

澳大利亚汉学家 李瑞智之研究

中华传统思想文化的当代价值

A Study of Reg Little

Contemporary Values of Chinese Intellectual Tradition

李书仓 著

海外学

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
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PREFACE I

I will never forget the first time, in 1966, that I opened a book of T'ang Dynasty poetry, with the original Chinese on the one page and an English translation on the facing page. I was only 14 at the time, and a cousin whom I idolized sent me the book from Taipei, China. He had been trained in Mandarin, and for me to read that book and, only slightly later, to hear him speak Mandarin with his Chinese wife, set me off on a life-long love of Chinese culture. At university, I took every course offered in Chinese, Chinese and Japanese history, literature, and religion, graduating with approximately one half of my credit hours in what constituted an independent "Asian studies" major. Back in those days, I could only go to Taiwan to study, as the Chinese mainland and the United States hadn't yet opened to each other for commerce, intellectual exchange, or tourism. I spent ten weeks in the summer of 1973 at Fu Ren University, near Taipei, and then an entire year, again in Taipei, on a Rotary Club International Graduate Fellowship. What has always interested me the most, from the first time I opened that book of T'ang poetry to the present, is the comparative study of Anglo-American and Chinese society and culture. I've kept up with all the latest translations of the Chinese classics, taught courses on Chinese religion and philosophy in my university's Asian Studies program, and I've been fortunate enough to visit and to teach in China on a number of occasions. Of course, the recent openness between the U.S. and China has resulted in spectacular work in almost all academic disciplines. Moreover, the rise of China makes a new, vital, and rigorous understanding of China and of the relationships between China and the rest of the world of paramount significance. Australian Reg Little is one of our most significant and informed scholars of China, present and past. He is also one of the sharpest critics of the so-called "West's" recent trends.

If Reg Little were known only for his 2007 book, *A Confucian-Daoist*



Millennium? and his more recent *The Twenty-First Century Dream of the Red Chamber*, he would still merit a work as synthetic and rigorous as Li Shucang's present study. In that study, Little explores, with the expertise of a life-long Sinologist, the prospects of China in the 21st century from the point of view of its philosophical past and the ways in which the Confucian and Daoist underpinnings of contemporary Chinese thought and, perhaps more importantly, attitude toward the social and political world. But Little has done much more than that. Beginning with a degree in Economics from Melbourne University, building through another B.A. in English and Russian in 1962, continuing with a Master of Science degree in Economics from Trinity College, Dublin, and culminating with a graduate diploma in International Law, Little's academic training has been both deep and wide. Moreover, after being trained as a diplomat, Little's international experience has taken in various foreign service capacities to Switzerland, Laos, Japan, Bangladesh, and, most importantly for the focus of this book, China, the country with which Little has engaged as a friend, a diplomat, a scholar, and a teacher for most of his adult life. Little embodies the spirit, the range, and the passion of a true polymath. Little is also a frequent contributor to the online *Confucian Weekly Bulletin* and to *On Line Opinion: Australia's e-Journal of Social and Political Debate*, with titles such as "Why Is the West Unprepared for China's Rise," "For Every Yin There Is a Yang," and "The Passion and Enthusiasm of Confucian Asia." While perhaps "little" known outside of Australian and Chinese cultural circles (his books are not yet available on the United States version of amazon.com), Little's thoughtful interventions into current events in the eastern and southern hemispheres deserve a broad readership.

Little's work raises important questions for the entire discipline of comparative studies, and, while his focus is frequently from the perspective of his native Australia, his work ranges far afield to embrace and to struggle with increasingly numerous vexations between what is conventionally called the "East" and the "West." It is in this field that Little's expertise in Confucian and Daoist structures and habits of thought enables him to shed valuable philosophical light on matters of economic, political, social, and technological differences between China and its "Western" competitors, whether from "down under" or from across the Pacific. About these matters, Little writes with much more than an educated "outsider"



perspective. As a matter of fact, he stresses throughout his career that the Chinese way has to be “experienced” and “lived,” not just studied and learned. Such a distinction also informs his view of the ongoing permeation of Confucian and Daoist values from the Chinese past as being immanent and thoroughly integrated, as opposed to the abstract and transcendent predilection of the West, as its own philosophical traditions still saturate its Occidental world view.

