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BOOK II

16 ...To beg and assume the original question is   64b
a species of failure to demonstrate the problem
proposed; but this happens in many ways. A man
may not reason syllogistically at all, or he   30
may argue from premisses which are less known
or equally unknown, or he may establish the an-
tecedent by means of its consequents; for demon-
stration proceeds from what is more certain and
is prior. Now begging the question is none of
these: but since we get to know some things
naturally through themselves, and other things
by means of something else (the first principles   35
through themselves, what is subordinate to them
through something else), whenever a man tries
to prove what is not self-evident by means of
itself, then he begs the original question. This
may be done by assuming what is in question at
once; it is also possible to make a transition
to other things which would naturally be proved   40
through the thesis proposed, and demonstrate it   65a
through them, e.g. if A should be proved through
B, and B through C, though it was natural that C
should be proved through A: for it turns out
that those who reason thus are proving A by
means of itself. This is what those persons
do who suppose that they are constructing paral-   5
lel straight lines. for they fail to see that
they are assuming facts which it is impossible
to demonstrate unless the parallels exist. So
it turns out that those who reason thus merely
say a particular thing is, if it is. in this
way everything will be self-evident. But that
is impossible.

     If then it is uncertain whether A belongs to C,   10
and also whether A belongs to B, and if one should
assume that A does belong to B, it is not yet
clear whether he begs the original question, but
it is evident that he is not demonstrating: for
what is as uncertain as the question to be an-
swered cannot be a principle of a demonstration.
If however B is so related to C that they are
identical, or if they are plainly convertible,   15
or the one belongs to the other, the original
question is begged. For one might equally well
prove that A belongs to B through those terms
if they are convertible. But if they are not
convertible, it is the fact that they are not that
prevents such a demonstration, not the method of
demonstrating. But if one were to make the con-

version, then he would be doing what we have des-
cribed and effecting a reciprocal proof with
three propositions.

Similarly if he should assume that B belongs
to C, this being as uncertain as the question   20
whether A belongs to C, the question is not
yet begged, but no demonstration is made.   If
however A and B are identical either because
they are convertible or because A follows B,
then the question is begged for the same reason
as before. For we have explained the meaning
of begging the question, viz. proving that which   25
is not self-evident by means of itself.

If then begging the question is proving what
is not self-evident by means of itself, in other
words failing to prove when the failure is due
to the thesis to be proved and the premiss through
which it is proved being equally uncertain,
either because predicates which are identical
belong to the same subject, or because the same
predicate belongs to subjects which are identi-
cal, the question may be begged in the middle and 30
third figures in both ways, though, if the syllo-
gism is affirmative, only in the third and first
figures. If the syllogism is negative, the
question is begged when identical predicates
are denied of the same subject; and both pre-
misses do not beg the question indifferently
(in a similar way the question may be begged
in the middle figure), because the terms in nega-
tive syllogisms are not convertible. In scienti-
fic demonstrations the question is begged when   35
the terms are really related in the manner des-
cribed, in dialectical arguments when they are
according to common opinion so related.

17 The objection that 'this is not the reason
why the result is false', which we frequently
make in argument, is made primarily in the case
of a reductio ad impossibile, to rebut the pro-   40
position which was being proved by the reduction.   65b
For unless a man has contradicted this proposi-
tion he will not say, 'False cause', but urge that
something false has been assumed in the earlier
parts of the argument; nor will he use the formula
in the case of an ostensive proof; for here
what one denies is not assumed as a premiss.
Further when anything is refuted ostensively
by the terms ABC, it cannot be objected that the   5

