



英语报刊选读系列教材

总主编 王嘉祺



# Journalistic Reading Book IV

## 英语报刊选读 第四册

主编 林 玫



北京大学出版社  
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
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# Journalistic Reading Book IV



## 编者说明

本套教材的编写,广泛借鉴了国内外优秀英语教材的编写经验,旨在通过原汁原味的外刊文章、鲜活生动的语言和多样的练习帮助学生扫除阅读英语报刊的障碍,培养阅读兴趣和良好的阅读习惯。本教材可供高等学校英语专业学生使用。

本套教材分为四册,每册十六个单元,选材既涉及与生活体验同质的校园、娱乐、体育方面,也有各类报刊中常见的医学、心理学、艺术、文化方面,在第三、四册我们还以国家为线索,选用了关于韩国、日本、印度、伊朗、伊拉克、巴基斯坦、以色列等热点问题较为集中的国家和地区。第一、二册每单元包含两篇文章,总字数控制在 2000 个单词以内;第三、四册包含两到三篇文章,总字数约为 3000 个单词。每个单元分三个部分,结构如下:

**第一部分 (Section A)** 是教学前的辅助材料,包括:

**导读 (Lead-in)** 介绍英语国家的主要报纸、杂志等,或简单讲解与本单元有关的背景知识。

**热身问题 (Warm-up Questions)** 集中体现在第一、二册,用几个与本单元相关的问题引出课文。

**第二部分 (Section B)** 是教材的课文部分,包含两至三篇相关题材的报道。其中第一、二册每单元两篇文章,每篇文章约为 800—900 个单词;第三、四册每单元两至三篇文章,每篇文章 1000 个单词以上。

**第三部分 (Section C)** 是教材的练习部分,分为词汇、句型和篇章三个类别。此部分参考答案请登录 <http://www.shengdabooks.com> 下载。

**词汇练习 (Vocabulary Builder)** 在第一、二册,词汇练习有根据上下文猜词、用原文中的生词填空、原文词组汉译英等形式;第三、四册的词汇练习采用生词与释义连线、近义词辨析、构词法练习等。

**句型练习 (Sentence Structure)** 在第一、二册,句型练习采用翻译长句的形式;

第三、四册则是将句子中的长句拆分为短句,再由学生将若干短句组合成长句。

**篇章练习 (Comprehension of the Texts)** 每册都设计了若干细节性或拓展性的问题,可供学生在课内或课外讨论。

本套教材坚持使用原汁原味的英语报刊文章,尽量不对原文进行编辑。我们认为,英语报刊阅读通常是带着生词的泛读,因此我们没有罗列生词表,也没有对课文进行注释。我们利用练习部分体现出文章的重点词汇,如一、二册的猜词、短语汉译英,又如三、四册的释义连线和近义词辨析等。由于我们的选材涵盖了英、美各大主流媒体的文章,为保持原文特色,没有对全书的英、美式拼写进行统一,望读者理解。

本套教材总主编为王嘉棣,第一、二册主编为刘雁,第三、四册主编为林玫。在教材编写过程中,我们得到了华东政法大学教务处、华东政法大学外语学院的关心和支持,也得到了北京大学出版社的大力帮助,在此一并致谢。

本书所选文章均已注明出处,因各种原因,未能联系上作者,敬请诸位作者与出版社或主编联系,以奉稿酬。

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## Unit 1

# Iran

## Section A Before Reading

**I**ran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a country in Central Asia, located on the northeastern shore of the Persian Gulf, northwestern shore of the Gulf of Oman, and the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. The name “Iran” has been in use natively since the Sassanid period and came into international use from 1935, before which the country was known as Persia. Both “Persia” and “Iran” are used interchangeably in cultural context; however, Iran is the name used officially in political context.

Iran is bordered on the east by Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and on the west by Turkey and Iraq. Tehran is the capital, the country’s largest city and the political, cultural, commercial, and industrial center of the nation. Iran is a regional power, and holds an important position in international energy security and world economy as a result of its large reserves of petroleum and natural gas.

