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# 精编英语 阅读理解 220篇

石春祯 编著

English Reading  
Comprehension 220



朝華出版社

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特别提示:本书附有免费赠两套考前英语全真模拟试卷及解答的科学防伪“回执卡”

# 第七次修订说明

## (代前言)

本书第一版出版于 1999 年,每年修订一次,本次是第七次修订。

本书自问世以来,一直深受广大读者厚爱。看到本书对读者提高英语阅读理解能力有所帮助,感到十分欣慰。

本书共选编英语阅读理解文章 220 篇。文章体裁以议论文和说明文为主;文章题材主要涉及科普、经济、社会生活、文化教育、人的生理和心理等方面。全部文章选自国外出版的书刊。

今年,根据读者的宝贵建议,对该书进行了大规模修订。修订的基本原则是为读者着想,进一步方便读者学习使用,增强本书的学习功能,更方便读者自学,有助于读者尽快提高英语阅读理解的真实能力。

本次修订后,本书共分三大部分。每部分结构如下:

第一部分(Part One)为综合阅读练习,总计 180 篇文章,分为 30 个单元,每单元共 6 篇文章。前 4 篇为多项选择练习,每篇文章后附有 5 道阅读理解题。这些题目以深层次问题为主,主要涉及文章的主旨和大意、作者的观点和态度、根据文章的思路进行判断、推理和引申等。第 5 篇文章为选择搭配题,文章后有 7 个选项,要求从中选择合适的选项填到原文的 5 处空白中。第 6 篇文章为英译汉,要求把划线的 5 句话译成汉语。

为了方便读者学习使用,本书增强了学习功能。每个单元设置了该单元分篇的超纲词汇表,以便读者迅速查找生词。

每个单元都附有该单元每篇文章的注释。从每篇文章中选择读者阅读时最难以理解的几句话(句尾有数字序号标示的句子)做了注释。每个注释不仅剖析了所涉及的长难句的句法结构,而且给出了该句的汉语译文。

部分单元附有练习题目的答案注释。

每单元后面附有该单元全部练习的答案。

第二部分(Part Two)为单项阅读练习,总计 15 篇文章,分为 3 个单元,每单元共 5 篇文章。每个单元后附有该单元分篇的超纲词汇表,以及每篇文章的注释。

第三部分(Part Three)为单项英译汉练习,总计 25 篇文章,分为 5 个单元,每单元共 5 篇文章。供读者练习英译汉使用。每个单元后附有英译汉答案。

本书最后的附录是超纲词分类总表,其中列有本书所涉及的全部超纲词汇,

共计 1868 个。为了便于读者熟悉和记忆词汇,这些超纲词汇按照词类分成动词、名词、形容词和副词等四个词表。不过,请读者注意,很多词可以用于不同词类。

有些读者关心,是否有必要把本书所涉及的 1868 个超纲词汇都背下来。我认为,学习英语时,词汇固然很重要,但是,不应该把词汇当知识来学。学习词汇,首先是为了用,能在听、说、读、写的过程中熟练应用。学习词汇,不是知道的越多越好,而是会用的越多越好。

读者在使用本书过程中,首先应关注大纲词汇的熟练应用。本书每个单元的超纲词汇表以及附录超纲词分类总表是为了减轻读者阅读过程中查找生词的困难而设置的。绝对没有必要花大量时间背这些超纲词汇。如果有余力,建议读者先记住附录中的 328 个超纲动词,可能更有用一些。

本书可供准备参加研究生入学考试的读者使用。如果考生能把本书的 220 篇阅读理解文章全部读完,练习全部作完,必然会大幅度提高自己的英语阅读水平。

千万不要仅仅把本书当作模拟题使用,每篇文章后的题目或要求翻译的句子只不过是供读者自我检验理解程度的手段而已。每个单元做完后,能得多少分,并不代表考试时能考多少分。

本书的主要目的是帮助读者提高真正的英文阅读理解能力。如果读者把注意力放在切实读懂每一篇文章上,把 220 篇文章都彻底读懂了,考试成绩必然会大幅度提高。

本书文章选材涉及的面相当广泛,希望能在扩充知识方面给读者带来一定益处。

本书可用作英语阅读教材,供大学英语四级以上水平的读者使用,或供那些对提高英语阅读理解能力感兴趣的读者使用。

石春禄

2006年3月5日

于北京大学

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# ***PART ONE***

**(UNIT 1-UNIT 30)**



1. The first part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the city government. The names are listed in alphabetical order, and each name is followed by the name of the office to which the person has been appointed.

