

1998~1999 年 欧

ANNUAL REPORT · EUROPE

主 编: 周 弘

副主编: 沈雁南 刘立群

欧洲  
蓝皮书

洲  
发  
展  
报  
告

欧洲学会 (CAES)

社会科学院欧洲研究所 (IESCASS)

社会科学院欧洲问题研究中心 (CESCASS)

社会科学文献出版社

1998 ~ 1999 年

# 欧洲发展报告

ANNUAL REPORT · EUROPE

---

中国欧洲学会(CAES)

中国社会科学院欧洲研究所(IESCASS)

中国社会科学院欧洲问题研究中心(CESCASS)

主 编 周 弘

副主编 沈雁南 刘立群

C092/02

社会科学文献出版社

## 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

1998~1999 年欧洲发展报告/周弘主编. - 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 1999.4

(欧洲蓝皮书)

ISBN 7-80149-154-8

I .19… II .周… III .①政治-欧洲-研究报告-1998~1999②经济发展-欧洲-研究报告-1998~1999  
IV .D75

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(1999)第 06995 号

·欧洲蓝皮书·

## 1998~1999 年欧洲发展报告



主 编: 周 弘

副 主 编: 沈雁南 刘立群

责任编辑: 程晓燕

责任校对: 伍 合

责任印制: 窦建中

出版发行: 社会科学文献出版社

(北京建国门内大街 5 号 电话 65139961 邮编 100732)

网址: <http://www.ssdph.com.cn>

经 销: 新华书店总店北京发行所

排 版: 北京中文天地文化艺术有限公司

印 刷: 北京科技印刷厂

开 本: 889×1194 毫米 1/32 开

印 张: 9

字 数: 233 千字

版 次: 1999 年 4 月第 1 版 1999 年 4 月第 1 次印刷

印 数: 0001-5000

ISBN 7-80149-154-8/D·016

定价: 22.80 元

版权所有 翻印必究

主 编 周 弘  
副 主 编 沈雁南 刘立群

编 委 (以姓氏笔画为序)  
刘 绯 刘立群 沈雁南  
周 弘 裘元伦

本 书 作 者 (按文章先后顺序)

前 言	周 弘	
提 要	周 弘	(执笔)
综 合 篇	吴国庆	裘元伦
	刘立群	潘琪昌
专 题 篇	吴 弦	
	刘靖华	赵俊杰
	王振华	肖元恺
国别与地区篇	张健雄	陈志瑞
	马胜利	顾俊礼
	罗红波	张 敏
	王 鹤	邝 杨
	杨解朴	李允华
资 料 篇	刘 绯	钱小平
英 文 翻 译	李靖堃	吴倩岚
英 文 校 订	周 弘	

本报告由欧洲联盟委员会资助出版，欧洲联盟委员会及任何代表欧洲联盟的工作人员均不对本报告之信息负责。

This publication is funded by the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained in this book.

# 前 言

《1998~1999 年欧洲发展报告》是欧洲发展系列报告的第三辑。本年度报告的各项工作继续得到来自学术界、政府部门，以及欧盟委员会和欧洲各国驻华使团的支持与鼓励。

本年度报告在结构和体例上都基本保持了上年度报告的格局，说明《欧洲发展报告》已经渐趋成熟。有鉴于此，编委会决定，从本年度开始，《欧洲发展报告》一方面扩充提要的篇幅，一方面增设英文提要。

本年度报告除综合部分外，继续保留了欧洲研究的国别特征，在此基础上对“第二届亚欧会议与中欧关系”、“欧元启动与欧洲央行体系的单一货币政策”以及“北爱尔兰的和平与科索沃危机的发展”等 3 个专题进行了较为细致的分析。在过去的一年里，欧洲还有其他一些值得深入研究和讨论的课题，例如有关“第三条道路”的争论和企业购并浪潮等。但是由于我们的研究力量有限，还来不及就这些问题进行深入的研究，因此决定留待以后另辟篇幅对这些问题进行专门的讨论。

《欧洲发展报告》一如既往是团结合作的产品。中国社会科学院欧洲研究所的研究人员和工作人员为此投入了辛勤的劳动，使其体现着集体的智慧。《欧洲发展报告》的工作继续采用集体讨论和多层审稿的程序，虽然错误仍然在所难免，但它毕竟可以代表全体工作者的水平。我们相信，随着我们研究条件的不断改善和研究能力的不断提高，《欧洲发展报告》将会越写越好。在此，我们仅向所有给予《欧洲发展报告》支持的院内外同仁表示诚挚的谢意，并希望得到指教和斧正。