Iran is home to one of the world’s oldest continuous major civilizations, with historical and urban settlements dating back to 7000 BC. The first Iranian dynasty formed during the Elamite kingdom in 2800 BC. The Iranian Medes unified Iran into an empire in 625 BC. They were succeeded by three Iranian Empires, the Achaemenids, Parthians and Sassanids, which governed Iran for more than 1000 years. Iranian post-Islamic dynasties and empires expanded the Persian language and culture throughout the Iranian plateau. Early Iranian dynasties which reasserted Iranian independence included the Tahirids, Saffarids, Samanids and Buyids. The blossoming of Persian literature, philosophy, medicine, astronomy, mathematics and art became major elements of Muslim civilization and started with the Saffarids and Samanids. Iran was once again re-unified as an independent state in 1501 by the Safavid dynasty—who promoted Twelver Shi’a Islam as the official religion of their empire, marking one of the most important turning points in the history of Islam. “Persia’s Constitutional Revolution” established the nation’s first parliament in 1906, within a constitutional monarchy. Iran officially



became an Islamic republic on 1 April 1979, following the Iranian Revolution.

Iran is a founding member of the UN, NAM, OIC and OPEC. The political system of Iran, based on the 1979 Constitution, comprises several intricately connected governing bodies. The highest state authority is the Supreme Leader. Shia Islam is the official religion and Persian is the official language.

## Section B Texts Reading

### Text A

#### What “Engagement” With Iran and North Korea Means

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/world/17sanger.html>

By David Sanger From *The New York Times* June 16, 2009

1 Ever since they settled into the Situation Room and began to plot strategies for their first encounters with North Korea and Iran, President Obama’s aides have described the two countries as polar opposites, unified only by a common desire for nuclear weapons.

2 Now the two countries are about to become two radically different experiments in how “engagement” works or fails to work, as the new president takes a dramatically more confrontational approach with Pyongyang on the high seas, and tries to navigate the tricky politics of exploiting the anger on the streets of Tehran.

3 President Bush famously lumped North Korea and Iran together as two-thirds of the Axis of Evil, a post-9/11 sound bite that obfuscated, in the minds of many, the very different challenges they pose.

4 After examining what went wrong in the Bush years, when North Korea harvested most of the plutonium for its small arsenal, and Iran sped ahead to build the capability to make its own nuclear fuel, Mr. Obama and his aides are now designing different strategies for the two countries that are based on radically different assess-

ments of their motivations.

5 In the Obama analysis, the North is receding into what the president's top strategists have repeatedly called a "defensive crouch," trying to stave off the world with a barrage of missile and nuclear tests while the country's leadership tries to sort out a survival strategy. Constantly on the brink of starvation, its military so broke that it cannot train its pilots, it has no illusions about becoming a great power in Asia. Its main goal is survival—and exploiting the money-making opportunities that come from arms exports.

6 In contrast, Iran looked to the Obama team as a far more dynamic, open society eager to restore its traditional role as one of the great powers—if not the greatest—in the Middle East. To the country's leadership, and to many of the reformers as well, the nuclear program is all about bolstering its chances at restoration. Unlike North Korea, Iran may not need a fully tested nuclear weapon. It just needs to create the perception that, with a few twists of the screwdriver, it is capable of turning a peaceful nuclear infrastructure into a weapons program, in a matter of months. The perception may be as powerful as the bomb.

7 "Nuclear weapons capability would surely add to Iran's ability to twist arms in the region," Dennis Ross, the administration's chief Iran strategist, wrote with David Makovsky in their new book about the Middle East, *Myths, Illusions, and Peace*, published just as Iranians went to the polls last week in the now-disputed election. The book, completed before Mr. Ross was hired by the administration, is causing considerable heartburn in the White House, because it lays out a step-by-step recipe for what the authors call the "hybrid option"—combining diplomatic initiatives with excruciating economic pressure on the most vulnerable elements of Iran's oil sector, whose output is declining.

8 But re-analyzing the problem is easier than designing workable strategies to reverse what may now be irreversible. American presidents have been certain they could contain North Korea, or perhaps speed its collapse, since the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953. That was the same year that the C. I. A. organized a coup that deposed Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and installed the Shah—a cold war operation for which Mr. Obama just publicly apologized during his speech at

Cairo University last month. Very little has broken Washington's way in either country in the ensuing 56 years.