syllogism does not depend on the assumption laid
down. For we use the expression 'false cause',
when the syllogism is concluded in spite of the
refutation of this position; but that is not
possible in ostensive proofs: since if an as-
sumption is refuted, a syllogism can no longer
be drawn in reference to it. It is clear then
that the expression 'false cause' can only be   10
used in the case of a reductio ad impossibile,
and when the original hypothesis is so related
to the impossible conclusion, that the conclu-
sion results indifferently whether the hypothesis
is made or not. The most obvious case of the
irrelevance of an assumption to a conclusion
which is false is when a syllogism drawn from
middle terms to an impossible conclusion is
independent of the hypothesis, as we have ex-   15
plained in the Topics. 1 For to put that which
is not the cause as the cause, is just this: e.g.
if a man, wishing to prove that the diagonal
of the square is incommensurate with the side,
should try to prove Zeno's theorem that motion
is impossible, and so establish a reductio ad
impossibile: for Zeno's false theorem has no   20
connexion at all with the original assumption.
Another case is where the impossible conclusion
is connected with the hypothesis, but does not
result from it. This may happen whether one
traces the connexion upwards or downwards,
e.g. if it is laid down that A belongs to B, B   25
to C, and C to D, and it should be false that B
belongs to D: for if we eliminated A and assumed
all the same that B belongs to C and C to D,
the false conclusion would not depend on the
original hypothesis. Or again trace the connexion 30
upwards; e.g. suppose that A belongs to B, E to
A, and F to E, it being false that F belongs to
A. In this way too the impossible conclusion
would result, though the original hypothesis were
eliminated. But the impossible conclusion ought
to be connected with the original terms: in this
way it will depend on the hypothesis, e.g. when
one traces the connexion downwards, the impos-   35
sible conclusion must be connected with that
term which is predicate in the hypothesis: for
if it is impossible that A should belong to D,
the false conclusion will no longer result after
A has been eliminated. If one traces the con-

1 Soph. El. 167b 21-36.

nexion upwards, the impossible conclusion must
be connected with that term which is subject
in the hypothesis: for if it is impossible that
F should belong to B, the impossible conclusion
will disappear if B is eliminated. Similarly when
the syllogisms are negative.   40

It is clear then that when the impossibility   66a
is not related to the original terms, the false
conclusion does not result on account of the as-
sumption. Or perhaps even so it may sometimes
be independent. For if it were laid down that
A belongs not to B but to K, and that K belongs   5
to C and C to D, the impossible conclusion would
still stand. Similarly if one takes the terms
in an ascending series. Consequently since
the impossibility results whether the first
assumption is suppressed or not, it would appear
to be independent of that assumption. Or per-
haps we ought not to understand the statement
that the false conclusion results independently
of the assumption, in the sense that if something
else were supposed the impossibility would result;   10
but rather we mean that when the first assump-
tion is eliminated, the same impossibility
results through the remaining premisses; since
it is not perhaps absurd that the same false
result should follow from several hypotheses,
e.g. that parallels meet, both on the assump-
tion that the interior angle is greater than
the exterior and on the assumption that a triangle
contains more than two right angles.   15

18 A false argument depends on the first false
statement in it. Every syllogism is made out
of two or more premisses. If then the false
conclusion is drawn from two premisses, one or
both of them must be false: for (as was proved 2)
a false syllogism cannot be drawn from true pre-   20
misses. But if the premisses are more than two,
e.g. if C is established through A and B, and
these through D, E, F, and G, one of these higher
propositions must be false, and on this the
argument depends: for A and B are inferred by
means of D, E, F, and G. Therefore the conclu-
sion and the error results from one of them.

19 In order to avoid having a syllogism drawn   25
against us, we must take care, whenever an oppon-

2 53b 11-25.

ent asks us to admit the reason without the
conclusions, not to grant him the same term
twice over in his premisses, since we know that
a syllogism cannot be drawn without a middle
term, and that term which is stated more than
once is the middle. How we ought to watch the
middle in reference to each conclusion, is evident
from our knowing what kind of thesis is proved   30
in each figure. This will not escape us since
we know how we are maintaining the argument.

