


国有企业经营者 任职生命周期及制度环境设计

◎ 王书坚 著



中国对外经济贸易出版社

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序 言

王书坚同志是一个工作阅历比较丰富的机关工作者。大学毕业后，曾在大型国有企业担任领导工作，对国企经营者任职行为和企业制度环境有着亲身体会。后来先后担任过政府和党委领导，分管国有企业领导班子建设工作，这一经历使他从管理者的角度，对国企改革及国企经营者管理行为特点，有了更进一步的理解和认识。同时，他又是一个勤于思考、善于钻研的人。平日比较注意钻研经济学、管理学问题，并用专业理论去思考、解决实践当中遇到的一些难点问题。在攻读博士学位期间，他系统学习了经济学、管理学有关理论，积极参加相关的前沿问题的讨论，并围绕国企经营者任职生命周期问题，展开了系统深入的研究，先后在《人民日报》、《光明日报》、《经济日报》、《人民论坛》等报刊上发表了十余篇有观点、有深度的学术论文。最后形成了这篇理论与实践相结合、具有鲜明特色的博士论文。从专家们对论文的评阅意见可以看出，王书坚同志已经具备了扎实的专业理论基础、较高的学术素养和较强的研究能力。

本书是在王书坚同志的博士论文《国有企业经营者任职生命周期及制度环境设计》基础上修改而成的。出版之际，我愿意将此书推荐给大家。

加强国有企业领导班子建设是搞好国有企业的关键环节，也是各级党委政府、学术界乃至全社会普遍关注的焦点问题。《国有企业经营者任职生命周期及制度环境设计》一书，通过系统运用经济学、管理学理论，结合我国国有企业实际，研究了国企经营者任职生命周期问题，提出了通过国有企业制度环境设计来影响和延长国企经营者任职生命周期的对策和措施，可为各级领导

制定有关政策,进一步加强国有企业领导班子建设提供一些有益的思考和借鉴。同时,对于国企经营者来讲,认识自身存在的任职生命周期现象,有利于他们积极主动地扬长避短,有针对性地超越自我,延长自己的管理生命。因此,王书坚同志的这一成果,具有重要的学术创新意义和实际应用价值。

在我看来,本书主要有以下创新之处:

一、提出了国企经营者任职生命周期问题。总裁生命周期理论是国外学者首先提出来的。美国学者艾特森(Eitzen)和惠特曼(Yetman)、汉布瑞克(Hambrick)和福克托马(Fukutomi)等先后作出了重要贡献。本书在研究吸收国外学者研究成果的基础上,从制度变迁理论出发,对我国国企经营者生命周期问题进行了深入研究,结合我国国情率先提出了国企经营者任职生命周期问题,分析了导致这一周期存在的原因,并提出了通过制度环境设计影响和改变其生命周期的对策。这是目前国内国企经营者任职生命周期规律研究方面较为系统、较有深度的研究成果。

二、运用制度变迁理论对国企经营者任职生命周期的形成机理进行了分析。国企经营者任职生命周期的存在是不以人的意志为转移的,反映了国企管理工作和领导行为的一般客观规律。本书对导致国企经营者任职生命周期存在的原因进行了深入分析,提出了六个方面因素:国企经营者利益集团逐渐向利益独占者转变、逐渐形成新路径依赖、企业内部寻租行为不断加剧、机会主义行为逐渐增多、国企经营者退出障碍逐渐增大、潜在利润内部化不断延缓,最终形成了国企经营者任职生命周期。

三、提出了国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”理论,探讨了识别、判断国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”的方法和途径。及时认识和判断“拐点”,对于影响和改变国企经营者任职生命周期,具有十分重要的意义。本书认为,每一个国企经营者任职生命周期都表现为由盛而衰的过程,这种过程都有一个“拐点”,尽管其任职生命周期的长短是不同的,“拐点”出现的时间也不

一样,本书还在研究分析国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”的六项特征基础上,从理论与实践相结合的角度,提出了识别和判断国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”的方法:量化分析的业绩指标和定性分析的评议指标相结合,并通过趋势图支持识别和判断。

四、研究制定了影响和延长国企经营者任职生命周期的制度环境设计方案。国企的制度环境是国家(或政府)层面的制度安排。本书提出,政府(国企所有者)要通过制度环境设计改变国企经营者任职生命周期,并促使国企经营者的行为朝着所有者所期望的方向变化。同时,根据国企经营者任职生命周期形成的原因,提出了改革国有产权制度、完善控制权分配制度、建立充分竞争的市场制度、完善报酬分配制度、改革选拔制度、重视声誉机制的作用、改进任用和退出制度、强化培训制度、强化信息披露制度等几个方面的制度环境设计方案。

