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军事英语阅读教程

A Reading Course in Military English 4



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第4分册

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前言

为适应军校对新型军事人才的培养需要,促进军校的军事英语教学,体现军校英语教学鲜明的军事特色,突出"军味",借助军事英语之桥梁,了解外军,掌握军事科技,开展军事交流,我们专门编写了这套《军事英语阅读教程》。

本教程共 4 册,每册 8 单元,每个单元包括 2 篇课文,配有生词、注释和练习,书后附有练习参考答案,旨在帮助学员掌握军事英语基础知识。同时列出与课文主题相关的书目和网址,为学员课后阅读提供更多的材料,以便有效扩大阅读量。

本教程紧紧围绕军事主题,选材新颖,内容广泛,涵盖了军事发展 史、各军兵种知识、军事训练、军事条令条例、武器、高科技装备、军事 理论、军事力量、军事机构、军事院校、军事人物、常规作战、现代战争、 军事新闻、军事基地、高技术战争、情报战、心理战、未来军事转型等, 具有较强的可读性。通过阅读,学员既可以了解外军的基本建制和军 事高科技,掌握大量的军事术语、缩略语等英文表达方式,还有助于提 高阅读理解能力,掌握必要的阅读技巧。

本教程既适合军队院校作为大学英语一、二年级的泛读教材,也 适合承担国防生培养计划的高校作为选修课教材,并可供喜爱军事的 广大读者选用。

本教程在编写过程中得到了解放军信息工程大学、解放军理工大学、解放军炮兵学院等院校的大力支持。在此一并表示衷心的感谢。

限于作者水平,编写时间仓促,书中难免存在不足之处,敬请读者 不吝指正。

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Unit 1

Text A

On Balance: New Technology and Traditional Skills

Did Operation Iraqi Freedom validate a new theory of warfare in which special forces, high technology, and creative war plans will replace America's traditional assets of firepower, maneuver, and brute strength? Some say yes, and now expect Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to push for the radical overhaul or "transformation" of the US armed forces that he reportedly wanted back in early 2001 but felt politically unable to pursue.

However, what is most striking about the recent war to overthrow Saddam is just how much traditional combat capabilities still mattered. Yes, special forces and modern air power were important, but so were Abrams tanks[©], 5-ton supply trucks, rifle-wielding soldiers and marines, and old-fashioned infantry combat skills. When US forces met the Republican Guard[©] 's Madinah Munawrah Armored and Baghdad Infantry divisions south of the Iraqi capital in the decisive battle of the war, they did so with numerical superiority, dominant air support, and tremendous firepower. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have essentially been won with the military the Bush administration inherited from Bill Clinton, the first President Bush, and Ronald Reagan[®]—a force constantly but gradually modernized—not with a reinvented force built by proponents of defense revolution. As such, those who would abandon the Powell(doctrine of overwhelming force in favor of a Rumsfeld doctrine of stealth, surprise, and small coalitions of the willing should temper their views.

The Four-week War Against Saddam

American, British, and Australian forces accomplished a remarkable feat between March 19 and April 9, the rough boundaries of the main combat phase of military operations in Iraq. They defeated a 400,000-man military, overthrew a dictator, and successfully carried on major urban combat operations while suffering fewer than 200 combat deaths—even smaller coalition losses than in Operation Desert Storm a decade ago. Although American-led forces were poorly prepared for the initial demands of stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq, that was more a reflection of poor planning at the Pentagon and CENTCOM than of any inherent lack of capacity on the part of the deployed troops.

What was responsible for this remarkable battlefield success? In particular, were Vice President Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers right when they claimed that the strategy devised by General Tommy Franks and his colleagues at CENTCOM was brilliant? Will war colleges around the world be teaching it to their students decades from now? Or will the conflict tend to be seen pri-

marily as a case of overwhelming military capability prevailing over a mediocre army from a mid-sized developing country?

Whether the war's concept deserves to be called "brilliant," as some claimed during and right after the war, is debatable. On balance, US military performance was so good and military supremacy so overwhelming that the American-led coalition probably could have won this war without a brilliant, or even a very good, war plan. That said, there were major elements of military creativity in the Iraq campaign as well as some that were not new at all.

Consider several key elements

Shock and awe^⑤. This was of course the bumper sticker for how the war would begin, well advertised weeks in advance. But the idea was not so new. Selectively hitting military targets while sparing civilian infrastructure is an idea that builds on the US experience in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Desert Storm. Avoiding attacks against regular Iraqi military units was smart, but it was well known that these forces were much less loyal to Saddam than were the Special Republican Guard^⑥, Republican Guard, and Fedayeen units^⑦. Striking hard in a war's early hours is a strategy that air-power proponents have counseled for decades. In the end, the shock-and-awe concept was not really followed because plans apparently changed with the attempt to kill Saddam on March 19. Given the degree to which Iraqi forces had become accustomed to coalition bombing in the preceding decade, there probably would not have been much shock or awe in any case, however.