2. The second part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the city government. The names are listed in alphabetical order, and each name is followed by the name of the office to which the person has been appointed.

# UNIT 1

总分: 40  
失分: 16  
得分: 24 } ⇒ 正确率: 6%  
日语: 7%, 即 28分

## Text 1-1

4/7 -3.

Despite his rather appealing personal humility, the tributes lavished upon Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, become more exuberant by the day. <sup>①</sup> Ahead of his retirement on January 31st, he has been widely and extravagantly acclaimed by economic commentators, politicians and investors. (After all, during much of his 18  $\frac{1}{2}$  years in office America enjoyed rapid growth with low inflation, and he successfully steered the economy around a series of financial hazards.) In his final days of glory, it may therefore seem churlish to question his record. However, Mr Greenspan's departure could well mark a high point for America's economy, with a period of sluggish growth ahead. This is not so much because he is leaving, but because of what he is leaving behind: the biggest economic imbalances in American history. <sup>②</sup>

One should not exaggerate Mr Greenspan's influence—both good and bad—over the economy. <sup>③</sup> Like all central bankers he is constrained by huge uncertainties about how the economy works, and by the limits of what monetary policy can do (it can affect inflation, but it cannot increase the long-term rate of growth). He controls only short-term interest rates, not bond yields, taxes or regulation. Yet for all these constraints, Mr Greenspan has long been the world's most important economic policy maker—and during an exceptional period when globalisation and information technology have been transforming the world economy. <sup>④</sup>

So far as the American economy is concerned, however, the Fed's policies of the past decade look like having painful long-term costs. It is true that the economy has shown amazing resilience in the face of the bursting in 2000 ~ 01 of the biggest stockmarket bubble in history, of terrorist attacks and of a tripling of oil prices. <sup>⑤</sup> Mr Greenspan's admirers attribute this to the Fed's enhanced credibility under his charge. Others point to flexible wages and prices, rapid immigration, a sounder banking system and globalisation as factors that have made the economy more resilient to shocks. <sup>⑥</sup>

The economy's greater flexibility may indeed provide a shock-absorber. A spurt in productivity has also boosted growth. But the main reason why America's growth has remained strong in recent years has been a massive monetary stimulus. The Fed held real interest rates negative for several years, and even today real rates remain low. By borrowing against capital gains on their homes, households have been able to consume more than they earn. Robust consumer spending has boosted GDP growth, but at the cost of a negative personal saving rate, a growing burden of household debt and a huge current-account deficit.

[424 words]

- Q1. Mr Greenspan was extravagantly admired since \_\_\_\_\_.  
C A. his departure means a high point for America's economy  
B. he served as the chairman of the Federal Reserve for long  
C. he helped promote the long prosperity of American economy

4/7

- D. there were a series of financial hazards ahead of him
- B2. The economic growth rate of America will slow down because \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. Mr Greenspan has left his office
- B. the economy he left behind was unbalanced
- C. the growth rate tends to drop after the high point
- D. America has had its rapid growth for so many years
- C B3. It is true that \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. Mr Greenspan's influence has been over exaggerated
- B. Mr Greenspan has been acclaimed too extravagantly
- C. Mr Greenspan has not been acclaimed too widely
- D. Mr Greenspan has no more good influence than bad one
- X D4. It is reasonable to attribute \_\_\_\_\_ to Mr Greenspan's endeavor.
- A. a sounder banking system
- B. the economy's greater flexibility 21:44
- C. the bursting of the biggest stockmarket bubble
- D. the rapid American economic recovery in troubled periods
- A 5. According to the text, \_\_\_\_\_ chiefly accounts for America's strong growth in recent years.
- A. Mr Greenspan's monetary stimulus
- B. Mr Greenspan's overwhelming influence
- C. a huge current-account deficit
- D. the rapid development of information technology