## 提 要

1998年4月3~4日，第二届亚欧会议在英国首都伦敦召开。比起1996年3月的曼谷首届亚欧会议来，出席本届会议的亚洲国家缺少了两年前的那种满满自信和虎虎生气，而欧洲国家则带来了几分新意和些许活力。在曼谷会议结束两年之后，关于“亚洲价值观”和“亚洲发展模式”的热烈讨论被代之以欧洲社会和企业界对亚洲经营方式和政府管理体制的怀疑和批评。这种欧洲式的自信随着欧元的如期出台和有关欧元讨论的升温而增强，使“欧洲的复兴”成为1998年的热门话题之一。

6年前，当美国经济学家莱斯特·瑟罗在《21世纪的角逐》中预言欧洲将成为布雷顿森林体系之后的世界规则制定者时，无论是在欧洲还是在亚洲，似乎都很少有人认为这是一种认真的预言。当时欧洲的政治家们虽然已经在《马斯特里赫特条约》中绘制了欧洲未来发展的蓝图，制定了欧洲统一大市场的规则，但是欧洲联盟各成员国正在分别为国内徘徊低迷的经济形势、日益庞大的失业队伍和持高不下的福利支出而一筹莫展，作为它们整体利益的代表，欧洲联盟似乎也在专注于解决各种繁杂的内部事务而无暇他顾。但是到了1998年末，欧洲的经济出现了明显的好转趋势。欧洲联盟作为一个整体，经济增长率高于工业七国的平均值，也高于经合组织的平均值，达到了2.9%。欧洲正逢经济周期的上升阶段，经济复苏的宏观环境良好。多年来欧洲联盟国家为了实现欧元而采取的低利率和联合降息的措施，以及为了成功实施欧元而共同采取的谨慎的财政政策和货币政策终见成效。

欧元的如期出台更是给欧元区内国家的经济平等竞争、企业改革创新、银行并购重组增添了新的刺激因素。虽然在欧洲经济中还有一些“灰点”，但是它的“亮点”至少在目前似乎显得鲜明一些。在欧元问世的强有力的推动下，1999 年欧洲的经济形势可望在 1998 年增长的基础上继续增长，虽然速度可能会略微减慢一点。

当然，作为成熟的工业区，欧洲的经济增长是平缓的，但却是稳健的。这种稳健的平缓增长不是由某个单一原因促成的，其中既有经济本身的原因，也有政治层面的原因，更有经济全球化和欧洲内部改革的因素在起作用。欧洲的发展向来以其复杂的内涵和多层的制约而独具特色，欧洲发展因其复杂而缓慢，也因其缓慢而稳健。

1998 年里，西欧诸国的国内政局总体稳定。英、法、德、意等大国，或是工党继续执政，或是左右共治，或是政府更迭，都比较平和，没有发生出人意料的情况。但是，这表面的平稳却不能掩盖欧洲政治中深层次的变化，这些深层变化的表现形式之一就是在欧洲联盟 15 个成员国中有 13 个国家的执政党是左翼或左翼联盟。1998 年 9 月，德国社会民主党和绿党的“红—绿联盟”击败执政长达 16 年之久，以“德国统一总理”和“欧洲统一总理”著称的科尔领导的德国基民盟—基社盟联盟，登上政坛，令人格外刮目。

欧洲左翼政党的纷纷上台执政也不单纯是一个政治或政党的问题。归根结底，欧洲现行的政党政治表达了欧洲人在经济全球化的背景下，对于经济竞争力和社会价值观的平衡方式。事实上，1998 年的欧洲并非一片繁荣，困扰着欧洲国家的严重失业问题依然普遍存在。就业制度和社会保障制度向来是成员国内社会团结和社会契约的形式；而今，继 1997 年 6 月《阿姆斯特丹条约》首次为就业问题设立了专门条款以来，欧洲联盟又在 1997 年 11 月卢森堡就业问题特别首脑会议上通过了《1998 年欧

盟成员国就业政策指导方针的建议》，并在1998年开始了对该《就业方针》的全面实施。显然，社会问题，特别是就业问题已被列入欧洲联盟的议程。在多方努力下，欧洲联盟成员国的平均失业率在1998年略有下降，在1999年可望继续以很缓慢的速度下降。

当然，欧洲联盟的就业政策并不是凯恩斯主义政府干预的翻版。欧洲联盟拨款600多亿欧洲货币单位，不是用于公共投资或消费，而是用于加强就业培训等，以使更多的失业者能够在新的国际竞争环境中获得就业。欧洲联盟还推荐了以“抑制工资上涨和分享工作机会”著称的灵活的荷兰就业模式。欧洲联盟的《1998~2000年社会行动纲要》既不能说是因循传统的自由放任主义，也不能说是继承正宗的社会民主主义。

