



复旦—胡佛近代中国人物与档案文献研究系列

Hoover Institution and Fudan University Modern China Research Series:

Leadership and Archival Documents

# 宋子文与外国人士 往来函电稿

*T. V. Soong: Important Wartime Correspondences*

(1940—1942)

吴景平 林孝庭 主编

Edited by Hsiao-ting Lin & Wu Jingping



復旦大學出版社

Fudan University Press



复旦—胡佛近代中国人物与档案文献研究系列

Hoover Institution and Fudan University Modern China Research Series:  
Leadership and Archival Documents

# 宋子文与外国人士 往来函电稿

*T. V. Soong: Important Wartime Correspondences*  
(1940—1942)

吴景平 林孝庭 主编

Edited by Hsiao-ting Lin & Wu Jingping

 復旦大學 出版社  
Fudan University Press

### 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

宋子文与外国人士往来函电稿(1940~1942)/吴景平,林孝庭主编. —上海:复旦大学出版社,2009.8

(复旦—胡佛近代中国人物与档案文献研究系列)

ISBN 978-7-309-06833-7

I. 宋… II. ①吴…②林… III. 宋子文(1894~1971)-书信集  
IV. K827 = 7

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2009)第 144354 号

### 宋子文与外国人士往来函电稿(1940~1942)

吴景平 林孝庭 主编

---

出版发行 复旦大学出版社 上海市国权路 579 号 邮编 200433  
86-21-65642857(门市零售)  
86-21-65100562(团体订购) 86-21-65109143(外埠邮购)  
fupnet@fudanpress.com <http://www.fudanpress.com>

---

责任编辑 史立丽

出品人 贺圣遂

---

印刷 上海第二教育学院印刷厂  
开本 787×960 1/16  
印张 34.5  
字数 619 千  
版次 2009 年 8 月第一版第一次印刷

---

书号 ISBN 978-7-309-06833-7/K·258  
定价 54.00 元

---

如有印装质量问题,请向复旦大学出版社发行部调换。

版权所有 侵权必究



吴景平, 1990年中国人民大学获法学博士, 现为复旦大学历史系教授、中国金融史研究中心主任, 兼任复旦大学校务委员、国务院学位委员会学科评议组成员、国家社会科学基金评审专家、上海市人大代表。主要著作、编著有《宋子文评传》、《宋子文思想研究》、《宋子文政治生涯编年》、《宋子文与他的时代》、《中德关系(1861—1992)》、《上海金融业与国民政府关系研究》、《近代上海金融组织研究》等, 发表《近代中国金融中心的区域变迁》等数十篇论文。

Wu Jingping is Professor in the Department of History, Fudan University. He received a Ph.D. in Law from Renmin University of China in 1990. At Fudan, Dr. Wu is the current Director of China Financial History Center, and the university committee member. He is also appointed as member of the Commission of Academic Degree Appraisal of the State Council, the National Social Science Foundation Appraisal Expert, and the Representative of Shanghai City Congress.

Dr. Wu's major publications include: (Books) *Biography of T. V. Soong*; *Sino-German Relations during 1861-1992*; *Select Telegrams between Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong, 1940-1943*; *T. V. Soong: His Life and Times*; *T. V. Soong and Wartime Nationalist China, 1937-1945*; *On the Relation between Shanghai Financial Industry and the Nationalist Government*; *On the Financial Institution in Modern Shanghai*. He also has published dozens of papers include "The Migration of the Financial Center in Modern China".



林孝庭, 英国牛津大学东方学部博士, 英国皇家亚洲学会会士, 美国史坦福大学胡佛研究院研究员。专研近代中国政治、外交、军事、边疆与少数民族问题, 中英外交史, 中美关系与台湾问题, 外交与军事关系等。主要英文论著有《西藏与国民党中国的边疆》、《宋子文与战时中美外交》、《国民党改造委员会在台湾》, 以及其他中、英、日文国际学术期刊论文、专书章节、研究报告、会议论文、书评与译作等六十余篇。

Hsiao-ting Lin is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, where he works on the Modern China Archives and Special Collection project. Lin received his D.Phil. in Oriental Studies in 2003 from the University of Oxford, and was elected Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland in 2008.