Li Shucang is well positioned to introduce Reg Little to the larger world. A scholar with a comparative bent himself, Li has studied, taught, and written on English teaching, American poetry, Shakespeare, translation theory, and various topics pertinent to his work on Little. An award-winning (both for teaching and research) professor at the Qilu University of Technology in Jinan, Shandong, China, Li has also spent time as a visiting scholar in the Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Toledo, Ohio, USA, and has collaborated with American scholars on teaching and research projects. Perhaps most importantly, he has collaborated with Reg Little, an opportunity that lends serious credibility to this study.

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PREFACE II

Placing Reg Little in the History of the Study of China

The study of China, whether defined as the writing and spreading and discussion of scholarly and interdisciplinary knowledge about various economic, cultural, political and social aspects of China, “China Studies,” and “China Watching,” or as more narrowly limited to a field of study now historically named as “classical sinology,”^[1] has consistently been framed by changing global political alliances and associations, forces and contexts and, of course, by the complicated histories of colonialism, post colonialism and neo colonialism.^[2] Post World War II, modern Chinese Studies developed, primarily as a consequence of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 as the colonial era “sinology” gave way to the arguably more enlightened “area studies.” “Area studies,” fraught with growing pains and its own controversies, including controversies within Chinese Studies, incorporates interdisciplinary fields of research and scholarship. Continuing controversies in Area Studies include the association of its origins with the American government’s need to know more about the rest of the world, especially what would somewhat later come to be called the Third World (including China) — a key battleground of the Cold War. Hence one rationale for the emergence of Area Studies was to provide the U.S. state political and intelligence

[1] See Louise Yelen, Review: “Post Colonial Criticism in the Era of Globalization,” *Studies in the Novel*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (spring 2002), pp. 90-101.

[2] See Norma Field, *The Cold War and Beyond in East Asian Studies*, PMLA Vol. 117, No. 5 (Oct., 2002), pp. 1261-1266 and Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies,” *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, ed. Andre Schiffrin (New York, 1997), pp. 195-232.



apparatuses with expertise and advice about parts of the world that few Americans had much knowledge about. During the early years of the Cold War, government officials and their colleagues at universities, foundations and research centers, hoped that the new Area Studies programs and scholars would produce knowledge and trained personnel to assist the American government in the making and implementation of American foreign policy.^[1] Ironically, while some scholars and researchers based in Area Studies (especially political scientists) actively desired to contribute to American policymaking and embraced political agendas, many had primarily scholarly and pedagogical interests and priorities and more idealistic motivations. And so, as the fields matured, by the late 1960s and early 1970s many of these fields witnessed the emergence of radical and severe critiques of the role of the United States government in the areas of the world on which particular scholars focused, including some work by scholars focusing on China, undermining the notion that area specialists should prioritize in their work serving the American government or framing their work with the issues central to the government.^[2]

The term, “Area Studies,” itself exists primarily as a generalization for what consists of, in the practice of scholarship, many complimentary, but as often divergent, fields of research, in both the social sciences and the humanities.^[3] Academic, university centered, Area Study programs usually involve history, political science, sociology, cultural studies, language study, geography, literature, and other related disciplines. Area Studies approaches, as they developed, especially in North America with scholars such as John King Fairbank, challenged and superseded the dominance of classical, colonial era, Sinology.^[4]

[1] Bates, Robert H. Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy? *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30, No. 2(1997), pp. 166-169.

[2] See Christopher Shea, “Political Scientists Clash over Value of Area Studies,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, (January 10, 1997): A13.

[3] See, e.g., Mungello, David E., *Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology*, Stuttgart: F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1985; rpr. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989 and Zurndorfer, Harriet, “A Brief History of Chinese Studies and Sinology,” in Zurndorfer, Harriet (1999). *China Bibliography: A Research Guide to Reference Works About China Past and Present*. Honolulu: Brill; reprinted, University of Hawaii Press.

[4] See Jonathan Spence’s review of *China: A New History* for the *NY Times*, “From the Stone Age to Tian’anmen Square,” <https://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/24/books/from-the-stone-age-to-tian-anmen-square.html>.



Fairbank was a prominent historian of China and the founder of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies at Harvard University. He exerted a profound and continuing influence on the field of China Studies and on all who followed him. He created fellowships for graduate students, trained China historians and, because of his reputation and influence, he was able to place students, after they graduated, in universities and colleges and places of importance around the world. During his illustrious career, Fairbank welcomed and funded researchers from all over the world and hosted a series of conferences and seminars and workshops, which brought scholars together and produced publications. Fairbank and his colleagues at Harvard also wrote an influential textbook on China and Japan, *A History of East Asian Civilization* and he did establish links to figures in government and establish a voice in government both by training journalists, government officials, and foundation executives and by giving his thoughts to the government on policy on China. He also established the Harvard East Asian Series for publishing.

