

吴振球◎著

ZHENG FU JING JI GUI ZHI LI LUN YAN JIU

政府经济规制理论研究

湖北长江出版集团
湖北人民出版社

吴振球◎著

ZHENG FU

LILUN YANJIU

政府经济规制理论研究

湖北长江出版集团
湖北人民出版社

鄂新登字 01 号

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

政府经济规制理论研究/吴振球著.

武汉:湖北人民出版社,2010.11

ISBN 978 - 7 - 216 - 06639 - 6

I. 政…

II. 吴…

III. 政府经济学—理论研究

IV. F20

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2010)第 223839 号

政府经济规制理论研究

吴振球 著

出版发行: 湖北长江出版集团
湖北人民出版社

地址:武汉市雄楚大街 268 号
邮编:430070

印刷:武汉明天印务有限公司
开本:787 毫米 × 1092 毫米 1/16

印张:16

插页:1

版次:2010 年 11 月第 1 版

印次:2010 年 11 月第 1 次印刷

字数:290 千字

定价:30.00 元

书号:ISBN 978 - 7 - 216 - 06639 - 6

本社网址:<http://www.hbpp.com.cn>

前 言

现代意义上的政府经济规制实践活动,一般认为起源于 19 世纪 70 年代。西方发达资本主义国家经济规制实践经历了“规制—放松规制—规制多元化”这样一个动态变迁过程。对政府经济规制的理论研究,最早可以追溯到 19 世纪 40 年代。1848 年,约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒就谈到自然垄断问题。对政府经济规制的理论研究,可以分为经验研究阶段、传统规制理论研究阶段、现代激励性规制理论研究阶段三个阶段。在经验研究阶段,经济学家们研究的中心是在规模报酬递增的情况下的定价与费率结构问题。在传统规制理论研究阶段,经济学家们研究的中心是政府应不应该进行经济规制、政府为什么进行经济规制、如何提高经济规制效率的问题。在现代激励性规制理论研究阶段,经济学家们研究的中心是在信息不对称条件下,分别在规制机构是公共利益者和自利者的假设下,在拉丰和梯若尔创立的能同时处理逆向选择和道德风险的规制分析框架下,如何提高经济规制效率的问题。

在传统规制理论研究阶段和现代激励性规制理论研究阶段,先后出现了规制公共利益理论、利益集团规制理论、规制价格理论、可竞争性理论、非市场组织理论和新古典经济学规制理论、有效竞争理论、非委托—代理框架下激励性规制理论、现代激励性规制理论。这些理论对于政府应不应该进行经济规制、政府为什么进行经济规制、如何才能提高经济规制效率的回答是冲突的或相异的,而且每一理论都不同程度地存在着缺陷。

本书主要采取经济学的研究方法,尤其是现代产业组织理论研究方法、博弈论、最优动态规划、机制设计理论、时变技术效率随机前沿生产模型,站在 20 世纪 90 年代以来经济规制理论最新学术成果的高度,从基础理论研究的视角,试图在全面、系统地梳理、评论已有经济规制理论的基础上,对相关理论进行比较、分析,并且紧密结合经济规制实践的特点,放松一些严格的假设条件,或者在模型中加入应该予以考虑的另外一些关键因素,或者根据实际情况进行新的机制设计,使不同理论关于同一命题的观点分歧缩小或一致起来,对经济规制现实具有更强的解释力和预测力,根据经济规制理论提出的经济规制政策建议更有说服力,更加有效。本书将重点、深入地研究三个问题,希望有所突破和创新:第一,希望能辨明规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论的差异所在,缩小两者的分歧,更加科学地回答“政府应不应该进行经济规制”这个基本理论问题,进而提出

如何进行经济规制的建议;第二,在技术演进和通货膨胀的动态环境下,在信息不对称条件下,在平均成本递减的自然垄断产业,设计出能诱导企业进行次优定价的定价方式;第三,在规制机构合谋模型中,考虑国会、生产者利益集团、消费者利益集团、规制机构、法院五者在经济规制活动中较为现实的互动与约束关系,建立新的规制机构合谋模型,提出更加合理的政策建议。

