


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海德格尔现象学下的翻译理论

● 屈平 著




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## 序

屈平这部书终于出版了,字字句句渗透着他的心血,我衷心地祝贺他。

屈平,出身寒微而久怀大志。完全靠自学修完大学本科,1997年获硕士学位后,曾经受聘于大公司担任翻译兼秘书,很受赏识,积累了不少知识和经验;后去大学外语系任教,晋升为副教授。2007年来河南大学外语学院读博,2010年获博士学位。

我和屈平相识已有多年,深知他的上进心和毅力。他素爱文学和诗歌,自小读过不同时期的中外名篇,有较深厚的功底。20世纪90年代,他就表示过读博的愿望,并且虚心接受师长建议,开始了有计划的读书并从事一定的科研工作,陆陆续续写出几篇文章,不求扬名报刊,只是压在书箱内垫底。大学任教8年是他教学和科研的丰收期,不但他的教学工作受到师生的赞誉,他还独立完成省级、校级科研项目3个,发表文章、译著10篇/部。他的科研主攻方向明确,其中英诗研究成果占三分之二;发表园地包括《外国文学研究》这样的国家核心期刊和译林出版社这样享有盛誉的国家著名出版社。读博梦圆,他毅然舍弃待遇可能较丰厚的选择,再上求学之路,并赋《喜考中抒怀》诗一首,其中说:“伴酒欲狂拨断弦,重任在肩岂敢欢!”在呈交的已读书单前题字说:“吾师是父母,始觉浅读书。”这样的雄心和抱负、这样的信任,使为师者感动不已。

到大学读博,是很多青年学子的梦想,但是只有身临其境才知个中艰辛。由副教授到博士生,原来较丰厚的待遇没有了,只有每月几百块钱的博士生补贴,妻儿老小是顾不上了,求学期间还要花钱和生活,这种考验很严峻。但是屈平仰慕中国诗歌之父屈原,又以屈子之字为名,向来志效历代先贤,他胜利地走过来了,使这段经历变成了

宝贵的人生财富。读博期间他很少回家,每天除了听课、跑图书馆,就是关在房间里读书、写作,人们只见他夜夜三更,甚至几近通宵。背名诗、诵名篇、啃原著、过难关,一篇篇心得、习作浸透着汗水,铺平了他的踏实前进之路,构成了他清晰可见的足迹。仅以这篇博士论文为例,据不完全统计,一年左右时间中,他参阅了140多位中外学者、专家的200多篇/部著作,单是德里达(Jacques Derrida)就有8篇/部,海德格尔(Martin Heidegger)就有24篇/部,经过消化吸收,形成了他在论文中反复阐述的翻译还原理论。

翻译还原论,这个使作者屈平魂牵梦绕了一年才形成文字的提法,他自己待之如宠儿,爱不释手,答辩专家们也给以肯定评价,答辩之后又过了两年,现在出版了。作为一个学术观点,这个提法能不能站得住脚,还有什么需要改进或者完善之处,这就要仰赖读者诸君的指教了。我们期待着各位的意见,以便再启心智。是为序。

王宝童

2012年7月1日

开封 河南大学 老塘斋

## **Acknowledgements**

I came to the Faculty of Foreign Languages, Henan University in 2007 to realize my dream of pursuing doctoral studies under the supervision of Professor Wang Baotong, and I think I have benefited a lot from his scholarship and humanness. It is under the direct influence of Professor Wang's theories and practice, especially in poetry translation, that I began to focus my interest on Heidegger, whose phenomenological hermeneutics is largely in agreement with what my supervisor usually tells me. I have studied a galaxy of Western philosophers such as Kant, Nietzsche, Derrida, Husserl, Levinas, Gadamer, and finally arrived at Heidegger. During my reading and thinking of those philosophers countless rays of intelligibility gradually converge on this lofty and glaring image of Heidegger. It is in this longing and visional atmosphere that I embarked on the reading and thinking journey of this dissertation.

I am lucky as a student of Professor Wang Baotong, whose learned guidance, humane generosity, and fatherly care are an inestimable support for me during the past three unforgettable years. He took all the trouble to read and re-read my drafts and made invaluable advice and proposition. I am also much indebted to Lady Liu Gang, associate researcher of library science and my supervisor's wife, who has given me a lot of encouragement and never hesitated to lend me a hand.