## Text 1-2

4.17 good

If you leave a loaded weapon lying around, it is bound to go off sooner or later. Snow-covered northern Europe heard the gunshot loud and clear when Russia cut supplies to Ukraine this week as part of a row about money and power, the two eternal battlegrounds of global energy. <sup>①</sup> From central Europe right across to France on the Atlantic seaboard, gas supplies fell by more than one-third. For years Europeans had been telling themselves that a cold-war enemy which had supplied them without fail could still be depended on now it was an ally. <sup>②</sup> Suddenly, nobody was quite so sure.

Fearing the threat to its reputation as a supplier, Russia rapidly restored the gas and settled its differences with Ukraine. But it was an uncomfortable glimpse of the dangers for a continent that imports roughly half its gas and expects to be importing 80% of its gas by 2030—much of it from Russia. <sup>③</sup> It was scarcely more welcome for America, which condemned Russia's tactics. And no wonder: it consumes one-quarter of the world's oil, but produces only 3% of the stuff. Over the coming years, the world's dependence on oil looks likely to concentrate on the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. Russian oil had seemed a useful alternative.

Fear of the energy weapon has a long history. When producers had the upper hand in the oil embargo of 1973 ~ 74, Arab members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cut supply, sowing turmoil and a global recession. When consumers had the upper hand in the early 1990s, the embargo cut the other way. <sup>④</sup> After Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the world shut in 5m barrels a day (b/d.) of production from the two countries in an attempt to force him out.

With oil costing \$ 60 a barrel, five times more than the nominal price in 1999, and spot prices for natural gas in some European and American markets at or near record levels, power has swung back to the producers for the first time since the early 1980s. <sup>⑤</sup> Nobody knows how long today's tight markets will last. "It took us a long time to get there and it will take us a long time to get back," says Robin West, chairman of PFC Energy in Washington. A clutch of alarmist books with titles such as "The Death of Oil" predict that so little oil is left in the ground that producers will always have pricing power. The question is how worried consumers should be. What are the threats to energy security and what should the world do about them? The answers suggest a need for planning and a certain amount of grim realism, but not for outright panic.

1452 words

- C 1. Which of the following is compared to "a loaded weapon going off"?
- A. Northern Europe heard the gunshot loud and clear. ✗
  - B. Gas supplies fell remarkably in Europe.
  - C. Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine.
  - D. Russia had a fierce row with Ukraine.
- D 2. The Europeans \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. can still depend on Russia for the supply of with gas
  - B. contended with their cold-war <sup>but</sup> enemy, Russia, for a long time
  - C. are glad to have Russia as their ally to supply them with gas
  - D. worry about the possible unreliability of gas supply from Russia
- B 3. According to the text, America \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. poses a threat to Russia's reputation as an oil supplier
  - B. wakes up to the dangers Russia's oil tactics may bring
  - C. is less vulnerable economically than European continent
  - D. <sup>x</sup> has shifted its dependence on oil from the middle east to Russia
- D 4. An oil embargo \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. leads to the decrease of oil supply
  - B. leads to the decrease of oil demand
  - C. signals an imminent global recession
  - D. may serve as a powerful weapon
- A 5. In the face of the shortage of oil supply, the consumers should \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. be well prepared for the grim future
  - B. <sup>be</sup> be more optimistic than ever before
  - C. be no less worried than the producers
  - D. be no more worried than the producers

### Text 1-3

4.17

-4

Begin with the fuss over wiretapping. According to Robert Byrd, a Democratic senator from West Virginia, George Bush has assumed "unchecked power" that is "reserved only for kings and potentates". Barbara Boxer of California says there is "no excuse" for Mr Bush's actions. A growing chorus of outrage, including Congressman John Lewis and John Dean (of Watergate fame), has suggested impeachment. Over at the *Nation*, Jonathan Schell argues that "Bush's abuses of

presidential power are the most extensive in American history". The administration "is not a dictatorship", he concedes, before adding that "it does manifest the characteristics of one in embryonic form." ①