五、研究分析了国企经营者利益机制的特点。不同的集团和阶层有着不同于其他集团和阶层的利益需求。搞清楚我国国有企业经营者的利益机制问题,是我们对国企经营者实施管理的基础和前提,对于加强和改进对国有企业经营者的管理工作,进一步增强管理措施的针对性、科学性和有效性,具有重要意义。本书在广泛调查研究的基础上,对我国国企经营者的效用函数,及其与国有企业效用函数的关系进行了分析,对国企经营者的利益机制及其结构进行了系统研究,提出了我国国企经营者利益机制的特征和物质需求、精神需求二者之间呈互补关系和替代关系的特点。由于地域、年龄和企业的不同,国企经营者的利益需求具有较大的差异性。

六、建立科学的国企经营者配置机制,加快市场化、职业化进程。合理的国企经营者配置机制是国有企业改革的关键所在,也是影响和延长国企经营者任职生命周期的重要环节。本书结合我国国有企业改革的实际,从理论与实践的结合上,对深化国有企业人事制度改革步伐,建立和规范经理市场,完善资格认证制

度,加快推进国企经营者市场化、职业化进程;实行任期制和契约管理制度;探索实行公开选拔、竞争上岗等制度,建立国企经营者能上能下、能进能出的选拔任用和淘汰退出机制等方面,进行了研究。并对国企经营者的任职生命周期进行“诊断”,判断识别其经验“拐点”,以此作为调整、配置国企经营者的重要依据。

总之,我认为本书最大的特点不仅在于提出了国企经营者任职生命周期的概念,指出了国企经营者管理行为存在着任职生命周期规律,而且剖析了其生命周期存在的主要原因,找到了识别和判断“拐点”的方法和途径,设计了影响和延长生命周期的制度环境方案。这一研究成果填补了国内这一领域研究的空白,对于我们正确认识和把握国企经营者任职规律,有针对性地加强国企领导班子建设,甚至对其他形式企业的经营管理者,都有着启发和借鉴意义。

当然,国有企业改革的实践仍在不断深化、发展,国企经营者面临的制度环境也处在变化之中。因此,我们对国企经营者任职规律的认识也将随着国企改革形势的发展逐步深化。从这个意义上讲,本书肯定存在不足和缺陷,有待在日后的研究中进一步修改、补充和完善。

尤建新

2003年7月28日

于同济大学

内 容 摘 要

研究国企经营者任职行为规律的特点，建立科学有效的制度环境，从而促进国有企业改革和发展，是国内外经济学和管理学界普遍关注的难点、热点问题。本书运用制度变迁理论、需要理论等，在对我国国企经营者任职生命周期及其利益机制进行研究的基础上，提出了通过制度环境设计影响和改变国企经营者任职生命周期的政策建议和对策措施。

一、分析研究了国企经营者任职生命周期形成规律，并运用制度变迁理论对其形成机理进行了研究

一般而言，国企经营者任职生命周期大致可以分为磨合期、上升期、成熟期和衰退期等四个阶段，与此相应，企业绩效表现出首先上升，继而保持，然后下降的趋势，呈抛物线型变化。导致国企经营者任职生命周期存在的原因主要是企业制度变迁的结果，国企经营者任职过程就是企业制度变迁的过程，是企业制度从制度僵滞阶段，经由创新阶段、均衡阶段，再到新的制度僵滞的过程。

国企经营者任职生命周期的形成机理可分为六个因素：国企经营者利益集团逐渐向利益独占者转变、逐渐形成新路径依赖、企业内部寻租行为不断加剧、机会主义行为逐渐增多、国企经营者退出障碍逐渐增大、潜在利润内部化不断延缓等。这六方面因素组成一个有机的整体，其中经营者利益集团逐渐向利益独占者转变是生命周期形成的主线。在这个转变过程中，逐渐形成新路径依赖，企业内部寻租行为不断加剧，机会主义行为逐渐增多，国企经营者退出障碍逐渐增大等问题，使得潜在利润内部化不断延缓，最终形成了国企经营者任职生命周期。