Equal thanks go to Professor Lü Changfa, Professor Gao Jihai, and Professor Guo Shangxing of the Research Institute of the Faculty of Foreign Languages, Henan University, who have in their readiness

rectified and replenished my every thought in the making; and to Professor Wang Hongyin of Nankai University, to Professor Cai Xinle of Henan University, both of whom have so kindly read through my humble work and offered many wise suggestions.

Special thanks must go to Doctor Zhang Zhizhong, Doctor Zhang Junjie, and Lecturer Hou Jian, who have been so ready to lend me their precious study materials in the course of my thinking about and composing the dissertation.

In addition, I owe a great debt to my mother and my parents-in-law, without whose support and help, it would have been impossible for me to go through my doctoral studies. I really hope I can repay them with a happy and carefree life for all.

Meanwhile, I am greatly indebted to my dear wife Wang Dongmei, whose love and support, both spiritual and material, have helped me tide over my MA study years and paved the way for the Ph. D. program. Love is great and beyond verbal expression. Whenever I was depressed or frustrated, she would turn up before me with her priceless understanding and encouragement. Her love is such as I can no way return. Nor do I hesitate to give thanks and good wishes to my son Qu Yilong, whose feelings and future are the constant drive for me to negotiate difficulties.

Finally, I must hasten to extend my thanks to Professor Shirley Wood who has so kindly taught me and taken pains to correct my papers, and to all people who have helped and cared for me during my study in Henan University.

## Abstract

The present study is, in general, a phenomenological exploration about translatology on the existential-ontological level. To apply the so-called “working-method of phenomenology” to the field of translation studies in accordance with Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology not only requires the object of translation studies be put into Heidegger **Thinking** from a new point of view but also necessitates Heidegger **Destructing** the prolonged conceptions about translatology. Destruction here does not mean to bury the past in nullity but to work out or lay open the working foundation for those conceptions; therefore, the purpose of this doing is positive, while its negative effect remains periphrastic and by-productive. These two requirements belong together; they depend upon each other. To shift the point of view on translation studies presupposes the laying bare of working conditions of possibility of translation. In the last analysis, both of them are essentially bound up with the ways in which **the question of the meaning of Being** is formulated; yet only within this formulation of the meaning of Being can it be possible to make a phenomenological investigation into the working conditions of possibility of translation on the ontological level. Guided by Heidegger’s “existential-ontological analytics of the human being”, we find that the human being itself is **always already circular** or **restitutional** in its understanding of Being — the only way in which Being gets itself performed and actualized. This **always already circular** or **restitutional** structure is what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic structure of “as”, which not merely



makes the foreunderstanding but also its derivative modes of interpretation/translation and various kinds of knowing possible. In Heidegger's view, the essence of the human being lies in its existence, and existence is nothing but the Being of the "there", therefore the human being is a **potentiality-for-Being**. Understanding is an existential Being of the human being's ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which exists in such a way that this kind of Being can disclose in itself what its Being is capable of. But Being is always the Being of an entity, therefore there is a necessary correspondence between the **Being** of the human being and the **Being** of an entity; the former always determines the latter and hence an entity. It is, however, pointless to infer that "meaning determines reference" because such inference overlooks the fact that Being is always already the **Being-in-the-world**. The world in this unitary phenomenon of "Being-in-the-world" does not refer to a surrounding or an environment considered objectively; or something at which scientists aim their gaze; or a mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that stand there purely as occurrences; but one which is ever-nonobjective to which we are subject as long as we exist from birth to death, where blessing and curse keep us transported into Being. If the interpretative "as" runs the hermeneutic model — **Being-entities-world**, then upon this model, entities encountered by human beings must be **within-the-world**. The **world** is equiprimordial with the **understanding of being**. In Heidegger's phenomenological hermeneutics, such terms as **being**, **understanding**, **meaning**, and **world** are always already co-original and interdependent. As a being-in-the-world, the translator is of course within the framework expounded by Heidegger's analytics of the human being. What translators can do only intensifies their being-in-the-world. Therefore, enlightened with that framework, we should be more transparent not merely with the existential states of translators but also with the essence of **translational restitution**, because **the conditions of**

possibility of translation are at the same time conditions of possibility of entities to be translated.

