“军事情报学国外原文著述选”书系 · 张晓军 主编

美国军事情报著作选

SELECTED READINGS FROM U.S. BOOKS ON MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

张晓军 编著

军事科学出版社

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“军事情报学国外原文著述选”书系

总　序

张晓军

引进国外的理论成果，既可为我们的学术研究提供重要的理论建设积淀，也有助于我们及时、准确地跟踪国际前沿理论发展动态。

对于研治军事理论的学者而言，研读外文原文是了解外国的最新研究动态、拓宽学术视野的必由途径之一；而军事情报学作为新兴的研究生与学位教育学科，又急需编著一批外文原文教材。有鉴于此，我们编选了这套“军事情报学国外原文著述选”书系。

本丛书的出版，将为研究外国军事、战略学、军队指挥学，尤其是军事情报学的专家学者和研究生、大学生，提供一套系统的原文读本和教材，同时，还可为历史学、美国学、国际政治、管理学、领导科学等领域，提供一些新鲜的研究素材和别样的研究角度与思路。

本丛书以美国出版的英文文献为主，主要包括《美国军事情报文选》、《美国军事情报著作选》、《美国重要情报法案选》、《美国军事情报条令选》《美国重要情报人物传记选》。

此外，丛书还将视情况收录其他语种的情报文献选，如《俄罗斯军事情报文选》等。但限于国情和体制的不同，其他国家并没有像美国那样有大量的、成系统的情报著作，所以我们在编选时，自然也不能像美国著述选本那样系统、全面。

是为序。

2006 年 11 月

序

美国的军事情报理论研究，发轫于20世纪40～50年代，发展于60～70年代，兴盛于80年代，成熟于90年代，变革转型于世纪之交，至今仍保持着蓬勃的发展势头。作为这些理论主要载体的，便是大量著作。自1949年第一部公开探讨情报在国家对外政策中地位与作用的作品——《服务于美国世界政策的战略情报》（*Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*）问世以来，美国在军事情报理论研究领域，一直保持着一派盎然的景象。时至今日，美国的军事情报研究早已成为公开的学问，并且呈现出学派林立，著作汗牛充栋的蔚然大观。[①] 这些著作从战争形态演变与军事情报的角色变化、军事情报失误等宏观研究，到军事情报分析心理、军事情报分析的依据与推理等微观研究，从军事情报的基本概念、性质、作用等基础理论的探讨，到信息时代情报工作的特点、联合作战情报支援等应用理论的研究，几乎涉及军事情报理论与实践的各个层面。

目前，国内学术界和情报界对此尚很陌生。这种陌生，不仅会妨碍我们对美国军事、外交政策的全面了解，还会导致我们对美国政治、社会、文化、历史理解的片面与残缺。我们编写这本教材，旨在介绍美国军事情报学说的同时，拓展我国相关领域研究人员的视野，为我国军事情报理论研究的创新与发展提供有力的支撑。

我们的编写历经五年多，这还不算前期的资料搜集时间。五年来，我们对美国公开出版的近四百本情报著作进行了泛读。在此基础上，我们从

① 作为军事学、政治学、情报学、国际关系、公共管理学、领导科学等社会科学研究的重要内容之一，军事情报研究备受美国情报界、学术界的关注，已经成为一门不折不扣的显学；并且，其研究成果已经转化为系统的教学内容和完备的课程体系，进入了大学课堂。除了大量著述，美国还有不少著名的军事情报学术期刊和一支庞大的军事情报研究队伍。前者如《情报与国家安全》（*Intelligence and National Security*）、《国家情报杂志》（*National Intelligence Journal*）、《情报研究》（*Studies in Intelligence*）等；后者不仅来自各情报部门的专业研究机构，比如中央情报局情报研究中心等，而且大量来自各知名大学的相关研究部门，比如哥伦比亚大学战争与和平研究所等。