二、分析讨论了国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”的特征及判断方法

从理论上讲,“拐点”是国企经营者任职生命周期从成熟期到衰退期的转折点,此时已经处于成熟期,即将步入衰退期;受前者影响,经营业绩即将由盛转衰,处于临界值。本书分析讨论了国企经营者任职生命周期出现“拐点”时的六项特征:经营管理工作存在比较明显的路径依赖,国企经营者不担心继任者的威胁,国企经营者“圈子”形成,企业中次利益集团数目较多,国企经营者的经营活动透明度下降,企业经营业绩已经在较高水平上保持一段时间不再上升、并有相对持续下降的趋势等。围绕“拐点”,还提出了国企经营者任职生命周期中止和再生的概念,并进行了初步探讨。

业绩考核评价既是考准考实国企经营者业绩和德才素质情况的必要手段,也是识别和判断国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”的重要方法和途径。本书提出了“拐点”特征的判断方法:采取可以量化分析的业绩指标和定性分析的评议指标,收集数据,做出趋势图进行判断。同时,提出了完善和规范业绩考核评价体系的建议:本着体现类别、科学规范、易于操作的原则,设计基础考核指标、辅助考核指标和特殊业绩考核指标,考核企业的盈利能力和成长能力。

准确判断和识别任职生命周期“拐点”,为合理配置和使用国企经营者提供科学依据;合理的经营者配置机制反过来也可以延缓国企经营者任职生命周期“拐点”的出现。本书提出了建立系统化、科学化的国企经营者配置机制的框架思路:一是加快国有企业人事制度改革步伐,建立和规范国企经营者市场,完善资格认证制度,加快经营者市场化、职业化步伐;二是完善业绩考核评价体系,改进考核评价方法,实行任期制和契约管理制度;三是探索实行公开选拔、竞争上岗等制度,建立国企经营者能上能下、能进能出的选拔任用和淘汰退出机制等。

三、研究提出了影响和延长国企经营者任职生命周期的制度环境设计方案

国企的制度环境是国家（或政府）层面的制度安排，大体可分为社会文化制度、政治制度、经济制度和技术制度四类。国企所有者通过制度环境设计改变国企经营者任职生命周期主要有两种方式：一是延长经营者任职生命周期，实质是缩短磨合期和上升期，延缓“拐点”的出现，延长成熟期，防止衰退期的到来；二是当不能延长或再生时，在“拐点”出现前选择新经营者，使原经营者退出。同时，作者提出国企制度环境设计必须满足三个基本条件：提高国企经营者的能力、减少信息不对称程度、降低退出障碍。根据国企经营者任职生命周期形成的原因，提出了改革国有产权制度、完善控制权分配制度、建立充分竞争的市场制度、完善报酬分配制度、改革选拔制度、重视声誉机制的作用、改进任用和退出制度、强化培训制度、强化信息披露制度九个方面的制度环境设计方案。

四、运用数理方法对我国国企经营者利益机制进行了系统分析

作者运用数理方法，系统讨论了我国国企经营者的效用函数特点，分析了国企经营者的利益机制特征。认为，国企经营者的物质需求与精神需求之间存在互补关系和替代关系，这两种关系协同作用，使国企经营者的物质需求与精神需求随着个人的发展而发生变化。互补关系是指当国企经营者在对精神需求和物质需求的偏好不变的前提下，其效用变化会引起精神需求和物质需求的共同递增变化，即物质需求的增加同时带来精神需求的量的增长；替代关系是指当国企经营者的效用不变时，增加一种需求会相应减少另一种需求，如在国企经营者精神需求得不到满足时，就会产生更多的物质需求。在国企经营者个人发展中，当精神利益满足较低且物质利益满足较低时，互补关系的作用大于替代关系的作用，个体倾向于追求物质利益；当物质利益达到一定程度

时,替代关系的作用又大于互补关系的作用,个体又开始倾向于追求精神利益。我国国企经营者有着与其他阶层群体不同的利益机制,他们既有较高的物质需求,期望得到较高的物质报酬收入,以确保能够维持较高的生活水平。同时,由于其职业特点具有人力资本特征,体现了较高的风险性、权力性和低代替性,因此他们还需要有较高的精神需求,包括经营自主权、较高的社会地位和职业声誉、充分的竞争激励机制等。当然,由于地域、年龄和企业情况的不同,国企经营者的利益需求具有较大的差异性。上述,为设计国企经营者的制度环境特别是完善激励约束机制提供了理论依据。