He was enlisted to work for the U.S. government from 1941 to 1946 and worked in China for two years. Fairbank was amongst those in the US who predicted the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and advocated establishing relations with the new, communist government. Fairbank had taught at Harvard until his retirement in 1977. Among his works are *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America* (1974), and *Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings* (1985, co-editor). Fairbank promoted the “study of China within a discipline,” an approach which downplayed the role of philological Sinology and focused on issues in history and the social sciences. As such, Fairbank establishes a remarkable and influential presence in the field of China Studies, combining an interdisciplinary approach with an attempt to avoid colonial era generalizations and to articulate contributions that Asia can make to the West. This is the tradition of scholarship, and, indeed the professional arc, that Reg Little and other contemporary China Watchers are following. Reg Little brings, for example, his Australian diplomatic experience and his study of Confucianism to his writing about China. It is Reg Little’s writing on China that is the focus of Shucang Li’s book.^[1]

[1] Clarence J Glacken, *Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, reprinted 1990).



The “culturally sanctioned habit of deploying large generalizations” within colonial discourse has been commented upon by Edward Said, the Palestinian-American critic. Said writes in *Orientalism: Western Concepts of the Orient* (1978),

Reality is divided into various collectives: languages, races, types, colors, mentalities, each category being not so much a neutral designation as an evaluative interpretation. (277)

Such tendencies have had a long tenure. European colonists and earlier generations of European writers had regarded vast regions of the world merely as blank spaces, lands “without narrative” waiting to be mapped, mined, written into existence. This domestication of the “orient” coupled with a discourse of the “inscrutable” nature of its peoples has been analyzed by Said in *Orientalism* (1978). The “orient” is a Western construct as much intended to define the East — a global cultural stereotype. The Marabar Caves in E.M. Forster’s novel *A Passage to India* (1924), for example, are imagined by Europeans initially as a locus for romance, but are subsequently translated, like India itself, into something repellent, maddening, destructive of identity under disoriented Western eyes. It has only been recently that these places, their societies and world views have begun to be inscribed. Particularly since the Second World War, as Said points out, there has been “[a] massive intellectual, moral and imaginative overhaul and deconstruction of Western representation of the non-Western world” (*Culture and Imperialism*, 1983).

The term “geopolitics,” which has proved useful in the study of international relations, identifies a framework that considers power relations as embedded in the spatial structure (size, distance, adjacency, etc.) of geographical states and territories.^[1] The colonial roots of Oriental or Asiatic scholarship, the war-driven migration of Asian scholars and the dispersion of their expertise and Cold War investment and competition are examples. The rising scholarly interest in China following its growing political-economic significance in recent decades, as well as the emergence of various “alternative discourses” and other attempts at intellectual decolonization, provide further examples.^[2]

[1] Albrecht Tzeng, William L. Richter, Ekaterina Koldunova, Introduction: Framing Asian Studies, Framing Asian Studies: Geopolitics and Institutions, Singapore: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018.

[2] Foucault, M. Truth and power. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (pp. 51-75). New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.



There are many institutions and agencies involved in the social and political processes of knowledge production about China — such as foundations, professional associations, publishers, journals, research institutes, cultural societies, governments and multinational entities, for example. These institutions and agencies operate in ways that reflect their roles, agendas and power relations within a geopolitical context, and leave their imprints, through funding and agenda setting and framing, on their associated scholarly networks and subsequently the intellectual landscape of human knowledge, especially in the West, about China. While institutions and agencies can often be seen as mechanisms by which geopolitical priorities help to frame China Studies, it is important to recognize that institutions and agencies and their associated networks can also be centers of opposition to the prevailing foreign policies and their geopolitical underpinnings.