1998年开始在欧洲兴起的这种既非国家干预主义，也非自由放任主义的政治哲学，以重实效、反教条、寻求社会公正、采取中左路线为标志。这种非左非右、左右趋同的所谓的“第三条道路”是一条欧洲式的发展道路。虽然各国的发展道路还有差别，但总的来说，在世界范围内无序竞争状态愈演愈烈的背景下，“第三条道路”以务实为特征，以国家发展、经济增长、创造就业、社会安定为目的。它倡导的不是什么主义，而是一种政策，一种被英国首相布莱尔称之为“没有左右之分，只有好坏之别”的经济政策。

1998年，和平发展的欧洲依然没有摆脱地区冲突的困扰。在英国和爱尔兰两国政府的共同努力和美国政府的直接干预下，4月10日，耗时22个月的北爱和谈在英国、爱尔兰以及北爱两派8个政党之间达成了协议。这项协议在搁置了爱尔兰统一问题的条件下，使冲突各方在均衡利益的原则下达成和解。但是，就在延续了近30年之久的北爱尔兰冲突终于望见一线和平解决之光时，欧洲的另外一个火药桶——科索沃又起战端。在科索沃，欧盟和北约干脆在没有联合国安理会最后授权的情况下，准备采

取军事干预行动,从而使北约的“集体防御”原则转变为一种可以用“人道主义”和“共同利益”解释的共同军事行动原则。北爱和平进程和科索沃危机的解决过程中都有美国和北约的介入,这说明欧洲自身的安全体系尚未建立起来。虽然 1998 年 12 月英国一反常规,和法国签署了《防务合作联合声明》,但是紧接着英国就撤开了欧洲联盟和联合国安理会,与美国共同对伊拉克实行了空中打击。美国和北约在解决地区冲突中表现出来的主动态势是近年来北约战略扩张的逻辑发展,美国参议员比尔·罗斯说:“北约为了保护价值和利益可使用武力。”这样一来,对于价值和利益的解释权就将对战争与和平发生新的作用。

当然在 1998 年,无论是“经济平稳复苏”,还是“左翼上台执政”,或是“地区危机起伏”,都没有像 1999 年 1 月 1 日问世的欧元那样打眼。欧元的诞生是当代世界经济和国际关系领域中最重大的历史事件之一。目前欧元已经成为欧盟 15 国中 11 国的共同货币,欧元区各国间的帐面支付结算均需使用欧元,为欧元履行其货币基本职能奠定了基础。毋庸预言,欧元将对战后以来美元的国际货币地位形成挑战,将使欧洲以其特有的法制传统和社会价值更多地参与国际货币金融事务,使欧洲在建立国际经济与政治新秩序的过程中扮演更加重要的角色。

欧元的历史意义还在于,它要求在欧盟的层次上统一各成员国的货币政策目标。欧盟成员国的货币政策原本各不相同,它们的政府曾经根据各国的需要选择多重的货币政策目标,如“物价稳定”、“充分就业”、“促进经济增长”和“平衡国际收支”等。为了将货币政策的多重目标集中到《马约》规定的“稳定物价”这个首要目标上来,各国都付出了艰苦的努力。欧元的最终实现说明了,在日趋激烈的国际竞争中,欧盟成员国就宏观经济发展方向达成了共识,把稳定增长作为首要的目标。同时,货币政策的统一也说明了,欧洲联盟在一体化的道路上又向前迈进了一大步。

稳定目标的实现得到了法律和制度的保证。根据《马约》的

规定，欧洲中央银行享有法律上的自主权，能够独立地制定货币政策。此外，欧洲央行体系还确立了一系列的统一政策工具（如公开市场业务和贴现率等）。作为欧洲第一个真正的联邦机构，欧洲中央银行的这些制度和工具将有助于促进欧盟的政治一体化，加强欧洲联盟作为世界一极在国际政治中的分量。

正是在这种背景下，1998 年欧洲对于遭受到金融危机沉重打击的亚洲表现出了援助的姿态。在伦敦亚欧会议上，欧洲联盟一方面重申平等伙伴关系和互助互利原则，另一方面则强调加强政治对话，推崇贸易和投资自由化。欧洲对亚洲的援助也是欧洲自身发展的需要，所以欧洲联盟表示，对亚洲的援助将要通过加强欧洲在国际组织中的作用来实现。1998 年 6 月开始运作的“世界银行亚欧会议信托基金”就是实例。如果说 1996 年欧洲还在大张旗鼓地谈论“亚洲价值观”，那么两年后的 1998 年，欧洲就是在不声不响地推行“欧洲价值观”了。