And the proof of dictatorship? On more than 30 different occasions, Mr Bush authorised the tapping of telephone calls made by American citizens. Tapping domestic telephone calls without getting a warrant is illegal. (But Mr Bush claims that his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief allowed him to do so because all these calls were international ones.) He maintains that going to the courts would have been cumbersome and that his first priority was to prevent another terrorist attack. ②

You can pick at this reasoning—for instance, there are retrospective warrants that might have done the trick. ③ But it is hard to claim that Mr Bush is being outlandish on any of these scores. John Schmidt, an associate attorney-general under Bill Clinton, thinks Mr Bush has the constitutional power to approve such taps; General Michael Hayden, the deputy director of national intelligence, has argued that the programme "has been successful in detecting and preventing attacks inside the United States".

That assertion is for Congress to probe, but the real argument here is surely one of nuance: ④ it has to do with how much freedom you should reasonably curtail in the name of security. ④ Mr Bush may have crossed a line, but he has hardly smashed through it. Most European countries have more intrusive surveillance regimes than America's. As for impeachment, the prospect of having to defend Mr Bush against the charge that he went a tad too far trying to avert a terrorist attack is the sort of thing Karl Rove salivates about. ⑤

[353 words]

Q1. What led to the challenge to President George Bush's power?

- A. His abuses of presidential power.
- B. The characteristics of his administration.
- C. A growing chorus of outrage to his recent actions.
- D. His authorization of tapping of telephone calls.

Bush's excuse for wiretapping is that \_\_\_\_\_.

- A. he has constitutional power to do so
- B. the prevention of terrorism is the top priority
- C. international calls might be made by terrorists
- D. no warrant is needed for tapping telephone calls

3. \_\_\_\_\_ (least) supports Bush's authorization of wiretapping.

- A. The press
- B. John Schmidt

C. Michael Hayden

D. Jonathan Schell → opposit

4. The author believes that \_\_\_\_\_.

- A. freedom must be sacrificed to certain extent to safeguard security
- B. even Congress has no more power to wiretap than the President
- C. Mr. Bush has been successful in fighting against terrorism
- D. Mr. Bush went too far trying to avert another terrorist attack

5. The author \_\_\_\_\_ Mr. Bush's authorization of wiretapping in many occasions.

- A. despises 轻视,蔑视
- C. appreciates

B. discusses 谈论

D. approves of 赞成

## Text 1-4

4.17

养老金计划

-1

When IBM announced an overhaul of its pension plan for employees in America last week, it joined a parade of employers that are shifting more responsibility for saving for retirement on to workers. ① For many Americans, of course, this is nothing new: millions of them have been managing their retirement assets in individual accounts for years. Nevertheless, in both America and Britain the closure of paternalistic corporate "defined benefit" programmes, in which pensions depend on earnings and years of service, is accelerating—even at healthy companies such as IBM. ②

To the extent that this creates and encourages individual choice and responsibility, it is something to welcome rather than to fear. ③ Many other countries, facing huge state-pension obligations, would also like to see their citizens assume a bigger role in providing for their own retirement. Even so, the trend raises an important question; how much do people due to take on these new responsibilities know about basic financial concepts? ④

The answer seems to be: not much, and less than they think they do. Studies show that many people overestimate their knowledge of everything from inflation to risk diversification and compound interest. One survey in Australia found that 37% of people who owned investments did not know that they could fluctuate in value. In America 31% did not know that the finance charge on a credit-card statement is what they pay to use credit. Britain's Financial Services Authority will release the results of its own survey on financial literacy in the next month or two.

Even educated professionals may know the basics but see no need to keep up to date—having no idea of the interest rates on their credit cards, the fees on their mutual funds or how their investments are doing. ⑤ But in both America and Britain low personal saving rates (negative in America, indeed) and record numbers of personal bankruptcies do not bode well. If people are to take charge of their pensions, shouldn't they know a little more?