五、研究提出了国企经营者制度环境设计的具体措施和对策

根据国企经营者制度环境设计方案,提出了改进国企制度环境的具体措施。在激励方面,提出了物质激励、精神激励相结合的思路,实行长期报酬收入与即期报酬收入相结合,以长期物质激励为主的报酬激励模式。在监督约束方面,提出了内部监督和外部监督相结合的监督约束体系。在国企内部,以完善法人治理结构为主,规范董事会、经理层和监事会的关系,形成相互制衡的权力分配和领导体制,加强企业党组织、工会和职工民主监督;在国企外部,充分发挥上级党组织、政府主管部门、相关利益者以及资本市场、经理市场、产品市场等监督主体的作用,重点建立四个层面的机制:一是所有权约束机制,二是市场约束机制,三是党组织监督、契约监督、法律法规和社会舆论监督,四是道德制约机制。通过建立强有力的内外部监督约束体系,进一步完善国企制度环境,延长国企经营者任职生命周期,促进国有企业健康快速发展。

关键词: 国企经营者; 任职生命周期; 利益机制; 制度环境设计; 激励约束

Abstract

Facilitating the reform and development of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) by establishing a scientific and effective institutional environment has been difficult and controversial, relying on the study of characteristics of the rules of the SOE Operators' in-service behavior with a view to the circles of economics and management worldwide. Based on research on the SOE Operators' in-service life cycle and profit mechanism in China through the Institutional Change Theory and Theory of Requirement, the author puts forward policy advice and counter-measures that could influence and change the SOE Operators' in-service life cycle through institutional environment design.

1. Forming rules on the in-service life cycle of SOE Operators, and its forming mechanism using Institutional Change Theory

Generally speaking, the in-service life cycle can be divided into four phases: grinding, climbing, maturing and waning. Enterprise performance rises at the initial stages, steadies afterwards and drops at the anaphase in a parabolic decline. The reason this life cycle exists is mainly because of institutional changes in the enterprise. The in-service course of SOE Operators reflects the course of institutional changes in the enterprise. The enterprise starts from a phase of stagnation, grows via the phases of innovation and balancing, and then falls into another stagnation phase owing to the birth of a new institution.

There are six elements in forming the mechanism of the in-service course of SOE Operators. The gradual transfer of SOE Operators from an

interest group to an interest monopoly entails relying on new paths, increasingly severe rent-seeking behavior in the enterprise, increasingly opportunistic actions, growing obstacles blocking the operator from withdrawing from the enterprise, continuous delay of the internalization of potential profits, etc. These six elements form an organic integration, out of which the gradual change of the SOE Operators from an interest group to an interest monopoly becomes the main line of such a life cycle. During such a change, such elements as relying on new paths, rent-seeking behavior, opportunism and growing obstacles blocking retreat by the operator, in turn lead to continuous delay of the internalization of potential profit, and finally, forms the in-service life cycle.

2. The characteristics and estimation method of "inflexion" of in-service life cycle of SOE Operators

Theoretically, "inflexion" is the turning point from maturing to waning during the in-service life cycle. It occurs during a time after maturation but before decline. Thus, management achievements of the enterprise start dropping at a marginal value. The author analyzes and discusses the six features of the in-service life cycle at "inflexion;"

- + There is comparatively obvious reliance on existing paths by business management.
- + The SOE Operator no longer worries about the threat of a potential successor.
- + The "cycle" of the SOE Operators has come into being.
- + There are numerous sub-profit groups in the enterprise.
- + Transparency of business activities of the SOE Operator declines.
- + Management achievement of the enterprise has been maintained at a plateau for a long time without any new increase and has even started to drop off.

Based on "inflexion", the author also puts forward the concept of breakdown and rebirth of the in-service life cycle, and makes an initial discussion.

Performance measurement is a necessary method for making an accurate evaluation of the performance of SOE Operators, as well as an important method and path for identifying and judging the "inflexion" of the in-service life cycle. The author puts forward the estimation method on features of "inflexion": creating a performance index that can be used for quantification analysis and an estimation index that can be used for qualitative analysis, and collecting relevant data to make diagram for further judgment. Meanwhile, the author also proposes the advice for perfecting and regulating the performance measurement system, that is, following the guidelines of categorization, scientific regulation and streamlined operation, by designing a basic examination index, subsidiary examination index and special performance examination index to make an examination of the enterprise's profit-making ability and growth prospects.