1998 年，中国顶住了东南亚金融危机的压力，坚持了人民币不贬值的政策，因此也赢得了欧洲的支持。1998 年 3 月 25 日欧盟委员会通过了“同中国建立全面伙伴关系”的政策性文件，继 1995 年的《欧中关系长期政策》之后，进一步将欧中之间的关系提到了和欧美、欧日及欧俄关系同等重要的地位。此前，欧盟外长理事会首次决定不向联合国人权会议提出批评中国人权的议案，此后，朱镕基总理访欧并在中欧之间建立了首脑对话机制，这些都为加强中欧之间的相互理解与合作铺平了道路。4 月 27 日欧盟理事会通过了 905/98 号条例，将中国从欧盟反倾销政策中的“非市场经济国家”名单中删除，对反倾销案采取了灵活处理方法。接着，欧洲联盟及其成员国领导人，卢森堡首相、意大利总统、爱尔兰总理、法国总理、英国首相、芬兰总理、比利时首相、欧盟委员会主席，纷纷来华，在中欧关系史中前所未有的。同时，中欧之间的贸易额以及欧洲来华投资都大大超出了往年，使得 1998 年成为名副其实的欧洲的“中国外交年”。

## Precis

On April 3 ~ 4, 1998, Asian countries came to the second Asian – European Meeting (ASEM) in London with less self-confidence and vitality than two years previously when they came to the first ASEM in Bangkok. On the other hand, the European countries brought with them more vitality and energy to the meeting this time. Skepticism and criticism of Asian management and governance by European society and business circles seemed to have replaced the high evaluation of “Asian Values” and “Asian development models”, which attracted much attention and discussion two years previously. Confidence in the European civilization, greatly enhanced by the launching of the Euro, made the “Recovery of Europe” one of the hottest issues in 1998.

Six years ago, when Lester C. Thurow, the American economist, predicted in his book *Head to Head*, that Europe would become the designer and regulator of the new world rules in the post-Bretton Woods System era, neither Europe nor Asia took his prediction seriously. In that year, the Maastricht Treaty had already laid down the foundations and decided the game rules for the future of Europe. However, the European Union seemed to be involved completely in its own internal affairs then, with its Member States burdened by depressing economic conditions, ever-increasing unemployment rates and exorbitant welfare expenses. No energy

seemed to be left over for the outside world.

By the end of 1998, the wheels of the EU economies began to move forward and recovery was obvious. Viewing the European Union as a whole, its average economic growth rate reached 2.9% in 1998, which was higher than that of G-7 and OECD. Europe is now undergoing an upswing in the economic cycle and the macro-environment for its economic recovery is favorable. In preparation for the launching of the Euro, the EU Member States have been adopting a low interest rate policy and a strict financial & monetary policy, both of which have turned out to be successful thus far. The birth of the Euro has further promoted fair competition, stimulated the restructuring and innovation of enterprises and enabled the merging and reforming of banks. In spite of the “gloomy points” still existing in the EU economy, the “bright points” played a more important role in its recovery in the year of 1998. Based on this recovery, especially with the impetus from the Euro, the European economy is expected to keep growing in 1999, though at a slower speed.

Of course, being industrially mature, the European economy is recovering very slowly, but steadily. The recovery has not been brought about by any single factor. Economic globalization and the internal reforms within the EU are counted as stimuli. European development has been characterized by its internal complexity and by its multiple constraints, all of which resolved into a slow but steady increase. European development is slow due to its complexity, and stable due to its slowness.

Generally speaking, the domestic political situations of the Western European countries remained stable in 1998. In Britain, France, Germany and Italy, whether the Social Democrats remained

in power, or Left Coalitions came into office, no significant and unexpected changes have taken place. However, underneath the apparent political stability, profound changes in the European political arena have occurred. One such change may be the fact that among the 15 EU Member States 13 came to be ruled by left – wing parties; either social democrats came into power single – handedly, or by a coalition. This trend attracted public attention world wide when in September 1998 the German “Red – Green Union” defeated the CDU – CSU in the General Election. The latter, led by the famous Chancellor Helmut Kohl, known as the “Chancellor of German Reunification ” and the “Chancellor of European Unification”, had to give up office after 16 years of power.