In the end, ignorance could rebound on governments: if people save too little for old age, the state may have to provide for them willy-nilly. "Governments are taking this very seriously," says Barbara Smith of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which recently produced a report on global financial literacy. Just this week the British government launched an online debt calculator for overstretched consumers and a money-management course for teenagers that will be offered in schools across the country later this year. ⑥ New Zealand is another country trying to catch its people young: one official financial-information website there (www.sorted.org.nz) includes an online game on "Money Island".

[438 words]

1. It is informed in the text that \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. IBM cannot help but overhaul its pension plan
- B. IBM takes much responsibility for saving for retirement
- C. workers will assume more financial responsibility for their old age
- D. most Americans have taken on responsibility for saving for retirement
- B2. Corporate "defined benefit" programmes will come to an end primarily because \_\_\_\_\_.
- A. most companies are not so healthy as IBM
- B. it can help companies relieve their pension obligations

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- C. millions of Americans have opened their individual accounts for years  
 D. more factors should be taken into consideration for a healthy pension plan
- B3. If one is to assume more financial responsibility, he should have more knowledge about \_\_\_\_\_.  
 A. risk diversification  
 B. basic financial concepts *223*  
 C. how much he pays to use credit  
 D. the fluctuation in value of his investment
- A4. It can be inferred from the text that \_\_\_\_\_.  
 A. even professionals are short of financial information  
 B. personal saving rates will no doubt increase remarkably  
 C. professionals are usually better prepared for their retirement  
 D. there will be less personal bankruptcies in both America and Britain
- C5. The main idea of this text is that \_\_\_\_\_.  
 A. most people are very ignorant about investment  
 B. individuals should have more choices and responsibility  
 C. individuals should be better prepared for their retirement  
 D. government should provide official financial information

## Text 1-5

### 【选择搭配题】

4.17 8'

For Bill Gates, Warren Buffett and many Wall Street number-crunchers, the dollar supplied one of the nastiest surprises of 2005. The world's two richest men and most financial-market seers predicted that the greenback would fall last year, dragged down by America's colossal current-account deficit. ① Many forecasters were predicting that the euro would buy \$ 1.40-odd by now and that a dollar would fetch less than ¥100.

(1) B Against the euro and yen, the greenback did even better. It ended the year at \$1.18 per euro, up by 14%. Despite a wobble in December, the dollar made a similar advance against the yen.

Not surprisingly, the pundits are more cautious about 2006. Although most expect the greenback to end this year weaker than it began it, the typical forecast is that any decline will be fairly modest and take place mainly in the latter part of 2006. ②

(2) E

The Federal Reserve raised short-term interest rates eight times in 2005, to 4.25%. Japan, in contrast, kept the liquidity taps open and interest rates at zero, while the European Central Bank raised rates only once, in December, to 2.25%. Relatively higher American interest rates brought foreign capital pouring into dollar assets and pushed the currency up.

(3) A But as America's tightening campaign levels off and European or (maybe) Japanese rates rise, the dollar will weaken. The consensus, according to a recent compilation of forecasts by Reuters, suggests that the dollar could reach \$1.25 per euro and ¥108 by the end of the year.

Judged by the first few days of 2006, those forecasts may prove too sanguine. The dollar



suffered its biggest two-day drop against the euro in two years, and hit a two-month low of \$1.21 against the European currency on January 4th.

(4) D C

An interest-rate gap that was merely stable ought to imply a weaker dollar. According to economic theory, it is the widening of interest-rate differentials that temporarily strengthens the exchange rate. (5) C

Financial markets may also have become too obsessed with the influence of interest rates on currencies. Historically interest-rate differentials have been little more use than anything else at predicting short-term movements in exchange rates. ③

