




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
丛书主编 / 刘 岩

新视角英语文学与文化系列教材

英语报刊阅读教程

ENGLISH JOURNALISTIC READINGS: A COURSEBOOK

■ 主编 / 胡正茂



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总 序

我们所处的时代是一个多元共生的时代。国际政治的多极化走向、经济的全球化趋势、社会的信息化局面以及文化的多元化态势正快速改变着我们的生活。科学技术的高速发展以及新兴学科的不断涌现加剧了世界各国文化的交流、碰撞和合作。如何培养适应新时代发展和需要的人才，这是我们这一代教育工作者面临的新的课题和挑战。

高等学校外语专业教学指导委员会英语组于2000年3月修订的《高等学校英语专业英语教学大纲》明确规定了高等学校英语专业的培养目标：“高等学校英语专业培养具有扎实的英语语言基础和广博的文化知识并能熟练地运用英语在外事、教育、经贸、文化、科技、军事等部门从事翻译、教学、管理、研究等工作的复合型英语人才。”这样的描述为我们编写英语专业教材和组织英语专业教学提供了重要依据。我校在长期的外语教学和研究实践中践行“明德尚行，学贯中西”的校训，着力推进外语与专业的融合，致力于培养一专多能、“双高”（思想素质高、专业水平高）、“两强”（外语实践能力强、信息技术运用能力强）、具有国际视野和创新意识的国际通用型人才。这要求全面提高学生的综合素质，包括拓宽人文学科知识，加强人文素质，培养创新精神，提高独立分析问题和解决问题的能力。

正是在这样的环境和背景下，我院精心策划并组织骨干教师编写了这套《新视角英语文学与文化系列教材》。这套教材可以用于英语专业高年级文学、文化、翻译等专业课和选修课的教学，也可



以为其他专业的学生提供必要的相关专业知识。我们期待这套教材能够以培养学生人文素质为根本原则，以加强学生人文修养、增强学生创新能力为目标，帮助学生批判地吸收世界文化精髓并弘扬中国优秀文化传统。

这套教材的策划和出版得到武汉大学出版社的积极推动和热情支持，没有他们的努力就不会有这套教材的问世。我院教师把多年教学经验积淀成书，每一本教材都凝结着他们的智慧和心血。还有我院一批渴求知识的学生，是他们的勤学好问让我们看到了工作的价值，也正是在教学相长的过程中我们的教材得到了不断的完善。在这套教材即将面世之际，让我们对所有参与教材编写和出版的人士表示衷心的感谢和敬意！也请同行专家对教材的缺憾不吝赐教。

广东外语外贸大学英语语言文化学院 刘岩博士



前 言

语言为文化载体，而英文报刊是了解英语国家文化最便捷的途径，同时也是学习当代英语的最佳语源。《英语报刊阅读教程》(*English Journalistic Readings: A Coursebook*)属普通高等教育“十一五”国家级规划教材，是为高等院校根据新版《高等学校英语专业英语教学大纲》开设的外国报刊选读课而编写的教材。其主要使用对象是大学英语专业中高年级本科生、非英语涉外专业高年级本科生，也可作为其他中高级英语爱好者的参考教材。

《英语报刊阅读教程》由八个单元组成，分别涉及国际关系与政治、国际经济与贸易、科学与技术、文化与社会、教育、环境、娱乐休闲和健康医疗八个专题。每一单元有四、五篇同一题材的文章，每篇文章选自近年来各英文报刊（主要为英美），如《纽约时报》、《经济学家》、《华盛顿邮报》、英国《金融时报》、美国《外交事务》季刊等。每篇选文除正文外包括六个部分的内容。第一部分 Questions for Discussion（问题讨论）设计了五个有关选文的讨论话题，供阅读时思考及课堂展开讨论。第二部分 Language Tips（阅读提示）为选文中可能存在的语言疑难点进行提示与注释，根据选文简要穿插介绍诸如造词、引典等报刊文体特点（更多了解则可参见第五部分的“报刊点滴”），同时对一般字典难以查到的词语提供解释。编者认为查单词、猜生词是学生阅读学习的必经过程，所以本教程与其他同类报刊阅读教材不同，不罗列并加释义的生词表，而让学生自己经历此过程，但对一般字典难查到的专有名词，“阅读提示”栏目提供帮助。第三部分 Cultural Notes（文化导



读)根据具体选文解释一些应当了解的背景知识(如 Goldwynism),并在理解文章的基础上适当引介一些相关文化(如 motherhood and apple pie)。第四部分 Further Online Reading(网络拓展阅读)就具体选文的话题提供更多报刊文章的网络链接,以拓展视野。当今网络 2.0 时代以及报刊网络化使网络拓展阅读成为现实,更顺应了新闻报刊的时效性以及报刊与读者互动的相关性。第五部分 Journalism 101(报刊点滴)介绍一些实用的英语报刊新闻知识,如报刊分类、版面安排、标题、语言特色等常识。第六部分 Reading Comprehension Quiz(选文测验)作为选文的通查提供 10 道正误判断与选择题练习,考查并帮助学生培养理解与分析判断能力。书后附有这些练习的参考答案。

