


# 中國海洋發展史論文集

第十輯

湯熙勇 主編

中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心 · 海洋史研究專題中心



# Essays in Chinese Ma

Vol. 10  
Cancer

Edited by Shi-yeung



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中央研究院人文社會科學研究中心專書(55)

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## 編者序

編輯與出版中國海洋發展史論文集的起源，與中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所（以下簡稱社科所）歷史思想組，從 1983 年起，以中國海洋發展史為研究中心議題有密切關係。1984 年，社科所為推動中國海洋發展史研究，首次舉辦中國海洋發展史學術研討會，出版中國海洋發展史論文集第一輯，開啓了臺灣研究海洋史之先河。其後，為擴及參與的層面與廣度，乃邀請海外及中國大陸之學者參與中國海洋發展史學術研討會。2005 年 8 月，中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所與蔡元培人文社會科學中心，合併為人文社會科學研究中心（以下簡稱人社中心），以原社科所研究大樓為人社中心大樓，原社科所歷史思想組改為「海洋史專題研究中心」，中國海洋發展史依然為核心的研究議題。

為了協助年輕學子瞭解海洋史研究的內涵及提昇研究之風氣，海洋史專題研究中心於 2005 年 6 月與 2007 年 8 月，已經分別於人社中心及金門技術學院，舉辦了二屆「海洋史研習營」，有來自國內各大學院校的研究生及大學三、四年級學生熱誠地參與。2006 年 8 月，海洋史專題研究中心舉辦第十屆海洋史國際學術研討會，以中國海洋發展史為中心議題，研討會出版之專書，仍維持「中國海洋發展史論文集」之名稱。

華人及其在海上的活動，可以溯及的時間很早。因此，中國海洋發展史的研究，並不侷限於某一個特定的時間與範圍，當然也未限於東亞海域（或環中國海域）內，與航運有關之貿易與船隻、移

民等，均包含於其內。在第十屆海洋史國際學術研討會中，特別邀請美籍教授 John E. Wills, Jr 擔任主題演講人，來自中國大陸廈門與上海的李金明、黃純艷兩位教授，及日本的村上衛教授，臺灣的教授及學者有鄭永常、方真真、張彬村、李若文及辛德蘭、陳政宏等，以港口、海外貿易、華僑、船隻等不同的議題發表專題論文。

對於海洋史國際學術研討會的議題，有學者表示希望能夠增加新面孔與新題目。事實上，在籌備與規劃海洋史國際學術研討會時，曾經討論過此一問題，也提出一些新的構想，例如在海洋的範圍上，以東亞海域為起點，進而連結太平洋、印度洋深入的研究與探討等，惟因主客觀之種種因素影響，例如有的學者臨時未能出席等，以致於在議題聚焦上之效果，仍然無法具體展現，這也說明了海洋史研究仍然具有寬廣的空間。此外，由於海洋史研究所涉及的範圍廣泛，邀請不同學科背景的學者專家參與討論，也是擴大研討深度和廣度的途徑，在本次海洋史國際學術研討會中，僅有一位從事造船研究者出席，或許這是一個可以繼續努力的方向。

本次論文集，除了主題演講一文外，共收有 11 篇學術性論文。這一些論文所探討之時間，從唐代迄於今日，其中與臺灣有關者，則有三篇。這一些論文，均依照人社中心之論文出版的流程，經二至三位專家學者的審查，過程甚為嚴謹，並經作者多次的修正與確認，方匯編成書，付梓出版，提供海內外人士參考。

本論文集從研討會後迄今，已屆兩年，除了在編務及審查過程中的因素外，與個人的能力有關，書中疏漏之處，個人應負起相關的責任。最後，對於本專書的作者與審查人員，和關心及等待此一專輯出版的讀者，個人致上最高的感謝與最深的歉疚。最後，對參與校對及編務行政工作的中心同仁，亦藉此表達個人衷心的感謝。

