



国信智库·博士后丛书

制度创新：


中国农村公共设施建设 体制改革方向

Zhidu Chuanxin:

Zhongguo Nongcun Gonggong Sheshi Jianshe Tizhi Gaige Fangxiang

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自建体制与代建体制的比较

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“国信智库·博士后丛书”序

“国信智库·博士后丛书”是由国家信息中心博士后科研工作站组织出版的博士后研究成果。国家信息中心是国家发展和改革委员会直接领导下的，以开发信息资源、服务科学决策为使命的，集信息技术、研究、管理于一体的机构，是直接服务国家重大战略研究与制定的重要智库。国家信息中心博士后科研工作站是原国家人事部 2003 年正式批准设立，在理论经济学、应用经济学、管理科学与工程、社会学、网络空间安全、战略学和心理学等七个学科，具有单独招收博士后研究人员资格的科研工作站。目前博士后指导教师 30 多人，为博士后开展跨学科、跨领域的重大问题研究提供了全方位的指导。

博士后工作站一直秉持“明确目标，突出特色，紧密围绕经济社会发展前沿问题”的建站思路，致力于经济建设和信息化发展领域的理论和应用研究、政府决策咨询的高层次人才培养，形成了有特色的博士后培养模式。建站以来，在中国人力资源和社会保障部和全国博士后管理委员会的领导下，在国家发展和改革委员会人事司和各位博士后导师的指导支持下，累计招收博士后研究人员近 70 人，在国家经济建设和信息化发展中发挥了日益重要的作用。

博士后在站期间直接参与重大课题和决策咨询研究，形成一系列有价值的研究成果。建站以来，除了每位博士后出站报告外，博士后站共承担国家重大科技专项、社会科学基金、自然科学基金、部委委托研究项目等。博士后通过实地调研撰写的研究报告，多篇获得中央和国务院有关部门的肯定。

为促进博士后研究成果的转化应用，发挥研究成果的社会效应，现集中整理本站博士后的优秀研究成果，编辑出版“国信智库·博士后丛书”。我们提倡创新、严谨、原创性研究，收录的研究作品均为博士后站研究人员的研究报告或阶段性研究成果。我们热切期待，社会各界特别是政策制定人士和学术界的朋友，能够关心支持“丛书”，并不吝赐教，使我们的工作不断完善。

序 言

农村公共设施建设是发展农村经济、增加农民收入、保障粮食生产能力的支撑条件。农村公共设施建设古已有之，利国利民的工程不胜枚举，近年来，随着农业农村提速发展，“三农”对公共建设的需求大于以往任何时期，然而，如何在有限的财政投入下供给更高效、更优质、更切合农民需求的公共品则是政府当下急需破解的难题。通过现实中大量鲜活的案例调查不难发现，这一问题的根源在于我国农村公共设施建设供给制度的缺位。

制度供给是对制度需求的回应，本书结合对安徽省水库移民区公共设施建设改革试点剖析，很好地解释和回答了不同类型的公共设施建设对不同建设体制的要求。读者可以带着以下问题去阅读本书：

首先，随着经济下行压力加大，财政资金支出也随之趋紧，那么，在有限的资金约束下，农村公共设施建设资金以何种方式配置与管理才能做到提供更多更优质的农村公共产品？

其次，体制是制度的具体表现形式，作者把农村公共设施建设体制的效用分为直接效用和间接效用，直接效用是特定体制下农民直接从公共设施建设中获取的直接劳务收益，间接效用是特定体制下公共设施建成后，农民因生产生活改进而增加的收入。在不同的制度供给下，农村公共设施建设体制对农民的行为有什么影响？进而又对农民收入有什么影响？

再次，农村公共品供给的公平性似乎一直是学者们关注的一个问题，作者将农村公共设施建设体制的公平性分解为主观公平与客观公平两种，进而试图揭示了不同体制下农村公共设施建设公平性的本质区别。那么，在此探索下，农村公共设施建设体制的社会公平性该如何量化？

最后，农村各类公共设施项目的建设规模、程序、难度、经费、方式等差异较大，作者结合不同类别的农村公共设施提出了不同的建管机制，为今后农村公共设施建设项目提供了有益的政策参考。同时，作者把效率与公平同时纳入评价体系，回答了农村公共建设体制该如何运行、是否有