本书的研究共分六个部分。

第一部分是界定相关概念。在分析卡恩、施蒂格勒、萨缪尔森、斯蒂格利茨等学者对经济规制的定义后,指出经济规制的定义有广义和狭义之分,给出了经济规制的描述性定义。探讨了经济规制的内容和方法,指出世界各国现在一般对公用事业、邮政广播电视电信业、交通运输业、金融业进行经济规制,主要采取进入与退出、价格、产量、投资控制等方法。研究了美国和日本经济规制的结构与程序。分析了经济规制法律与政策的地位与体系,比较了宏观经济政策与经济规制政策的异同,等。

第二部分是对经济规制理论的发展脉络进行梳理和归纳。本部分遵循简单、精练的原则,按照每一理论的来龙去脉,简要地介绍了规制公共利益理论、利益集团规制理论、规制价格理论、可竞争性理论、非市场组织理论和新古典经济学规制理论、有效竞争理论、非委托—代理框架下激励性规制理论、现代激励性规制理论的发展历程、主要内容、存在缺陷与发展趋势。

第三部分详细地介绍了规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论、规制经济理论、有效竞争理论与现代激励性规制理论,并比较了规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论,有效竞争理论与现代激励性规制理论。本部分认为,规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论的区别在于:规制公共利益理论认为实际竞争会损失成本可加性的效率,因而主张禁止其他企业进入。可竞争性理论认为潜在竞争的威胁、压力就足以使在位企业在可维持价格上制定价格,因而主张规制机构应该尽可能地创造可竞争性环境,反对禁止其他企业进入。前者认为政府保护会产生经济效率,后者认为政府放任(但不是完全的)会产生经济效率。规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论的相同之处在于:规制公共利益理论的禁止进入,在客观上消除了实际竞争,通过规制实现了最优定价。可竞争性理论的创造可竞争性环境,利用潜在进入的“威慑力”,厂商“被迫”采取最优定价,也消除了实际竞争。手段相反,但达到的目的是一样的。

本部分认为,探寻、追溯规制经济理论的发展足迹,从单一压力集团对规制决策者的作用,到多个压力集团对规制决策者的作用;从静态模型、一期模型,到动态模型、多期模型;从将经济规制当作外生变量,到将经济规制当作内生变量,经济规制理论基本上遵循的是同一假设和同一内在逻辑。规制经济理论是对规

制公共利益理论的彻底否定。规制公共利益理论的假设前提基本上脱离现实,因此,它遭到人们的怀疑与否定是理所当然的。规制过程模型对规制经济理论提出了批判。规制经济理论没有在不完全信息委托—代理框架下思考和分析问题;规制经济理论没有将规制过程当作一个博弈过程来分析,这些都是它的缺陷。

本部分认为,有效竞争理论与以拉丰等为代表的现代激励性规制理论都是在成本可加性的前提下,来研究如何提高被规制企业生产效率与分配效率的理论。但是,两种理论提高经济效率的方法与途径是截然不同的。有效竞争,主要是通过企业的实际竞争或虚拟竞争,直接竞争或间接竞争,提高企业的经济效率。激励性规制理论与有效竞争理论不同,它主要通过规制机构设计好激励机制,引导企业经济效率的提高。但是,特许权竞标,会造成被淘汰在位企业沉淀性资产难处理问题,会造成“胜者的悲剧”问题,会造成合同期限难确定问题。标尺竞争会带来很难运用回归分析技术“离析”出不同区域内企业经营环境的差异,因而难以运用标尺竞争的问题。它还会带来如果被规制企业为了对付标尺竞争,形成串谋联盟,标尺竞争会失去效用的问题。直接竞争带来的问题是如果竞争带来经济效率的提高不能补偿成本可加性的效率损失,直接竞争就是一种失败的决策选择。以拉丰等为代表的现代激励性规制理论,从纯理论的角度来看,是无懈可击的。但是完美信息要求是它的“软肋”。它要求规制者拥有某些贝叶斯先验信念,要求知道关于技术、努力、成本的函数和一些需求函数,这在实践中往往是难以做到的。

第四部分研究了经济规制中定价方式的演进。本部分主要介绍了边际成本定价、拉姆齐—布瓦德定价、资本投资回报率定价、成本加成定价、固定价格定价、价格上限定价、芬辛格—沃格尔桑动态定价、按比例调整的最优线性定价八种定价方式,并且详细分析了每种定价方式的优缺点。在信息不对称条件下,设计出了诱导企业进行次优定价的定价方式。

