms and munitions have never been exported in considerable quantities from any of the States on this coast; and we doubt whether they would be available, even if the Governments concerned connived at the participation of their nationals in the arms traffic.

We suggest, therefore, that the best way to make the Embargo really effective is to render it impossible for ships laden with arms to reach Chinese ports, either from Europe or America. It would, we fancy, be perfectly feasible for the Embargo Signatories to give notice that from now onward no vessels laden with arms and munitions, other than cargoes certified to be the property of Governments parties to the China Embargo, would be given any facilities in any ports situated within their respective territories, and to bar the passage of such vessels through either the Panama or the Suez Canal. It seems, on the face of it, absurd that the Governments which are opposed to the arms traffic in China should actually permit facilities to be given to vessels engaged in transporting arms and munitions of war, to this country.

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EXPORT OF ARMS TO CHINA.

JUL 27 1928 P.T.T.

London, July 7.

It must clearly be in the interests of some European Governments to supply an explanation of the bald figures which were given by Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons this week on the subject of the exportation of arms to China. In the year 1926—the latest for which statistics are available—arms and munitions passed from foreign countries into China to the value of £330,220; and the figures are incomplete. They include only the arms that were imported through the Customs at the Treaty Ports, and do not therefore cover the consignments entering China overland from Russia; and they must be read with the proviso made by the Foreign Secretary that the various countries named as exporters are those from which the arms were shipped and not necessarily those which produced them. Germany therefore may certainly be expected to have some explanation of the unfortunate position which she occupies on the list. She comes easily first. The value of the arms sent from Germany is very nearly four times as great as that from Japan, which comes second, and about eight times as great as the total from French Indo-China, the third country on the list, and, like Japan, a Far Eastern neighbour.

While the published list admittedly creates a first impression strongly unfavourable to Germany, it would be unfair to assume that the Reich is the principal offender. In the first place, the figures refer to a period before Germany had declared her adherence to the China Arms Embargo Agreement, which is the only operative international instrument for preventing the supply of weapons of war to China. And in the second place the greater

proportion of the arms shipped from Germany were undoubtedly manufactured elsewhere. Hamburg, it must be remembered, acts as chief seaport to Czechoslovakia; and that country and Soviet Russia are the only two important arms-producing States which are not parties to the Embargo Agreement. Much of the merchandise of Scandinavia is also shipped from Hamburg; and Norway, besides manufacturing an excellent pattern of rifle herself, may act as *entrepôt* for some of the arms and munitions freely dispensed by the Bolshevists. Some signatory States there are, too, whose officials are not as zealous as they might be in enforcing the provisions of the Arms Embargo Agreement. However that may be, the fact remains that the two countries chiefly responsible for the supply of the sinews of civil war to China are Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. Rifle and bayonet are the most easily transportable of arms; and in China they form the staple weapon of warfare and unfortunately become the instruments of the most horrible tortures. The bayonet in the hands of the brigand who calls himself a soldier in the Nationalist armies serves the basest purposes of cruelty and is the curse of China to-day.—*Times*.

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ARMS IMPORTED INTO CHINA IN 1926 VALUED AT £330,220

N.C.S.

AUG - 1 1928

Mr. Chamberlain, replying to Hongkong	131,881
the question of a labour member French Indo-China	116,715
in the House of Commons on July Britain	84,849
4th about arms imported to China Sweden	66,039
in 1926, stated that the value Germany	1,261,252
totalled H. K. Tls. 2,120,476 or Belgium	82
330,220 pounds sterling. These France	65,552
figures show the value of arms Italy	4,054
passed through the Maritime Korea	209
Customs and do not include the Japan (including Formosa)	363,214
arms sent to China from Russia. Philippines	19,644
The value of arms required by Canada	225
the various foreign contingents in U. S. (including Hawaii)	31,907
China and Shanghai Volunteer Total	2,200,623
Corps is included in the figures. Re-exported	80,147
The following gives the detailed Balance	2,120,476
account. —Toho.	
Imported from H. K. Tls.	2,200,623

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Tientsin, Wednes., Feb. 20, 1929

THE ARMS EMBARGO.

P.T.T.
A CABLE which we print this

morning confirms the report that the American Government is about to cancel the Arms Embargo against China at an early date. The Secretary of State has made a statement to this effect to the House Military Affairs Committee, and it is construed, in Washington, as an additional manifestation of the belief that the Nationalist Government is firm, and that allowing shipments of arms to China will not be an incentive to fresh civil warfare. This is the interpretation that would naturally be placed upon the American Government's decision in political circles. Actually, however, the State Department is probably actuated as much by the futility of the embargo, as by any faith in the stability of the Nationalist Government, or any belief that the importation of arms will not act as an incentive to civil war. The plain truth is that the Embargo, from the date it was first enforced, nearly ten years ago, has been a complete fiasco. It was never adhered to by several States which were in a position to export arms of their own or other countries' manufacture, and it was so vaguely phrased that bonafide foreign traders were in genuine doubt as to the extent of the prohibition.

The proposal of an Arms Embargo was first made by the American Minister at Peking on April 8, 1919. During the following month there was an exchange of views between the major Powers, and on May 5 a Note was communicated to the Wanchiaopu announcing that the Governments of Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, the United States, Russia, Brazil, France and Japan had "agreed effectively to restrain their subjects and citizens from exporting to, or importing into, China arms and munitions of war, and materials

destined exclusively for their manufacture until the establishment of a Government whose authority is recognized throughout the whole country, and also to prohibit during the above period the delivery of arms and munitions for which contracts have already been made but not executed." The Representatives of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and Italy were stated to be in full accord with this decision, but to be awaiting the instructions of their respective Governments, which ultimately, with some reservations, adhered to the Embargo. The inclusion of Russia was apparently unauthorized. And it will be noticed that a number of other States which were in a position to export arms to China, directly, or indirectly, were not included in the list of signatories.

The export of arms and munitions to China continued, large quantities coming in from Czechoslovakia, Norway, and other non-signatory States, and millions of dollars worth being supplied to Canton and the Kuomintang, by Moscow. Difficulty arose almost immediately over the precise meaning of "materials destined exclusively for their manufacture." It became obvious that such materials might be imported in the innocent guise of drain-pipes, sporting cartridges, raw materials, and lathes, etc. Moreover it was a nice point whether aeroplanes should be included in the embargo. The British Vickers and Handley-Page machines, which had been imported on a Government guarantee that they would be used solely for commercial purposes, were soon commandeered by the militarists, and used exclusively for military work. Aeroplanes continued to be imported, some of them with machine-gun mountings and bomb-dropping apparatus. And during China's incessant civil wars there were often occasions when motor-cars, locomotives and rolling stock, and petrol were far more urgently required for military purposes than field-guns, rifles, or cartridges.

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