Investigating these themes further invites critical examination of the power structure underlying this knowledge: Who has written about China — why, for what purpose(s) and for whom? Where is this knowledge disseminated and consumed? Which (institutional, societal-structural, national) interests and biases have been brought into this knowledge production and dissemination? Which topics have been emphasized or excluded? Or modified? Been framed and reframed? What is the nature of China, in other words, as “subject”? To be a subject, Foucault has shown, is at the same time to undergo subjection. If one discards any essentialist notion of culture, then one must turn to the constitution of the subject, to the “games of truth” and practices of power that makes possible certain determined forms of subjectification in order to reevaluate our understanding of them. Such an analysis of the “relationships. . . between constitution of the subject or different forms of the subject and games of truth, practices of power and so forth” involves, according to Foucault, the rejection of any “a priori theory of the subject” (121).^[1]

Following in the professional and critical tradition established by John K Fairbank’s, Reg Little is a contemporary, important, interesting and controversial writer and speaker who has focused on the official return of Confucianism to

[1] A *New York Times* article from February 13, 2014 on the official attitude: “Mr. Xi said the party leadership was preparing a policy document ‘to promote traditional values, implant new social mores and a cohesive national spirit, and enhance cultural soft power.’” http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/xi-touts-communist-party-as-defender-of-confuciuss-virtues/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1.



China.^[1] Formerly of the Australian Foreign Service, Little draws upon his extensive diplomatic experience in Asia in his writings and speeches. He often attempts to make prescient pronouncements regarding Asia's, and especially, China's, place in the world vis-a-vis the West. He is sympathetic, perhaps overly so, to many of the values and achievements of Asia, and especially China, and his writings and talks about China usually strive to communicate some of the essence of what he sees as their positive and useful values. Simply put, his underlying point is that China is still profoundly and essentially influenced by the cultural inheritance of the Confucian ethical tradition and that the West has much to learn and unlearn about China. This tradition, in Little's opinion, is based on notions of human obligations, the community and the rule of virtue or, in practice, of extremely powerful men. For example, In *The Analects*, Confucius wrote:

Lead the people by laws and regulate them by penalties and the people will try to keep out of jail but will have no sense of shame. Lead the people by virtue and restrain them by rules of decorum, and the people will have a sense of shame and moreover, will become good.^[2]

In an age of the Internet, fast international air travel, and ever growing international contacts, the differing perceptions and interpretations of the role of ethics in China have become much more compelling and relevant and important to policymakers and social scientists alike. Reg Little urges the importance of achieving an understanding in Western countries of the modern form of Chinese Confucianism that he believes is the frame, and indeed the energy as well, for the remarkable and unexpected (by most Western observers at least) economic advance of China in the 21st century. Amongst other things, according to Little's analysis, the emphasis in 21st century China on rigorous and even ruthless, by Western moral and ethical standards, competitive education and the awarding of lifetime positions in government and private business bureaucracies can be traced directly to the return in China of the importance of Confucianism. The authority and responsibility carried by officials, which is part of the basis of both ancient and modern Chinese

[1] Reg Little, 2018 July 17, <https://confucianweeklybulletin.wordpress.com/diplomatic-insight-from-dr-reg-little/>.

[2] Confucius (translated by D C Lau), *The Analects* (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1979).



Confucianism, and the conclusion that it is these officials who should hold and wield power, is, in Little's view, an accepted and advantageous practice in China. And the Chinese stress on rituals and rites and ceremonies, in this view, ensures that individual activity is pursued within a framework of established social behavior and courtesies which help to preserve the social fabric and ruling consensus. In academia there is a movement to reclaim Confucianist social and cultural norms that were discarded by the May Fourth Movement and the "Cultural Revolution."^[1] Knowledge and understanding of these important and essential aspects of China is, for Little, critical for geopolitics in the 21st century, and, in his opinion, sadly lacking in officials and scholars in the West.

Geopolitics began in the nineteenth century as a way to try and establish an objective geographic "science" of statecraft. Ironically, the "science" of geopolitics was itself shaped by the same imperial and colonial forces and motivations that gave rise to orientalism. Sir Halford Mackinder's famous "heartland" doctrine — that whichever power controlled the Eurasian "heartland" would control the world — reflected decades of British imperial competition with Russia in Central Asia.^[2] The American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan expressed a geopolitical theory of sea power that was used to help justify President Theodore Roosevelt's expansion and use of U.S. naval forces.^[3] The German Karl Haushofer adapted Mackinder to create a *Geopolitik* in support of Hitler's Third Reich.^[4] And the American Nicholas Spykman countered Mackinder's Heartland theory with a "Rimland" theory that later became a significant basis for the application to Asia of the United States' Cold War doctrine of containment.^[5]

The recognition that geopolitics might differ from country to country has led to the contemporary study of critical geopolitics. Like Asian Studies, Geopolitics (as

[1] For a more detailed examination, see Wang Gungwu, May Fourth and the GPCU: The "Cultural Revolution" Remedy, *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 52, No. 4 (Winter, 1979-1980), pp. 674-690.