9 So is there any reason to believe that Mr. Obama's new approaches will change the dynamic with either country? Maybe, but there are huge risks ahead.

10 The decision to confront North Korea with overwhelming pressure—designed to bring its shipping and financial transactions to a virtual standstill—is based on the conclusion that re-entering negotiations to buy the dismantlement of the country's main nuclear facility at Yongbyon is a futile strategy. It has already failed twice, once for President Clinton, once for President Bush. When Robert M. Gates, the defense secretary, said "I'm tired of buying the same horse twice," he was signaling that the administration would not offer fuel, food or security guarantees in return for incremental steps to take apart the reactors and plutonium reprocessing facilities inside the high walls at Yongbyon.

11 It may not be a problem; North Korea says it is never coming back to the talks. Maybe it will, maybe it won't. But until then, Mr. Obama's "engagement" strategy is more about overwhelming pressure than diplomacy.

12 By hailing and seeking to inspect suspect North Korean ships in the Sea of Japan, and then pressing nations around the world to pick apart the ship's cargo once they pull into ports for refueling, Mr. Obama is seeking to bring to a grinding halt the last revenue-producing element of the North Korean economy. The risk is that, however carefully designed to avoid open confrontation, the North Koreans will lash out—perhaps opening fire on American, Japanese or South Korean ships, creating an incident that could quickly escalate.

13 "Right now, our biggest worry is the North Korean captain who does something very, very stupid," a senior military officer in the Pacific Command said Monday. "And when you intercept ships and tell them to stop, the risk is that someone can't control their adrenaline. Then we can find ourselves back in the old days."

14 In Iran, in contrast, the administration's approach is likely to be far more about diplomacy in the next few months than about pressure.

15 Mr. Obama's aides are clearly seeking to stand back and watch while protesters take to the streets shouting slogans against the country's ruling elite. The White

House fears that if the president speaks too supportively of the protesters, it will give President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the chance he is looking for to portray the angry crowds as American stooges. After all, in Iran it does not take much to stoke memories of the Mossadeq fiasco.

16 It is too early to know whether these protests, which no one predicted, will gain steam or simply burn out. Mr. Obama's conundrum is that he does not have the luxury of time. International nuclear inspectors describe a nuclear program that is speeding up—moving the country very close to the nuclear capability that the United States, Israel and Iran's Arab neighbors say they cannot abide.

17 Yet if the new administration moves too quickly in executing the strategy of "engagement with pressure"—what Mr. Ross and Mr. Makovsky describe in their book as showing the mullahs that "Iran's economic lifeline is going to be cut and the oil revenues are going to dry up"—it could quickly turn those young Iranians in the streets against Washington. And as one of Mr. Obama's strategists put it the other day, hearing those protesters shout down the clerics "sounds a lot better to my ears than 'Death to America!'"

### *Text B*

## **Inside the Iranian Crackdown**

**When the unrest flared, the Ayatollah's enforcers took to the streets of Tehran with batons and zeal**

<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124726981104525893.html>

By Farnaz Fassihi From *The Wall Street Journal* July 11, 2009

1 TEHRAN—When the protests broke out here last month, Mehdi Moradani answered the call to crush them.

2 On the first day of the unrest, the 24-year-old volunteer member of Iran's paramilitary Basij force mounted his motorcycle and chased reformist protesters through the streets, shouting out the names of Shiite saints as he revved his engine.

3 On the fourth day, he picked up a thick wooden stick issued by his Basij neigh-

borhood task force and beat demonstrators who refused to disperse.



Members of Iran's Basij paramilitary force, on motorcycle, police a demonstration in Tehran on Thursday.

4 By the eighth day, demonstrators alleging that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had rigged his re-election were out by the hundreds of thousands. Mr. Moradani says he mobilized in a 12-man motorcycle crew, scouting out restive neighborhoods across Tehran. He battled protesters with a baton and tear gas. The demonstrators fought back with rocks, bricks and bottles. Mr. Moradani says he handcuffed scores of demonstrators and dragged them away as they kicked and screamed.