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中挑选了十三本被美国乃至整个西方军事情报界认可的“经典之作”[①] 进行精读。最后，我们择其重要章节，并附上相应的作者简介和思考题编著成册。为了方便读者进一步阅读原文、读更多的原文，我们专门在每篇文选最后附上了必读书目和相关的参考书目。毕竟，要想准确、完整地理解作者的思想，还得要沉下心来，一行一行、一页一页地去啃原著，这恐怕需要经年累月地坚持不懈才行。从这个意义上说，我们编写的充其量是一本原著导读性教材。

美国军事情报学说的关注重点是什么？我们在研读过程中发现，基础理论研究和情报分析在美国军事情报名著中占据了很大份额。美国的军事情报研究为什么会集中在这两个方面呢？情报基础理论研究是情报研究的奠基性工程，是其他情报命题的研究起点和立论前提；在整个情报理论的构建过程中，情报基础理论的渗透性、辐射性最强，是情报研究的重要内容之一。情报分析，是情报工作的核心。情报工作的价值实现，在很大程度上落实于分析研判。情报分析在总体上是一个偏向于社会科学，充满着模棱两可、不确定性、迷惑性的领域，是科学，也是艺术。量化和数学方法的介入，可以解决情报分析的某一部分、某一方面或某一阶段的问题——这也是情报分析工作科学化的重要体现——但在总体上，情报分析不可能完全凭借量化的方法得到解决。在实际工作中，情报分析处于情报工作的核心和顶层位置，情报分析人员是最重要的顶层专家。于是，对情报分析的研究，自然也就成了情报研究领域的重中之重。与这两项内容相关的，则是情报失误研究、情报控制研究等。它们实际上是对情报分析问题的进一步延深，因为情报失误研究和情报控制研究的归旨均在于提高情报工作的效率，而这种效率的最直接成果就是情报分析成品，只不过情报失误是从反面做文章，而情报控制则是从管理和建设层面做文章。

有鉴于此，我们力图在编写过程中对情报基础理论和情报分析理论做出比较透彻的介绍。为此，我们首先从美国军事情报学说的核心概念等做起，以便更加深入地理解美国乃至整个西方军事情报学界的一些本源性思考。譬如，谢尔曼·肯特（Sherman Kent）在其经典著作《服务于美国世界

① 所谓“经典”的标准是：第一，被美国人当作“经典教材”一版再版，不断成为美国军事情报、国际政治课堂中的必读书目；第二，提出的相关理论具有较强的解释力；第三，提出的相关理论在一定时期甚至长期成为争论的焦点。后两条标准其实是统一的，即经典的学术著作能够在一定程度上跨越一定的时空，但绝不会成为不可撼动的“学术权威”；因此，经典也会不断受到挑战与质疑，这种驳斥的过程其实也可以看作是美国乃至整个西方学术界向前发展的基本轨迹。

政策的战略情报》中提出的“情报三位一体论”，亚伯拉罕·舒尔斯基在（Abram Shulsky）《无声的战争——理解情报世界》（*Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*）中对“情报双重本性”的阐释等等。其次，美国乃至整个西方军事情报学界一直讨论的一个话题就是情报分析。情报分析同样是我国军事情报学界和业界近些年关注的重点，在人类已然跨入信息时代的当今世界，情报分析成为情报工作流程中最重要但又最难做好的环节已成共识。这是因为，我们所面临的最大悖论恐怕当属“更多的信息，更少的情报”。美国的不少学者和专家毕生致力于克服情报分析过程中所面临的难题。譬如兰德公司女研究员罗伯塔·沃尔斯泰特（Roberta Wohlstetter）在《珍珠港——警报与决心》（*Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*）中提出著名的情报分析“信噪”困境之后，为了找到有效克服情报分析难题的途径，许多学者作了不懈的努力与尝试，譬如：戴维·舒姆（David Schum）在《情报分析的依据与推理》（*Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst*）中提出了“模糊证据”处理的假设，哈罗德·福特（Harold Ford）在《评估情报》（*Estimative Intelligence*）中提出了战略情报评估的原则，理查兹·休尔（Richards Heuer）在《情报分析心理学》（*Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*）中提出了以“竞争性假设”为代表的科学方法，等等。此外，美国军事情报学界很早就开始研究作战中的情报保障与支援问题，他们所谓的“作战情报”实际上与我们时下十分关注的战场情报范畴十分接近。著名历史学家、陆军少将迈克尔·汉德尔（Michael Handel）在《战争、战略与情报》（*War, Strategy, and Intelligence*）中运用棋牌博弈直观形象地对战场情报的功能进行了类比。应该说，这些思想对于我们具有重要的借鉴意义，极具启发性。更为重要的是，这些思想大多建立在扎实、可信的证据之上，通过缜密的推论得来，极少泛泛而论，更鲜见“劈空而来，绝身而去”式的无根游谈。