Lin has published extensively on modern Chinese politics, history and ethnic minorities. His publications include the award-winning book *Tibet and Nationalist China Frontier: Intrigues and Ethnopolitics, 1928-49* (University of British Columbia Press, 2006), *T. V. Soong in Modern Chinese History: A Look at his Role in Sino-American Relations in World War II* (Hoover Institution Press, 2006), *Breaking with the Past: The Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-52* (Hoover Institution Press, 2007), and more than 60 journal articles, book chapters, essays, reviews, and translation works.

Snow  
Beverly Hotel  
Hollywood  
March 2, 1941

Mr. T. V. Soong  
New York City

Dear Mr. Soong:

It was good to hear of your continued interest in C.I.C. and in the proposed American loan to China for the development of that organization. Many people have now become convinced that this is a good method of supporting China, and the proposal which originated in the Philippines is, as you know, being more seriously considered in Washington. A petition to the President, urging him to loan China \$50 million for industrial cooperatives is being widely circulated and here in California, especially in the south where a strong Indusco committee has just been organized in Hollywood and Los Angeles, with Lin Yu-tang as chairman, thousands have enthusiastically signed.

While in Hong Kong I discussed with Bishop Hall and S. J. Chen and Chen Han-seng and others the various means of implementing aid to C.I.C. They were all of the same opinion as Rewi Alley and other field leaders of Indusco--that is, that the American Committee to Aid C.I.C. should continue to support the International Committee and its revolving fund and other constitutional aims. Major Carlson told me he brought back with him a letter conveying a similar request from the leaders of the C.I.C. secretariat at Chungking. Meanwhile Bishop Hall wrote, for the International Committee, and Chen Han-seng and I and others wrote as individuals to Admiral Farnell and the American Committee on the same question. We all urged that the American Committee affiliate itself with the International Committee on the same basis as already existing promotion committees have done in Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Java, England and Australia.

It was good news, therefore, to hear that at a recent meeting of the American Committee it was formally voted to affiliate with the I.C., to adhere to its constitution, and to extend the financial help raised in America through that central organization. The vote meant the abandonment of an earlier minority proposal that the American Committee set up an agency of its own in Chungking, to work independently of the I.C., directly with the Central administration of the C.I.C. under the government.

Now, it seems that at a meeting a few days ago some remarks of yours were interpreted, I am told by members, to mean that you desire the American Committee not to affiliate on the above terms with the International Committee, but prefer it to establish an independent office at Chungking. It led to an impression that you consider the I.C. to be too British and too Chinese in its make-up. I am sure you have been incorrectly reported, as you know what the aims of the I.C. have been from the beginning. These are 1) to establish a representative central committee to coordinate all overseas support organized for C.I.C., 2) to act as trustees for a revolving fund administered on a non-partisan basis, and 3) to maintain the unity of different groups interested in C.I.C. All these functions are more important than ever, I'm sure you will agree. I believe the I.C. actually has more American members than British, and can add any number to its membership, according to the constitution, deemed necessary for a proper balance. There is no limit to the number of branch committees that can be authorized to work with it, either at Chungking or elsewhere. It can move its headquarters to the Philippines, or Rangoon, or Chungking--or New York, if considered desirable.

But as I understand the situation the International Committee could not realize its objectives successfully if the American Committee now sets up separate organizations of its own in China. Such a procedure would likely be misunderstood not only among all existing committees now represented in the I.C., but by many supporters of the C.I.C. in America, and might cause unnecessary complications. No doubt you know this, and what you had in mind was something different--perhaps an advisory group to help administer an American loan to C.I.C. Anyway, some clarification would be helpful. With best wishes,

Sincerely,  
Edgar Snow

1941年3月2日埃德加·斯诺致宋子文函

August 29, 1941

Dear Jimmy:

I received your three letters and have forwarded Miss Pauline's letter to your father. The Young Marshall had a ruptured appendix and nearly died but fortunately he has been saved. Do not tell his family although they may read it in the Chinese newspapers.

