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專題／黃筱慧 主編

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詮釋學專題導言

黃筱慧

東吳大學哲學系副教授

回顧詮釋學（Hermeneutics）這一個科目正式成為一門有著特色的哲學方法論的開端，應該起始自 1819 年史萊瑪赫（Schleiermacher）發表有關文法的與心理（或稱為技術的）研究。台灣的學界，對這一門涉及理解之藝術的新起哲學科目的關注與濃厚的研究興趣，可謂始於出版界引進美國帕瑪（Richard E. Palmer）教授所著的一本以詮釋學（*Hermeneutics*）¹為題的著作後，相關的論著即隨之漸漸雲擁而至。帕瑪教授於其所任教的麥克莫瑞學院（MacMurray College²）榮退後，現尚留校任教相關課程。他任職教授理解與詮釋理論迄今約超過三十年以上，他曾隨高達美教授（Hans-Georg Gadamer）於德國海德堡（Heidelberg, Germany）進行四年的博士後研究。1965 年至 1996 年間，一直在從事相關的教學與著述研究。並與高達美教授保持密切的合作與研究情誼直至高達美教授逝世前為止。帕瑪教授於 1999 年榮退，但除教課外更專注所有的時間從事與此科目相關的翻譯與寫作。

在本期的詮釋學專題中，我們很榮幸地邀請包括帕瑪教授在內的四位中外學者，專文論述有關詮釋學的相關文章，並且安排專人翻譯其中原文為英文的一篇論文，中、英文同刊出版，以期可以提供台灣學界對這些主題有興趣的同好閱讀。在本期中，三位哲學同好與筆者本人亦撰寫四篇有關詮釋學中文作品的書評，以及引介台灣出版界的四本中文作品，供讀者參考。這四篇論文分別為帕瑪教授的〈高達美之『字與形』中的十一個斷定〉（由台灣師範大學歷史系鄧世安教授譯為中文），華梵大學哲學系的黃冠閔教授的〈檔案、文本、歷史〉，華梵哲學系的郭朝順教授的〈論天台智顗的『文本』概念〉，與美國大學（American University）哲學系的朴真暎教授（Jin Y. Park）的〈禪宗詮釋學面對海德格式與德希達式的迂迴〉（由本人作中文導言）等四篇精彩的文章。

我們在這一次的專題中的論文有一個隱含但共在的特質，作者們經過對詮釋學

¹ Richard Palmer, *Hermeneutics*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969) .

² Richard Palmer, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Scholar in Residence, MacMurray College, Jacksonville, Illinois, USA. 詳見 <http://www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/>

的理解之後，文字本身亦是一份呈現，它承載著此學科走向其他領域的機遇。由字與形中，這一份高達美尚未譯為英文的主題之中已經透露出本專題的意旨所指。而由儲形為檔，黃教授以檔案、文本與歷史的理念續接這一專題的另一個設計，以傅科（Michel Foucault）與呂格爾（Paul Ricoeur）為法國詮釋學界與學者的縫隙與邊緣為文之核心宗旨。第三篇專文的核心所指向的是直接切向佛學的文本概念以期讀者可以由東方哲理中領略文本的新可能性，又或者是東、西文本概念足可融通的交會界面所在，亦不無可能。本專題的第四篇論文指向的是當今的與現場的理論焦點：我們可否依禪宗起緣，以海德格與德希達這兩位特別的哲學家為面，迂迴於其中，以論述我們將此東、西兩造相遇、並比之的可能性所在。朴教授原籍韓國，現任教於華盛頓特區美國大學，相關於中國佛學與禪宗的論著與梅洛龐帝（Maurice Merleau-Ponty）知覺現象學，解構理論的著作甚多，在本文中，她以東方哲思遇合於西方兩大當代哲學家的為文氣度與廣闊性，使本專題再進一步提供詮釋學可以作為東西哲思之共在基底的思索與研究的特質。

我們希望這一個專題的設計可以為在華文詮釋學專著林立的當下，再提供以下幾個面向的思考焦點：釋字於形，建檔於史，引介東方經典中的「文本」與禪宗詮釋學作為當代著名西方哲學思想，足可迂迴之關鍵與可能。

Eleven Assertions about “das Bild” in Gadamer’s “Wort und Bild: So wahr so seiend!”