与此相关的，这本书所涉及的13位作者都是美国公认的“大家”或“大师级人物”。他们的共同特点是，都有过双重身份或者身兼数职——要么先是在大学供职的教授，后来成为美国情报界的高级分析专家或高层管理人士，要么先在美国情报界从事情报业务工作，后来被知名大学聘为专门讲授情报分析、国际安全问题的教授。此外，他们基本上都获得过博士学位。以被美国情报界和学术界分别誉为“情报分析之父”和“战略情报之父”的谢尔曼·肯特为例：他于1926年和1933年先后获得美国耶鲁大学文学学士和历史学博士学位，后留校任历史学教授；1941年，他出任情报

协调局研究分析处亚洲科科长，后又担任过战略情报局研究分析处欧洲和非洲科科长、国务院研究与情报办公室代理主任；1946 年，他在美国著名的国家战争学院任教，次年回到耶鲁大学任历史学教授；1952～1967 年，他又重新回到中央情报局，任“国家评估委员会”主席。因此，作为本教材原始素材的作品既具学术性，又不至于一味沉浸于理论思辨，既具现实针对性，又不流于情况的描述和经验的简单归总，而是理论导向与实践指向俱赅、科学分析与经验主义兼顾。

最后，需要特别指出的是，美国并不是我们现在所接触的军事情报学说的发源地。约二千五百余年前，在我国出现了基本的军事情报理论体系时，美国根本就不曾立国，即便北美大陆也还是一块无人问津的蛮荒之地。美国真正成为军事情报学说的重镇，始于第二次世界大战结束以后。这自然与美国维持其超级大国地位及实现其全球战略目标直接相关，也与美国人注重创新、追求实用的学术传统密不可分，而后者在一定程度上与美国人重视吸收外来文化和思想有关。翻阅他们的作品不难发现，我国的《孙子兵法》时常会被提及和引用。反观我国，军事情报研究何以从一开始的“早熟”却变得滞后？我们之所以难以超越古代先贤，恐怕与我们长期只在书斋中进行概念上的自我循环不无干系。比较言之，被选中作为本教材主要内容的作品之所以在美国堪称经典，最重要的一点，恐怕就是作者们把对历史和现实的深切关注作为其立足点。由于他们思考的出发点和归宿都是军事情报斗争实践，因此他们的贡献就是将这些实践变成一种历史智慧和哲学。“复杂纷繁的世事一旦被透彻简洁的方式提高到哲学境界，它们便走出了粗俗和原始，便具有了知识美感。”[①] 更何况原著作者们所提出的诸多命题对今天仍有意义！