Special operations raids. These were more impressive than the early air campaign. Dozens of small special operations teams disrupted Iraqi command and control, seized oil infrastructure, prevented

dams from being demolished, and took hold of airfields in regions where Scud missiles might have been launched at Israel. Special operations and intelligence units also appear to have disrupted Iraqi lines of communication in Baghdad and elsewhere, perhaps hastening the collapse of Iraqi forces once the urban fights began. These operations were brave, creative, and effective. They also prevented some nightmare scenarios.

Bypassing southeastern cities while rushing to Baghdad. In the war's first 10 days, it was not clear that coalition ground forces could sufficiently protect their flanks in areas that they preferred not to seize. The following debate was somewhat overblown; in a worst case, coalition forces could have waited a couple of weeks for other units to arrive with little harm done to the broader strategy. Regardless, this approach, which placed a premium on speed and deep penetration, was hardly new. Hitler's generals did not make pit stops in Strasbourg or Luxembourg or northeastern France; they drove straight for the French coast to cut off the French army, and then for Paris.

Striking Iraqi forces with a powerful preparatory air bombardment. The combination of GPS-guided all-weather bombs, better all-weather sensors such as JSTARS aircraft flying well within Iraqi airspace, and real-time joint communications networks denied Iraqi forces any sanctuary. Even if the Iraqis tried to move during sandstorms, or at night, coalition forces could see and strike them. In addition, due to the rapid movements of coalition ground forces, any Iraqi redeployments had to happen quickly if they were to help frontline forces under attack. That made it more likely they would move in large formations on roadways. They were badly hurt as a result. Again, this was textbook doctrine, applied with devastating ef-


fectiveness, rather than brilliant generalship.

Decimating combined-arms attacks against the Republican Guard. In addition to the above combat dynamics, coalition forces were remarkably effective when air and ground units worked together. By the last days of March and early days of April, US forces were mauling Republican Guard forces deployed outside of Baghdad. Saddam made a major mistake in keeping them there, perhaps out of fear that they would turn against him if allowed into Baghdad or perhaps out of overconfidence that they could hide in the complex terrain of the Tigris-Euphrates valley. The coalition did employ some tactics—such as the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division's "bump and run" move to outflank part of the Madinah Division near Karbala—but what won that fight was a devastating display of combined-arms warfare. It built on a decades-old concept with dramatically improved technology that was acquired and integrated into American military doctrine and tactics during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton years.

The fights for Baghdad and Basra. Here, there was some genuine cleverness and creativity. To try to seize the cities quickly probably would have produced high casualties on all sides. By contrast, to wait patiently for the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division and other reinforcements would have given Saddam's forces confidence as well as time to regroup and devise new tactics. So the middle ground—using increasingly assertive "reconnaissance in force" operations to gain information, disrupt Saddam's forces, embolden the Iraqi population to resist, and engage selectively in firefights against elite Iraqi forces—was just right.

On balance, the main pillars of the coalition's success in Iraq—new technology and traditional skills—provided a remarkable pair of

capabilities. In terms of equipment, of particular note were the all-weather reconnaissance systems, all-weather bombs, and modern communications networks developed in the last decade. In addition, one is struck by the competence of American and British troops and their commanders, and the excellence of their doctrine and training. Indeed, old-fashioned tanks performed extremely well, and urban combat operations were executed magnificently.



firepower n. 火力,火力突击能力

Secretary of Defense 国防部长

transformation of the US

armed forces 美军转型

marine n. 海军陆战队队员

infantry division 步兵师 armored division 装甲师

CENTCOM 美国中央司令部

bumper sticker 粘贴在汽车保险杠上的小标语(宣

传、广告用)

air campaign 空袭

Scud missile 飞毛腿导弹

intelligence n. 情报


place a premium on 重视,助长

deep penetration纵深突破air bombardment空中轰炸

frontline force 前线部队,前沿一线部队

formation combined-arms attack (warfare) 多兵(军)种联合讲攻(作战) maul mechanized infantry division

n. 队形,编队:合成部队,兵团 v. 殴打,打伤;用大槌和木楔劈开 机械化步兵师 v. 翼侧包围



(1) Abrams tank

outflank

艾布拉姆斯坦克。美国陆军及海军陆战队主战坦克。自 1979 年问 世以来,先后经历了 M1、M1A1、M1A2 和 M1A2SEP 等发展阶段。 1984 年, M1A1 坦克定型, 1986 年正式装备。 M1A2 坦克是 M1A1 的 第二阶段改进产品,首辆于1992年出厂,1993年开始装备部队。


- ② the Republican Guard
 - 共和国卫队。伊拉克装备最好、训练最佳的部队,卫队的成员大多 来自萨达姆总统的家乡提克里特,对萨达姆政权忠诚,愿为其效 命,是保卫萨达姆等高级领导人及巴格达安全的主要力量。
- (3) Ronald Reagan 罗纳德•里根。美国第40任总统,在其第二个任期内发生了一些 国际大事,如冷战的结束,轰炸利比亚,伊朗门事件。
- 4 Powell

鲍威尔。美国政治家,陆军四星上将,曾任第65任国务卿(2001— 2005),是第一个担此要职的美国黑人。在其军事生涯中,出任过 里根总统的国家安全顾问(1987—1989),美国陆军部队总司令 (1989),参谋长联席会议主席(1989—1993),并以此职参与指挥了 海湾战争。他是第一个,也是迄今为止唯一的担任过参谋长联席 会议主席的美国黑人。

