

复旦博学·研究生英语系列



研究生英语 文献阅读

冯 奇 等主编



复旦大学出版社

Literature Reading for Postgraduates

复旦博学·研究生英语系列

研究生英语文献阅读

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内 容 提 要

本教材以研究生培养目标为编写原则，选用了西方哲学、社会学、心理学、历史、文化、语言学等学科的部分经典原著节选24篇。12个单元中的每一个单元都由两篇在主题内容上或相关或对立的文献构成。教材按照文献阅读的基本要求设计。正文之前的Lead-in介绍作者的生平或文献的主要内容。练习要求学习者提供作者信息、内容摘要、关键词、文献理论核心概念的解释和讨论等。通过文献阅读与练习设计，我们期望达到两个目的：1) 进一步提高研究生的学术语言的感受能力和使用能力；2) 进一步提高研究生的思辨能力和良好的阅读习惯。

前言

21 世纪是中国各行各业不断深化改革的时代。作为社会改革的组成部分,研究生教育改革的核心目标之一就是转变落后的教育理念,努力培养研究生主动有效的学习习惯,切实提高研究生的创新与思辨能力。课程教育改革是实现这一目标的关键步骤,而文献阅读研讨课的设立是落实这一目标的具体措施。作为研究生教育改革的执行者和实践者,我深刻体会到,无论是基础课还是专业课,不以研究作为基础的课程,都很难保证教学质量。

据上海市学位办 2001—2008 年有关研究生教育质量的统计,在实施文献阅读研讨课的高校中,学位论文异议率大幅度下降,而研究生科研成果量却稳步上升。这些事实说明,文献阅读与研讨是一个切实可行的教学理念。它推进了教师科研与教学完美结合,实现了教学相长,符合建构主义的工作原理和学习者的知识习得规律。在专业课程教学中的成功经验让我产生了在非英语专业研究生基础课程中作进一步尝试的想法。

虽然专业课的文献阅读研讨在内容和范围上都有别于基础课的文献阅读研讨,但阅读思想丰富的学术文献和根据文献内容展开学术讨论的原理却是一致的。本着“了解知识创新的过程比被动接受知识更重要”的原则,我们编写了这部《研究生英语文献阅读》,力求能将外语学习与研究生主动探究和评判能力的培养结合起来。本教程设计的核心思想就是把学习与研究的主动权还给学生,让其成为名副其实的研究生。

从知识习得的原理出发,文献的阅读仅仅是一个输入的过程。知识

的获得与消化必须经过输入与输出的不断交替才能完成。为此,在选定文献之后,我们设计了与文献内容有关的研讨思考题,要求研究生在课前自主阅读后能就所读文献作者的主要观点表达自己的见解,文献作者的观点与学生自己的见解将构成课堂集体研讨的基础。上好文献阅读研讨课最重要的环节是学生和教师的教育观念要实现由追求知识到追求能力的转变。它有别于学生只是学习经过教材编写者消化后、作为结果呈现的知识的传统理念。它要求学生了解知识创新的全程,即为什么会产生这些知识,这些知识又是如何创造发展的,这对于研究生的创新能力培养是极为重要的。

鉴于研究生公共英语教程的教学对象是来自专业和学术背景不完全相同的学习者,本教程的总体设计遵循了宽泛选材的编写原则,阅读材料以学习者普遍较为熟悉的人文社科话题为主,主要涵盖了西方哲学、社会学、心理学、历史、文化、语言学等学科的部分经典原著。可以设想,不同的学术背景和学缘结构会有效提高学习者的研讨参与度,开拓参与者的学术视野,促进学科的交叉融合,并最终达到培养研究生创新与思辨能力的目的。在改革的背后是“知识”与“能力”哪个更重要的教育观念,是“授鱼”还是“授渔”的教学原则。这不仅仅是一个教学方法的问题。教材编写对提升教学理念也能有所作为。

这种课程内容与形式上的改革主要有三个方面的好处:

1) 它有助于提高研究生查阅文献、汲取学科前沿知识的能力。会查找资料,会从资料中提炼出最有用的东西并与自己所学挂上钩,能从中发现和提出新问题,这是培养研究生自学能力和科研能力的最基本路径。通过阅读文献,他们可以掌握阅读文献的技巧,学习前人研究问题、解决问题的思路和撰写学术论文的方法,这对他们今后的工作大有裨益。

2) 通过研讨可以锻炼研究生立论与逻辑思维能力、语言表达能力。文献阅读研讨课要求研究生走上讲台,讲解自己对所读文献的认识,并回答同学们的质疑。因此,准备一次文献研讨课,相当于准备一篇规范的学术论文或进行一次公开的学术报告,其对学生综合能力的锻炼是普通的课堂讲授所无法比及的。

