双语

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

美国外交政策

兼论美国对华政策与西藏问题AMERICAN CHINA POLICY AND TIBET ISSUE

程早霞 编著

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美国外交政策

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内容简介

全书由上下两编组成。上编为美国外交政策,全部为英文,覆盖了有关美国外交政策的主要理论观点与重大外交实践案例,所采集资料皆为美国外交政策研究专著中的代表之作,基本反映了美国学界对这一课程教学与研究的最新成果。下编为美国对华政策与西藏问题,所采纳之资料全部为本人最近几年的研究成果,部分成果曾分别发表于有关的学术期刊如《中国藏学》、《中国边疆史地研究》、《外交学院学报》等杂志上,重点探究了美国插手西藏问题的来龙去脉,美国情报机构、美国国会等插手西藏问题的方式方法及本质所在。

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前 言

自二战结束至今,美国一直占据着世界首强的宝座。其牢固的地位至少在今后二三十年内无一国可以撼动。自然,美国成为包括中国在内的世界各国最重要的外交对象国。我们要认识这个世界、认识其频繁互动的复杂的国际关系,应该了解美国,研究美国的外交政策。

美国的外交决策拥有复杂的运作机制。总统与国会是外交政策的主角,同时媒体、公共舆论及利益集团等的影响深刻渗透其中。

从历史上华盛顿首倡的孤立主义,到上个世纪之交的门户开放机会均等,直至第一次世界大战后的威尔逊主义、第二次世界大战后的杜鲁门主义,美国对外战略的演变不但反应了美国从地区大国走向世界舞台及至成为世界首强的历史脉络,而且明显渗透着成为其立国之本的民主原则对美国外交决策的重要影响。

《美国外交政策——兼论美国对华政策与西藏问题》一书由上下两编组成。上编为美国外交政策(American Foreign Policy),全部为英文,覆盖了有关美国外交政策的主要理论观点与重大外交实践案例。第一章,美国外交历史概览;第二章,美国外交政策政治学;第三章,美国卷入全球事务、冷战开始;第四章,冷战的教训与遗产;第五章,古巴导弹危机。所采集资料皆为美国外交政策研究专著中的代表之作,基本反映了美国学界这一课程教学与研究的最新成果。下编为美国对华政策与西藏问题(American China Policy and Tibet Issue)。在中美关系的三 T(Trade, Taiwan, Tibet)问题中,西藏问题是国内学界相关研究领域中最为薄弱的一环,但由于西藏所处之地理位置的重要性,西藏问题本身所具有的复杂性

及藏独势力在美国的活动与影响不断上升等因素,西藏问题日益 成为中美关系发展中一个重要而敏感的政治问题。自 1998 年始, 笔者一直致力于美国对华政策与西藏问题的研究。其中部分研究 成果为国内学界相关专题的拓荒探索,曾分别发表于有关的学术 期刊如《中国藏学》、《中国边疆史地研究》、《外交学院学报》等杂志 上。第一章,美国对华政策历史概览;第二章,美国插手西藏问题 历史探源:第三章,美国中央情报局与中国西藏:第四章,美国国会 与中国西藏;第五章,美国学界关于美国对华政策与西藏问题的研 究。所采集资料全部为作者最近几年在"美国对华政策与西藏问 题"这一研究领域的最新研究成果,主要依据美国政府解密的对外 关系文件及美国学者的研究成果,比较完整的再现了美国插手西 藏问题的历史概貌,从中可以进一步了解美国插手西藏问题的方 式、方法与战略意图,进而深刻领会中美关系的复杂性及西藏问题 在中美关系中的敏感性与重要性。读罢此书,读者们会不难理解 为什么美国的总统访问中国要大谈中国的西藏问题,为什么达赖 喇嘛那么热衷于访问美国,为什么美国的国务院要设立一位西藏 问题特别协调员。在最后的附录中,选编了一些有关美国外交政 策、中美关系及西藏问题的重要文件:美国独立宣言、华盛顿告别 演说、中美三个联合公报及解决西藏问题的十七条协议。为了帮 助读者理解,此部分文献全部为英中文对照。