一定的可行性？

本书是在作者的博士论文基础上完成的，作者从农村公共建设体制比较出发，改变了以往单一从制度效率的角度评价制度绩效的方法，构建了一个农村公共建设体制绩效的分析框架，系统地从效率和公平两个维度解释了制度绩效决定，是一部对农村公共建设体制绩效分析比较完整和系统的作品，值得鉴赏和关注！

国家发展和改革委员会宏观经济研究院

副院长：马晓河

2016年6月24日

摘 要

长期以来,中央提出了一系列农村工作的指导方针,也实施了一系列强农惠农的政策,用于农村公共设施建设投资也不断增加,而且数额巨大。农村公共设施不仅关系国计民生的一些大项目,也涉及千家万户分散的中小型项目,而这些中小型项目涉及面又非常之宽。当前,政府代建体制是中小型项目建设实行的主要方式,建设的自主权是由政府主管部门作为投资和建设主体,包揽代建,由此引发的问题日益突出。五年前,安徽省水库移民区创造性地实践了另一种公共设施建设体制——村民自建体制,该项改革引发了对农村公共设施建设体制的一系列思考,如农村公共设施建设体制如何演变、村民自建体制是否能遵循一般规律并最终取代政府代建体制,以及如何适时调整现时公共设施建设框架等都将成为中国农村公共设施建设体制改革面临的重大课题。

基于比较制度的分析框架,本书针对安徽省水库移民区公共建设体制的重大改革这一极具变革意义的社会现象,在将国外发达国家农村公共设施建设体制以及我国历史上农村公共设施体制变迁的特点进行系统性分析的基础上,对体制绩效变迁路径的一般过程进行了总结,并认为各种体制绩效“较量”的结果决定了体制的变迁,而体制绩效的“较量”包括效率与公平两个方面的比较。具体地,本书通过对安徽省合肥市肥东县和六安市裕安区的抽样调查数据整理,首先重点比较分析了当前两种公共设施建设体制下的效率与公平度,其次证实了农村公共设施建设体制变迁的方向,再次从当前向这个变迁方向进行体制改革的现实难点出发,构建了新时期农村公共设施建设机制,最后针对这种机制的实施主体进行了可行性探讨。经过本书的研究和分析,主要得出了以下几点结论:

第一,从农村公共设施建设体制变迁的历史路径来看,体制变迁特征体现在:一是强制性制度变迁逐渐转向诱致性制度变迁;二是政府农村公共设施建设“自上而下”的决策权逐渐弱化;三是农村公共设施建设筹资机制趋于向制度内转变;四是农村公共设施生产和管护逐渐合理放权;五

是新的农村公共设施建设体制绩效总体上优于以往的体制。农村公共设施建设体制的实质是国家、地方和农民三大利益相关主体之间相互冲突与合作的过程，同时也是国家、地方和农民利益重新调配的过程，而体制变迁本身则是经济体制改革强力催生的结果。从农村公共设施建设体制变迁过程中还可以发现，政府投资主导的农村公共设施建设体制变迁大致是一个由政府垄断到控制，到干预，再到放权的过程。通过安徽自建体制的试点经验与当前农村公共设施建设代建体制的运行机制的对比发现，二者在决策主体、建设方式、建设程序以及后期维护环节都存在明显的差异，较之代建体制，自建体制的运行机制充分体现了政府部门放权与农民现实需求。

第二，农村公共设施建设体制取决于与之相关的产权、交易成本以及国家机构的效率。在此三因素的作用下，不同的农村公共设施建设体制会产生不同的社会福利分配效果，而更优的福利分配会催生新的体制变革。政府垄断型公共设施建设存在寻租问题和 X 非效率问题，公共设施建设因大量的非生产性费用而建设效率低下；政府控制型公共设施建设使得农村公共设施福利分配不均和供给不足；政府干预型公共设施建设往往会导致过度干预，因而政府机构职能被放大，致使公共设施建设成本提高；而政府若放权公共设施建设，则无论是供给方还是需求方，即政府与农民福利都有较大增加，整个社会经济福利也大大增加。判断新兴体制能否拥有强大生命力，是否能取代原有体制，取决于新兴体制是否能带来更多的社会福利，即更好的运作效率以及更公平的成果分配。因此，文章认为，农村公共设施建设体制绩效变迁路径在一定范围内，体制的边际绩效具有递减规律，但是这种边际绩效递减不会导致新体制与原有体制产生相互替代的效应，反而会催发新的体制的成长，并逐渐替代原有体制。但是，新体制替代旧体制不是一蹴而就的，新的体制边际绩效提升的过程和旧的体制绩效递减的过程会形成双重均衡，这个平衡点便是新旧体制同时并存的时点，越过这个点，新体制绩效将高于原有体制绩效，此时，作为制度表现形式的新体制机制将逐渐替代原有体制机制。在此分析框架下，文章提出了代表新兴体制的自建体制一定范围内较之代建体制可能更具绩效，并将逐渐取代代建体制的隐含假说。