3) 有助于催生创新性思维。研究生在文献研讨课上的集体讨论,正是“如切如磋如琢如磨”的思想碰撞过程,是吸纳他人意见和修正自己观点的过程。同时,由于文献阅读研讨课是按专业进行设置的,本专业内不同研究方向的研究生在一起讨论交流,可以涉猎不同研究方向的知识与进展情况,从而有助于开阔研究生的视野,达到宽口径培养的目标。

研究生教育关系到我国在国际舞台的地位和整个社会文明的进程,我们热切地希望有更多致力于研究生教育的教师积极参与改革的过程。在研究生外语基础课教学中引入文献阅读研讨的理念处于初步探索阶段。它的有效实施除了教育政策、教材编写等原则问题外,还需要教学实践各个环节的协同合作。

本教材在编写过程中得到了复旦大学出版社施胜今老师和上海大学教务处的的大力支持,在此表示衷心的感谢。

冯 奇

2009年3月21日于上大聚丰园

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Unit 1

Lucky England, Normal China

Text A

Lead-in

Peter C. Perdue is an author, professor and historian in America. He is also a holder of the title of T. T. and Wei Fong Chao Professor of Asian Civilizations in Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He shows great interest in research on modern Chinese and Japanese social and economic history, history of frontiers and world history. He reviews Kenneth Pomeranz's recent book of *The Great Divergence* whose ideas have inspired imagination and triggered a shower of opinions. This book gives a new insight into a long-standing classic question of history, that is, why did industrial revolution and ensuing sustained growth first appeared in northwest Europe although there were surprising similarities between east and west Eurasia?

Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, 2000

Peter Perdue reviews the book for H-World.

Release Date: 08/01/2000

Kenneth Pomeranz. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. The Princeton Economic History of the Western World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Reviewed by: Peter C. Perdue, Department of History, MIT.

Published by: H-World (August, 2000)

<http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=4476>

Lucky England, Normal China

Explanations of the Industrial Revolution abound. The debate over its origins has been called a well-squeezed lemon, yielding few new drops of insight. Kenneth Pomeranz's brilliant analysis, however, fundamentally reorients discussion of this hoary question by placing it in a comparative global framework.

It is not easy reading. Close argumentation is joined to meticulous empirical comparison, derived from the best, most up-to-date studies of China and Europe. Although he does not introduce new primary sources, he gleans valuable data from many monographs. He focuses mostly on England and the lower Yangzi delta of China [Jiangnan] from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, but sometimes includes all of Europe, China, Japan, India, and the New World. The main thesis is, nevertheless, quite clear: that China, and Europe were basically similar in nearly all significant economic indices, including standard of living, market development, agrarian productivity, and institutional structures that affected growth. This fundamental similarity invalidates arguments stressing deeply rooted European singularities. The "great divergence" — a sudden, unexpected leap by England ahead of the rest of Eurasia beginning around 1800 came from two fortuitous circumstances: convenient coal supplies and access to the abundance of the New World. This huge windfall allowed England to escape the ecological trap toward which the entire continent was headed. The geological contingency which put coal and the Americas closer to the western than the eastern end of Eurasia dramatically reversed the fate of its regions.

Building on regional socioeconomic studies of imperial China, Pomeranz methodically bats down five categories of arguments for European uniqueness, referring to demography, markets, luxury consumption, labor, and ecology. In each case, he carefully teases out which differences matter. For example, many credit the much touted European demographic system, featuring late marriage, low percent married, but unrestricted fertility within marriage, with keeping down European populations. Asians, by contrast, were viewed as breeding heedlessly because of early and universal marriage. But, fertility control within marriage kept

Chinese populations below their maximum, too, ensuring them life expectancies equal or greater than most of Europe, and roughly comparable standards of living. The special European demographic structure was not, in the end, economically significant.

Allocation of capital, labor, and land by competitive markets in China was if anything freer than in Europe. Imperial China, by and large, had free labor, substantial migration, frequent land sales, and enforceable property rights, which allowed efficient resource use, while even in the most modern parts of Europe, entailment restricted land sales, and urban guilds restricted craftsmen. In the rest of Europe, much more severe controls, from apprenticeship to serfdom, severely constrained investment and kept urban-rural income gaps high. Given these barriers, it is hard to make a case that income inequalities were any larger in China than in comparable regions of Europe.