Accurate judgment and identification of the "inflexion" of the in-service life cycle may provide scientific grounds for the reasonable allocation and utilization of SOE Operators. Contrarily, the reasonable allocation and utilization of SOE Operators may also delay the emergence of "inflexion" of the in-service life cycle. The author puts forward a frame of thoughts on the establishment of a systematic and scientific allocation institution of SOE Operators:

- + First, to accelerate the reform of personnel institutions of the SOEs, set up and regulate the market for SOE Operators, perfect the system of qualification authorization and speed up the steps of marketizing and professionalizing managers.

- + Second, to complete a performance measurement system, improve the method of examination and evaluation and practise an in-service

system and contract control system.

+ Third, to probe and practise such concepts as open-to-the-public selection and competitive hiring practices, establish a hiring and firing mechanism that makes the SOE operator competent to work both at the top and the grass roots.

3. Proposal on the design plan of institutional environment that either effects or prolongs the in-service life cycle of SOE operators

The institutional environment for an SOE is an institutional arrangement at the Government level. It can be generally divided into four categories: social culture institutions, politics institutions, economic institutions and technical institutions. There are two means for SOE owners to shift the in-service life cycle through institutional environment design: one is to prolong the in-service life cycle by materially shortening the grinding and rising phases, delaying the emergence of "inflexion", prolonging the maturation phase and preventing the waning phase; alternately, if prolonging the life cycle or having a rebirth becomes impossible, SOE owners can select new operators before the emergence of "inflexion" and let the out-going operator end his mission. Meanwhile, the author advances three basic conditions that comply to the design of the SOE's institutional environment: improvement of the ability of SOE operators, reduction of asymmetric information and reduction of obstacles of retreat. According to the course of the in-service life cycle, the author also puts forward design plans on institutional environment in nine aspects:

- + Reform of the state-owned property rights system
- + Perfection of the rights of control of the distribution system
- + Establishment of a market system for sufficient competition
- + Completion of a payment distribution system
- + Reform of the selection system

- + Strengthening the importance of reputation
- + Reforming the hiring and firing system
- + Enhancing the training system
- + Strengthening the information disclosure system.

4. Systematic analysis on the benefit mechanism of SOE operators in China by the mathematical-physics method

The author, by using the mathematical-physics method, systematically discusses characteristics of the utility function of the SOE operators in China, and analyzes features of benefit mechanisms for the SOE operators. The author believes there are complementary and substitutional relationships between material demands and psychological demands of the SOE operators. The two relationships intertwine with each other and keep material demands and psychological demands changing in accordance with the individual development of the operators. Complementary relationships refer to shared incremental changes in material and psychological demands due to the changes of the work requirements of the SOE operators, premised on theories that the relationship between the operators' material and psychological demands will remain unchanged; that is, the increase of material demands brings about the rise of psychological demands at the same time. Substitution relationship refers to the increase of one demand resulting in the decrease of the other, premised on the work requirements of the SOE operators remain unchanged; for instance, when psychological demands of the SOE operators cannot be satisfied, more material demands will emerge. For individual development of the SOE operators, when both their material demands and psychological demands are comparatively low, the function of the complementary relationship becomes greater than that of substitutional relationship, so the individual is apt to seek material benefits. When material benefits reach a certain level, the substitutional rela-

tionship then becomes greater than the complementary relationship, and the individual thus tends to seek psychological benefits. The SOE owners in China have benefit mechanisms different from other class groups. They have upper material demands and expect to receive comparatively high income so as to maintain a better living standard. Meanwhile, due to the characteristics of their profession, that is, overseeing so many employees, they have powerful, high-risk jobs with little chance of substitution, and they have comparatively high psychological demands including decision-making power in management, high social status and professional reputation, and a system that encourages competition. Certainly, the SOE operators' demand for benefits can greatly differ due to differences in regions, ages and the conditions of their enterprises. The above conditions thus provide the SOE operators with the theoretical foundations for the design of institutional environment, especially the perfection of a mechanism for rewards and restrictions.

5. Idiographic measures and stratagems on the design of institutional environment for the SOE operators

On the basis of the design plan of the institutional environment for the SOE operators, the author puts forward idiographic measures to promote the institutional environment of the SOEs. In the aspect of encouragement, based on the long-term material encouragement formula, he pointed out that, material and psychological rewards can be combined together as well as the rewards of long-term income and bonuses. In the aspect of supervision and obligation, he agrees with the system of integrating internal and external supervision. In the SOE, the main tasks should be to perfect the management structure of the legal person; regulate the relationship of the board of directors, managers and supervisory board; set up a power distribution system among the leaders so they will restrict and