第三，从体制效率的角度看，通过对安徽省 2008—2011 年调研所获移

民村和非移民村村级数据的整理和分析,从政府投资规模效益上比较,发现移民村公共设施建设投资使用效率高,而非移民村公共设施建设投资使用效率相对较低。四年来,两个地区的变化趋势也十分明显,具体表现为移民村规模效益逐渐提高,而非移民村规模效益逐年降低,而且当大部分样本移民村前2年或前3年并未具有规模优势时,大部分非移民村却相对具有规模优势,而在后2年或后3年,情况却正好相反。这个结果恰恰印证了前面所提出的农村公共设施建设体制绩效变迁的过程;从对农民收入的影响上分析,发现在长期内,移民村与非移民村公共设施建设投资、村民劳务费支出均与村民人均收入存在长期的协整关系,但是影响方式不同。对于移民村而言,公共设施建设投资每增加1%,村民人均收入增长0.15%,村民劳务费支出每增加1%,村民人均收入增长0.05%;对于非移民村而言,公共设施建设投资每增加1%,村民人均收入下降2.13%,村民劳务费支出每增加1%,人均收入增加0.1%。短期内,移民村公共设施建设投资是村民收入增长的重要原因,村民劳务费支出也较大程度地促进了村民收入的直接增长。此外,移民村人均收入的变化短期内也会引起公共设施投资的变化,可见,对移民村的财政投入存在某种“相机抉择”的情况,与“格瓦纳法则”基本一致;反观非移民村,其公共设施建设投资、村民劳务费支出以及村民人均收入均不存在短期影响。从效率总体上看,自建体制较之代建体制有更大的提升空间,合乎体制绩效的变迁一般路径。

第四,从公平的角度看,利用安徽省2011年农户调研数据对移民农户与非移民农户进行了比较分析,就客观公平分析结果而言,贫困与否(不贫困=1,贫困=0)与农户类型(移民=1,非移民=0)呈显著的正相关关系,该变量系数为0.871。由于不同类型的农户处于不同公共设施建设体制,因此,可以判断移民农户受村民自建体制的正向影响,返贫率比非移民农户低。这是因为贫困线本身就是一条与收入公平紧密相关的标准线,将二者放入全国范围内进行比较,移民村自建体制的实行带动了贫困线以上农户的增加或者降低了农户返贫率,在很大程度上都意味着移民农户较之非移民农户在全国范围内与其他农户的差距在缩小。就主观公平分析结果而言,移民农户与非移民农户的差距感的影响因素虽有相同,但也各有

侧重。家庭人均纯收入和对公共设施建设经费的了解都使得两类村村民的差距感在缩小。对于移民农户而言，收入差距感的缩小更多地取决于村民文化程度、农村公共设施投资方式的满意度以及建设方式的满意度，也就是说移民农户的差距感更多地受农村公共设施建设体制的影响；对于非移民农户而言，收入差距感的缩小更主要受亩均机械投入、人均承包面积的影响。最后，从公平度评价方面总体观之，农村公共设施建设体制由代建向自建变迁具有一定的必然性。

第五，当前形势下，农村公共设施建设体制改革面临自建主体的非合作、行业主管部门的权力约束以及工程技术难度等问题，因此，综合考虑体制变迁的成本与难点，通过制度设计，构建公共设施分层建设框架，以适应新体制在现实中继续发挥其作用，推广其机制的需要是十分必要的。同时，通过对所构造的分层建设框架的现实可行性分析发现，在界定其范围内，就中央政府、地方政府与农民三方主体而言，实行村民自建体制具有逻辑可行性。