第五部分对英国、美国和日本的经济规制改革与经验进行了研究和比较,对中国民用航空运输业进行了实证研究。实证研究是为了印证理论,国际研究与比较既是为了再一次印证理论,也是为我国的经济规制改革提供借鉴。在进行实证研究前,本书提出了完全规制情况下成本—收益分析法和竞争性规制情况下成本—收益分析法的计算公式。第五部分还对中国自然垄断性行业全要素生产率增长与分解进行了研究,指出随着资本存量的递增与劳动存量的递减,国家铁路运输业、自来水生产与供应业、电力蒸汽热水生产与供应业资源配置改善的空间尚有一些,但已经不大;自然垄断性行业垄断生产经营的生产效率与分配效率是低下的,但是低下的程度远没有人们想象的那样大;在传统上被认为是自然

垄断性的行业引入有限竞争,能够提高全要素生产率增长率、前沿技术进步,但降低了规模经济性改善。

第六部分总体上评论了经济规制的理论成果,分析了实证研究和国际比较研究在实践上对经济规制改革的启示,重点分析了中国经济规制存在的问题,根据理论和实践研究的成果,对中国经济规制改革提出了十条政策建议。

本书主要在以下方面有所突破和创新:第一,本书大胆地突破了“理想”的可竞争性理论的三大假设,并且假定信息不对称存在,引入了进入企业沉淀成本的先验性分布函数和信息搜寻成本关于发现新企业进入的概率函数,将可竞争性理论的结论推广到现实情况。对“政府应不应该进行经济规制”这个基本理论问题进行了详细的论证和明确的回答:政府应该进行经济规制,主要应该采取进入规制和价格规制手段,并且要采用先进的设计方案和方法。这种回答不是对规制公共利益理论的简单重复,而是在研究了几乎所有的规制经济理论和经济规制实践经验后的必然结论。第二,借鉴拉丰和梯若尔在平均成本递增产业征收价格变化税的设计思路,在平均成本递减产业设计了同时征收价格变化税和成本税的方案,以诱导被规制企业按照拉姆齐价格定价。这种设计不仅信息要求不高,而且具有可操作性,并且在模型中考虑了技术进步和通货膨胀两个关键因素。由于针对的产业领域不同,本模型与拉丰和梯若尔的拉姆齐定价诱导模型构成了一种互补关系,从而从整体上完善了拉姆齐定价诱导模型。第三,本书建立的模型将拉丰等人创立的规制机构合谋模型中被规制企业的成本函数由离散型推广到连续型情形,假定国会如果发现被规制企业与规制机构合谋,会依据虚报成本的程度来处罚规制机构,考虑到了国会、规制机构、被规制企业、消费者、法院之间复杂的互动关系,因此模型更加接近现实,得出的政策结论增加了,而且更有说服力和针对性。

Preface

It has been thought generally that the modern government economic regulation practice action originated in 1870's. The western developed capitalism countries' economic regulation has gone through a dynamic process of "regulation - deregulation - regulation multidimensionation". The theoretical research about government economic regulation is traced up to 1840's at least. John Stuart Mill talked about natural monopoly in 1848. The theoretical research of government economic regulation is divided into empirical research stage, traditional regulation theoretical research stage and modern incentive regulation theoretical research stage. In the empirical research stage, the research centre of the economists was the question of pricing and rate structure under the economics of scale. In the traditional regulation theoretical research stage, the research centre of the economists was that the government should or should not execute the economic regulation, why the government execute the economic regulation, how to increase the efficiency of the economic regulation? In the modern incentive regulation theoretical research stage, the research centre of the economists is how to increase the efficiency of the economic regulation under the asymmetric information and the assumption of the self - interest or public interest regulator in the regulation analysis framework which Jean - Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole create to deal with adverse selection and moral hazard in the meantime.

In the traditional regulation theoretical research stage and the modern incentive regulation theoretical research stage, the public interest theory of regulation, the interest group theory of regulation, the price theory of regulation, the contestable theory, the non - market organization theory and Neoclassical Economics regulation theory, the workable competition theory, the incentive regulation theory under the non - principal - agent framework, the modern incentive regulation theory occurred gradually. These theories' answers to these questions about the government should or should not execute economic regulation, why the government execute economic regulation and how to increase the efficiency of economic regulation are conflict or different, and every theory has some

defection in some ways.

