

英美报刊文选

SELECTED READINGS FROM
BRITISH & AMERICAN PRESS

第二册

Re-Elect
PRESIDENT
CARTER

US NEWS

Trigger-Happy
Soviets

外语教学与研究出版社

A Jolt
To Relations
With U.S.

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英 美 报 刊 文 选

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BRITISH & AMERICAN PRESS

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梅 平 江泽均 译注

第 二 册

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前 言

本书所选各篇，系英美17家主要报刊对近几年（主要是1982、1983年）一些重大国际事件以及英、美等国内部重大政治、经济问题的报道和评论。这些文章当时在国际舆论界产生过一定影响；我国报刊也曾引用过其中不少材料或介绍过其中某些论点。现汇集成册，目的在于帮助从事涉外工作、国际问题研究和英语学习的读者提高阅读和翻译新闻英语的能力，同时也起到了了解和研究对方的作用。

全书共收40篇文章，分为5个单元20课，每课均有A、B两篇。这些文章大多从近年来外交学院“外国报刊”课教材中选出，并由外交学院英语系副教授戴树乔、潘绍中、袁士槟、江泽均和讲师梅平翻译和注释。每课A、B两篇内容大体属同一主题。A篇附有参考译文，以便初学者对照阅读；其注释重在说明对某些译文处理的考虑，供读者借鉴。B篇仅加注释，不附参考译文，旨在提供读者作翻译练习之用。此外，书后附有几篇美、英政府首脑在不同时期不同场合所作的较有代表性的演讲及1982年中美联合公报（均附译文），作为阅读补充材料。

在语言方面，这些文章体现了新闻英语的文字简练、文风犀利、结构多变化等特点（如“Thinking the Unthinkable”，“Push Comes to Shove”等）；不少篇章诙谐幽默，具有较强的讽刺意味（如“Yearning for the Presidential Fix”，“The Greying of America”等）；有的矛头直指

霸权主义（如“Unruly Neighbors”等），反映了两霸的矛盾；许多文章的遣词用字也颇有特色。

英美报刊作为资产阶级的喉舌，反映的是本国统治阶级的政治观点，其基本立场无疑是反动的。因此，在阅读时须注意用马列主义和毛泽东思想的立场观点加以分析、鉴别和批判。

本书的主要对象是具有中等英语程度的读者，也可供一切有志于攻读英语报刊的读者自学使用。

《翻译通讯》编辑部

1984年11月

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Lesson One Text A

Inside Afghanistan: A War Russia Is Losing¹

With rebel forces
in Afghanistan

In the short space of a year, a ragtag army of Moslem tribesmen has become a disciplined guerrilla force² that has fought Russian invaders to a standstill³ and gained control of huge swaths of this Soviet-occupied land . . . and for Russia, the comparison with America's Vietnam experience daily becomes more apt.⁴

Soviet troops and the weakened forces of Prime Minister Babrak Karmal still take temporary control of rural districts. But rebels quickly return once the enemy has left. The Soviets can travel main roads only in well-defended convoys, and even then they come under regular attack.⁵

Assaults on Russian supply lines provide the guerrillas with many of their weapons and much of their ammunition. In some provinces, supplies can be delivered to Russian outposts only by air. As a result, Communist offensives are becoming less frequent.⁶

The Kremlin's 85,000 occupation troops have been forced to take refuge in garrisons and cities. But even there they are far from safe.

At night, cities belong to the rebels.⁷

The Afghan army is of little help. Defections are occurring at a rapid rate, and enlistment drives are flagging. Manpower has dropped by nearly 80 percent since the invasion, and many officers are in league with the rebels.⁸ Morale is at rock bottom, and the Russians cannot count on Afghans to back them up in battle.

I witnessed the latest attempt by Soviet and Afghan troops to seize the Panjshir Valley, about 40 miles north of Kabul, in a battle that pointed up Russian failure to defeat the rebels.

Massed on the Communist side¹⁰ were 10,000 to 15,000 Soviet and Afghan soldiers, 1,500 armored vehicles and substantial air support. But despite their overwhelming superiority, Communist forces ran into trouble even before the main fighting began.

Units from different guerrilla bands in the surrounding regions mobilized quickly to harass and slow the movement of the Soviets along roads leading to the Panjshir. For the Russians, getting to the battlefield was as perilous as¹¹ the combat that lay ahead. Rebel groups, many armed with captured Soviet weapons, entrenched themselves in the mountains around the mouth of the valley. From the start, this strategic advantage discouraged Soviet pilots from¹² flying too close. They knew from experience that, while the rebels have only a few anti-aircraft guns, their aim is mostly true.¹³

When Soviet tanks tried to break into the Panjshir, government forces launched devastating barrages of mortar, rockets and cannon fire against villages and partisan concentrations.

Soviet forces, bent on victory at any cost¹⁴, left the relative safety of their armored vehicles for the first time and tried to establish positions in the imposing mountains overlooking the valley. But they were no match for partisans fighting in their own element,¹⁵ a wilderness of tall peaks threaded with a confusing network of paths.

At one point Communist troops managed to take a jagged, rocky ridge, from which they lobbed mortar shells at key guerrilla positions, bringing the rebels under withering fire. While the sun was up, the guerrillas made no attempt to counterattack. But shortly after nightfall, several guerrilla units, commanded by a charismatic young rebel known only as "Massoud", suddenly struck back.