除丰富的单元布局外,本教程有以下特色:1. 汲取广东外语外贸大学英语语言文化学院英美报刊选读课程的长期教学经验,并以拓宽学生知识面并增强其自主学习能力的宗旨。2. 充分体现以学生为中心的自主学习这一教学模式。积极鼓励和引导学生发现、思考并解决阅读中的问题,增强学习自主性,力争实现由“疑问”变“学问”的转变。3. 教材以时效性长、思想性强、文化含量较大为标尺从英美各主流报刊中精选各种题材的文章,以专题分为若干单元,体裁囊括新闻分析(news analysis)、特写(feature)与评论(opinion)等各类软新闻(soft news)。

针对具体教学安排,本教程建议如下:原则上每周学习完一篇文章。学期若以 18 周为有效教学时间,作为学期课程的《报刊选读》课可计划从每一专题中挑选两至三篇文章进行分析讨论;或者从每一专题中挑选两篇文章进行分析讨论,余下两周可引导学生针对专题,自己从当前纸质或网络报刊中挑选语言与内容合适的文章,进行分析,提出并解决问题,再在课堂与其他同学分享。

就课程教学方法而言,学习者在学习过程中应该掌握“能够对自己的学习负责的一种能力”,即对有关学习各方面的问题进行决策。(Henri Holec 1981)学生在学习过程中是主体,学生的学习主动性和积极性是学习的内因,它决定了学习和掌握学科知识的可



能和限度。学生应从知识的被动接收者转变为主动参与者和积极探索者，因此，教师在发挥主导作用的同时，应充分发挥学生的主体作用，为学生的积极参与创造条件，以引导学生去思考、探索、发现，鼓励学生大胆提出问题，并探索多种途径解决问题的手段与方法，将研究性学习、探究性学习、协作性学习等现代教育理念应用于教学与学习过程中，实现“由疑问变学问”的转变。据此理念，报刊选读课在正常教学程序的基础上（如学生课前预习指定阅读文章），可考虑采用讨论式、自助式、师生角色变换、点滴启发式、课堂内外结合式以及讲授法等一系列教学方法。（胡正茂 2009）

需要说明的是，本教材取材于英美等期刊、报纸文章，有些内容是时下热门话题，时效性很强，但会带有西方观念，读者对此应持有自己的判断与甄别，这种独立分析与评判也正是本课程的一个重要教学宗旨。

本课程编者将选文看做精细研读部分，与此同时积极鼓励学生针对自己的兴趣爱好广泛阅读其他报刊文章，尤其是通过网络，使阅读成为一种习惯。

本教程在编写过程中得到广东外语外贸大学英语语言文化学院领导与同事的积极支持，编者在此一并致谢。作为学院报刊选读课的先行倡导者与领军人物，邹启明教授慷慨大度的人格魅力，让编者钦佩并心存感激。

本教程中的疏漏不妥之处，祈望使用者不吝指正。

胡正茂

2009年7月于白云山



目 录

Unit One International Relations and Politics

第一单元 国际关系与政治..... 1

- 1. The Age of Nonpolarity 1
- 2. America's Longest War: September 11th Remembrance ... 22
- 3. Losing Sight of Reality 38
- 4. The Return of Soft Power? 53
- 5. Vlad and MAD | Russia and Arms Control 67

Unit Two International Economics and Business

第二单元 国际经济与贸易 81

- 1. Analysis: The Vision Thing 81
- 2. Read the Big Four to Know Capital's Fate 102
- 3. We Forgot Everything Keynes Taught Us 119
- 4. Charlemagne | Euro Blues 138
- 5. Thoroughly Modern Marx 148

Unit Three Science and Technology

第三单元 科学与技术..... 166

- 1. Computers vs. Brains 166
- 2. Just Googling It Is Striking Fear into Companies 178
- 3. Electronic-book Readers 193
- 4. The RNA Revolution 206

5. New Web Sites Seeking Profit in Wiki Model	220
---	-----

Unit Four Culture and Society

第四单元 文化与社会	232
1. The Way We Read Now as Our World Totters	232
2. Feeling at Home	248
3. Rise of the New Anglo-world Order	261
4. Reading on the Web Is Not Really Reading	285

Unit Five Education

第五单元 教育	301
1. Education Reform	301
2. On Campus, Vampires Are Besting the Beats	316
3. We Treat Our Pupils like Aldous Huxley's Gammas	340
4. Will the Humanities Save Us?	358