Alternatively, others argue that Europe benefited not from its freedoms, but from its constraints. Large scale monopolistic merchants and luxury consumption by aristocratic and urban elites could have been the motor of industrialism. But China, too, had both merchant dynasties and crazes for fashionable goods. One example not cited by Pomeranz supports his point. Many believe that Nathan Rothschild, who died in 1836, was the richest man in the world, but his fortune pales by comparison with that of his contemporary Wu Bingjian, the Canton merchant known to Europeans as Howqua. Rothschild held capital equivalent to 5.3 million U. S. dollars in 1828, while Wu's wealth amounted to 56 million American dollars, more than the entire Rothschild family. Did Wu simply invest his fortune in land? No, he actively managed much of his portfolio by investing with the Forbes family of Boston. In any case, capital was not the limiting factor for early industry, since the cost of establishing a factory was low. Land and materials were far more important.

Other arguments focus on the cost of labor. Did China's low-wage, dense populations discourage labor-saving innovation? Or were Chinese women forced to spin and weave in their households for wages below subsistence? Pomeranz finds male and female textile workers wages roughly equal, and not noticeably less than Europe's. Europeans did send more women to factories than China, but Chinese women sold their household products on competitive markets for fairly high prices. Again, the European difference does not matter.

Finally, both ends of Eurasia were running into severe resource limits by 1800.

65 The most original part of Pomeranz argument is his effort to compare the degree of scarcity of productive resources like land and forests in Europe and China. He finds that China was not worse off than Europe at this time (contrary to common wisdom), but both were nearing exhaustion. China did suffer severe environmental deterioration in the nineteenth century, but Europe had a very narrow escape.

70 I find the evidence for these similarities convincing, and their implications large. The Industrial Revolution did not grow smoothly out of long term European superiority. England was instead a "fortunate freak" whose coal supplies, close to abundant water and accessible ports, made the steam engine economically feasible.

75 China, whose main coal deposits were in the northwest, far from its textile manufacturers in Jiangnan, had no use for a steam engine, and no reason to overcome the huge cost of getting coal to the lower Yangtze. Such very local accidents of geology had a powerful effect on creating the preconditions for the first industrial breakthrough.

80 But the Industrial Revolution was both local and global. The leitmotifs of the book are the relationships between contingency, coercion, and global conjunctures. Although he stresses accidents, Pomeranz does not reject large-scale explanations. He invokes three kinds of contingency, each of which is linked to global processes: windfalls, unintended consequences, and the "Panda's Thumb" phenomenon, in which resources and organizations created for one purpose are

85 diverted to serve an entirely different one. (As Stephen Jay Gould explains, the giant panda's thumb evolved not from a finger bone, but from the wrist.) New World silver, timber, sugar, and cotton were unexpected windfalls, but the resources alone were not the key. Instead it was the unintended consequences of New World colonization that mobilized them to solve Europe's ecological crisis,

90 and European chartered trade companies were the Panda's Thumbs that collected these resources. Created not for accumulating capital, but for conquest, these quasi-private entities were given free reign to engage in the piracy and commerce needed to compete with more experienced and efficient Asian traders and run Caribbean plantations. Only much later did this organizational form, transmuted into the

95 corporation, become the most efficient method of mobilizing capital for large industrial enterprises.

These trading companies projected European interstate rivalries overseas, connecting the European state system to global economic dominance. Military competition is universal, and China was no pacifist empire either. Where Europeans stood out was in the active protection of their commercial representatives abroad. China, by contrast, did not use its vast state power to protect merchants who settled in Southeast Asia, even when they were massacred by rivals. Here geopolitical strategy enters the economic story. Chinese dynasties from the fifteenth century on focused nearly all their military attention on Central Eurasia, where the nomadic warrior was the main threat. In Central Eurasia, the empire used force and diplomacy to ensure that frontier merchants could trade China's textiles for one essential product: horses. Other merchants had little strategic importance.

Colonization linked geographical contingencies, coercive capital organizations, and global conjunctures. But the most important benefits for Europe came not from Asia, but from the New World. The Caribbean and Brazilian plantation complex, and the southern American cotton and tobacco production system, were indispensable in providing the resources necessary for industrialization. Pomeranz revives older interpretations of the triangle trade with a new ecological twist. More important than profits were the "ghost acres" freed up by the ability to use the American lands. Sugar, timber, and cotton, if grown in Europe, would have used ten to fifteen million acres, or two-thirds of England's total arable land, according to Pomeranz's calculations. This very special form of colonial exploitation radically distinguished the New World peripheries from the old. Because slaves needed large imports, grain and timber exports from North America to the Caribbean gave Northerners the income to buy British manufactures. Chinese frontier settlers, by contrast, established themselves as independent farmers with state support, and soon developed "import substitution" rural industries that competed with the lower Yangtze, reducing its linkages to the periphery.