湯熙勇

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## The South China Sea Is Not a Mediterranean: Implications for the History of Chinese Foreign Relations

John E. Wills, Jr.\*

For European and North American studies of China, maritime China, at least before the great crisis of the late 1800s, has been a marginal topic. This also has been true in different ways of Japanese Sinology, in the thrall of the textual richness of Jiangnan; of mainland Chinese studies under the political imperatives of the heirs of Qing “Greater China”; and even of Taiwan as long as the Guomintang hegemony kept continental dreams alive and named most of Taipei’s streets after mainland cities. Now, in this series of distinguished conferences and volumes and in much else in Taiwan’s vibrant intellectual scene, interest in maritime China has become intertwined with complex assertions of Taiwanese identity as another way of being Chinese, to adapt Li Tana’s phrase about southern Vietnam,<sup>1</sup> of *not* being Chinese, or at least of

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\* Professor Emeritus, University of Southern California.

1 Li Tana, *Nguyen Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Studies Publications, 1998), p. 156. The Vietnamese are even less comfortable with the idea of a plurality of modes of identity than the Chinese.

rejecting the hegemonic political implications of some definitions of Chineseness. It also is linked in fascinating ways to the political, economic, and cultural end of Chinese “isolation”—note that European languages seem to insist on a maritime metaphor where the crucial Chinese fact and metaphor would seem to be the Great Wall—an open-ended transformation that is a crucial shaper of the twenty-first century world, of which Taiwan has been a complex and ambivalent vanguard.

For historians, this end of isolation requires placing everything we study about China, maritime and continental, in global and comparative perspective. Bear with me as I take a long way around to maritime questions. I want to begin by placing the *continentality* of China in comparative perspective and long temporal continuity. China grew as a continental realm to immense size, and only relatively late developed dynamic maritime connections, and even later than that paid serious attention to those connections in the public discourse of rulers and elites. We have begun to work on comparisons of the Ming-Qing empire with the other great empires of the early modern world, especially the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal. The parallels of success in maintaining internal order over a very large area with rather modest tax revenues and size of centralized army and bureaucracy are striking. But there is an important contrast; the Ming and Qing made much less use of delegation of power to ethno-religious communities, as in the autonomous internal powers of Hindu “caste” groups in Mughal India, the famous *millet* system that gave Armenian, Greek, Jewish, and even Roman Catholic communities much autonomy in the Ottoman Empire, or the major economic roles of the Armenian community in Safavid Persia. The Qing alternative needs to be seen as a set of modest but important adjustments, some perhaps in the direction of the ethno-religious delegation of the other empires

mentioned, to a very long continuity in Chinese political culture. Here please bear with me in a further digression into what some of you will recognize as themes from lecture notes for a survey course in Chinese history, and the ways I sketched them in my *Mountain of Fame*. We need to try to think about a world-historical question not often posed in quite this simple-minded fashion: Why has China been so big for so long?

Let us begin with a fascinating multi-state phase of conflict, growth, and cultural creativity from about 500 to 200 BCE, ending in unification into a single centralized empire under the Qin. From this time on, Chinese history was characterized by long periods of unified rule over a very wide area, and by the expansion of that area, especially to the south and southwest, as local elites in border areas allowed themselves to be co-opted into structures of central rule. From around 200 BCE on, the Chinese confronted on their northern borders nomadic herding peoples highly adept at cavalry warfare, and united defense, often with the construction of some kind of wall, was necessary. Recent scholarship suggests that this was the result of two opposing precipitations out of a common background of a “Northern culture”.<sup>2</sup> There also was a water control problem. The Yellow River if unconfined wanders as it drops its load of silt and builds up new sandbars, with devastating consequences for people trying to farm near it. Already in the second and first centuries BCE, Chinese imperial administrations were coordinating the building of dikes along the lower course of the Yellow River. So failures of unity and coordination could lead to nomadic warriors trampling the fields, or to fields under water.