美国与中国,这两个重要的世界大国,由于综合国力、历史传统与所处的地理位置截然不同,而形成了截然不同的外交与安全理念。美国,位于东西两洋之间,浩瀚的太平洋与大西洋成为其保护自身安全的天然屏障,南北是两个与之友好且实力相对弱得多的邻邦。自从美利坚合众国成立至今,二百多年的历史对于美国来说几乎没有一场发生在本土且具有真正失败意义的大战。2002年美国的 GDP 总量达 104 462 亿美元,约占全球经济总量的 28%,军事上,美国 2003 年的国防开支超过 4 000 亿美元,比俄、中、意、英、法、德、日等七个大国军事开支总和的 2 倍还多。贸易的全球

化使美国的利益在全球之内无所不在。而中国,则是一个有着多达十五个陆地邻国的国家,在中华人民共和国成立之前的近百年时间里,曾有多达十几个国家对它进行过野蛮侵略,邻国中不乏世界级大国与地区强国。中国把国家自身的统一与繁荣作为头等大事,认为自身面临的最紧迫安全问题是在边界线上和边境之内。而美国则认为它的安全问题是在国外。正如一位美国学者所言:"美国军队是在远离国土千里之外的世界各地巡逻,中国军队操心的却是抗衡人侵……"正因为中美国情差异如此之大,我们才特别需要认真研究美国的政治外交运作机制。

目前在大学的课堂里进行社会科学课程的双语教学还是一个尝试,编写一本具有一定学术水准的双语教材也是一个尝试,包括对中美关系与西藏问题的研究也是刚刚开始起步。既然是尝试就会有不完善的地方,期待并欢迎来自各方面善意的批评与指导。对于那些关心、支持、帮助我的前辈、领导、老师、同事,我表示衷心的感谢。

作 者

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上编 美国外交政策

Chapter 1

America's Traditions in Foreign Policy

Politics, at its roots, deals with values and value differences among individuals, groups, and nations. Various definitions of the term politics attest to the central place that values play in political life. Political scientist Harold Lasswell has written, for example, that politics "is the study of influence and the influential..... The influentials are those who get the most of what there is to get." What there is to get, Lasswell continued, is values, such as "deference, income, and safety." Drawing upon Aristotle and Max Weber, Robert Dahl notes that what seems to be common across different definitions of politics is that they deal with values such as power, rule, and authority. David Easton's famous definition of politics is even more explicit in its assessment of the relationship between politics and values: "Politics is the authoritative allocation of values." According to this definition, authority structures (e.g., governments) distribute something, and that something is values.

Values refer to "modes of conduct and end-states of existence" that guide people's lives. They are "abstract ideals" which serve as an "imperative" for action. Further, values are viewed as "goods" (not in a material, but in an ethical sense) that ought to be obtained or maintained by a person or a society. In the Declaration of Independence, for instance,

the values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were explicitly stated as reasons for creating the United States. These values, moreover, came to serve as guides to political action in the earliest days of the nation. Indeed, such values have remained important to this day. Liberty, or freedom, is emphasized again and again by American political leaders as one value that differentiates this nation from so many others.

1. Values, Beliefs, and Foreign Policy

Because the essence of politics is so closely related to achieving and maintaining particular values, the analysis of values and beliefs is a deliberate choice as the organizing theme for studying the foreign policy of the United States. Further, since values and beliefs are the motivating forces for individual action—and because we shall make the assumption that foreign policy is ultimately the result of individual decisions—their importance for foreign policy analysis becomes readily apparent. Thus, by identifying the values and beliefs that American society fosters, we ought to be in a good position to understand how they have shaped our actions toward the rest of the world.

Social psychologists have provided an important analysis of the relationships among values, beliefs, and the behavior of individuals. Milton Rokeach defines beliefs as propositions "inferred from what a person says or does" and whose content "may describe an object or situation as true or false; evaluate it as good or bad; or advocate a certain course of action as desirable or undesirable." Individuals thus may have numerous beliefs, but some are more central than others in accounting for their behavior. These core beliefs are values. As Rokeach notes, "A value is a type of belief, centrally located within one's total belief system, about how one ought, or ought not, to behave, or about some end state of existence worth, or not worth, attaining." Although these values are likely to be few

in number, they are crucial in understanding the attitudes and behaviors that an individual expresses. By extension, then, nation-states would operate in the same way, since ultimately individuals comprise them.