Our treatise proceeds as follows.

Chapter One outlines current translation studies, our object, rationale and objectives of the present research.

Chapters Two and Three make a review of the relevant literature. Because Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is applied to translation studies under the phenomenological point of view for the first time, it is necessary to make it on a safe ground with relevant materials at hand. We try to find out the relevant materials to bridge Heidegger and the topic of the present thesis. In particular, our efforts have been made in exploring Heideggerian senses of understanding and interpretation with a view to demonstrating how essential or fundamental they are in translational restitution.

Chapter Four inquires into the problem of commensurability through reflections on Heidegger's conception of phenomenology as compared with the relevant theories involving Sperber & Wilson, and Gutt. The commensurability between Heidegger and Sperber & Wilson phenomenologically embodies, first of all, in Heideggerian senses of understanding and interpretation what are equiprimordial with the human being's practical existence. Sperber & Wilson's **communication theory** — a theory about how the human language is used by the human being in the practical world — is ultimately founded upon Heideggerian senses of understanding and interpretation. Like Heideggerian senses of understanding and interpretation, it is not concerned primarily with the lingual users' know-what; it is concerned, first of all, with know-how — the human being's capability of how to understand and interpret in a lingually constructed world or a system of lingual Relations. In Heidegger's view, a human is such a being as understands and speaks. The conceptions of understanding and interpretation in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology refer to nothing but the entire scope of

ability, competence, or know-how rather than know-what. Gutt, largely based upon Sperber & Wilson's communication theory, firmly holds that translation is just a mode of communication; and accordingly he believes that translation studies must be presupposed by the Relevance Theory of Communication and Cognition. In his view, the act of translation is nothing more than a subset or hyponymy of communication. But communication ontologically exists in Discourse — the constitutive agency for communication. Therefore the most primordial “home” of Gutt's **explanatory translation theory** is ultimately found in the human understanding of being built up with language “the house of being”, a home in which man dwells.

Chapter Five examines Heidegger's phenomenological method in translatology. As a method, Heidegger's phenomenology is not merely circular but also ontological in character. It is the most fundamental interpretative method which ontologically discloses the existential conditions of our understanding something *as* something. Since “to interpret is to translate” (Palmer, 1969: 26), the idea can be reasonably applied to translation studies. In fact, the phenomenological slogan “To the things themselves!” in the last analysis, is to the “**being of understanding**” of the human being whose existence is **being-in-the-world**.

Chapter Six ponders on translation being a process of restitution in Heideggerian sense of hermeneutic phenomenology. Whatever it is, or no matter how it is done, translation can only be the **process of restitution of the meaning of the being** generated and accomplished by explicitly actualizing the interpretative (hermeneutic) structure of something *as* something.

Chapter Seven applies the author's view on faithfulness to translation studies. Faithfulness is not a property that can be added to or removed categorically, but it existentially characterizes the “**understanding of being**”, which is the most primordial foundation for

interpretation/translation. We are so faithful in our “**understanding of being**” that without it we simply cannot be as such, as that as we are.

Chapter Eight concludes the whole thesis by putting forward the following remarks: Being-in-the-world is the most basic unity of phenomenon in human existence, and each item of this phenomenon cannot stand alone for a single moment, so much so that the human being is so concrete, ownmost and vivid that it cannot but be called as “Dasein”. Dasein’s translation or interpretation is the restitution of the primary understanding of being, which takes place before the dichotomy between subject and object. So long as translation or interpretation is the restitution of the meaning of being, translation or interpretation must take being-in-the-world as its fundamental ontology. Translation and meaning are not only of freedom but also of transcendence. To be transcendental towards “going to the things themselves” has to abide by the Heidegger’s phenomenology which guarantees our transcendence as the most fundamental existential understanding of being, and thus into the meaningful system of relations characterized by various “in-order-to” and “for-the-sake-of”. Through the restitution of the primary understanding of being in a way in which the interpretative “as-structure” of the primary understanding is made explicitly and thematically is the phenomenological “going to the things themselves”. Only with this attitude to the relationship between human beings and the world can our lifeworld be existentially disclosed as such and such in the sense of Laozi’s “Dwelling with the being of darkness while understanding the being of thatness and whatness” (知其白守其黑).