Richard E. Palmer

MacMurray College (Illinois, USA)

Abstract: Professor Gadamer wrote two lengthy final essays that culminate his collection of essays on aesthetic theory in his *Collected Works* [*Gesammelte Werke*], volume 8, titled *Kunst als Aussage* [Art as Assertion]. The first of the two essays is “Wort und Bild: ‘So wahr, so seiend!’” [Word and Image: “So true, so full of being!”] and the other is “Zur Phänomenologie von Ritual und Sprache” [On the Phenomenology of Ritual and Language]. Neither of these two late essays has yet been translated into English. The first was composed in 1991 and the other in 1992 and they appeared in volume 8 in 1993.

At the 1998 meeting of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature, I offered the present paper as an analysis of Gadamer’s concept of *Bild* (image) as given in the essay, “Wort und Bild.” I presented my paper in the form of eleven assertions Gadamer makes about artworks that take the form of a visible image. I clarified each of the assertions briefly. Some of the major claims about the artwork that are made by Gadamer in these eleven propositions are: that it hold a certain sovereignty in its very being, it presents itself as contemporaneous with the viewer no matter how old it may be, it “takes place” for the viewer as an event in time, it absorbs the viewer into itself, it is by no means merely a copy of something, it is both beautiful and true and escapes all external measurement, and finally it is “read” in the way that one reads a text. The process of reading has a great deal to say about the way we experience any artwork. These eleven assertions constitute a good introduction to Gadamer’s account of the experience of the artwork.

Key Terms: Bild [image], Bildhoheit [sovereignty of the artistic image], Gleichzeitigkeit [contemporaneity], Vollzug [process], energie a [Greek for energy], aletheia [Greek for truth], and kallon [Greek word for beautiful]

Gadamer's important late essay in aesthetics, "Wort und Bild—'So wahr, so seiend!'"¹ ["Word and Image—'So true, so existing!'"] invokes in its title an exclamation by Goethe on encountering an artwork: "So true, so full of being!" Gadamer's use of this citation correctly suggests that even in 1992 he is not giving up his earlier Heideggerian claims for the "truth" of artworks in terms of their power of ontological disclosure. On the contrary, in this essay he builds on this Heideggerian impetus. He briefly goes back to Hegel and then more extensively to certain Greek concepts that antedate the modern concept of aesthetics altogether. To these he also adds his own hermeneutical observations on art and seeks a philosophical concept of art capable of being applied to both representational and nonrepresentational works of art, and to both poetry and images in the "nonverbal" arts, such as pictures, music, sculpture, and architecture. Like Derrida, Gadamer in this essay seeks to move thinking about art beyond the "oppositional thinking" of modern metaphysics and toward something like a deconstructive awareness of the role that metaphysical conceptions have played in the view one takes of works of art.

There may even be the basis here for another "encounter" between Derrida and Gadamer, one that would be more fruitful than previous ones (in which, as Derrida has remarked to Neal Oxenhandler, "Nothing happened").² One could perhaps compare Derrida's *La vérité en peinture* with Gadamer's claims for the truth of art here. In any

¹ This essay, dated 1992, appears in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Gesammelte Werke 8—Ästhetik und Poetik I: Kunst als Aussage* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1993), pp. 373-399. I have translated this lengthy untranslated essay into English but not yet published it.