The use of values and beliefs (or "ideas," as Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane recently called them) as our organizing scheme and focusing on nations and individuals contrasts with other principal models of analysis offered in recent years: the rational actor model, the organizational process model, and the governmental or bureaucratic politics model. While each of these models has something to offer in helping us analyze foreign policy, none of them focuses sufficiently on the role of values and beliefs.

The rational actor model, for example, begins with the assumption that nations (like individuals) are self-interested and seek to maximize their payoffs (or outcomes) when making foreign policy decisions. In this model, the key to understanding foreign policy is to identify the policy preferences and their rank-ordering for a state. From a values perspective, however, the source of individual preferences and the relative ordering of those preferences have not been well explored. The organizational process model focuses more on identifying the decision-making routines by policy makers. As a result, foreign policy behavior is less the result of clear choices and more a function of organizations following standing operating procedures. In large measure, the values and beliefs of the policy makers are assumed and not fully analyzed. The bureaucratic politics model gives some attention to the role of values and beliefs (since each bureaucracy has institutional beliefs that it is seeking to maximize), but the primary explanatory focus is on the competition among the bureaucracies, based upon relative power and influence. Once again, though, the roles of values and beliefs within the bureaucracies are not brought into sharp focus. In this sense, while these foreign policy models have much to offer (and careful readers will note that we will use them in various ways throughout the book), an initial focus upon values and beliefs will enable us to provide a more complete picture for understanding the decisions made by American foreign policy makers.

(1) Some Cautions with This Approach

There are some potential difficulties in focusing on values and beliefs and in assuming a direct analogy between individuals and nation-state behavior in analyzing American foreign policy. First, other factors such as the idiosyncratic personality traits of some leaders, the dynamics of the bureaucratic environment, and the restraints of the governmental process will intrude on any complete identification of a nation's values and beliefs. While recognizing these factors and the wealth of research that has gone into their analysis by others, we contend that the role of underlying values and beliefs remains critically important and should not be overlooked in foreign policy analysis.

Even accepting this position, a second reason raises doubts about using this kind of values perspective: The very definition of national values is likely to be problematic. Whose values are we to identify? Should they be the values of political leaders or the public at large? With both the public and the elite, the array of values in a pluralist society is considerable, ranging from religiously based to more secularly driven values. While our analysis will focus primarily on particular values held by the political elites, the values and beliefs of the public, by necessity, will also be considered and examined as well.

A third caution in using the values approach to the study of American foreign policy is potentially more troubling. By focusing on values and beliefs, and using them as the basis for explaining U.S. foreign policy, we are close to relying on the national character (or, more generally, the political culture) explanation of behavior. As A. F. K.

Organski has asserted, the national character approach makes several key assumptions:

① that the individual citizens of a nation share a common psychological make-up or personality or value system that distinguishes them from the citizens of other nations, ② that this national character persists without major changes over a relatively long period of time, and ③ that there is a traceable relationship between individual character and national goals.

Such assumptions are very difficult to make. Thus, there are limitations to the national character approach as a meaningful explanation of foreign policy, and it cannot be relied on completely. Its use in a more limited sense to identify the "basic attitudes, beliefs, values, and value orientations" of a society as a beginning point for analysis is appropriate, however, since individuals (and hence, nations) make decisions within the context of a particular array of values and beliefs.

(2) Some Rationales for This Approach

Although we acknowledge and recognize these limitations, we believe that this values approach is a sufficiently useful first step to warrant more coverage than it has received. Moreover, our analysis will not contend that certain values and beliefs do not change, although surely some principles are less changeable (and hence permanent) than others. Rather, we shall assess the changes in value emphasis and their consistency, especially in the past five decades, when the United States has been an active and continuing participant in the global arena.