**Key Words:** phenomenology; translation; restitution; the as-structure; Heidegger

## 摘 要

整体上来说,本论文是从存在本体论层面上对翻译研究进行的一次现象学探讨。依据海德格尔的诠释现象学,把所谓的“现象学工作方法”应用到翻译学领域不仅需要从新的视角把翻译研究纳入“思”的轨道,还需要对翻译研究中一些挥之不去的概念进行破解。此处的破解不是把过去埋葬而是设法弄清形成这些概念的本源性条件,因此破解的意义是积极的、建设性的,而它的负面效应则是边缘的和附带的。此两项要求不仅一致而且互为条件。转换翻译研究的视角,其前提在于澄清翻译可行的条件,而要澄清翻译可行的条件又必须以转换翻译研究的视角为前提。质言之,二者都与如何探讨“是”的意义有着紧密的关系;然而问题的核心在于:只有在如何探讨“是”的意义框架内,翻译可行的条件才能在本体论意义上对其进行现象学的探讨。在海德格尔的“人之存在-本体论剖析”指导下,我们发现人之为人在于其实现自身的唯一方式——“是的理解”上。这个“是的理解”其存在论的特征是:“永远已经是循环的或者说是还原的”。“永远已经是循环的或者说是还原的”,从结构上看,就是海德格尔所谓的不仅使前理解成为可能而且使其派生的解释/翻译及其各式各样的“知”成为可能的“如如”诠释学结构。在海德格尔看来,人没有本质只有存在;而存在的意义又仅仅在于“那是”或者说“将是”。因此,概而言之,人之为人就是“能够是其所是”。理解是人“能够是其所是”的存在之是;而之所以如此,是因为是本身能够在其自身中揭示出能(那)是什么。但是,是总是某一实体的是,因此,在人的是与实体的是之间必然存在着对应关系,前者总是决定着后者并使后者如其所是。但如果据此推出“意义决定所指”那就不得要领,因为这样的推理忽略了是总是已经是-在-世界。在这同为一体的

现象“是-在-世界”中,“世界”不是客观意义上的周围和环境;也不是科学家注目的对象;也不是由就是在那的可数或不可数、熟悉和不熟悉的东西聚集而成;而是人一出生只要其生死荣辱总在是中就隶属的、向来都不曾客观的世界。如果解释的“如如”其诠释的模式是是-实体-世界,那么在这个模式中我们所能够遇到的一切实体尽在世界之内。世界与是之理解同生共源。在海德格尔的现象学诠释中,此类术语如是、理解、意义和世界总是同源共在。译者作为是-在世界,自然处在由海德格尔对人的存在-本体论分析所阐明的框架内。译者之所为只能是加强其是-在世界。是故,如果能够以此框架所示,我们不仅能够对译者存在的状况更加透明,而且还会对翻译可行的条件更加透明,因为,翻译可行的条件同时就是翻译之实体可行的条件。

本论文结构如下:

第一章概述当前的翻译研究及本文的研究对象、研究理据、和研究目的。

第二、三章是文献综述。因为海德格尔诠释现象学是在现象学关照下首次应用到翻译研究中,所以有必要从现有资料中为其找到切实可行的依据。我们试着用这些资料把海德格尔嫁接到本文主题上来。我们着力探讨海德格尔的理解与解释观,目的在于证明它们在翻译还原这一主题上存在的内在性或者说根本性。

第四章通过反思海德格尔现象学概念,我们试图证明这些概念与文献中出现的概念之间所具有的通约性问题;这涉及素珀尔和威尔森、卡特的关联理论与海德格尔现象学之间的比较研究。海德格尔与素珀尔和威尔森之间的通约性首先体现在与人同生共源的海德格尔的理解与解释观中。素珀尔和威尔森的交际理论即语言在实际生活中如何使用的理论最终奠基于海德格尔的理解与解释观。像海德格尔的理解与解释现象学一样,素珀尔和威尔森的交际理论首先不是关心语言使用者“知道什么”(所知)而是关心“如何知道”(能知)——在这一语言构成的世界或者语言关系中人是如何能够理解和解释的。在海德格尔看来,人是理解和说话的存在。理解和解释在海德格尔的诠释现象学中指的就是能力、能够、如何能够(能知)而