That which we urge men to beware of in their
admissions, they ought in attack to try to con-
ceal. This will be possible first, if, instead   35
of drawing the conclusions of preliminary syl-
logisms, they take the necessary premisses and
leave the conclusions in the dark; secondly
if instead of inviting assent to propositions
which are closely connected they take as far
as possible those that are not connected by
middle terms. For example suppose that A is to
be inferred to be true of F; B, C, D, and E
being middle terms. One ought then to ask
whether A belongs to B, and next whether D
belongs to E, instead of asking whether B belongs   40
to C; after that he may ask whether B belongs to   66b
C, and so on. And if the syllogism is drawn
through one middle term, he ought to begin with
that: in this way he will most likely deceive his
opponent.

20 Since we know when a syllogism can be formed
and how its terms must be related, it is clear   5
when refutation will be possible and when im-
possible. A refutation is possible whether
everything is conceded, or the answers alternate
(one, I mean, being affirmative, the other nega-
tive). For as has been shown a syllogism is
possible whether the terms are related in af-
firmative propositions or one proposition is af-
firmative, the other negative: consequently, if
what is laid down is contrary to the conclusion,   10
a refutation must take place: for a refutation is
a syllogism which establishes the contradictory.
But if nothing is conceded, a refutation is im-
possible: for no syllogism is possible (as we
saw 3) when all the terms are negative: therefore
no refutation is possible. For if a refutation
were possible, a syllogism must be possible;   15

3 41b 6.

although if a syllogism is possible it does not
follow that a refutation is possible. Similarly
refutation is not possible if nothing is conceded
universally: since the fields of refutation and
syllogism are defined in the same way.

21. It sometimes happens that just as we are dec-
eived in the arrangement of the terms, 4 so   20
error may arise in our thought about them, e.g.
if it is possible that the same predicate should
belong to more than one subject immediately,
but although knowing the one, a man may forget
the other and think the opposite true. Suppose
that A belongs to B and to C in virtue of their
nature, and that B and C belong to all D in the
same way. If then a man thinks that A belongs
to all B, and B to D, but A to no C, and C to
all D, he will both know and not know the same   25
thing 5 in respect of the same thing. 6 Again
if a man were to make a mistake about the mem-
bers of a single series; e.g. suppose A belongs
to B, B to C, and C to D, but some one thinks
that A belongs to all B, but to no C: he will
both know that A belongs to D, and think that   30
it does not. Does he then maintain after this
simply that what he knows, he does not think?
For he knows in a way that A belongs to C through
B, since the part is included in the whole;
so that what he knows in a way, this he main-
tains he does not think at all: but that is
impossible.
In the former case, where the middle term does   35
not belong to the same series, it is not possible
to think both the premisses with reference to
each of the two middle terms: e.g. that A belongs
to all B, but to no C, and both B and C belong to
all D. For it turns out that the first premiss
of the one syllogism is either wholly or partial-
ly contrary to the first premiss of the other.
For if he thinks that A belongs to everything   40
to which B belongs, and he knows that B belongs
to D, then he knows that A belongs to D. Con-   67a
sequently if again he thinks that A belongs to
nothing to which C belongs, he thinks that A
does not belong to some of that to which B be-
longs; but if he thinks that A belongs to every-
thing to which B belongs, and again thinks that

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4 Cf. i. 32 ff.   5 i.e. subject.
6 i.e. attribute.