关键词：公共设施；自建体制；代建体制

Abstract

For a long time, the central government puts forward a series of rural work guidelines, and implemented a series of policy to strengthen and benefit agriculture and farmers. The investment for rural public infrastructure is also constantly increased, and the amount involved is very huge. The rural public facilities are not only related to the big projects of people's livelihood, but also involve the scattered small projects for thousands of households, and these small projects involve a very wide scope. At present, the main construction body of these small and medium - sized projects is the government, and the autonomy of the investment and construction is the government departments, which caused lots of troubles. Five years ago, Anhui reservoir immigrants' areas creatively practiced another public facilities construction system - villagers self - build system. This reform has brought out a series of thinking about the rural public facilities construction system, such as how the rural public facilities construction system evolved? Can the villager self - build system follow the general rules and eventually replace the government substituted - built system? How to adjust to the current framework of the public facilities construction? All of these problems are the important topics that China's rural public facilities construction system reform will be faced.

Based on the framework of the comparative institution analysis, in view of the public construction system in Anhui province reservoir immigrants' area, which is a kind of significant social phenomenon, this paper analyzes rural public facilities construction system of the foreign developed countries and the history of our country rural public facilities system. Then, the author summarizes the path of general process in the system change, and that "battles" results of all kinds of system performance determines the

change of system, and “battles” of the system performance including comparison of two aspects: efficiency and fair. Based on this, through sampling survey in Feidong, Hefei city, and Yuan, Luan city in Anhui province, This paper focuses on the efficiency and fair degree of the two kinds of public facilities construction systems, and points to the change direction rural public facilities construction system. Finally, starting from the current real difficulties of the reform of the system, this paper constructs the rural public facilities construction mechanism in new period, and discusses the feasibility of the subject in the implementing mechanism. Through the research and analysis, the main result comes out:

Firstly, from the history path of rural public facilities construction system change, the system change characteristics: firstly, the mandatory institutional change gradually turned to induced institutional change. The second is government's “top-down” decision-making power of rural public facilities construction gradually blurred. The third is the rural public facilities construction financing mechanism tends to change within the system. The fourth is the rural public facilities production and management gradually rational decentralization. The fifth is the new rural public facilities construction system, which the overall performance is superior to the former system. The essence of rural public facilities construction system is a conflict and cooperation process between the three stakeholder, national, local and farmers between, at the same time it is also the interests allocating process of the nation, local and the farmers, and system change itself is advanced by the reform of economic system. From the process of change of the rural public facilities construction system, it also can be found, and the change of the government invest and lead rural public facilities construction system generally is a monopoly by the government, to control, to intervention, and then to the process of decentralization. Comparing with the experience of the Anhui self-build system and the current rural public facilities construction and the build system of the operation mechanism, there are

significant differences in the main body of the decision-making, construction methods, construction procedure and follow-up maintenance process in both of them, compared with the agent - build system, the self - build system fully embodies the government decentralization and farmers' real demand.

Secondly, the rural public facilities construction system depends on the related property rights, the transaction cost and the efficiency of the state institutions. In the three factors, different rural public facilities construction system will produce different social welfare distribution, and better welfare distribution will lead to new system change. there are rent - seeking and X not efficiency in the government monopoly public facilities construction, it produce a lot of non - productive construction cost and low efficiency in public facilities construction. The government control public facilities construction that makes the welfare of rural public facilities distribution and supply unevenly. Government intervenes public facilities that often leads to excessive intervention, leading to government agencies function amplification, which causes public facilities construction cost increasing. And if the government decentralize public facilities construction, both suppliers' or home - textile, the welfare of the government and the peasants will be increased considerably, and the whole social economic welfare will be greatly increased. Judge a emerging system can have a strong vitality, whether it can replace the original system, depending on whether the new system can bring more social welfare, namely better operational efficiency and more fairly distribution. On this basis, the article holds that the change path of rural public facilities construction system performance is marginal decreasing in a certain range, but the marginal performance declining will not lead to an alternative effect between the new system and the original system, but only the new system will be urged to grow, and will gradually replace the original system. However, the new system which replaces the old system is not achieved overnight, process of the new system marginal performance ascension and process of the old system performance declining can form

double balance, in the balance point, old and new system exist at the same time, once the date across the point, the new system performance will be higher than the original system performance. At this time, as the form of the system performance, the new system mechanism will gradually replace the original system mechanism. In the framework of analysis, the paper puts forward an implicit assumption: as a new system, self-build system may have better performance than the agent-build system in a certain range, and it will gradually replace the agent-build system.