5 "It wasn't about elections anymore," says Mr. Moradani, a short, skinny man with pitch-black hair and a beard. "I was defending my country and our revolution and Islam. Everything was at risk."

6 The mass uprising against the results of the June 12 election by supporters of Mr. Ahmadinejad's challengers has largely died down. Demonstrations this Thursday, though heated, drew thousands rather than hundreds of thousands. Iranian officials have said between 17 and 20 people have died in the month long protests. Independent organizations tracking human-rights violations in Iran put the death toll closer to several dozen.

7 If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei succeeds in stamping out the unrest, it will be in large part because of Mr. Moradani and his colleagues in the Basij mili-

tia, the Islamic Republic's most loyal foot soldiers.

8        The story of Mr. Moradani, a mid-ranking Basij member, offers a rare glimpse into one of the most mysterious and feared arms of Iran's regime—and into the group's most significant mobilization since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. This portrait of Mr. Moradani is based on interviews with him conducted in person and by phone, both before the uprising and after the crackdown began.

9        The Basij fanned out across Tehran, beating protesters with sticks, lining streets and squares, and roaring through neighborhoods on their motorcycles in a show of force. Regime officials praised the shock troops.

10       “Our efforts to unveil the faces of our enemy saved Iran from a grave danger,” Yadollah Javani, the political chief of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which commands the Basij, said last week.

11       But the Basij also became the most visible target of the opposition's fury. In some neighborhoods, protesters covered streets with oil to thwart Basij motorbikes, surrounding and beating fallen Basij riders.

12       The Basij was created in 1979 by the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It was devised as a volunteer force, to back up the Iranian army in the Iran-Iraq war. Many of its young members were deployed to the battlefield to walk ahead of soldiers and detonate Iraqi mines.

13       After the war ended in 1988, the Basij evolved into a type of neighborhood task force. Members serve as law enforcers, morality police, social-service providers and organizers of religious ceremonies. In times of crisis, the Basij are tasked with restoring order and ferreting out dissidents.

14       Iran's government says the Basij count some five million members. Independent analysts put the number closer to one million, out of an Iranian population of about 75 million.

15       Those numbers make the group the regime's largest and most wide-reaching network of security volunteers. Members, both men and women, slip easily between roles, from social worker to community spy.

16       The Basij don't wear uniforms. Men typically sport beards, and often wear loose-fitting shirts that fall untucked over their pants. Women members are usually covered in head-to-toe black chadors.

- 17 Rank-and-file members don't draw salaries, though there are perks to the job. They enjoy special consideration when competing for university admission or government jobs.
- 18 A Basij chapter operates out of every officially sanctioned institution, private or government owned. Ministries, universities, factories, schools, mosques and hospitals all house Basij units. Joining the Basij can be as easy as signing up. But members are carefully vetted. Indoctrination includes theology and ideology seminars, then military training.
- 19 During the administration of reformist President Mohamad Khatami, from 1997 to 2005, the Basij were only called out during times of street protests. After Mr. Ahmadinejad won the presidency in 2005, the Basij enjoyed something of a revival.
- 20 Under Mr. Ahmadinejad, authorities reinstituted street checkpoints, manned by Basij and separate morality police, who monitored everything from men's haircuts to how women wear their mandatory headscarves.
- 21 In 2005, Basij forces were placed under the command of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran's most elite security force. The Guard, with responsibility for internal security, runs a sort of parallel military, with its own air force and naval branches, its own ministry and extensive business activities.
- 22 Mr. Moradani is the son of a former commander of the Guard, who fought against Israel in Lebanon in the 1980s and helped train the armed militia of Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite group.
- 23 The eldest of three children, Mr. Moradani was enrolled by his parents in the Basij's youth club when he was nine years old. The youth club is a mix between the Boy Scouts and Bible school. The clubs organize soccer games, swimming lessons and picnics in the woods.
- 24 Children are taught how to pray, and they recite Quranic verses. Religious teachings at the clubs emphasize the call to defend Islam, even at the expense of death, or martyrdom. Future Basij members are told to strive to create a pure society in line with conservative Islamic values.
- 25 Mr. Moradani remembers field trips to war monuments, Shiite shrines and so-called martyrs' cemeteries, where those who died in the Iran-Iraq war are buried. He received his first military training before he turned 14, learning how to handle a gun

and fight from trenches, he says.