² Niel Oxenhandler, "The Man with Shoes of Wind: The Derrida-Gadamer Encounter," in *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter*, ed. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), p. 268.

case, Gadamer’s views of *Bild* and such cognate terms as *Bildhoheit* [sovereignty] and *Gebilde* [structure] will undoubtedly link up with other discussions of *das Bild* at this conference, such as Wayne Froman’s “Image, Blind Spot, and Word,” or the session organized by P. Christopher Smith on “*Das Bild* in Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger.”³

The word “*Bild*” in German generally means “picture” or “image.” It has many cognates, such as *Vorbild*, meaning a model or example, and *vorbildlich* which means exemplary. There is, for instance, the verb *bilden*, meaning to mold or shape, *Bildung*, meaning “culture” (an important term in *Truth and Method*), *einbilden* means to imagine, and *Einbildungskraft*, imagination. In Gadamer’s title, “Wort und Bild,” *Bild* refers not just to painting but to the whole range of verbal and nonverbal arts, such as painting, sculpture, music, and architecture, so I translate it word and image. From his earliest encounters with literary and “plastic” arts (*die bildende Künste*), Gadamer was struck by the strange power of the artwork to draw one into its enchanted circle. He was dissatisfied with the theories of art of his time, because they did not seem to account for profound meaningfulness of his encounters with works of art—the power, the urgency, the “absorbing” qualities that images possess in artworks, whether in poetic words or in artistic images.

Later, he found in Heidegger’s *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* (1935), which he heard him deliver in Frankfurt, the possibility of understanding this powerful experience in terms of an emergence of truth. This led to his taking the experience of art as a key element in his defense of the humanities in *Truth and Method*, written in the decade of the 1950s and published in 1960. In the more than 120 of his writings before and since *Truth and Method* related to art and poetry—80 of which are collected together in the twin “*Ästhetik und Poetik*” volumes of his *Gesammelte Werke* 8 and 9—Gadamer deals both with the theory and the interpretative problem in relation to specific works of art and poetry. Volume 8 deals with questions of aesthetics and poetics and volume 9 with specific works, mostly poetry. In my longer project of which this piece is a part, namely a book on Gadamer’s philosophy of art, I will deal with his position after *Truth and*

³ This paper was originally presented at the University of California at Irvine in May, 1998, at the annual meeting of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature.

Method, exploring: (a) his debt to Heidegger and departures from him, (b) his interpretations of Hölderlin and Celan [another intersection with Heidegger], (c) his “anthropological turn” in *The Relevance of the Beautiful* (1974) and in his other 1992 essay, “Zur Phänomenologie von Ritual und Sprache,” and (d) his surprising re-envisioning of his relationship to Kantian aesthetic reflection in the 1980 essay, “*Anschauung und Anschaulichkeit*” [Intuition and Vividness].⁴ Here I will focus on the artistic image, *Bild*, as he describes it in “Wort und Bild.”

In “Word and Image: So true so existing” Gadamer is not so much concerned with articulating the *distinctions* between the forms of art that use words and those that mold images, as he is with the Heideggerian question, “*What is it that makes art art?*” Which entails the question: What is it that *both* forms of artistic images—verbal and nonverbal—have in common? He first turns to Hegel, noting that like religion and philosophy, for Hegel art per se has a certain presentness that stands above time [*zeitlose Gegenwärtigkeit*], an “absoluteness” that is able to transcend historical distance. In relation to time, a work of literature has a certain “*Zeitüberlegenheit*” [superiority over time] that enables it to speak across temporal distance, says Gadamer. And, he says, “similarly, a picture worthy of being called a ‘work of art’ possesses an immediate power to affect us. Both of them require us to ‘tarry’ with the form . . . in both there is much that is unnameable to which the work directs our thinking” (*GW* 8:374). But it is in ancient Greece that Gadamer finds the resources for confronting the question of art in a way that antedates the modern aesthetic concepts, metaphysical presuppositions, and the philosophical oppositions familiar in present-day aesthetics.

So the real foundations for his thinking on art, other than Heidegger, reside in his knowledge of ancient Greek culture: its language, its cultural practices, and the evolving of the conceptual terms of Western thought. He finds in the Greek concepts of the beautiful, in their concepts of *mimesis* (in Aristotle, not Plato) and *energeia*, an alternative basis for his thought about the encounter with works of art. Clearly,

⁴ This essay has been translated into English by Dan Tate as “Intuition and Vividness” in *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*, edited by Robert Bernasconi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 157-170.