Thirdly, from the perspective of system efficiency, through collection and analysis of the Anhui 2008—2011 the immigrants village and the non-immigrants village data, the comparison of the government investment scale efficiency finds public facilities construction investment efficiency in immigrants village is higher, and public facilities construction investment efficiency in non-immigrants village is relatively low. In the past four years, the change tendency of the two regions is also very obvious, the specific performance that scale efficiency gradually improve in immigrants village, but scale efficiency decline in non-immigrants village, and when most of the immigrants village sample first two years or three years ago did not have the scale advantage, most of the non-immigrants village but relatively have the scale advantage, and in the two years or three years ago, the counter-productive comes out. The results confirm the front proposed change process of the rural public facilities construction system performance. From the effect analysis of the farmers' income, it found that there is a cointegration relationship in the public facilities construction investment. Villagers' service fee spending all of the villagers' per capita income in non-immigrants village and immigrants village in the long term, but the ways of impact are different. As for immigrants village, the public facilities construction investment increased each 1%, in per capita income have the growth of 0.15%, the villagers service fee spending every increased by 1%, the per capita income increased by 0.05%. As for non-immigrants village, the public facilities

ties construction investment each increased by 1%, the per capita income fell by 2.13%, the villagers service fee spending every increased by 1%, the per capita income increased by 0.1%. In the short term, the public facilities construction investment immigrants village is an important reason for the income growth, the villagers service fee spending also greatly promote the villagers' income growth directly. In addition, per capita income of immigrants village change in the short term can also cause public facilities investment changes, therefore, there is a certain "camera choice" in immigrants village' s financial investment, and consistent with "lattice tile nano rule" . In non - immigrants village, its public facilities construction investment, villagers' service fee spending and villagers' per capita income do not exist short - term effects.

Fourthly, from the fair point of view, it uses Anhui province in 2011 peasant household survey data of immigrants and non - immigrants to analyze and compare. as for the results of the objective fair analysis, poverty or not ("no poverty" = 1, "poverty" = 0) and peasant household type ("immigrants" = 1, "non - immigrants" = 0) have a significant positive correlation, and this variable coefficient is 0.871. Due to the different types of farmers are in the different public facilities construction system, and therefore, the author can judge the immigrants have positive influence on system, and the re - poverty rate is lower than non - immigrants. Poverty line itself is a standard line which closely relate to the fair revenue, combine them into a nationwide comparison, the practice of the self - build system drive the farmers who are above the poverty line increased or reduced the re - poverty rate. To a great extent, it means immigrants much closed the gap than non immigrants when compares with other farmers of the country. As for the results of the subjective fairness analysis, some influence factors of sense of the gap in immigrants and the non - immigrants are the same, but also have each emphasize particularly on. Per capita net income of the family and the understanding of the public facilities construction funds make two

kinds of villagers narrow the sense of the gap. As for immigrants, narrowing the income gap sense much depends on the education level, the satisfaction of the rural public infrastructure investment and the satisfaction of construction method, and that is to say, gap sense of immigrants is more easily influenced by rural public facilities construction system. For the non-immigrants, which narrowing the income gap sense is mainly by mechanical input, the influence of the area per capita contract. From a fair evaluation of the overall view, rural public facilities construction system will turn to self-build system is certain inevitability.

Fifthly, in the current situation, the reform of the rural public facilities construction self-build system faces the non-cooperation of the subject, the power constraints of the relative government department and the difficulty of engineering technology, therefore, comprehensively considering the cost of the system change and the difficulty, through the system designing, building layered framework of the public facilities construction, in order to adapt to the needs of the new system continue to play its role, promote its mechanism in reality. At the same time, based on reality feasibility analysis of the hierarchical construction framework, it found that tripartite main body, the central government, local government and farmers, the self-build system are feasibility logically in the defined range.

Key words: Public Infrastructure; Self-build System; Agent-build System

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“国信智库·博士后丛书”序

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