Concerning Martin, I wired to Dr. Wallington Koo and received the report that he is really in a mental institution, that Raymond is resigning his commission to be with his brother and is ready to take him to the United States. Dr. Koo, however, doubts whether it is wise to have him taken to America. This message has been duly passed on to Pauline through Mr. Tschou, former personal secretary to the Young Marshall and now acting in the same capacity in my place.

I have received a letter from Pauline explaining why she did not come to see us when she arrived in New York. I told her that she must be patient with her mother, that her mother's illness easily might be recurrent and that she is the only one that now could be of service to her mother.

Really, I am sorry the children are behaving so unfeelingly with their parents but perhaps that is to be expected when one considers the vicissitudes the family suffered and in particular the unfair confinement of the Young Marshall.

With kindest regards and hoping that you and Mrs. Elder and child are well,

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

Mr. James Elder  
17100 Rancho Street  
Encino, California

1941年8月29日宋子文在致吉米函中关心张学良的子女

32:4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. With developments in Russia, the position of China in the general strategic picture has undergone a great change. If Russia falls back of the Urals, it is reduced to a nation of fifty-one million people. China will then be the only reservoir of man power in the East to carry on the war against Germany and Japan.

2. American assistance to China, it seems to us, has heretofore been given with the limited objective of continuing her resistance to Japan. Now China, with a slight acceleration of aid, might make a considerable contribution to overall strategy.

3. The Japanese are rapidly massing troops for an attack on the Siberian Maritime Provinces. It must be now a cardinal aim of the Democracies to prevent a total collapse of Russia. China today has the only land forces in Asia capable of containing additional large masses of Japanese troops. China can, by well planned counter-attacks, compel the withdrawal of substantial Japanese forces from the Siberian border as well as make more certain the protection of Singapore, as China has demonstrated in recent weeks by operations near Ichang and Changsha. We need, however, modest but immediate deliveries of promised aircraft and ordnance to achieve these objects as Japan may attack Siberia any time now.

  
T. V. Soong

October 24, 1941

1941年10月24日宋子文致美国总统罗斯福备忘录

Indu

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. I received a telegram on June 25th from the Generalissimo transmitting text of a letter from Gandhi, copy of which please find attached. The Generalissimo asked that the telegram be personally conveyed by me to the President and the Prime Minister, but the President had already left for Hyde Park.
2. In the meantime the British Ambassador Sir Horace Seymour, upon the instructions of his Government, called on the Generalissimo June 27th, and stated that it is feared that Gandhi plans to take adverse action which the Indian Government is preparing to suppress, and that if it is found necessary to arrest Gandhi it is hoped that the Generalissimo would understand.

The Generalissimo told Sir Horace the contents of Gandhi's letter which openly stated that he intends to take action. He (the Generalissimo) was aware that the matter was an internal question of the British Empire but because of consequences affecting not only the British Empire but all of the United Nations, as a friend he hoped that the British Government will act cautiously.

3. As Lord Halifax was leaving for London, on July 1st I gave him a copy of Gandhi's letter for the Prime Minister, and acquainted him also of Sir Horace Seymour's visit. Lord Halifax stated that although the Prime Minister takes the view that as a perfectly good offer was made and rejected nothing more could be done, he himself does not believe that the question should remain deadlocked. He mentioned in confidence of a new formula which he intends suggesting to the Prime Minister. The British could do nothing now to induce Gandhi to listen to reason, but he hoped that the Generalissimo will persuade Gandhi not to take precipitate action that will wreck all chances of a settlement. I immediately telegraphed his suggestion to the Generalissimo.
4. I received today three urgent messages from the Generalissimo stating that the Indian National Congress will hold a meeting from July 6th to July 8th at which it is bound to come to a decision as to what action to take. (The President will be aware that matters have come to a head with the British Government appointing two days ago an Indian Defence Minister and two Indian members to the War Cabinet, and arresting an important member of the Indian National Congress.)