Gadamer’s relatively long essay (42 typed double-spaced pages in my translation) deals with much more than Gadamer’s thinking about the image in works of art, but our interrogation of the essay here will focus on the image [*Bild*], setting forth and explaining eleven propositions put forward in the essay. These will give us an introduction to Gadamer’s philosophy of art.

I. A List of Eleven Assertions about *das Bild* in “Wort und Bild”

For your consideration, then, I will offer here eleven “assertions” that I have culled from “*Wort und Bild*” about his view of *das Bild*. While these grow out of his own encounter with works of plastic art, they are also enlightened by concepts from ancient and modern philosophy. Most of these assertions are not new in Gadamer nor unprecedented in the history of aesthetics, but I hope you will find them of interest. After listing the eleven assertions I will explain each one briefly and at the conclusion of my paper take up some objections that could be raised to his position and these theses, starting with the inherent risks and limitations involved in formulating positive statements about “the experience of art.”

1. *Das Bild* as artwork possesses a certain sovereignty which Gadamer calls *Bildhoheit*.
2. *Das Bild* as artwork possesses “contemporaneity” which Gadamer, following Kierkegaard, calls *Gleichzeitigkeit*.
3. *Das Bild* as artwork has its being in being “carried out,” a process Gadamer calls *Vollzug*.
4. *Das Bild* as artwork “absorbs” the viewer into itself. Gadamer says one must “go with it.” As in a game, one is “*dabei*”—in it.
5. *Das Bild* as artwork possesses what Aristotle called *energeia*.

6. *Das Bild* is not a “copy” of something else: “*Es ist kein Abbild!*”
7. *Das Bild* as artwork is “beautiful” in the Greek sense of the word *kalon* and the Greek understanding of this word sheds light on the nature of the work of art.
8. *Das Bild* as artwork lets the “true” come out, which Heidegger called *aletheia*. It makes a statement, which Gadamer calls *Aussage*.
9. *Das Bild* as artwork breaks limits and boundaries, escapes measurement.
10. *Das Bild* in the artwork differs from *das Bild* in decorative art, and that difference is instructive.
11. *Das Bild* in the artwork is experienced in time; it needs to be “read.”

II、An Explanation of Each of the Eleven Assertions

First: *Das Bild* as artwork possesses a certain sovereignty which Gadamer calls *Bildhoheit*. In art, says Gadamer “the image has its own sovereignty [*Hoheit*]. Even standing before a wonderful still life or a landscape you say this, because in the picture everything harmonizes just as it is.” One consequence of this is that “one leaves behind every conception of art as making a ‘copy’ of something. This is the sovereignty of the picture—*Bildhoheit*.” (392) For this reason, it is important to let *it* lead, let *it* speak, let *it* dictate the terms. Gadamer recalls a term here that he has used elsewhere also in reference to literature: “the dictatorship of the text”—*die Dictatur des Textes* (392). But in both cases, he says, “*one is dealing with a ruling, normative power*” in the artwork. And “like every norm, it is always only reachable in varying degrees of nearness” (392).

The artwork, says Gadamer, possesses a certain “absoluteness.” He is not here referring to either an Hegelian or Platonic Absolute; rather art claims absoluteness, he

says, because “it is detached from and independent of all historical-social conditions” (375). It “constructs something that is valued for itself . . . and precisely then it is a *work* done by the artist, which he or she can sign” (379). The “work” need not be something within a “frame” so long as one takes the presentation as something *intended by the artist(s)* to make a [nonverbal] “statement,” even though one has access to the intentions only in the work itself. So the term “work” for Gadamer still has a place in art. Even an organ improvisation or actors improvising on the street “is the work of a creative instant” and makes a lasting impression—it is art (379). It is a “work of art.”