不是指能够什么(所知)。卡特的翻译关联理论或者说解释翻译理论其主要依据是素珀尔和威尔森的交际理论,因此,它最本源的“家园”仍是海德格尔的“是之理解”——这一人类栖居的家园,它以语言是“存在之家”建筑而成。

第五章考察海德格尔现象学方法在翻译学中的意义。就方法论而言,海德格尔现象学在本质上不仅是循环的而且是本体的。它是最为本源的解释方法,该方法在本体论上揭示如(是)其所是理解的存在论条件。因为“解释就是翻译”,所以海德格尔现象学方法理所应当能够应用于翻译研究。事实上,现象学口号“回到事情本身”就是回到存在——是-在-世界的人的“是之理解”上来。

第六章用海德格尔诠释现象学论述翻译是还原的观点。不论如何去翻译也不论翻译叫做什么,翻译都无法逃离对“是的意义”的还原;而还原的产生和完成就是“如如”的诠释学结构实现明晰化的过程。

第七章以本文作者对翻译忠实的存在论理解来尝试性地还原翻译忠实之本相。忠实不是范畴论中可以附加或者去除的一种属性,它是对解释/翻译的最本源的根据“是之理解”在存在论上的刻写。我们是如此忠实于自己的“是之理解”,以至于舍此我们将无法“如(是)其所是”。

第八章以“余论”总结全文。人生于世就是一个最为本体的存在论整体,其中的每一个构件都与整体须臾不可分离,以至于人的存在就是那么的生动、具体,只好以“此在”或者“缘在”或者“亲在”等相称之。这样的“此在”本身就是一个循环还原结构,它永远已经是以“如如”的诠释现象学的形式对自己的人生于世的存在论境遇进行着最为本己的当下的理解(领会)和解释(翻译)。这种存在论循环的“如如”解释学结构正是本论在翻译视角下探讨的翻译还原的存在论现象学。以存在论的内在性看待翻译虽然并不否定传统的主客二分的外在性对翻译研究所做的大量工作,但它能为翻译研究提供最为广泛的,也是最为本体的存在论基础,因为它是对“回到事情本身”的一种最好的回应。我们常以主客二分的思维模式或者人生态度对待“我”之外的万事万物,这种彼此互为外在关系的确立尽管推动了

科技日新月异地向前发展,但它却不自然地或人为地破坏了人与万事万物本不分离、本是相通相容的自然的内在关系。这种自然科学的认知和追求方式不适合人文学科的探讨和研究,因为,在人文学科中“回到事情本身”就是“回到 是-在-世界”这个永远已经是有着关联指引的意义的世界上来。是故,超越主客二分回到万物一体不仅是向着人生于世的最为本源的回归,而且更是在当下科学认知为主导的思维方式中向着人生审美境界的超越。翻译是自由也是超越,是向着“如(是)其所是”的意义世界的超越,这种向着“回到事情本身”的超越又必须依着“如如”的诠释学结构在海氏现象学还原中使得本源的是-在-世界的领会或者理解以意义的形式明晰化和主体化,如是,我们的生活世界便可以以老子所言“知其白守其黑”的存在本体论来“如(是)其所是”地揭示之。

关键词:现象学;翻译;还原;“如如”诠释学结构;海德格尔



## Abbreviations for Major Works Cited

### Carman

HA *Heidegger's Analytic*

### Gadamer

TM *Truth and Method*

### Gutt

TR *Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context*

### Heidegger

IM *An Introduction to Metaphysics*

BP *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

BW *Basic Writings*

BT *Being and Time*

DT *Discourse on Thinking*

EB *Existence and Being*

OT *Off the Beaten Track*

PT *Poetry, Language, Thought*

### Inwood

HD *A Heidegger Dictionary*

### Lafont

HW *Heidegger, Language, and World-disclosure*

### Long

EL *English Literature*

### Sperber & Wilson

RC *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*