These continental ecological factors go only part way even

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2 Nicola di Cosmo, *Ancient China and Its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

toward explaining the persistent unity of north China, and do nothing at all to explain the long and successful incorporation of the center, south, and eventually southwest and even Hainan and Taiwan, where water control problems usually could be worked out at local levels, where local cultures were quite different from those of north China, and where linguistic variety was far greater than in the north. Here we have to look comparatively at some peculiarities of north Chinese culture that opened the way toward incorporation of southern elites and peoples. In many parts of the world, there is a strong tendency to divide people into “us” and “them”. When you meet one of them you are always on your guard, or perhaps you just shoot first. Serbs and Croats are a good example. You would never want your daughter to marry one of *them*; in fact, in such a “tribal” system, cross-cousin marriage often is a preferred option. Such systems of *competitive corporate solidarities* were ancestral to the competing city-states of ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy and to the multi-state system that crystallized in Europe in 1648 and was spread over the world after 1815. In contrast, as far back as we can trace Chinese constructions of kinship, they have been exogamous and patrilineal. People in the same patriline, later those bearing the same surname even if no genetic relation was clear, did not marry. Thus every marriage involved making a connection with someone “outside”, not predetermined by blood. In many parts of the world today, and throughout the world until about 1850, it has been understood that a marriage is an alliance between two families, to be based on more reliable criteria than raging young hormones. A Chinese potential son-in-law might have to prove himself, or continue to show his qualities even after the wedding.

This family and kinship background can be seen nourishing a political culture in the legends of three sage emperors, Yao, Shun,

and Yu. Each succeeded the one before not by heredity but after proving himself the best man for the position. Shun passed the ultimate test when Yao gave him his two daughters in marriage, and Shun kept harmony in the household. We have here in kinship, I think, an important root of a political culture that produced not competitive corporate solidarities like the Greek city states but open-ended *networks* of one-to-one human connections, many of them hierarchical. Such connections are important in all complex organizations, but the Chinese have been unusually adept at them and self-conscious about them. It is impossible to function or talk about functioning in a Chinese society without thinking a lot about *guanxi*.

A particular form of human connection that was of special importance in traditional Chinese political culture was “the Way of the Ruler and the Minister”, 君臣之道。A great many of the most heroic figures in the very rich Chinese stories of their own past are not rulers but selfless ministers, defending the realm against invaders, protesting against corruption and abuse of the common people, risking their own lives to give unwanted advice to unworthy rulers. Confucius himself was a would-be minister and teacher of other would-be ministers. Not even Confucius had a very strong sense of commitment to his home state in a multi-state world; when politics went sour there, he and his disciples moved around, looking for a ruler who would listen to the Master’s Way.

The importance of this theme in political culture for the enduring Chinese tendency to unity of a very large continental area is immense. Already in the Warring States, a powerful ruler could count on having a large number of able men from a very wide area present themselves as candidates for ministerial positions, and could appoint them to govern local areas. Already in Qin and early Han times, members of local elites, even hereditary rulers on the

fringes of the Chinese realm, might be attracted by the moral glamour and material rewards of ministerial status; grandees of a northern culture zone with much herding, and the elite of the Yangzi valley state of Chu, with a distinctive shamanic culture, were drawn into the central political order. The Way of the Ruler and the Minister was protean in the changing circumstances to which it adjusted, as protean as the idioms of citizenship and solidarity in the European tradition. I have sketched some of the changes in *Mountain of Fame*. It surely is a clue to the anomalous and ultimately ineffective actions of Zheng Chenggong that he was neither a ruler nor a minister 不君不臣. Let me then remind you of final triumphs of Chinese continentality under the Qing, in which ethnic elites from Yunnan in the southwest still were being drawn into the dominant order, and ambitious men from Yunnan or Guangdong found irresistible the possibility of passing the great imperial examinations and rising in the bureaucracy. Thus we have here a political elite focused on the preservation of the culture and values that kept the whole system on track, on alliances and advancement within the bureaucracy, on practical reform of its services, such as famine relief and flood control. The common people, little involved in politics except when the whole machine broke down, might aspire to have a son study for the examinations but more often sought to better their lives through diligence and ingenuity in agriculture, crafts, and trade. They also were hardy pioneers, pushing into the southwestern mountains and even to Taiwan as miners and farmers of new crops of American origin.