A does not belong to some of that to which B
belongs, these beliefs are wholly or partially   5
contrary. In this way then it is not possible
to think; but nothing prevents a man thinking
one premiss of each syllogism or both premisses
of one of the two syllogisms: e.g. A belongs to
all B, and B to D, and again A belongs to no
C. An error of this kind is similar to the error
into which we fall concerning particulars: e.g.
if A belongs to all B, and B to all C, A will   10
belong to all C. If then a man knows that A
belongs to everything to which B belongs, he
knows that A belongs to C. But nothing prevents
his being ignorant that C exists; e.g. let A
stand for two right angles, B for triangle, C
for a particular diagram of a triangle. A man
might think that C did not exist, though he knew   15
that every triangle contains two right angles;
consequently he will know and not know the same
thing at the same time. For the expression 'to
know that every triangle has its angles equal to
two right angles' is ambiguous, meaning to have
the knowledge either of the universal or of the
particulars. Thus then he knows that C contains
two right angles with a knowledge of the uni-
versal, but not with a knowledge of the particu-   20
lars; consequently his knowledge will not be
contrary to his ignorance. The argument in the
Meno 7 that learning is recollection may be
criticized in a similar way. For it never happens
that a man starts with a foreknowledge of the
particular, but along with the process of being
led to see the general principle he receives a
knowledge of the particulars, by an act (as it
were) of recognition. For we know some things
directly; e.g. that the angles are equal to two   25
right angles, if we know that the figure is a
trangle. Similarly in all other cases.
By a knowledge of the universal then we see
the particulars, but we do not know them by the
kind of knowledge which is proper to them; con-
sequently it is possible that we may make mistakes
about them, but not that we should have the knowl-
edge and error that are contrary to one another;
rather we have the knowledge of the universal   30
but make a mistake in apprehending the particu-
lar. Similarly in the cases stated above. 8
The error in respect of the middle term is not

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7 81.   8 66b 20-6, 26-30.

contrary to the knowledge obtained through the
syllogism, nor is the thought in respect of one
middle term contrary to that in respect of the
other. Nothing prevents a man who knows both
that A belongs to the whole of B, and that B
again belongs to C, thinking that A does not   35
belong to C, e.g. knowing that every mule is
sterile and that this is a mule, and thinking
that this animal is with foal: for he does not
know that A belongs to C, unless he considers
the two propositions together. So it is evident
that if he knows the one and does not know the
other. he will fall into error. And this is
the relation of knowledge of the universal to
knowledge of the particular. For we know no   67b
sensible thing, once it has passed beyond the
range of our senses, even if we happen to have
perceived it, except by means of the universal
and the possession of the knowledge which is
proper to the particular, but without the actual
exercise of that knowledge. For to know is used
in three senses: it may mean either to have
knowledge of the universal or to have knowledge
proper to the matter in hand or to exercise   5
such knowledge: consequently three kinds of error
also are possible. Nothing then prevents a man
both knowing and being mistaken about the same
thing, provided that his knowledge and his error
are not contrary. And this happens also to the
man whose knowledge is limited to each of the
premisses and who has not previously considered
the particular question. For when he thinks
that the mule is with foal he has not the
knowledge in the sense of its actual exercise,
nor on the other hand has his thought caused   10
an error contrary to his knowledge: for the error
contrary to the knowledge of the universal would
be a syllogism.

But he who thinks the essence of good is the
essence of bad will think the same thing to be
the essence of good and the essence of bad. Let
A stand for the essence of good and B for the
essence of bad, and again C for the essence of   15
good. Since then he thinks B and C identical,
he will think that C is B, and similarly that B
is A, consequently that C is A. For just as we
saw that if B is true of all of which C is true,
and A is true of all of which B is true, A is
true of C, similarly with the word 'think'.

Similarly also with the word 'is'; for we saw   20
that if C is the same as B, and B as A, C is
the same as A. Similarly therefore with 'opine'.
Perhaps then this 9 is necessary if a man will
grant the first point. 10 But presumably that
is false, that any one could suppose the essence
of good to be the essence of bad, save incidental-
ly. For it is possible to think this in many   25
different ways. But we must consider this mat-
ter better. 11