Beyond the utility of the values approach to analyzing the foreign policy of any nation, it is especially germane to the study of American foreign policy for at least three additional reasons. First, the nation was explicitly founded on particular sets of values, and these values made the United States view itself as "different" (or "exceptional") from the nations of the Old World from which it originated. In this view, politics was not to be conducted upon the principles of power politics, but it was to be conducted on the basis of democratic principles. In the view of many, then, America should act in the world only on the basis of moral principles or in defense of such principles. Domestic values, at all times, were to be the guide to political behavior. Whether the United States lived up to these standards is debatable, but the inevitable desire to justify actions within a value context emphasizes the role of such principles as guides to U.S. foreign policy.

Second, since some American values toward international affairs have changed in recent years, an understanding of these changes is especially important for U.S. foreign policy analysis. As we shall discuss, America has moved from its isolationist past to an active globalism in the post-World War II years. Indeed, a particular set of values, often labeled the Cold War consensus, came to dominate the motivations of American policy actions from the late 1940s to at least the middle 1960s. In the post-Vietnam period (roughly 1973 and beyond), the value orientation of the various American administrations toward the world has changed a number of times-from the realism of the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford years, to the idealism of the Carter term, and back to the Cold War values of the Reagan administration. With the beginning of the "end of the Cold War" and with the onset of the post-Cold War years of the Clinton administration, American foreign policy values have again been undergoing change-with a new focus on selective global engagement and the promotion of democracy. With such discernible shifts throughout the recent history of U.S. foreign policy and the current searching for a definitive set of foreign policy values today, a knowledge of both past value approaches

and their policy implications is important as the United States looks toward the twenty-first century.

Third, the lack of a foreign policy consensus at either the elite or mass levels in American society today further invites the use of a values approach. According to several national surveys, none of the foreign policy approaches of the post-Vietnam era has been fully embraced by the American public or its leaders. Both the public at large and the American leadership are divided as to the appropriate set of values to guide American policy for the future.

Finally, as we have noted, there have been efforts lately by analysts to reincorporate the role of values into the study of foreign policy and foreign policy decision making. Two well-known political scientists, Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffmann, have written works assessing how ethical values may be or should be incorporated into international politics, generally, and particularly into foreign policy calculations. Even more recently, another analyst, through a careful review of several cases in the twentieth century, has sought to demonstrate the moral and ethical considerations that have been evident in American foreign policy.

In this first chapter, then, we begin our analysis by sketching the historical values and beliefs of American society and then suggest how they have influenced our foreign policy toward the rest of the world, especially in the first century and a half of the nation.

2. The United States: A New Democratic State

Numerous scholars have noted that the United States was founded upon values that were different from those of the rest of the world. It was to be a democratic nation in a world governed primarily by monarchies and autocracies. Indeed, according to one historian, America's founders "didn't just want to believe that they were involved in a sordid little revolt on the

fringes of the British Empire or of European civilization. They wanted to believe they were coming up with a better model, ...a better way for human beings to form a government that would be responsive to them." Thomas Jefferson stated this view best when he described the new American state as "the solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights... the sole depositary of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence." Because of its democratic value emphasis, moreover, America developed with the belief that its society was unique and possessed a set of values worthy of emulation by others. In this sense, the country emerged as a deeply ideological society (although Americans do not readily admit it), and as one not always tolerant of those who hold contrary views.

(1) A Free Society

In 1776 the United States was explicitly conceived in liberty and equality in contrast to other nations, where ascription and privilege were so important. It emerged as an essentially free society in a world that stressed authority and order. This new American state, to a large measure, was dynamic, classless, and free, in contrast to Europe, which was largely class-bound and restrictive. (Revolutionary France does not fit this description, but "classbound and restrictive" certainly describes politics under the Concert of Europe, the European power arrangement dominated by the conservative regimes of Prussia, Russia, and Austria after the defeat of Napoleon.) Thus, the American Revolution was fought in defiance of the very principles by which Europe was governed. In this sense, there developed a natural aversion to European values—and foreign politics—which further reinforced America's beliefs in its own uniqueness.

The fundamental American beliefs that were perceived to be so different from European values of the time can be summarized in the