- ☒ A. By this logic, as long as America raises rates faster than others, the dollar will stay strong.
- ☒ B. They were all wrong. Although America's current-account deficit headed towards \$800 billion in 2005, the dollar rose. It was up by 3.5% against a broad trade-weighted basket of currencies, the first rise in four years.
- ☒ C. Over time, an international difference in interest rates is offset by a drop in the currency with the higher interest rate.
- ☐ D. China is yet another cause of uncertainty. Its eagerly awaited but ultimately minuscule exchange-rate shift in July 2005 was a boon for the dollar because it did not set in train a wider realignment of Asian currencies. ④
- ☒ E. That is because most analysts attribute the dollar's recent strength to widening differences between American, European and Japanese interest rates. These gaps are expected to grow for a few more months before closing slightly later in the year.
- ☐ F. An alternative view is that the exporters, like others, were attracted by rising American interest rates. A recent study by the Bank for International Settlements, for instance, suggested that the currency composition of OPEC members' deposits has become more sensitive to interest-rate differentials.
- ☐ G. One reason is that investors are becoming jittery about how soon the interest-rate gap might stop growing. The dollar swooned after the release this week of the minutes of the Fed's December meeting, which suggested that short-term interest rates might not need to go much higher. ⑤

## Text 1-6

### 【英译汉】

Where does history end and current affairs begin? John Lewis Gaddis, who is often described as the dean of cold-war historians, has no doubts about his own special subject. (1) To his students at

Yale University, many of whom were still children when the confrontation with the Soviets ended in 1989, he writes, the cold war is "history: not all that different from the Peloponnesian War" . With a mixture of wistfulness and wonderment, Mr Gaddis notes: "When I talk about Stalin and Truman, even Reagan and Gorbachev, it could as easily be Napoleon, Caesar or Alexander the Great. "

It is partly in deference to a new generation that Mr Gaddis has decided to write a fresh and admirably concise history of the cold war. With disarming frankness, he also admits that his agent had spotted a gap in the market. But Mr Gaddis's latest work avoids the obvious trap of simply being a summary of his earlier writings, the historian's equivalent of a "Greatest Hits" album. (2) While the books that made Mr Gaddis's reputation, in particular his 1982 classic, "Strategies of Containment", necessarily concentrated on the American perspective, his latest work provides a much more rounded picture by drawing on the flood of information that has come out from the Soviet side since the end of the cold war. Mr Gaddis recounts not only what Truman, Kennedy and Reagan were thinking, but also how Stalin, Khrushchev and Mikhail Gorbachev responded to the same events.

The reader learns, for example, how close the Americans came to winning the Korean war and creating a united, pro-western Korea. At one point Stalin seemed resigned to the defeat of North Korea. Mr Gaddis quotes him as "wearily" remarking: "So what. Let it be. Let the Americans be our neighbours." The pro-western tide was turned only when Mao persuaded his own advisers that China must intervene, and sent 300, 000 troops to support Kim Il Sung.

The American side of the cold war has been familiar for a long time. But even here Mr Gaddis's mastery of the material, his fluent style and eye for the telling anecdote make his new work a pleasure. (3) The reader comes across plain-speaking Harry Truman worrying privately about the need for a complete change in human nature if the nuclear age was not to be succeeded by the "insect age or an atmosphereless planet". There is also the sleepless Richard Nixon leaving the White House in the early hours of the morning to argue with anti-Vietnam-war demonstrators gathered under the Lincoln Memorial.

(4) As one of America's leading historians, Mr Gaddis has been consulted by President George Bush on several occasions-notably just before Mr Bush made his second inaugural speech in which he pledged to "end tyranny" around the world. The admiration is mutual. Unusually for an Ivy League eminence, Mr Gaddis backed the Iraq war and praised the Bush administration for the boldness and vision of its foreign policy. (5) And while he is too conscientious an historian to allow his political views to intrude upon his narrative of the cold war, a few minor passages hint at his real feelings: a trace of irritation in his account of General de Gaulle's anti-Americanism and an obvious admiration for the clarity and simplicity of the ideas of Ronald Reagan.

[547 words]

## Notes to Unit 1

### 【超纲词汇】

#### Text 1- 1

churlish

/tʃ ɜ:lɪʃ/

adj.

粗野的, 脾气坏的, 无礼的