22 Whenever the extremes are convertible it is
necessary that the middle should be convertible
with both. For if A belongs to C through B, then
if A and C are convertible and C belongs to
everything to which A belongs, B is convertible   30
with A, and B belongs to everything to which A
belongs, through C as middle, and C is conver-
tible with B through A as middle. Similarly if
the conclusion is negative, e.g. if B belongs
to C, but A does not belong to B, neither will
A belong to C. If then B is convertible with
A, C will be convertible with A. Suppose B does   35
not belong to A; neither then will C: for ex
hypothesi B belonged to all C. And if C is con-
vertible with B, B is convertible also with A: for
C is said of that of all of which B is said. And
if C is convertible in relation to A and to B,
B also is convertible in relation to A. For C
belongs to that to which B belongs: but C does   68a
not belong to that to which A belongs. And this
alone starts from the conclusion; the preceding
moods do not do so as in the affirmative syllo-
gism. Again if A and B are convertible, and simi-
larly C and D, and if A or C must belong to any-   5
thing whatever, then B and D will be such that
one or other belongs to anything whatever. For
since B belongs, and since A or C belongs to
everything, but not together, it is clear that B
or D belongs to everything, but not together. For
example if that which is uncreated is incorrup-
tible and that which is incorruptible is uncreated,
it is necessary that what is created should be   10
corruptible and what is corruptible should have

9 That a man should think the same thing to
be the essence of good and to be the essence
of bad.   10 That the essence of good is the
essence of bad.   11 The reference may be to
Met. iv. (F.

been created. For two syllogisms have been put
together. Again if A or B belongs to everything
and if C or D belongs to everything, but they
cannot belong together, then when A and C are con-
vertible B and D are convertible. For if B
does not belong to something to which D belongs,
it is clear that A belongs to it. But if A
then C: for they are convertible. Therefore C   15
and D belong together. But this is impossible.
When A belongs to the whole of B and to C and is
affirmed of nothing else, and B also belongs to
all C, it is necessary that A and B should be
convertible: for since A is said of B and C only,   20
and B is affirmed both of itself and of C, it is
clear that B will be said of everything of which
A is said, except A itself. Again when A and
B belong to the whole of C, and C is convertible
with B, it is necessary that A should belong
to all B: for since A belongs to all C, and C
to B by conversion, A will belong to all B.
  When, of two opposites A and B, A is preferable   25
to B, and similarly D is preferable to C, then if
A and C together are preferable to B and D
together, A must be preferable to D. For A is
an object of desire to the same extent as B is
an object of aversion, since they are opposites:
and C is similarly related to D, since they also
are opposites. If then A is an object of desire   30
to the same extent as D, B is an object of aver-
sion to the same extent as C (since each is to the
same extent as each---the one an object of aver-
sion, the other an object of desire). Therefore
both A and C together, and B and D together, will
be equally objects of desire or aversion. But
since A and C are preferable to B and D, A can-
not be equally desirable with D; for then B
along with D would be equally desirable with A   35
along with C. But if D is preferable to A,
then B must be less an object of aversion than
C: for the less is opposed to the less. But the
greater good and lesser evil are preferable to
the lesser good and greater evil: the whole BD
then is preferable to the whole AC. But ex
hypothesi this is not so. A then is preferable
to D, and C consequently is less an object of
aversion than B. If then every lover in virtue
of his love would prefer A, viz. that the beloved   40
should be such as to grant a favour, and yet
should not grant it (for which C stands), to

the beloved's granting the favour (represented
by D) without being such as to grant it (repre-   68b
sented by B), it is clear that A (being of such
a nature) is preferable to granting the favour.
To receive affection then is preferable in love
to sexual intercourse. Love then is more depen-
dent on friendship than on intercourse. And
if it is most dependent on receiving affection,
then this is its end. Intercourse then either   5
is not an end at all or is an end relative to
the further end, the receiving of affection.
And indeed the same is true of the other desires
and arts.