① 袁明：《国际关系学名著系列“总序”》，世界知识出版社，2004 年 5 月，第 3 页。

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谢尔曼·肯特：《服务于美国世界政策的战略情报》

作者简介：

谢尔曼·肯特（Sherman Kent）出身美国东部望族，是典型的 WASP（白种盎格鲁撒克逊清教徒）。肯特在耶鲁大学学习、教授历史近 20 年，他正式开始对情报（确切来说是情报分析）产生兴趣是在 1941 年美国正式参战前夕，那时候他响应国家召唤，加入新成立的战略情报局从事情报分析工作。肯特不久就在运用科学方法进行情报分析方面显示出非凡的才能，同时他还擅长组织性格迥异、各有专长的学者专家，使他们作为一个团队及时高效地工作，以满足情报用户对情报的迫切需求。肯特引以为荣的战时成就之一，就是曾经为支援 1942 年盟军北非登陆行动，亲率一个专家小组进行了大量分析研究工作，其最终研究成果得到了军方用户的高度评价。

在战略情报局的服役经历使肯特对情报组织的运作和情报流程拥有切身体会，作为历史学者受到的严格学术训练则使肯特对情报的思考更加深刻，视野更加广阔。肯特曾经对中央情报局的同事哈罗德·P. 福特说过，“我同战略情报局的同事交谈得越多，就越发感到有必要写一本情报方面的专著。它已经成为一种强迫性的冲动，我所有要做的就是把脑子中所想的写下来就行。”[①] 肯特最终实现了自己的宿愿，于 1947 年完成了专著《服务于美国世界政策的战略情报》（*Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*）。

《服务于美国世界政策的战略情报》是美国战略情报和情报分析领域的开山之作。在书的前言中，谢尔曼·肯特引用了约翰·洛克《政府论》中的一段文字——“在这种性质的论文中，对于世界上已经通用的一些字眼和名词加以挑剔，或者会被指责为一种不恰当的非难，但是当旧名词易于使人陷于错误时，则提出一些新名词来可能不会被认为是不对的”[②]。由此可以看出他写作本书的目的在于批判当时流行的错误的情报观念，构建理想的完整的情报体系。

《服务于美国世界政策的战略情报》一书结构清晰，思路严谨，语言生动，逻辑性强。作为对当时现实思考的对策性专论，它具有极强的启发性和可操作性；作为情报研究学术著作，它对情报定义、情报分析、情报与政策的关系等方面的研究具有里程碑的意义。虽然书中部分建议性内容（主要集中在情报组织设立方面）在时隔半个多世纪以后已经不再具有现实性意义，但是书中的基本内容和思考（如情报定义、情报分析、情报与保密、情报与政策的关系等）并未过时，其中的真知灼见对我们今天的情报研究和情报工作依然能够提供良好的借鉴和启示。

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① Harold P. Ford, “A Tribute to Sherman Kent”, Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates, http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/shermankent/1tribute.html.

② ［英］约翰·洛克，《政府论》，瞿菊农、叶启芳译，商务印书馆，1982 年。

文选

Chapter 1:

Intelligence is Knowledge

Intelligence means knowledge. If it cannot be stretched to mean all knowledge, at least it means an amazing bulk and assortment of knowledge. This book deals with only a fraction of the total, but probably the most important fraction. It deals with the part, known to the intelligence trade as "high-level foreign positive intelligence." This phrase is short for the kind of knowledge our state must possess regarding other states in order to assure itself that its cause will not suffer nor its undertakings fail because its statesmen and soldiers plan and act in ignorance. This is the knowledge upon which we base our high-level national policy toward the other states of the world.

Notice what is being excluded. First, all knowledge of our own domestic scene is being left out. Foreign positive intelligence is truly "foreign" in purpose, scope, and substance. It is not concerned with what goes on in the United States or in its territories and possessions. Second, all knowledge of the sort which lies behind the police function is excluded. The word "positive" comes into the phrase to denote that the intelligence in question is not so-called "counter-intelligence" and counter-espionage nor any other sort of intelligence designed to uncover domestically-produced traitors or imported foreign agents. The words "high-level" are there to exclude what is called "operational" intelligence, tactical intelligence, and the intelligence of small military formations in battle known as combat intelligence. What is left is the knowledge indispensable to our welfare and security. It is both the constructive knowledge with which we can work toward peace and freedom throughout the world, and the knowledge necessary to the defense of our country and its ideals. Some of this knowledge may be acquired through clandestine means, but the bulk of it must be had through unromantic open-and-above-board observation and research. ①