26 When he was 14, the Basij forces piled Mr. Moradani and 100 other youths into buses and took them around the dormitories of Tehran University. At the time—10 years ago this week—students had been orchestrating large, antigovernment protests. The demonstrations were among the most significant since the 1979 founding of the Islamic Republic.

27 Basij commanders ordered the teenagers to beat up student organizers, Mr. Moradani says. They did. In 2003, when student uprisings erupted again, he rushed to help quash them.

28 “The revolution and Islam need me. I will give my life in a heartbeat if the regime asks me,” Mr. Moradani said in an interview earlier this year at a shop in central Tehran, where he sells Islamic and revolutionary paraphernalia, including key chains, T-shirts and CDs. “Our society is now at the verge of sin and filled with antirevolutionary people.”

29 In his small store, Mr. Moradani works with his shoes off, because he also prays there. The shop’s walls are adorned with framed posters of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Mr. Ahmadinejad.

30 “My heroes,” he says.

31 Mr. Moradani, who lives in Shahr-eh Rey, a city adjacent to southern Tehran, didn’t attend university. He focused instead on his religious studies. He says he hopes one day to follow in his father’s footsteps and join the Revolutionary Guard.

32 He has taken the Guard’s rigorous entrance exam twice, passing the ideology and the written portions both times. But he failed the final hurdle: an intense interview that lasts six to eight hours. Applicants must discuss why they are loyal to the regime and the Supreme Leader. He intends to try again.

33 Mr. Moradani takes religious-singing lessons and aspires to master “madahi,” the art of chanting Shiite religious odes at holy ceremonies. His cellphone is programmed to ring with a famous religious song about Imam Hussein, a Shiite saint.

34 Before the election, Mr. Moradani campaigned for Mr. Ahmadinejad. He printed campaign posters and pasted them on walls. The day after the vote, with his candidate declared the winner, Mr. Moradani bought a box of chocolate cupcakes and drove his motorcycle to one of Mr. Ahmadinejad’s campaign offices to celebrate.



- 35 A few hours later, he recalls, he was shocked to see demonstrators filling the streets. They set plastic trash bins afire along Tehran's long Vali Asr Avenue. Men and women, gathered in clusters across town, shouted "Death to the Dictator."
- 36 Riot police chased them away. The demonstrators regrouped and began chanting again—a cat-and-mouse game that played out for days.
- 37 "I never expected the protests to be so intense and last so long," said Mr. Moradani in a phone interview from Tehran this week. "I thought it would be over in a few days."
- 38 Basij members organized to support riot police and other security officials across Tehran. Some Basij members infiltrated the opposition demonstrations, according to eyewitnesses.
- 39 Protesters, most of them young, fought back. "You saw young people on both sides mobilizing with vengeance and willing to kill," said Issa Saharkheez, a political analyst in Tehran, in an interview shortly after the election. Mr. Saharkheez was subsequently arrested in detentions that followed the unrest.
- 40 At the height of the street battles, in Saadat Abad, a middle-class neighborhood in east Tehran, young men and women organized themselves into an unofficial militia to fight the Basij, with a "commander" taking responsibility for each street. Every afternoon, they would meet to prepare for the evening's expected battle, according to a 25-year-old student who was involved with the group.
- 41 They collected rocks, tiles and bricks from construction sites and spilled oil on the roads, an attempt to sideline the Basij's motorcycles. When a Basij rider would go down, the young men would beat him, according to the student. Women stood back, screaming "Death to the Dictator" and stoking bonfires in the street. Older supporters remained indoors, throwing ashtrays, vases and other household items from their balconies and windows onto the Basij motorcycle riders below.
- 42 "There was a war going on here every night," the student says. "We are not going to stand and let them beat us."
- 43 At the end of the first week of protests, Mr. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader, led Friday prayers and endorsed Mr. Ahmadinejad's victory. He ordered all demonstrators off the streets.
- 44 A few hours after Mr. Khamenei's sermon, Mr. Moradani got a call at home.