The book mainly adopts the economics research method, especially the method of modern industry organization theory, game theory, the optimal dynamic programming and mechanism design theory, standing on the height of the latest academic achievements of economic regulation theories since the 1990s, from basic theory study angle, tries to hackle and generalize these economic regulation theories existed, compare and analyze the interrelated theories. The doctoral dissertation will connect with the character of the economic regulation tightly, loose some strict assumption condition, or join other key factors in the model, or carry on new mechanism designation according to the economic regulation reality, so as that we make the interrelated theories more comprehensive and accordant, make the creative regulation theory have more powerful interpretation – power and prediction – power, make the economic regulation policy suggestion according to the creative regulation theory more persuasion and effective. The book will emphasize on three problems deeply: First, I hope I can discern the differences between the public interest theory of regulation and the contestable theory, decrease their divergency, answer the basic theoretical problem about the government should or should not execute economic regulation more scientifically, and put forwards the policy suggestions how to execute economic regulation furthermore. Second, in the dynamic environment of the technology progress and inflation, and in the natural monopoly industry of the average cost decrease continuously, I shall design pricing method which can induce the regulated firm to execute second – best pricing. Third, I will consider parliament, producer interest group, consumer interest group, regulator and court's more realistic interaction and restriction relation in the regulator collusion model, establish a new regulator collusion model, put forwards some more rational policy suggestions.

The book has been divided into six parts.

The part one has defined some related conceptions. After the part has analyzed the economic regulation definition of the economists, such as A. E. Kahn, George J Stigler, Paul A. Samuelson, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and so on in the part, the part points out the economic regulation's definition is divided into broad sense and narrow sense, and give a kind of description definition. The part discuss the contents and ways of the economic regulation, points out that every country execute economic regulation in the industries of the public affairs, post, broadcast,

television, telecommunication, transportation and finance in the world nowadays, mainly take advantage of the control of entry and exit, price, product, investment, and so on. The part has concentrated on the economic regulation's structure and procedure of and Japan. The part has analyzed the economic regulation law and policy's system and position, has compared the differences between macroeconomic policy and economic regulation policy, and so on.

The part two has hackled and generalized the development thread of the economic regulation. The part has followed the principle of simplicity and polish, has briefly introduced the development process, main content, defection and tendency of the public interest theory of regulation, the interest group theory of regulation, the price theory of regulation, the contestable theory, the non-market organization theory and Neoclassical Economics regulation theory, the workable competition theory, the incentive regulation theory under the non-principal-agent framework, the modern incentive regulation theory according to these theories' origination and trend.

The part three has introduced the public interest theory of regulation and the contestable theory, the economic theory of regulation, the workable competition theory elaborately, and has compared the public interest theory of regulation with the contestable theory, compared the workable competition theory with the modern incentive regulation theory. The part thinks that the public interest theory of regulation and the contestable theory are different in some aspects. The public interest theory of regulation thinks that the realistic competition can decrease the efficiency which the cost subadditivity bring about, so it urges that the government should prohibit other firms from entering. The contestable theory thinks that the threat and pressure of the potential competition is enough to make the incumbency firm lay down price in the sustainable price, so it urges that the regulator should create the contestable environment as possible as he can, object to forbid other firms to enter. The former thinks that the government protection can bring about economic efficiency, the latter think the government abandon (but not absolute) can lead to economic efficiency. The public interest theory of regulation and the contestable are coincident in other aspects. That the public interest theory of regulation urges to forbid other firms to enter can eliminate real competition, can realize the optimal pricing through the economic regulation. That the contestable theory believes to create the contestable environment, and make use of the pressure

of the potential entry can oblige the regulated firm to execute the optimal pricing, eliminate the real competition meanwhile. Two theories' methods are opposite, though their purposes are same.

The part has traced the development footmark of the economic theories of regulation, from the effect of the single pressure group to the regulator, to the effect of several pressure group to the regulator, from the static model, single - period model, to the dynamic model, multi - period model, from regarding the economic regulation as the exogenous variable, to regarding the economic regulation as the internal variable, the economic theories of regulation has been discovered to comply with the same assumption and logic. The economic theory of regulation has denied the public interest theory of regulation absolutely. Because the assumption of the public interest theory of regulation is not realistic basically, it is inevitable that some persons suspect and deny it. The regulation process model has criticized the economic theory of regulation. The economic theory of regulation has departed the principal - agent framework under the imperfect information to consider and analyze problems, the economic theory of regulation has not regarded the regulation process as the game process. These aspects are its shortcoming.

