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经济转轨时期的产业政策

——对中国经验的实证分析与前景展望

江小涓 著

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
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重点研究领域有:工业化理论与发展中 国家的工业发展问题,产业结构理论与产业 政策,国际贸易、国际投资理论与政策,政府 行为与政府职能等。

已有5部专著和若干篇论文发表。代表作有:《中国工业发展与对外经济贸易关系的研究》(经济管理出版社1993年版)、《后来居上——中国工业发展中长期展望》(与刘世锦合著,中信出版社1991年版)、《减弱"复关"冲击的国际经验比较》(与李海舰等合著,经济管理出版社1995年版)。论文《中国产业政策推行中的公共选择问题》(发表于《经济研究》1993年第6期)获1994年度孙冶方经济科学奖。

出版前言





为了全面地、系统地反映当代经济学的全 貌及其进程,总结与挖掘当代经济学已有的 和潜在的成果,展示当代经济学新的发展方向,我们决定出版"当代经济学系列丛书"。

的最新发展。

本丛书致力于推动中国经济学的现代化和国际标准化,力图在一个不太长的时期内,从研究范围、研究内容、研究方法、分析技术等方面逐步完成中国经济学从传统向现代的转轨。我们渴望经济学家们支持我们的追求,向这套丛书提供高质量的标准经济学著作,进而为提高中国经济学的水平,使之立足于世界经济学之林而共同努力。

我们和经济学家一起瞻望着中国经济学 的未来。

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ABSTRACT

INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD AN ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE

1. Perspectives of the Study

This book features an empirical study of the Chinese experience in pursuing the industrial policy and gives a prognostication of the prospects of the industrial policy in China in future.

China has had repeated recourse to the industrial policy since the advent of the period of reform and opening up to the outside world in the late 1970s. This is because the industrial policy offers a highly elastic means of government intervention, which may work in different directions: similar to compulsory plans, which enables the government to directly intervene in the operation of enterprises or to indirect intervention of government in a market economy. Therefore, the industrial policy is a means of government intervention acceptable to either proponents of the leading role of the planned economy or those in favour of market—oriented

reform according to their own understanding.

The arguments that "the market mechanism is not without its drawbacks" and that "as a latecomer China needs the kind of development which enables it to catch up with and surpass the developed nations" are the two main theoretical basis for the promotion of the industrial policy in China. The two arguments alone are enough to prescribe rather extensive space for the implementation of the industrial policy in China. On the one hand, where the market mechanism is flawed, there is the need for the industrial policy to play its role; in China, the market economy is still in its infancy and therefore flaws caused by imperfect market mechanism are ubiquitous. On the other hand, there is a glaring gap between the Chinese economic structure and those of industrialized nations and newly industrialized countries and regions, and China peėds to catch up with them in so many fields. These two lines of thought have vindicated the necessity of the industrial policy in China. Since the adoption of the policy of reform and opening to the outside world China has, for varying reasons, pushed a host of industrial policies which, if put together, can cover nearly all the industries and products.

However, the Chinese experience over the last dozen years indicates that the actual results of these industrial policies are far from being satisfactory. Many such policies, despite their well—defined goals and long—term perseverance, have failed to provide the solution to lingering structural problems—in some cases they have engendered new structural problems. As befitting all problematic policies, it is difficult to pinpoint the reason why these industrial policies have failed to work as anticipated. There are so many possibilities: theories which are either wrong or do not fit; questionable designs;

incorrect approaches to implementation; or some seemingly minor problems. Behind different interpretations lie contradicting opinions about the industrial policies. If we believe that the problems stemmed from such things as designing, choice of ways and means, and mode of implementation, then we can enhance the effect of these policies by improving the way the industrial policy is designed and intensifying the process of implementation. If we believe that the problems originated in improper understanding and application of theories on which the industrial policy is based, then we cannot but ask if it is feasible for such a policy to exist. In this kind of disputes, economic theories and the experiences of other countries may help, but they cannot provide the ultimate criteria for judgement. Because of the fact that, theoretically speaking, there are always antagonistic viewpoints, and that in terms of experience, the examples

provided are pregnant with contradictory implications, pros and cons can both obtain their favorable theoretical and practical grounds. Therefore, to understand the issues concerning China's industrial policy, it is necessary to conduct, on the basis of appropriate theories, an empirical analysis of the actual process in which the Chinese industrial policy is implemented. It is fortunate that the decade—long Chinese experience has provided us with the time span and practical materials needed for making such an analysis.

To better understand the rationales for the existence of the industrial policy during the period of economic transition and the workings of such a policy, to gain a comprehensive picture of the implementation of the industrial policy in China and the practical results, this book furnishes a number of new angles.

1. Formulation and implementation of the

industrial policy involve an economic as well as political process.

The behaviours of the government have a profound impact on the industrial policy. The government's decision-making process is a political one, and therefore the issue of industrial policy need to be regarded as a political process in association with an economic issue. In the study of the industrial policy, the government is a most important factor in making and implementing this policy; that is to say, the government itself is an object of study and should not be simply interpreted as the representative of the "interests of the whole". The following questions should be asked: first, if government policy-makers are willing and able to formulate a reasonable industrial policy; second, if the government administrative system is willing and able to effectively carry out the industrial policy; third, if it is more effective to solve the problems through the industrial policy than market mechanism. However, the practice of China over the last sixteen years in formulating and implementing the industrial policy has not offered enough evidence for us to derive definite answers to these questions.

2. The industrial policy has the function of allocating resources as well as the function to redistribute incomes.

Different from the situation under the market mechanism, the industrial policy's resource allocation function works by changing the way the resources are allocated. The industrial policy performs its income redistribution function by shifting the incomes from one group of people to another. To spend money collected from all tax—payers on the construction of projects to the benefit of only a group of people is one such example. The two functions may manifest themselves in different policies, but more often than

not they exist in the same policy. Different criteria are applied to judge them — efficiency for the resource allocation function, and fairness for the income redistribution function. Therefore, to separate these two functions may lead to different judgements on the same policy. In the past researchers paid relatively little attention to the redistribution function of the industrial policy despite its pronounced effect on the industrial policy.

3. Different tools to implementation may change the nature of the industrial policy.

The industrial policy has very few policy tools peculiarly its own. Most of the tools employed by the government in regulating and controlling the economy may be used to carry out the industrial policy. On the one hand, some tools designed for direct control, such as the project examination and approval system, may make the industrial policy look like a compulsory

plan; on the other, when only guidance methods with no binding force at all are used, such as the distribution of information or project guidebooks, then the industrial policy becomes a benign method which serves nothing but to exchange information. Because of its highly selective tools, the industrial policy has become an elastic phrase open to free interpretation. Because of differences in the understanding of the industrial policy's actual meanings, when people show their approval or disapproval of such a policy, it is hard to tell what kind of industrial policy (that is, what tools are employed) they are really talking about. Thus those in favour of strengthening the government's intervention and those who want the market mechanism to be beefed up may both demand that the functions of the industrial policy be strengthened --- different understanding of the methods employed is the cause for this phenomenon.