We have an abundance of documents in Chinese and Manchu and European languages to help us understand the great triumphs of Qing continentality. In an eyewitness account by a Portuguese Jesuit who accompanied a Portuguese ambassador to Beijing in 1670, the seventeen-year-old Kangxi Emperor, who would reign

until 1722, appears as a lively and curious young man, especially fascinated by an African slave accompanying one of the Portuguese. I think it likely that the emperor and his courtiers were speaking Manchu, not Chinese, in this interview, but I really have no evidence either way. Not seen, but a hugely influential figure at court, was the emperor's grandmother, the Grand Dowager Empress Xiaozhuang. She was a Borjigit Mongol, of the lineage of the great Chinggis and Khubilai, and her marriage to the pre-conquest Manchu emperor Hongtaiji had been a major step in the co-optation of the Mongol elite into the structure of the Manchu-ruled Qing Dynasty. Tibetan Buddhism already was very important among the Mongols, and the Dowager Empress had her portrait painted in Buddhist nun's robe and beads. Beginning around 1690, the Qing crushed some hostile Mongol groups, and found that in order to maintain full control over the steppes they needed to have a garrison in Lhasa with a resident overseeing the affairs of the Tibetan clerical state, especially the discernments of the trans-migrations of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, and needed to have garrisons in the oasis towns around the Takla Makan Desert.

Also in the late 1600s and early 1700s, to the north of the steppes Russian exiles, religious dissidents, Cossacks, drunken priests, and other riffraff were spreading with astonishing speed across Siberia and extorting from the native peoples those sable and ermine furs you see on so many European royal portraits of this time. The world-historical results were first, that the Mongol peoples were in a vise; the Qing and the Russians worked out some durable accommodations, and neither would ally with the Mongols, who were left with only their ambiguous role in the Qing Empire and their memories of days of world conquest; and second, that the territory effectively governed from Beijing reached all the way to the present boundaries of the People's Republic of China

and even included what are now the Mongolian People's Republic and the Maritime Province of Russian Siberia. These astonishing continental successes were definitive for the self-image and strategy of the Qing rulers. You can sense the power of that orientation even in Beijing, when the wind and the dust blow from the north, but it struck me most powerfully a long time ago, in 1979, when with Fred Wakeman's delegation of Ming and Qing historians I saw the *Bishu shanzhuang* at Chengde, with its two Tibetan monasteries on the pattern of the Potala in Lhasa and its Jiangnan-style lakes and gardens. The Qing also were deservedly confident of their co-optation of a Chinese scholar-official elite from a very wide geographical range; one of the famous statesmen of the Qianlong reign, Chen Hongmou, came from Guilin in distant Guangxi. On other frontiers they felt less at ease; they got into a pointless war with Burma, and even made the mistake, in 1788, of invading Vietnam. And of course they felt very defensive and ill at ease in confronting the changing world of their maritime frontier, to which we now must turn. (Finally!, they say.)

What does all this have to do with foreign relations, maritime or otherwise? Here's a first try, beginning with the term "foreign relations" 外交. We can find in early China, especially in the Warring States period, interesting and well-developed analogies to interstate relations of the modern Western kind, but from the Qin unification on relations among equals within the Chinese political and cultural zone have been unstable, in part because members of the elite had only weak allegiances to any territorial entity and often sought office in another state. In cultural constructions already very influential in Qin and Han, "inner" 內 and "outer" 外 were viewed as a complementary pair, like so many pairs in the yin-yang idiom. Mark Edward Lewis, in his brilliant new *The*