Second: ***Das Bild* as artwork possesses “contemporaneity” which Gadamer, following Kierkegaard, calls *Gleichzeitigkeit*.** Here he borrows a term from theology to describe a power held by works of art. In theology, he explains, the term refers to the fact that “the promised return of the Redeemer happens today in the acceptance of the faith” (375); the message of the text possesses a here-and-now urgency and power. It is not something that belongs to a time long ago and far away. It speaks now. This is also true of philosophical texts, says Gadamer, with which philosophy is in dialogue with great thinkers “as if they were contemporary partners with us” (375). The same thing applies, for Gadamer, with the great works of art. They speak today, overcoming all barriers of time. He observes that as one views the history of art it is “not possible to think in terms of ‘progress’ toward an ultimate fulfillment—*eine letzte Vollendung*—of pictorial art as such” (375). The picture is not an historical artifact but “contemporaneous [*gleichzeitig*, simultaneous] [376] with us.”

Here also, the “presentness” of the work of art is involved. Gadamer notes that the German word *Gegenwärtigkeit* contains the word *Gegenwart*, which contains *warten*, waiting, which “already points to the fact that the future is in play in the present” and also “not only is a horizon of the future opened up but also the horizon of the past is in play. The present [*Gegenwart*] is not so much a matter of memory and backward-looking thought as of experience that in the present awaits the future—*gegenwärtige Erfahrung*” [experience in the present] (376). This present, too, “has its own *Lebensraum* [living-space] and its own tradition, which is stamped on its forms of life, its morals and customs and on all the institutions of social life” (376). Yet art has a presentness that comes into the historical present and speaks. Even in very alien forms art has the power to speak, to gain acceptance, as European music has in

Japan and African music in America. “This demonstrates, I think, the absolute *Allgegenwart*—omnipresence, presentness to all times and places—of art” (376). These are some other dimensions of the *Gleichzeitigkeit* of art for Gadamer. By the way, although I have used “contemporaneity” to translate *Gleichzeitigkeit*, Gadamer has expressed to me his strong preference for “simultaneity” because for him “contemporary” means of my era but not necessarily present here and now, but *Gleichzeitigkeit* means here-before-me, confronting me in the now as if it belonged to *my* now. The demand the work places is on me, the sovereign authority of the artwork is over me, not just a generalized audience of my contemporaries.

Third: *Das Bild* as artwork has its being in being “carried out,” a process Gadamer calls *Vollzug*. Although Gadamer argues that “work” is still a relevant concept in art, he goes to great lengths to overcome the tendency to see the artwork as an *object*. The artwork has its “being” not as an *ergon* [something done] but in “*Vollzug*”—in its taking place, in its consummation in being taken in, or in being “carried out” as one carries out an order. Gadamer here again goes back to Aristotle’s term *entelecheia*—entelechy. Like *energeia*, which we will discuss in a moment, *entelecheia* directs us, Gadamer asserts, to “something that is not like an *ergon*; that is, a work whose existence lies in the fact that its construction is now completed” (386). Rather, it belongs among those concepts Aristotle used to characterize the being of motion. Terms like *dynamis*, *energeia*, and *entelecheia*, Gadamer points out, “all refer to the carrying-out or *performance*—*der Vollzug*—of something and not to an *ergon* (a completed work)” (387). For the teleological thinker Aristotle, what is interesting here is that in these processes the carrying-out “has its fulfillment (τελος εχει) *in itself*. This point makes it clear to us that *energeia* does not mean mere “*kinesis*”—motion—because motion, as such, is ατελης. [ateles] that is to say, so long as it is underway, it is not completed, the moved thing is still underway, it has not yet arrived at its goal. It is still in becoming, “becoming something” (387). A work as *ergon* [work] is something that has become, but as *energeia* it is still becoming. Aristotle also notes that seeing and having-seen are simultaneous, and likewise thinking something over and having thought something over. They imply a kind of “tarrying,” a “being totally involved” in a topic. One is “*bei der Sache*” (387), immersed in the matter itself, a point we will take up later. The point here is that “the artwork realizes