As the Indian problem vitally affects the security of the United Nations, he hopes that the President will initiate definite measures leading to a just and reasonable settlement. Failing a settlement he is apprehensive that the recent Malayan and Burmese disasters will be repeated in India on an infinitely wider scale.

He solicits a clear indication of the President's attitude and opinion on the Indian problem so that he may determine his own attitude. Because of the meeting of the Indian National Congress, he hopes that he may receive the reply before July 7th, which corresponds to July 6th Washington time.

Respectfully submitted,

July 5th 1942.

T.V.Soung.



WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 15, 1942

My dear Mr. Soong:

Since the receipt of your letter of January 6 with reference to the telegram you received from the Generalissimo on January 5 for the organization of the Joint Staff in Chungking, I have talked the matter over with the Secretary of War and with General Marshall. Our view is about as follows:

"The suggestion that an American officer be sent to Chungking to serve as Chief of Staff on the Joint Staff is being considered. In our opinion, the services of such an officer could be of far greater value, especially in the Burma theatre, where Chinese, American and British factors are all present, if he were given executive power to coordinate these factors. This, of course, amounts to command power over Chinese units, as well as British and American, but there is no other way to get the same result. Also in his capacity as Chief of Staff for the Generalissimo, such an officer would be fully cognizant of all matters of policy. An expression of the feeling of the Generalissimo on this matter would be appreciated."

Sincerely yours,



JOHN J. McCLOY  
Assistant Secretary of War

The Honorable  
T. V. Soong,  
2871 Woodland Drive,  
Washington, D. C.

*Under Wavell & Hutton. Chinese units already under Hutton  
as Chief of staff have command in Burma. His relation  
with Hutton.  
Joint headquarters planning staff*

1942年1月15日美国陆军部次长麦克洛依致宋子文函。下端  
为宋子文亲笔注文

January 30, 1942

DUPLICATE

My dear Mr. Stimson:

I have to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of January 29th and wish to confirm our understanding that the functions of the United States Army Representative are to be generally as follows:

To supervise and control all United States defense-aid affairs for China.

Under the Generalissimo to command all United States forces in China and such Chinese forces as may be assigned to him.

To represent the United States Government on any International War Council in China and act as the Chief of Staff for the Generalissimo.

To improve, maintain and control the Burma Road in China.

With reference to the appointment of an Air officer of high rank, the Generalissimo would indeed like if possible to retain Colonel Chennault as the highest ranking American Air Officer in China, because of his signal services to both our countries, and much appreciates your kind consideration in the matter.

I am glad to learn of your intention to promote Colonel Chennault to the grade of Brigadier General in due course.

Yours sincerely,

T. V. Soong

The Honorable  
The Secretary of War  
Washington

1942年1月30日宋子文致美国陆军部长史汀生函

Tell area.

No. 4 counter-  
88th (1st)  
attack divs

Area. The 1st  
182nd, 184th  
N 28th, N 39  
divisions. 71  
and the 49th  
to be given  
but not to be

but it is the logical move and it will be feasible in time. As soon as there is any  
prospect for initiating it, a large increase of aviation should be secured to  
support the operation and at once capitalize on it by starting a continuous

may seem ov  
plan on the  
States, the

A continuing  
and bringin

in training.  
consist of 1  
ordnance and  
something be  
instructed  
Yunnan. I re  
directive, b  
put into eff

start now.  
by less sui  
replacement  
garrisons i  
will be pow  
present, th  
actually co  
his scatter  
seize the i

Air Force b  
success in  
support for

stationing

Paoshan gr

full numbe  
divisions.

to the Kan

Kunming gr

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
U. S. ARMY FORCES  
CHINA, BURMA AND INDIA