It should be borne in mind—in anticipation of later chapters of this book which deal with intelligence as a process—that the intelligence activity consists basically of two sorts of operation. I have called them the *surveillance operation*, by which I mean the many ways by which

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① Appendix I, offers a brief discussion of all types of intelligence; separates them out from each other in two rather formidable charts, and endeavors to show the interrelationship between the key types.

the contemporary world is put under close and systematic observation, and the *research operation.* By the latter I mean the attempts to establish meaningful patterns out of what was observed in the past and attempts to get meaning out of what appears to be going on now. The two operations are virtually inseparable, though for administrative and other reasons they are often physically separated. In actual practice there are generally two different staffs each of which cultivates the respective specialisms of surveillance and research. But however far apart they get on the administrative diagram or in the development of their own techniques they are closely bound together by their common devotion to the production of knowledge.

How describe this kind of knowledge? There are at least two ways. One way is to treat high-level foreign positive intelligence as the substance of humanity and nature—abroad. This involves an almost endless listing of the components of humanity and nature. The listings can be alphabetical or topical. Whichever, it runs to hundreds of pages and would ill serve the interests of the readers of this sort of book.

The other way, and the one I have adopted, is neither alphabetical nor topical. It might be called functional. It starts from the premise that our state, in order to survive in a world of competing states, must have two sorts of state policy. The one is its own self-initiated, positive, outgoing policy, undertaken in the interests of a better world order and a higher degree of national prosperity. The other is its defensive-protective policy necessarily undertaken to counter those policies of other states which are inimical to our national aspirations. This second kind of policy might better be called our policy for national security. I make this artificial distinction, between positive and security policies, for purposes of the present analysis.

Consider our positive policy first. To be effective, its framers, planners, and implementers must be able to select the proper instrumentality of suasion from a long list of possibles. Will it be a resolution in the UN, will it be diplomacy, will it be political and economic inducement or threat, will it be propaganda or information, will it be force, will it be a combination of several? The framers, planners, and implementers must also know where, how, and when to apply the instrumentality of their choice. Now neither the selecting nor the applying can be done without reference to the party of the second part. Before the policy leaders do either they would be well advised to know:

how the other country is going to receive the policy in question and what it is prepared to use to counter it;

what the other country lacks in the way of countering force (i. e.) its specific vulnerabilities;

what it is doing to array its protective force; and

what it is doing, or indeed can do, to mend its specific vulnerabilities.

Thus our policy leaders find themselves in need of a great deal of knowledge about foreign countries. They need knowledge which is complete, which is accurate, which is delivered on time, and which is capable of serving as a basis for action. To put their positive policy into

effect they should first and foremost know about other countries as objective entities. For example, they must know about:

a. the physiques of these countries, that is, their natural topography and environment and the multiform permanent structures which man has added to the landscape (his cities, his agricultural and industrial enterprises, his transportation facilities, and so on);
b. their people—how many; how they are settled; how occupied;
c. the status of the arts, sciences, and technologies of these people (and I would include in this the status of their armed forces);
d. the character of their political systems, their economies, their social groupings, their codes of morality, and the dynamic interrelations which prevail among all these.

Armed with this knowledge the leaders of positive policy may go forward assured at least that, if they fail, their failure will not be chargeable to their ignorance.

Secondly, consider our other sort of policy, that is, our policy concerned with the maintenance of the national security. In the interests of security out policy leaders must make constant provision for the positive policies of other states. Some of these policies we will have to regard as hostile to our interests and we must take steps to block them. Some, we may wish to meet half way. To frame and operate this kind of security policy we must have a second large class of information about foreign countries, and again the knowledge must be complete, accurate, timely, and capable of serving as a basis for action. We must know the nature and weight of the instrumentalities which these other countries can summon in behalf of their own policies, and we must know the direction those policies are likely to take. We must know the direction those policies are likely to take. We must know this not only so that we will not be taken by surprise, but also so that we will be in a position of defensive or offensive readiness when the policy is launched. When you know such things you know a good deal about the other country's strategic statture, to borrow a phrase I will develop in Chapter 4. And on the theory that there is a relationship between what a country adopts as an objective and what it thinks it can expect to accomplish, knowledge of strategic stature constitutes, in some degree at least, knowledge of the other country's probable intentions.