The part thinks that the workable competition theory and the modern incentive regulation theory in the name of Laffont are the theories in which they have studied to how to increase the regulated firms' productive efficiency and allocation efficiency under the precondition of the cost subadditivity, but two theories' methods and approaches to increase the economic efficiency are different. The workable competition raises the economic efficiency through the firms' real competition or subjunctive competition, direct competition or indirect competition mainly. The incentive regulation theory is different from the workable competition theory, it need the regulator to design the good incentive mechanism, so as to induce the regulated firms to increase the economic efficiency. The franchise bidding' s questions are as follows: first, it is difficult to deal with the failed incumbency firms' sedimentation assets. second, it can bring about the question of "winner' s tragedy" . third, it is difficult to determine the contract' s time limit. It is difficult to make use of the regression analysis technology to split the difference of the firm' s management environment. If the regulated firms form the collusion alliance so as to cope with the yardstick competition, it will abate. If the efficiency' s increase which direct competition brings about can not compensate the

efficiency's loss which to abandon the cost subadditivity leads to, the direct competition will be a failure choice. From the view of pure theory, the modern incentive regulation theory in name of Laffont is perfect, but, it is the theory's shortcoming to require perfect information. For example, the theory demands the regulator to have some Bayesian transcendental information, to know the function of technology, endeavor, cost or demand is hard to resolve in practice.

The part four has studied on the evolution of pricing method under the economic regulation. The part has introduced the marginal cost pricing, Ramsey - Boiteux Pricing, the capital investment return rate pricing, the cost addition pricing, the fixed price pricing, the price - cap pricing, Finsinger - Vogelsang dynamic pricing, the scale adjustment optimal linear pricing, and analyzed these pricing methods' shortcoming. I have designed a pricing method which can induce the regulated firm to execute second - best pricing under the asymmetric information condition. The part five has executed an empirical research on Chinese civil aviation transportation industry and a comparison research on England, America, Japan's economic regulation reform. The empirical research is to prove the theory. Not only is the international comparison research to prove the theory, but also affords some examples for Chinese economic regulation reform. I have inferred the calculation formula of cost - revenue analysis method under the condition of the absolute regulation or the competition regulation before I execute the empirical research. The part five also studies the total factor productivity growth and decomposition of China's natural monopoly industries, points that with capital stock increasing and labor inventory decreasing, resources allocation in the state railway transport industry, water production and supply industry, electric power, steam and hot water production and supply industry has but little room for improvement; the production efficiency and allocation efficiency of natural monopoly industries is low, but the degree is not so high that people has imagined; introducing limited competition in the traditionally regarded natural monopoly industries can enhance the total factor productivity growth, cutting - edge technology progress, but reduced the improvement of the scale economy.

The part six has comment on the theory's achievement of the economic regulation as a whole, has analyzed the empirical research and the international comparison research's implication to the economic regulation in practice, has analyzed Chinese economic regulation's problems mainly, has put forwards ten

policy suggestions of the economic regulation in China according to the achievement of the theory and practice.

The book's innovation is as follows:

Firstly, not only has the book broken through three assumptions of the contestable theory, but also it has assumed to exist the asymmetric information, has imported the transcendental distribution function of the entry firm's sedimentation cost and the probability distribution function of the relation between the search information cost and finding new firms to enter, has generalized the conclusion of the contestable theory to the reality. The book has demonstrated in detail and answered definitely the basic theory problem about the government should or should not execute the economic regulation. It has drawn a conclusion that the government should execute economic regulation, the government should make use of entry regulation and price regulation mainly, and it should resort the advanced design programs and ways. The answer is not simply ditto of the public interest theory of regulation, but a necessary conclusion after the dissertation has researched almost all economic regulation theory and economic regulation practice experience.

Secondly, the book has learned from the design thread by which Laffont and Tirole levies price change tax, has designed to levy price change tax and cost tax's program in the average cost decrease industry, so as to induce the regulated firms to decide price in the second - best price. Not only is the design's information requirement low, but also it is feasible. I have considered two key factors of the technology progress and inflation. The model and Laffont and Tirole's model has formed a kind of inter - supplement relation because of the different cover range.