November 6th, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. SOONG

1. Assuming sufficient force, with the necessary equipment and training,  
successive future objectives of the Chinese Army should be:-

1. THE RECAPTURE OF BURMA. Essential prerequisite to assure a flow  
of weapons and equipment. Even if all Burma cannot be taken before the monsoon, an advance to Mandalay will permit of the linking up by road of Lado and Shamo. A considerable tonnage can then reach the Chinese units in Yunnan and Kweichow

In preparation for this operation, the Yunnan contingent should be built up on the principle of having a smaller number of divisions thoroughly equipped, and using the remainder as replacements, L.O.C. troops, and even labor, rather than spreading the available means evenly throughout. More than five divisions could not be deployed initially; it is therefore all the more important that they be the best available, and well supplied and supported. They should get the bulk of the artillery available, and should be kept up to strength at the expense of rear units. The next five divisions could be partially absorbed as replacements and still retain enough personnel for reconstitution later. The third five divisions could be passed through the spear-head at Lashio, pick up their artillery (if necessary), continue the push while the others re-organize.

2. RE-ADJUSTMENT OF UNITS. Immediately after the occupation of Burma is assured, the experienced units should be moved to eastern Yunnan, Kweichow and Hunan, and set up for an operation against Hankow. All possible supplies should be hauled at once to dumps in the Changsha area. Divisions of the 33-division plan in the Hankow and Loyang areas should meanwhile be re-organizing, filling up and training.

3. RE-OCCUPATION OF CENTRAL CHINA. Hankow can be taken by an attack directed from the Changsha area on Kiukiang. The Nanchang garrison can be contained or defeated and the weight of the attack can go on to the Yang Tze at Kiukiang. Simultaneously, attacks from west Hupeh should contain enough Jap strength to make the Kiukiang operation feasible. At Kiukiang a junction with the Chinese east, and in the Ta Pish Shan would complete the ring around Hankow. Any attempt at relief via the Yangtze could be countered by a move of the Kiangsi and Chekiang garrisons toward the river. Attempts at relief from the north down the R.R. could be countered by an attack east from Loyang.

4. RE-OCCUPATION OF HUKUANG. This step puts us where it will be possible to reach Japan from the air. It cuts the Shanghai area off from all communications except by sea. It makes it possible to clear Kiangsi and close the Yangtze above Hankow—it is a threat of a further advance to Tsinan, in which case the Jap garrison in Shansi would be threatened. It would be opposed in strength, and would have to wait on an adequate supply of munitions,

1942年11月6日史迪威致宋子文备忘录

67:7

*Spencer*

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES  
CHINA BURMA INDIA

*Reg. No. 1221  
26/11/42*

*Dec. 26.*

*Mr. T. V. Soong -*

*Dear Mr. Soong, -*

*Many thanks for your thought of me on Christmas. The cigarette box is a beautiful piece of handicraft and I appreciate having it. Let me take this opportunity also to tell you how helpful you have been and how much we lean on you. You are probably the one man who can solve our problem, and I trust you will be able to stay here until there is reasonable assurance that it will be done.*

*With best wishes for the New Year,*

*Sincerely yours,*

*J. W. Stilwell.*

1942年12月26日史迪威致宋子文亲笔函

# “复旦—胡佛近代中国人物与 档案文献研究系列”总序

复旦大学历史悠久,在自然科学、医学、经济金融、政治外交、思想文化等领域的研究与教学,享誉中外。百年来,对中国现代化的进展,贡献卓著。复旦大学在近代中国人物和档案文献研究方面,也有相当的积累和成果,并积极与海内外学术机构交流合作。

史坦福大学胡佛研究院是世界著名的智库,除了杰出的学者之外,还有享誉全球的图书及档案蒐藏。自1919年创办以来,胡佛研究院档案馆一直注重近代人物档案文献的征集、整理和开放,最近更扩大近代中国档案的蒐藏及研究。新公开的档案包括蒋介石日记、蒋经国日记、国民党党史资料、宋子文文件等,对于近代中国政治、经济、外交诸领域的研究,极具价值。