"The Russians don't like to fight at night," the thin, hawk-faced¹⁶ guerrilla commander explained. "We'll keep them busy by launching a diversionary assault against the Salang Highway. We have got to keep hitting them from all sides. Already, they are getting tired and demoralized." The plan worked. By dawn, the ridge was back in guerrilla hands, the Communists routed.¹⁷

But the Russians refused to call off the attack,¹⁸ and fighting went on for weeks. Yet the valley remained under control of outgunned rebels, who relied on clever strategy as much as firepower. Though denied by Afghan and Soviet commands, the victory was verified by Western diplomats, who reported that the *Mujeheddin* had captured large amounts of Soviet equipment and inflicted "unprecedented casualties" on their Communist foes.

Massoud has 1,000 men under his command in the Panjshir Valley. "We are certainly better equipped than before," says the rebel leader, a onetime engineering student. "But we could field thousands more against the Communists if we had more guns."²⁰

Most guns and ammunition used by the Panjshir rebels are captured from the Soviet and Afghan forces, but some military gear comes from Pakistan.

During my time with the rebels, I saw no sign of American aid, even though Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has said that the U.S. has been buying Russian weapons from Egypt and giving them to the guerrillas. Rebel leaders could not — or would not — confirm this dis-

closure.

So far at least, most training appears to be a local affair in which few outsiders are involved. Since the invasion, Massoud has schooled more than 5,000 *Mujeheddin* in guerrilla warfare and weaponry.²¹ Many were instructed at a "guerrilla academy", which sounds much more impressive than it looks. The school is housed in a scattering of mud and brick huts tucked away in a Panjshir village.

"Graduates" fight for two weeks, then rotate out of combat areas for a rest period. It is a common sight to see groups of rebels toting Soviet-made Kalashnikov rifles and laden with heavy cartridge belts trudging into the mountains, en route to battle.

Top rebel leaders are largely self-taught,²² though there is some talk of a clandestine training camp along the Pakistan border where the most promising fighters are taught combat skills by former Afghan Army experts. Massoud claims to have picked up everything he knows about fighting from reading books about guerrilla warfare.

The two-month "academy" run by his lieutenants is serious business. Carefully selected recruits in their late teens or early 20s sit on the closely cropped grass of a cow pasture outside the school and watch intently as an instructor dressed in rough denims and a woolen cap shows them how to fire a Russian AK-47 assault rifle.

A few yards away, another group of trainees carries out close-combat exercises — how to choke or stab an enemy to death.²³ In nearby buildings, more-experienced resistance fighters are taught commando tactics by ex-Army officers, using large wall maps and a film projector to show footage of anti-Soviet guerrilla operations.²⁴

Results of the training are strongly evident among front-line fighters, all of whom carry Russian weapons. They are a hardened bunch who have earned a reputation as ferocious and merciless warriors. They seldom take prisoners.²⁵

The most impressive characteristic of the resistance — in Panjshir and all Afghanistan — is the determination of the anti-Communist population to continue fighting.

Under present circumstances, the conflict is a no-win situation²⁶ for both sides. Despite the improved fighting ability of the *Mujeheddin*, they cannot hope to push the Russians from Afghan soil. Nor can the Russians or the Kabul regime hope to crush the rebels.

With the partisans becoming steadily more aggressive, Kremlin leaders must soon make a decision: Slug it out with the rebels in an expanded conflict — a move that experts estimate could require up to 300,000 additional Soviet troops — or seek a diplomatic solution that might enable the Russian forces to withdraw from the country gracefully.

Whatever course it takes,²⁷ Moscow is far from achieving its goal of turning Afghanistan into another compliant²⁸ satellite state. That is not likely to happen as long as the spirit of Afghan independence thrives in places like the Panjshir Valley.

(from *US News & World Report*, Oct. 5, 1981)

参考译文

在阿富汗，俄国正在输掉一场战争

（和阿富汗叛乱分子军队在一起）

梅 平译 江泽均注

在短短的一年时间里，由穆斯林部落成员拼凑成的杂牌军一跃而成了一支纪律严明的游击队武装力量，他们不仅把俄国入侵者打得寸步难行，而且还控制了被苏联占领的国家的不少宽阔地带。……对俄国来说，它的处境正日益变得跟美国当年在越南的遭遇更为相似。

虽然农村地区一时还处于苏联部队和巴布拉克·卡尔迈勒总理的业已削弱的军队的控制之下，但是一俟敌人离开，叛乱分子便立即开赴回来。在主要公路上，苏联人只能乘坐防卫森严的车子结队而行，即便如此，他们也还时常遭到袭击。

叛乱分子袭击俄国人的供应线，从中获得不少武器和弹药。在某些省份，只能依靠飞机往俄国人前沿阵地运送供应品。这样，共方只能减少其进攻的次数。

克里姆林宫派出的为数达85,000人的占领部队被迫龟缩在军营和城市里。但是即使在那里也远非安全。这些城市到了夜间都是叛乱分子的天下。

阿富汗军队帮不了什么忙。倒戈反水的事不断发生，征收新兵的工作疲疲沓沓。部队人员从入侵以来减少了将近80%，加之不少军官与叛乱分子相互勾结，士气低落到了极点。俄国人无法指望这些阿富汗人在战斗中给予支持。

最近苏联和阿富汗军队曾力图攻克喀布尔以北40英里的帕尼希尔谷地，我亲眼目睹了这场足以说明俄国人无力击败叛乱分子的战斗。