The coming into power of European left – wing parties is not merely a political phenomenon. The current European political situation mirrors the fundamental balancing efforts made by Europeans between economic competitiveness and social values in an age of economic globalization. As a matter of fact, the European economy in 1998 was not booming everywhere. Instead, it was still haunted by the chronic ailment of unemployment. The employment and social security systems in Europe have long been regarded as forms of social solidarity and social contracts. The Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997 took the first step by devoting a chapter to employment issues. That initiative has been followed by a series of actions, among them the holding of the Luxembourg Employment Summit in November 1997 and the overall implementation of the Employment Guidelines of 1998. Apparently, social issues, with that of employment in particular, have been brought into the agenda of EU. The average unemployment rate of the EU member states in 1998 tapered off slightly compared with that in 1997 and is expected

to further decline very slowly in 1999, as the economy continues to pick up.

Nevertheless, EU employment policy is not a simple duplication of Keynesian state-interventionism. More than 60 billion ECU has been allocated by the EU, not for public investment or procurement, but for the promotion of employment training, so as to help the unemployed seek employment in a new and more competitive environment. The essence of the Dutch Polder Model recommended by the EU is the flexibility in employment combined with social solidarity known as “curbing high wages and sharing employment opportunities.” The spirit of the Social Action Programme of 1998~2000 released by the EU can neither be regarded as inherited from traditional liberalism nor from conventional social democracy.

This emerging political philosophy in 1998 in Europe, neither interventionist nor liberal, emphasizes pragmatic effect, opposes dogmatism, seeks for social fairness and therefore takes a central-left line. The so-called “third way”, which is a convergence between the left and the right, opens a unique European-style way for development. Despite the differences between individual lines for development routes in the EU member states, the “third way”, aims at promoting national development, economic growth, job creation and social stability as opposed to disorderly world competition. What it advocates may not be viewed as a doctrine, but as an economic policy, such as explained by Mr. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, that cannot be divided by the left and the right, but only be determined as good or bad.

In 1998, Europe was still subject to regional conflicts. With the concerted efforts of the British and Irish Governments and the

intervention by the USA, a peace accord was signed between Britain, Ireland and the 8 political parties in Northern Ireland on April 10, 1998. The accord was a successful result of the 22 – month peace talks, which had harmonized the conflicting interests by shelving the issue of the unification of Ireland. However, hardly had one wave subsided, when another arose. Kosovo, another hot spot in Europe, became embroiled in war. Without any authorization by the UN Security Council, the EU and NATO Planned to take military action in Kosovo. The action prepared by NATO turned the principle of “collective defense” into one of common military action that was pictured as “humanitarian” and defending “common interests”. In December 1998, soon after signing a joint statement on defense cooperation with France, Britain joined America in air raids in Iraq, without consulting either the European Union or the UN Security Council. All of these events demonstrate that Europe’s own security system has not yet been established, and the EU continues to rely, at least to some extent, on the United States for maintaining peace and order in Europe. These events also indicate that the right of determining “values” and “common interests” will have a new role to play in peace and war.

No occurrence — including the stable economic recovery, the coming into power by left-wing parties, and even the regional crises in Europe in 1998 — was more striking than the birth of the Euro on January 1, 1999. The coming into being of the Euro is one of the most significant historic events in the fields of the world economics and international relations in modern times. At present, the Euro has already become the common currency of 11 out of the 15 Member States of the EU; the payments and settlements between Euro nations are being converted to the Euro, thus making it

possible for the Euro to be used as a real currency. Needless to say, the Euro is a challenge to the dominant position of the US dollar in the foreign reserve market. It will also lead to increased involvement for Europe, with its particular legal traditions and social values, in international monetary and financial affairs. With this perspective in mind, Europe is expected to play a more important role in the shaping of the new economic and political order.

The historic significance of the introduction of the Euro rests also on the fact that it requires the unification of the monetary policy goals of different member states at the EU level. Originally, the EU member states differed in monetary policy making. They inclined to select multiple goals for their monetary policies, such as “price stability”, “full-employment”, “promotion of economic growth”, and “balance of international payment”, each according to its domestic needs. In order to harmonize these multiple goals to that of “price stability”, the major goal set by the Maastricht Treaty, all the member states have made arduous efforts. The realization of the Euro proves that, in answering to the ever-intensifying world competition, the EU member states have reached consensus on macro-economic development orientation, and set up stable growth as their main goal. At the same time, the harmonization of monetary policies represents a big step forward by the EU on the road to integration.

The stability policy of the European Central Bank will be legally and institutionally guaranteed. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Central Bank enjoys legal autonomy and can make independent decisions on monetary policy. In addition, the European Central Bank has adopted several uniformed policy tools, such as “open market operation” and “discount rate”. As the first