Thirdly, my model has generalized the cost function of Laffont and Tirole's regulator collusion model to continuity, assumed parliament will punish the regulators according to canard cost extent, if parliament finds collusion between regulator and regulated firms. My model has considered complicated interaction of parliament, producer interest group, consumer interest group, regulator and court, so my model is closer to the reality, my model's policy conclusions are more than before, more persuasive and more pertinent.

目 录

第一章 导论	(1)
1.1 问题的提出	(1)
1.2 国内外研究现状与本书选题意义	(3)
1.3 本书研究方法、创新之处与结构安排	(8)
第二章 相关概念界定	(11)
2.1 经济规制的概念与目标	(11)
2.2 经济规制的内容和方法	(15)
2.3 经济规制的结构与程序	(17)
2.4 经济规制政策与法律的地位与体系	(21)
2.5 宏观经济政策与经济规制法律、政策	(24)
2.6 经济规制理论在西方经济理论中的地位	(29)
2.7 经济规制法律政策的分析范式	(30)
第三章 经济规制理论发展脉络	(33)
3.1 经验研究阶段	(33)
3.2 传统规制理论研究阶段	(34)
3.3 现代激励性规制理论研究阶段	(53)
第四章 经济规制的规范性理论	(61)
4.1 经济规制的公共利益理论	(61)
4.2 可竞争性理论	(75)
4.3 规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论的比较	(94)
4.4 与两种规范性理论相关联的理论观点	(95)
第五章 经济规制的实证性理论	(101)
5.1 施蒂格勒模型	(101)
5.2 佩尔兹曼模型	(104)
5.3 贝克尔模型	(107)
5.4 波斯纳模型	(110)
5.5 施蒂格勒的产业生命周期模型	(111)
5.6 埃利格模型	(112)
5.7 对规制经济理论的评论与批判	(114)
5.8 对规制经济理论新的理解:博弈视角	(116)

第六章 经济规制的效率性理论	(121)
6.1 有效竞争理论	(121)
6.2 现代激励性规制理论	(125)
6.3 有效竞争理论与以拉丰等为代表的激励性规制理论的比较 ...	(143)
6.4 委托—代理框架下合谋模型向现实逼近的进一步发展	(144)
第七章 经济规制中定价方式的演进与发展	(148)
7.1 边际成本定价	(148)
7.2 拉姆齐—布瓦德定价	(150)
7.3 资本投资回报率定价	(151)
7.4 成本加成定价	(153)
7.5 固定价格定价	(154)
7.6 价格上限定价	(155)
7.7 芬辛格—沃格尔桑动态定价	(156)
7.8 按比例调整的最优线性价格定价	(157)
7.9 八种定价方式的总体性评论	(159)
7.10 信息不对称条件下一种次优定价方式的诱导性设计.....	(160)
第八章 经济规制中成本—收益分析法研究	(165)
8.1 完全规制的成本—收益分析方法	(165)
8.2 竞争性规制的成本—收益分析方法	(170)
第九章 经济规制的实践研究	(172)
9.1 经济规制改革的国际比较研究	(172)
9.2 中国民用航空运输业的实证研究	(186)
第十章 自然垄断性行业全要素生产率增长的分解与实证研究	(192)
10.1 全要素生产率增长分解研究述评.....	(193)
10.2 对数形式的时变技术效率随机前沿生产模型与数据处理.....	(195)
10.3 全要素生产率增长分解的结果与分析.....	(199)
10.4 主要结论与政策含义.....	(206)
第十一章 中国经济规制的思考与展望	(209)
11.1 经济规制的理论评论.....	(209)
11.2 经济规制的实证与实践启示.....	(215)
11.3 中国经济规制的现状.....	(216)
11.4 完善中国经济规制的政策建议.....	(220)
参考文献	(224)
后 记	(241)