(5) shock and awe

震慑与畏惧。美军的一种新的战略思维,那就是不再一味寻求依靠决定性的军事优势来击败敌人,而是从心理而非物理和肉体上打败敌人。它不同于拼实力、拼损耗的传统战略思维,它相信能够有更好的方式来解除敌人的武装、消灭敌人的抵抗力量,而这种方式就是"震慑与畏惧"。强调对敌人意志的控制,充分利用自己在军力、战场感知、机动方面的操控性优势,通过刻意的实力展示,极大削弱敌人的战场感知能力,摧毁敌人的战斗意志,使敌人根本无力反抗,除了遵从美军的战略意图之外别无选择。

- ⑥ Special Republican Guard 共和国特别卫队。特别卫队是伊拉克共和国卫队中的一部分,配备有 重装甲旅和防空部队,主要任务是保卫萨达姆及其家人安全,保护总统 设施,防止政变和叛乱,它是唯一被部署在靠近巴格达市中心的部队。
- ⑦ Fedayeen units 敢死队,又叫"萨达姆敢死队",是伊拉克总统部队的一部分,比共和国卫队更死心塌地效忠于萨达姆,成员主要为青少年,穿便服,擅长游击战,也常被用于残酷地镇压伊拉克部队中潜在的反叛。



- I. Decide whether each of the following statements is true or false according to the text. Write T for True or F or False before each statement.
- 1. ____ The most striking about the recent war to overthrow Saddam is the new theory of warfare.
- 2. _____ Firepower, maneuver, and brute strength make a big part in the new theory of warfare.

3	Special forces, high technology, and creative war plans
	make a big part in the new theory of warfare.
1. _	Early in 2001, Rumsfeld pushed for and pursued the radi-
	cal overhaul or "transformation" of the US armed forces.
5.	Numerical superiority, dominant air support, and tremen-
	dous firepower are in the domain of new technology rather
	than traditional skills.
6.	Powell doctrine focuses more on traditional skills and
	Rumsfeld doctrine focuses more on new technology.
7.	American-led forces were poorly prepared for the initial
	demands of stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq mainly because of
	the inherent lack of capacity on the part of the deployed
	troops.
8.	without a brilliant or even a very good war plan, it could
	have been impossible for the American-led coalition to
	achieve the remarkable battlefield success.
9.	The strategy " Shock and Awe" did not bring about much
	of the expected effect because it was not totally brand-new
	to the Iraqi forces.
10.	The combined-arms attacks against the Republican Guard
	embodied more traditional skills than new technology.

${\rm I\hspace{-.1em}I}$. Translate the following sentences into Chinese

- Some say yes, and now expect Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to push for the radical overhaul or "transformation" of the US armed forces that he reportedly wanted back in early 2001 but felt politically unable to pursue.
- 2. The recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have essentially been won with the military the Bush administration inherited from Bill

- Clinton, the first President Bush, and Ronald Reagan—a force constantly but gradually modernized—not with a reinvented force built by proponents of defense revolution.
- 3. Although American-led forces were poorly prepared for the initial demands of stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq, that was more a reflection of poor planning at the Pentagon and CENTCOM than of any inherent lack of capacity on the part of the deployed troops.
- 4. Shock and awe. This was of course the bumper sticker for how the war would begin, well advertised weeks in advance. But the idea was not so new. Selectively hitting military targets while sparing civilian infrastructure is an idea that builds on the US experience in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Desert Storm.
- Given the degree to which Iraqi forces had become accustomed to coalition bombing in the preceding decade, there probably would not have been much shock or awe in any case, however.

II. Topics for discussion.

- 1. What military elements mainly fall within the category of traditional skills? What military elements mainly fall within the category of new technology?
- 2. As far as traditional skills and new technology are concerned, what does Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate?
- 3. What are the major elements of the coalition military creativity in the Iraq Campaign?

Suggested Readings and Websites

1. http://www. nato. int/docu/review/2005/issuel/english/art4.

html

- 2. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FG28Ak01.html
- 3. http://www. iwar. org. uk/news-archive/iraq/lessons-learned/hasc-03-10-02-giambastiani, htm

Text B

Merits of US Military Transformation and Demerits of Saddam

As for the entire thrust of the current program of military transformation of the US armed forces, Bush proclaimed that a new era would dawn. "Power is increasingly defined, not by mass or size, but by mobility and swiftness. Influence is measured in information, safety is gained in stealth, and force is projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons." The Bush Administration has been allocating defense resources in accord with the priorities and vision of future war defined by network-centric warfare (NCW)[®] and "shock and awe." All of the major transformation efforts in the military services and the major military systems under research, development, and construction focus on improving the armed forces' ability to destroy enemy targets precisely, rapidly, and from hundreds (or thousands) of miles away.

Operation Iraqi Freedom has done nothing to slow these trends. As the war ended, a chorus began to sing the praises of military transformation as demonstrated in that war. One reporter declared, "Iraq, in fact, may be remembered as the first true war of the infor-