23 It is clear then how the terms are related in
conversion, and in respect of being in a higher
degree objects of aversion or of desire. We   10
must now state that not only dialectical and
demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of
the aforesaid figures, but also rhetorical syl-
logisms and in general any form of persuasion,
however it may be presented. For every belief
comes either through syllogism or from induction.
  Now induction, or rather the syllogism which   15
springs out of induction, consists in establishing
syllogistically a relation between one extreme
and the middle by means of the other extreme, e.g.
if B is the middle term between A and C, it con-
sists in proving through C that A belongs to B.
For this is the manner in which we make inductions.
For example let A stand for long-lived, B for
bileless, and C for the particular long-lived   20
animals, e.g. man, horse, mule. A then belongs
to the whole of C: for whatever is bileless is
long-lived. But B also ('not possessing bile')
belongs to all C. If then C is convertible with
B, and the middle term is not wider in extension,
it is necessary that A should belong to B. For
it has already been proved that if two things   25
belong to the same thing, and the extreme is
convertible with one of them, then the other
predicate will belong to the predicate that is
converted. But we must apprehend C as made up of
all the particulars. For induction proceeds
through an enumeration of all the cases.
  Such is the syllogism which establishes the   30
first and immediate premiss: for where there is
a middle term the syllogism proceeds through the
middle term; when there is no middle term, through

induction. and in a way induction is opposed to
syllogism: for the latter proves the major term
to belong to the third term by means of the middle,
the former proves the major to belong to the mid-
dle by means of the third. In the order of   35
nature, syllogism through the middle term is prior
and better known, but syllogism through induction
is clearer to us.

24 We have an 'example' when the major term is pro-
ved to belong to the middle by means of a term
which resembles the third. It ought to be   40
known both that the middle belongs to the third
term, and that the first belongs to that which
resembles the third. For example let A be   69a
evil, B making war against neighbours, C Athen-
ians against Thebans, D Thebans against Phocians.
If then we wish to prove that to fight with the
Thebans is an evil, we must assume that to fight
against neighbours is an evil. Evidence of this
is obtained from similar cases, e.g. that the   5
war against the Phocians was an evil to the
Thebans. Since then to fight against neighbours
is an evil, and to fight against the Thebans is
to fight against neighbours, it is clear that
to fight against the Thebans is an evil. Now
it is clear that B belongs to C and to D (for
both are cases of making war upon one's neigh-
bours) and that A belongs to D (for the war
against the Phocians did not turn out well for   10
the Thebans): but that A belongs to B will be
proved through D. Similarly if the belief in
the relation of the middle term to the extreme
should be produced by several similar cases. Clear-
ly then to argue by example is neither like
reasoning from part to whole, nor like reasoning
from whole to part, but rather reasoning from   15
part to part, when both particulars are subor-
dinate to the same term, and one of them is known.
It differs from induction, because induction
starting from all the particular cases proves
(as we saw 12) that the major term belongs to
the middle, and does not apply the syllogistic
conclusion to the minor term, whereas argument
by example does make this application and does
not draw its proof from all the particular cases.

25 By reduction we mean an argument in which the   20

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12 ch. 23.

first term clearly belongs to the middle, but
the relation of the middle to the last term is
uncertain though equally or more probable than
the conclusion; or again an argument in which
the terms intermediate between the last term
and the middle are few. For in any of these
cases it turns out that we approach more nearly
to knowledge. For example let A stand for what   25
can be taught, B for knowledge. C for justice.
Now it is clear that knowledge can be taught:
but it is uncertain whether virtue is knowledge.
If now the statement BC 13 is equally or more
probable than AC, we have a reduction: for we
are nearer to knowledge, since we have taken a
new term, 14 being so far without knowledge
that A belongs to C. Or again suppose that the
terms intermediate between B and C are few: for   30
thus too we are nearer knowledge. For example
let D stand for squaring, E for rectilinear
figure, F for circle. If there were only one
term intermediate between E and F (viz. that the
circle is made equal to a rectilinear figure
by the help of lunules), we should be near to
knowledge. But when BC is not more probable than   35
AC, and the intermediate terms are not few, I
do not call this reduction: nor again when the
statement BC is immediate: for such a statement
is knowledge.