第一章

导 论

1.1 问题的提出

广义的政府经济规制活动,从市场经济开始出现的时候就已经存在了。然而,现代意义上的政府经济规制实践活动,一般认为起源于19世纪70年代。其主要标志是美国1871年通过了标志着公用事业规制开端的格兰其法(对铁路的货运和客运收费进行管制的州法律);1877年,马恩对伊利诺伊州诉讼案的判决,促使伊利诺伊州政府着手管制粮仓和批发店制定的粮食价格。由于经济规制在一定程度上能实现预期目标,所以从19世纪70年代到20世纪60年代,经济规制在美国持续得到加强。如美国1887年通过《州际商业法》,1935年通过《汽车运输法》、《公用事业法》、《证券交易法》、《民用航空法》。但到了20世纪70—80年代,世界范围内出现了放松经济规制的浪潮。如美国1977年通过《航空货运解除管制法》,1978年通过《航空线路解除管制法》,1982年通过《解除无线电管制行政命令》。20世纪90年代至今,政府经济规制出现多元化趋势,有些行业继续放松规制,引入竞争,有些行业则在规制与放松规制之间摇摆,有些则是兼顾规制与放松规制相结合。如美国1993年通过《解除对蜂窝式电话费率的州级管制》,1991年通过《联邦存款保险公司改善法》,1992年通过《有线电视消费者保护与竞争法》。政府经济规制经历了“规制—放松规制—规制多元化”这样一个过程。

对政府经济规制的理论研究,最早可以追溯到19世纪40年代。1848年,约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒(Mill, John Stuart., 1926)就谈到自然垄断问题。然而,这些学者及其后继者的研究本意并不是为创立规制经济学来开展的,即使在以后一个相当长的时期内,这些研究成果也是作为主流微观经济学、产业组织理论的一个组成部分来看待的。霍特林(Hotelling, H., 1938)发表的论文《有关税收和铁路与费率问题的一般福利》是政府经济规制经验研究阶段的开端。美国经济学家乔治·J.施蒂格勒1971年发表的《经济规制理论》、卡恩1970年发表的《规

制经济学:原理和制度》标志着规制经济学的形成。以后又经过萨姆·佩尔兹曼(Sam Peltzman)、加里·S. 贝克尔(Gray S. Becker)、萨平顿·D(Sappington D.)、沃格尔桑(Vogelsang)、芬辛格(Finsinger)、威廉·J. 鲍莫尔(William J. Baumol)、德姆塞茨(Demsetz)等学者的发展。1986年拉丰和梯若尔(Laffont and Tirole)在《政治经济学杂志》上发表的经典论文《运用成本观察来规制企业》是新规制经济学的发轫。1993年,他们出版的专著性教材《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》标志着新规制经济学的形成。在新的时代背景下,新规制经济学仍然是一个充满挑战、乐趣和发展活力的领域。

综观经济规制理论的发展历史,可以发现,整个经济规制理论是围绕“政府应不应该进行经济规制”、“政府为什么进行经济规制”、“如何才能提高经济规制效率”这三大问题展开并生发的。经济规制理论产生并发展了一百五十多年,已经建立起了一座高大宏伟、富丽堂皇的理论“大厦”,然而,这座“大厦”的根基和主体部分并不牢固,换句话说,它的“硬核”部分还不完善。突出地表现在以下方面:

对“政府应不应该进行经济规制”的回答虽然有相互融合的态势,但由于规制公共利益理论与可竞争性理论的假设、出发点、路径的不同,因而对如何进行规制的回答是对立的。如何找出它们的分歧,对两种理论进行有效的综合,尚未完成。

对“政府为什么进行经济规制”的回答,利益集团规制理论给出了一个相对较为合理的解释。但是它只能解释部分经济规制现象,另外一些经济规制现象却无法解释。埃利格内生规制模型虽然在内生性地解释经济规制为什么产生上有一定的进步,但是该理论没有考虑到对寻租进行约束可以大大提高效率。在不对寻租行为进行限制时,虽然可以使无谓损失最小化,但是利益集团仍然可以通过寻租行为耗尽转移财富,这是一种纯粹的浪费。

对“如何才能提高经济规制效率”的回答,有效竞争理论给出了特许权竞标、标尺竞争、直接竞争等方法,但每种方法都存在着缺陷,做不到“十全十美”。以拉丰和梯若尔为创始人和带头人的现代激励性规制理论,对“如何才能提高经济规制效率”给出了在理论上看来十分精巧、严密的方法,但大多由于对信息或可行工具要求太高,不具备现实可行性。对信息要求不太高的一些政策建议,难免与其他一些理论的政策建议雷同。

综上所述,已经建立起来的经济规制理论,取得了较大的成就,但是它们还有许多不完善的地方,还有一些较为具体的理论与实践问题没有解决,还有改进的地方和发展的空间,需要进行进一步的研究。

本书试图在全面、系统地梳理、归纳、评论已有经济规制理论的基础上,对相关理论进行比较、分析。并且紧密结合经济规制实践的特点,放松一些严格的假