the fulfillment of its being—*telos echei*, has its goal—*im Vollzug*—in being carried out, being performed” (390). Its being is not that of a “product” and “the concepts of production and reproduction from the side of the perceiver do not apply in the case of art.” Rather, art has its being in the being seen of a picture, the being-heard of music or poetry. “Certainly the artist, the architect, the painter, the poet, work according to a plan.” Gadamer concedes, “but this is not producing something that another person wants in order to make practical use of it. [References to] such ‘producing’ and such a ‘product’ . . . actually cover over that secret *Selbigkeit*—sameness—in appearing that resides in the creating and in the perceiving.” What Aristotle’s *energeia*, *dynamis*, and *entelcheia* concepts teach us is “not to inquire that way any more” (392). We have now learned from Aristotle a new way of inquiring, of interrogation, about art. Although the process of taking in a work of art takes place in time, in a “while,” it is a while that “no-one seeks to measure and no-one finds to be either tedious or merely ‘entertaining’ ”(392).

Near the end of his essay, Gadamer says that the process of encountering a work of art may “*after the fact* ” be analyzed, “and this may contribute to real seeing or hearing—that is, to the *Vollzug*—so that it gains in differentiation,” but the event of encounter in which the composite formal pattern, the *Formgestalt*, takes shape is an interpretive moment “without an express act of cancellation and withdrawal. *Der Vollzug ist die Interpretation.*” (398) The moment of *interpretation*, linguistic or nonlinguistic, is what contains the being of the work of art, not the product, the work as object. It is into this process of being that inquiry or interrogation must be directed. What happens in it? What happens to the viewer? What comes to disclosure? What is the meaning of this moment for an existing human being? What is it that makes it “art”?

Fourth: ***Das Bild* as artwork “absorbs” the viewer into itself. Gadamer says One must “go with it.” As in a game, one is totally in it—“ganz dabei.”** Here the facile dichotomy of work as object and viewer as subject is transcended. The phenomenology that offered Heidegger a way of doing this is relevant, for it is on the moment of appearing that he as phenomenologist focussed, the moment of intuiting on which he focussed in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* and later carried this over into the moment of the appearing of truth in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*.

Gadamer's earlier metaphor of a game into which one is totally absorbed, which dictates the rules, is not mentioned here, but it seems to be the same point. Here he simply says that in viewing a work of art, one must "go with it" and this means disappear into it. In viewing an artwork one is "*ganz dabei*"—right there! As Gadamer says:

That is also how it is in an experience of art. It is no mere taking in—*Aufnahme*—of something. Rather you are yourself taken up into it, absorbed in it.

It is more like a waiting and a preserving tarrying which lets the work of art come forth, than it is an action on your part. Again we can harken to language: What comes out of the work "speaks to you," as we say, and thus it is as if the one being spoken to is in a dialogue with what comes out. This holds true just as much for seeing, as for listening or for reading: one tarries or dwells—*verweilt*—with the work of art. To tarry is, however, not "losing time." For *verweilendes Sein*—Being that is tarrying—is like a richly various conversation that does not come to an end but rather lasts until it is ended. A conversation is the kind of whole [*Ganze*] in which for the while one is in it one is totally—"in conversation"—and that means you are *ganz dabei*—"totally there with it."(387)

This is not a "subjective" moment, but "more like a waiting and preserving tarrying which *lets the work come forth*." The Heideggerian motifs here are unmistakable: the tarrying that lets the truth of the work "come forth." Even the "conversation" metaphor does not belong to Gadamer, although it is his trademark, but goes back earlier to Heidegger and Hölderlin: for "We are a conversation." But the point is well taken that the phenomenon of art as an experience of encountering something that is powerful and compelling is not appropriately dealt with if one treats artworks, as Heidegger says, like sacks of potatoes in a storeroom.

Fifth: ***Das Bild* as artwork possesses what Aristotle called *energeia*.** Gadamer's strategy is to return to Aristotle's efforts to account for motion not so much by looking at the object as at the process. He observes that this word is apparently Aristotle's own coinage and "with this new conceptual expression, "*energeia*," a problem-horizon is opened up which may cast new light on the way of being of the artwork." In Theta 6 of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle defines this word by analogy with *dynamis* and in relation to *entelechia*, all of which have to do with process rather than object (386), as we have noted above. Rather it is a term that "shifts back and forth in