保存历史、还原历史,是我们的初衷;进一步阐明历史、从历史中学习,是我们的心愿。自2004年起,复旦与胡佛的学者开始合作整理与研究胡佛典藏的近代中国人物档案。2005年,双方合作举办了“近代中国档案文献研究”学术研讨会;2006年共同举办“宋子文与战时中国(1937—1945)”学术研讨会。为了更进一步推动中国近代史研究的合作交流,并促进有关机构及时

开放历史档案文献,双方决定共同编辑和不定期出版“复旦—胡佛近代中国人物与档案文献研究系列”。

本研究系列包括档案史料汇编、研究著作、专题论集、口述历史稿、照片图册等。入编档案史料以胡佛研究院典藏中外文档案为主,也欢迎其他来源的珍档。档案文献的选编校注均从尊重历史、体现原始文本样态的准则,著作、专题论集则代表各相关作者的观点。

此项研究系列的出版得以实现,首先要感谢复旦大学和胡佛研究院的大力支持,还有许多参与写作、整理、编辑、出版、校对等工作的同仁,以及对本研究系列热忱协助的朋友及档案所有人家属,在此表示诚挚的敬意和感谢。

吴景平(复旦大学)  
郭岱君(胡佛研究院)  
2008年3月8日

# **Preface: Hoover Institution and Fudan University Modern China Research Series: Leadership and Archival Documents**

The Hoover Institution is a public policy research center located at Stanford University. It is world-renowned for its scholarship and research on domestic and foreign affairs, and the repository of valuable archival and documentary material from Europe and Asia. Many documents date from before World War I. The Hoover Institution Archives is now a repository of the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, as well as copies of the vast historical records from the Kuomintang, the dominant political party in China before 1949 when it moved to Taiwan (The Kuomintang remained as the ruling party in Taiwan until 2000).

Fudan University is the leading university in Shanghai, China, known world-wide for its research facilities in the natural and social sciences. Its Department of History has been researching the work of modern Chinese

leaders and their influence on the modernization of China.

In 2005, Hoover Institution and Fudan University collaborated on the first seminar on the management, collection, and preservation of Chinese materials from the Nationalist period. A second seminar in 2006, “T. V. Soong and Wartime Nationalist China, 1937 – 1945” was held in Shanghai, and scholars from the United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland China could now examine the role of T. V. Soong during World War II.

It is from this second seminar that the Hoover Institution and Fudan University are pleased to publish some of these historical documents in a new series, *Hoover Institution and Fudan University Modern China Research Series: Leadership and Archival Documents*. The first volume presents the telegrams exchanged between T. V. Soong and Chiang Kai-shek from 1940 – 1943. The second consists of photographs of T. V. Soong, many taken from his personal family album. The third volume is the proceedings of this 2006 seminar.

Future publications will continue to collect the writings, oral histories, private correspondence, and personal photographs of many major and important figures in modern Chinese history. This series is now promoting an exciting and new understanding of modern China.

We want to express our deepest gratitude to the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and Fudan University. Their support has made this series possible. We also want to thank the many colleagues, friends, and donors for their participation in this project. We appreciate their hard work, devotion, and generosity to make this series successful.

Tai-chun Kuo, Hoover Institution, Stanford University  
Wu Jingping, Department of History, Fudan University  
March 8, 2008



# 总目

“复旦—胡佛近代中国人物与档案文献研究系列”总序	1
Preface: Hoover Institution and Fudan University Modern China Research Series: Leaders and Archival Documents	3

中文版(译稿)	1—239
---------	-------

Chinese Version(translation), pp. 1 – 239	
---	--

英文版(原稿)	241—525
---------	---------

English Version(original), pp. 241 – 525	
--	--

中文索引	527—534
------	---------

Chinese Index	pp. 527 – 534
---------------	---------------

英文索引	535—542
------	---------

English Index	pp. 535 – 542
---------------	---------------