From the foregoing it can be seen that my first class of information to be acquired is essentially descriptive and reportorial. It is descriptive of the relatively changeless things like terrain, hydrography, and climate. It is descriptive of the changeable but no less permanent things like population. It is descriptive, too, of the more transient man-made phenomena such as governmental or economic structures. With this kind of knowledge our leaders can draft the guide lines of our positive policy, of our peacetime and wartime strategy.

The second class of information to be acquired deals with the future and its possibilities and probabilities: how another country may shape its internal forces to service its foreign policy or strategy; how it may try to use these strengths against us, when, where, and with what effectiveness. Where the first was descriptive, this speculative and evaluative.

Within these classes of things to be known, then, we may perceive the statics, the dynamics, and the potentials of other countries; we will perceive the established things, the presently going-on things, and probable things of the future. Taken together these make up the subject matter of what I have called high-level foreign positive intelligence, or as I shall call it henceforth—strategic intelligence. Incidentally, they also indicate the three main forms in which strategic intelligence is turned out by intelligence organizations. These forms are: the *basic descriptive form*, the *current reportorial form*, and the *speculative-evaluative form.* ① Each of these is covered in a succeeding chapter.

In these coming chapters I will give a picture of the diversity and the size of strategic intelligence's substantive content. There is no gainsaying that it is both extremely diversified and extremely large. But this does not argue that the strategic intelligence business is either continuously occupied with every subject in the huge overall content or exclusively responsible for gathering all the data which make up the content. I wish to be clear about these two points.

Intelligence must be equipped to deal with the array of subjects which I will consider, and in the course of the years it may conceivably deal with all of the subjects at least once. It will, however, tend to deal with any single subject only when that subject is part of a threat to our national interest or is required by a prospective course of action. One of the most continuously vexing problems in the administration of intelligence is deciding which particular subjects shall be watched, reported upon, or made the object of descriptive or speculative research. Equally vexing is deciding the order of their priority. The point is that intelligence is always fully occupied, but occupied almost exclusively on a relatively few subjects of real national concern. At the same time intelligence must be ready to handle a large number of subjects.

Collecting the materials necessary to handle this large number is a task which intelligence

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① Here is the first place where I will depart from some of the accepted usages of the intelligence language. I take this departure, as I have noted in the preface, because of the large confusion one encounters in the lexicon of the trade. In the trade, what I have called the basic descriptive form is variously called basic research, fundamental research, basic data, monographic data, etc. what I call the current reportorial form goes by such names as current intelligence, current evaluations, current appreciations, reports, cable material, hot intelligence, etc. what I call the speculative-evaluative form is known as estimates, strategic estimates, evaluations, staff intelligence, capabilities intelligence, and so on. On the theory that the consumers of intelligence are interested in things of the past, present, and future, I have adopted the element of time as the element of overruling importance. This permits an easy and consistent arrangement of the subject matter of intelligence and permits one to postpone cataloguing this subject matter according to use-to -be-served, consumer, etc. until a later and more appropriate stage. Few intelligence devotees have done this in the past. Far too many of them in making up their categories of the kinds of intelligence have deferred to several factors of discrimination in the same list. Thus you may find important directives of the intelligence brotherhood which contain a list of the kinds of intelligence looking something like this: (1) Basic research, (2) Strategic intelligence, (3) Technical intelligence, (4) Counter intelligence, (5) Tactical intelligence, (6) Capabilities and estimates intelligence. Such categories are by no means mutually exclusive nor are they consistent with one another.

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