26 An objection is a premiss contrary to a pre-
miss. It differs from a premiss, because it may
be particular, but a premiss either cannot be
particular at all or not in universal syllogisms.
An objection is brought in two ways and through   69b
two figures; in two ways because every objec-
tion is either universal or particular, by two
figures because objections are brought in op-
position to the premiss, and opposites can be pro-   5
ved only in the first and third figures. If a
man maintains a universal affirmative, we reply
with a universal or a particular negative; the
former is proved from the first figure, the lat-
ter from the third. For example let A stand
for there being a single science, B for contra-
ries. If a man premisses that contraries are
subjects of a single science, the objection   10

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13 See note 20.   14 viz. B, thus obtaining
a certain premiss AB, and a premiss BC, on
which the inquiry now turns.

may be either that opposites are never subjects
of a single science, and contraries are opposi-
tes, so that we get the first figure, or that
the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects
of a single science: this proof is in the third
figure: for it is true of C (the knowable and
the unknowable) that they are contraries, and
it is false that they are the subjects of a
single science.

Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative.
For if a man maintains that contraries are not   15
subjects of a single science, we reply either
that all opposites or that certain contraries,
e.g. what is healthy and what is sickly, are
subjects of the same science: the former argu-
ment issues from the first, the latter from the
third figure.

In general if a man urges a universal objection
he must frame his contradiction with reference   20
to the universal of the terms taken by his oppon-
ent, e.g. if a man maintains that contraries
are not subjects of the same science, his opponent
must reply that there is a single science of all
opposites. Thus we must have the first figure:
for the term which embraces the original subject
becomes the middle term.

If the objection is particular, the objector
must frame his contradiction with reference to a
term relatively to which the subject of his
opponent's premiss is universal, e.g. he will
point out that the knowable and the unknowable   25
are not subjects of the same science: 'contraries'
is universal relatively to these. And we have
the third figure: for the particular term as-
sumed is middle, e.g. the knowable and the un-
knowable. Premisses from which it is possible
to draw the contrary conclusion are what we
start from when we try to make objections. Con-   30
sequently we bring objections in these figures
only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms
possible, since the second figure cannot pro-
duce an affirmative conclusion.

Besides, an objection in the middle figure
would require a fuller argument, e.g. if it
should not be granted that A belongs to B, be-
cause C does not follow B. This can be made   35
clear only by other premisses. But an objection
ought not to turn off into other things, but have
its new premiss quite clear immediately. For this

reason also this is the only figure from which
proof by signs cannot be obtained.

We must consider later the other kinds of
objection, namely the objection from contraries,
from similars, and from common opinion, and in-   70a
quire whether a particular objection cannot be
elicited from the first figure or a negative
objection from the second.

27 A probability and a sign are not identical,
but a probability is a generally approved pro-
position: what men know to happen or not to   5
happen, to be or not to be, for the most part
thus and thus, is a probability, e.g. 'the en-
vious hate', 'the beloved show affection'.   A
sign means a demonstrative proposition neces-
sary or generally approved: for anything such
that when it is another thing is, or when it
has come into being the other has come into
being before or after, is a sign of the other's
being or having come into being. Now an enthy-   10
meme is a syllogism starting from probabilities
or signs, and a sign may be taken in three ways,
corresponding to the position of the middle term
in the figures. For it may be taken as in the
first figure or the second or the third. For
example the proof that a woman is with child
because she has milk is in the first figure:
for to have milk is the middle term. Let A   15
represent to be with child, B to have milk,
C woman. The proof that wise men are good,
since Pittacus is good, comes through the last
figure. Let A stand for good, B for wise men, C
for Pittacus. It is true then to affirm both A
and B of C: only men do not say the latter,
because they know it, though they state the for-   20
mer. The proof that a woman is with child because
she is pale is meant to come through the middle
figure: for since paleness follows women with
child and is a concomitant of this woman, people
suppose it has been proved that she is with
child. Let A stand for paleness, B for being
with child, C for woman. Now if the one pro-   25
position is stated, we have only a sign, but if
the other is stated as well, a syllogism, e.g.
'Pittacus is generous, since ambitious men are
generous and Pittacus is ambitious'. Or again
'Wise men are good, since Pittacus is not only
good but wise'. In this way then syllogisms are