[2] Sloan, G.R. "Sir Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now", in Gray C.S. and Sloan G.R., *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy*. London: Frank Cass, 1999.

[3] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

[4] Saul Bernard Cohen. "Geopolitics of the World System." Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2003.

[5] Nicholas Spykman with A. A. Rollins, *Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy, I*, *The American Political Science Review* 1939, issue 3.



a set of theories or field of study) is itself framed by real and/or perceived political conditions. We tend to speak of geopolitical eras. Orientalism developed in the era of European colonialism. Area Studies developed in the Cold War era, faced major challenges in the brief period between the end of the Cold War and 9/11, and continues to evolve in the post-9/11 era. These broad generalizations, of course, overly simplify temporal and geographic complexity.

Chinese Studies has roots that can be traced back to the European colonial interest in Asia, or the Orient, and the indigenous intellectual attempts to resist colonial dominance through promoting forms of pan-Asianism. But as an institutionalized field of inquiry it was largely developed in the special geopolitical circumstances following World War II — the rapid dismantling of colonial empires; the proliferation of “new nations” in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere; and Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Reg Little was an Australian diplomat for 25 years, during which time he received language training in Japanese and Chinese and served as Deputy or Head of five Australian overseas diplomatic missions.^[1] In Canberra he headed Divisions concerned with North Asia, International Economic Organizations and Policy Planning, and directed the Australia China Council. In 1976 in Beijing, he predicted China’s future double digit growth. For the past three decades he has been active in China and other parts of Asia in conferences addressing the renaissance of Confucian traditional values, about which he has been involved in writing a number of books and conference presentations. Little’s time in Japan from 1964 to 1969 led to his judgment in 1976 that China would emulate Japanese growth. It also led to *The Confucian Renaissance* in 1989 and *The Tyranny of Fortune: Australia’s Asian Destiny* in 1997, and *A Confucian Daoist Millennium?* in 2007. His most recent work is *A 21st Century Dream of Red Chambers* (forthcoming). Since 2009 he has been a vice president of the Beijing-based International Confucian Association.

The International Confucian Association (ICA) held its inaugural meeting in Beijing between the 5th and 8th of October, 1994, to celebrate the two thousand, five hundred and forty fifth anniversary of the birth of Confucius. It represented a commitment by all the member communities

[1] See Paul M. Evans. *Biography of Fairbank, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of China*, Blackwell Pub, 1988.



of East Asia to a serious exploration of the qualities of the Confucian tradition which are producing a range of unique, non-Western approaches to cultural, social and economic organisation amongst the growth economies of East Asia...

It is not difficult to recognise some qualities which are common throughout East Asia. In fact, participants in conferences focusing on the Confucian tradition are beginning to identify a number of organisational qualities which are of importance to anyone wanting to do business in Asia and, indeed, to anyone interested in the future of the global economy...

...a knowledge of Confucian and associated Daoist values suggests that contemporary Western thinking may need to look again and critically at some of the legacies of the Enlightenment which still tend to predetermine Western behavior and notions of progress. It may even be that, viewed against the panorama of history and civilisation, the mechanical principles of Isaac Newton, the liberal political instincts of John Locke and the commercial ethos of Adam Smith come to look a little like the horsemanship of Genghis Khan-genius, releasing raw energy capable of conquering the world, but in another time.^[1]

Little has previously written on the early and later acquaintance between Asian communities and the Christian West. In *The Confucian Renaissance* (1989), Little and Warren Reed, his co-author, sketch the importance of the 19th century leadership of Japan and the Chinese Revolution. They analyze the pervasive influence of the West and especially the US in the global bodies which were established after the Second World War and conclude that the West is content to watch these global systems “decay, until pressure mount: to oblige them to accept leadership without becoming involved in over contests and conflict.” It is in this context that the authors urge the importance of achieving an understanding in Western countries of the “modern form of renaissance of Confucianism.”

In *A Confucian-Daoist Millennium?* (2006), Little addresses such questions

[1] Little, Reg. Conference Report. Confucius in Beijing: The Conference of the International Confucian Foundation. September 1955.