Unit Six Environment

第六单元 环境	374
1. The Environmental Movement Endangered Species	374
2. Selling the Green Economy	394
3. Adapt or Die	411
4. The Litany and the Heretic	425

Unit Seven Entertainment and Leisure

第七单元 娱乐休闲	441
1. Saying Yes to Mess	441
2. Too Busy to Notice You're Too Busy	460
3. What's So Funny? Well, Maybe Nothing	476
4. Why Women Don't Relax?	492

Unit Eight Health Care

第八单元 健康医疗	505
1. A Mind Is a Terrible Thing to Measure	505
2. Rest: It's Required	516
3. Are You Really Ready to Clean Up Your Act?	531
4. Downtime: It's Enough to Make Some People Sick	546

Keys to Exercises

练习参考答案	561
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References

参考文献	563
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Unit One International Relations and Politics



第一单元 国际关系与政治

1. The Age of Nonpolarity

Richard N. Haass

The principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.

The twentieth century started out distinctly multipolar. But after almost 50 years, two world wars, and many smaller conflicts, a bipolar system emerged. Then, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity—an international system dominated by one power, in this case the United States. But today power is diffuse, and the onset of nonpolarity raises a number of important questions. How does nonpolarity differ from other forms of international order? How and why did it materialize? What are its likely consequences? And how should the United States respond?



☞ Newer world order

In contrast to multipolarity—which involves several distinct poles or concentrations of power—a nonpolar international system is characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power.

In a multipolar system, no power dominates, or the system will become unipolar. Nor do concentrations of power revolve around two positions, or the system will become bipolar. Multipolar systems can be cooperative, even assuming the form of a concert of powers, in which a few major powers work together on setting the rules of the game and disciplining those who violate them. They can also be more competitive, revolving around a balance of power, or conflictual, when the balance breaks down.

2

At first glance, the world today may appear to be multipolar. The major powers—China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia, and the United States—contain just over half the world's people and account for 75 percent of global GDP and 80 percent of global defense spending. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Today's world differs in a fundamental way from one of classic multipolarity: there are many more power centers, and quite a few of these poles are not nation-states. Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places.



In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America; Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia in Oceania and South Korea in East Asia. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, São Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that dominate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). Today's world is increasingly one of distributed, rather than concentrated, power.

In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power. But the reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world—and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence. The U. S. share of global imports is already down to 15 percent. Although U. S. GDP accounts for over 25 percent of the world's



total, this percentage is sure to decline over time given the actual and projected differential between the United States' growth rate and those of the Asian giants and many other countries, a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States.

GDP growth is hardly the only indication of a move away from U. S. economic dominance. The rise of sovereign wealth funds—in countries such as China, Kuwait, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—is another. These government-controlled pools of wealth, mostly the result of oil and gas exports, now total some \$3 trillion. They are growing at a projected rate of \$1 trillion a year and are an increasingly important source of liquidity for U. S. firms. A majority of the world's foreign exchange holdings are now in currencies other than the dollar, and a move to denominate oil in euros or a basket of currencies is possible, a step that would only leave the U. S. economy more vulnerable to inflation as well as currency crises.

U. S. primacy is also being challenged in other realms, such as military effectiveness and diplomacy. Measures of military spending are not the same as measures of military capacity.

Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity. U. S. calls for others to reform will tend to fall on deaf ears, U. S. assistance programs will buy less, and U. S.-led sanctions will accomplish less. After all, China proved to be the country best able to influence North Korea's nuclear program.

The trend also extends to the worlds of culture and information. Bollywood produces more films every year than Hollywood. Alternatives to U. S.-produced and disseminated television are multiplying. Web sites



and blogs from other countries provide further competition for U.S.-produced news and commentary. The proliferation of information is as much a cause of nonpolarity as is the proliferation of weaponry.

❏ Farewell to unipolarity

Charles Krauthammer was more correct than he realized when he wrote in these pages nearly two decades ago about what he termed “the unipolar moment.” At the time, U.S. dominance was real. But it lasted for only 15 or 20 years. In historical terms, it was a moment. Traditional realist theory would have predicted the end of unipolarity and the dawn of a multipolar world. According to this line of reasoning, great powers, when they act as great powers are wont to do, stimulate competition from others that fear or resent them. Krauthammer, subscribing to just this theory, wrote, “No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era.”

But this has not happened. Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States.

But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally.



A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over \$20 a barrel to over \$100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers.

Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons.

Multilateralism will be essential in dealing with a nonpolar world. To succeed, though, it must be recast to include actors other than the great powers. The UN Security Council and the G-8 (the group of highly industrialized states) need to be reconstituted to reflect the world of today and not the post-World War II era. A recent meeting at the United Nations on how best to coordinate global responses to public