Consequences of Accident: Pomeranz' provocative insights bring the Industrial Revolution debate up to date. Arnold Toynbee, who coined the term in 1884, saw it as a sharp discontinuity, characterized by free competition and the steam engine. The "early modernist" interpretation that arose in the 1970s saw it as evolving slowly out of centuries of special European development. The cycle of interpretation has returned

130 to its origins, but with a difference. The great divergence now once again looks
later, more sudden, and less “deep” than the early modernists believed. The crucial
factors are now ecological, not technological or cultural, and vitally dependent on
the “global conjuncture” that united the peoples of the world, not on their separate
cultures. Interaction, ecology, and contingency have replaced separation,
135 civilizational dichotomies, and determinism.

Stressing contingency also means rejecting the faith of classical economic theory
in the determination of equilibrium by large-scale balancing of supply and demand.
Newer economic theories, however, do recognize the large effects of small events,
bringing economics closer to history. As Paul Romer, founder of New Growth
140 Theory, has stated,

“We must confront the fact that there is no special logic behind the world we
inhabit. Any number of arbitrarily small perturbations along the way could have
made the world as we know it turn out very differently. We are forced to admit that
the world as we know it is the result of a long string of chance outcomes.” (Romer
145 1994, cited in Lewis 2000, p. 252)

Pomeranz’ argument has two other targets: those who see Western Europe as
the only dynamic society before 1800, and those who see the Industrial Revolution
as merely a shift in dominance within an integrated global system. The abundant
evidence of similarities deals a heavy blow to Eurocentric interpretations, but I
150 expect that the debate will not end. Diehards can always look for other unique
factors. Recently, for example, many economists have recognized the significance
of information to economic growth. Some have already begun to argue that Europe
accumulated a larger stock of applicable technical knowledge than China by 1800.
But once again, this may be a distinction without a difference. We do not know
155 which knowledges really matter for economic growth, and how much of them
Chinese and Japanese possessed. The pendulum will keep on swinging, as
Europeanists proffer other special features while Asianists find their equivalents in
Asia. But the more important implication is that England could just as easily have
become Jiangnan, trapped in an ecological cul-de-sac. She had a narrow escape.

160 World historians ought to pay special attention to the implicit challenge to world
system theorists. Much of this theorizing looks back from the twentieth century, as
Marx looked back from the nineteenth. The conspicuous rise of Asia in the late

twentieth century has led to a new recognition of the dominance of Asian economies in the past. (Frank) The system theorists share with the Eurocentrists a sense of long-term inevitability. They likewise give privileged attention to core areas, which diffuse impulses of change to the periphery. Now, in their view, the global economy has returned to a “natural” state that was interrupted by the nineteenth and twentieth-century imperialist interludes. 165

Such retrospective prediction is alien to the perspective of this book, which instead looks forward from the eighteenth century, when the future was no more obvious than it is today. We, too, should be prepared for more surprises. Extend the metaphor of exploration to the microscopic realm of biochemistry and the macroscopic realm of outer space, and we will find more windfalls, which will be exploited by contingency and coercion with global implications. Pomeranz’ brilliant analysis will not end the debate on this subject, but he brings it up to the twenty-first century, a time of unprecedented global linkages accompanied by great uncertainty. 175

No one interested in economic history, Asian history, or world history can ignore his powerful argument.

Background Information

Fill in the form about the excerpt you’ve read.

Background information of the excerpt	
Author	
Publication time and place	
Publisher	
Theme of the excerpt:	
Other writings you’ve read about this topic:	

Thought About the Views

Work in pairs to find answers to the text-related questions.

1. Give explanation to the following phrases:
 - 1) Great Divergence
 - 2) "Panda's Thumb" phenomenon
 - 3) Ghost Acres
2. What does the author want to tell us by comparing once-richest-man-in-the-world Nathan Rothschild with Wu Bingjian, Canton merchant known to Europeans as Howqua?
3. Why did England and subsequently Europe not follow the labor-intensive path of the "industrious revolution" of their Far Eastern contemporaries and instead take the capital-intensive path of the industrial revolution?
4. Who devised the term of "*the Industrial Revolution*"? What is or are its characteristic(s)?
5. What is or are the difference(s) between world system theorists and world historians like Pomeranz in their opinions?

Further Discussion

Work with your partner(s) to explore the questions in depth.

1. As a scholar of China, how does Pomeranz use the comparative method to see whether any advantages can be identified which contributed to marked divergence of core areas in Europe, especially England from the core areas primarily in Southern China?
2. What are the three kinds of contingencies Peter Perdue mentions? What do they represent respectively? What decisive roles do you think they played in the history of Europe, particularly in England?
3. When it comes to Eurocentric interpretations, the author is obviously on its opposite side. He says "the pendulum will keep on swinging". What can you get at from it? Share your opinions with your partners.