

中国园林 古典神庙 法国花园

法国启蒙时期的自由观

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南开大学出版社

中国园林，古典神庙，法国花园： 法国启蒙时期的自由观

Chinese Gardens, Antique Temples, the Désert de Retz:
The Concept of Freedom in Enlightenment France

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前 言

当今世界，自由绝对是个时髦词汇，大至国际动荡、政权更迭，小到人际交往、穿衣戴帽，都可套用自由的观念来品评解说。然而，自由如此紧密地渗入我们的生活只是现代之后的事。此前，即便在西方，无论是古希腊罗马时期，还是之后的中世纪甚至文艺复兴时期，自由只是依附于政治、宗教等重大议题的小小注脚，时常被顺带提及，却鲜有专门论述。自由概念的真正形成是在启蒙运动时期。彼时的欧洲，教会式微，皇权岌岌，社会各阶层人人思变，各种新问题新矛盾亟待破解，自由的观念遂被推到前台。

换言之，塑形国际政治、社会运动、文化思潮等的主要力量。作为现代社会的开端，启蒙运动是自由概念的形成期，对启蒙自由的理解有助于厘清自由的历史演进与意义内涵。目前，对启蒙自由的探讨多从政治、法制等角度着眼，而跨学科、多维度的分析并不多见。同时，在全球化背景下重新审视自由，也需要以跨文化的视角来思考其他文明对西方现代自由观的影响。《中国园林，古典神庙，法国花园：法国启蒙时期的自由观》正是沿循该思路的一个有趣尝试。

本书着眼于启蒙时期法国园林的典型之作，从分析花园入手，从文化、社会、政治、哲学等多个层面展开论述，考察了异域文明与古典文明影响下，法国启蒙时期自由观的内涵与外延。第一章介绍了该花园与园主的基本情况，尤其关注其在当时社会文化中的地位与作用。第二章分析了启蒙时期法国的文化潮流与美学思想，凸显了文化讨论背后的社会认识变革。第三至第五章是本书的主体，分析了法国启蒙自由观的三个主要特点，即借鉴古典与中国元素来彰显人的自然心性，通过“全时空”策略来强调实用性，以及将古典与异域文明他者化所体现的以现代欧洲为中心的本质。本书的整

体逻辑脉络是：该花园反映出当时法国园林的显著特点，这些特点由启蒙时期法国的文化潮流与社会思潮决定，体现出法国知识界在政治与哲学层面关于自由的根本性思考。

本书在分析视角、研究方法、论证过程等方面具有几大特色。首先，本书通过文化艺术创作来探讨政治哲学课题。由于其在政治、法律和国际关系中的重要地位，学界在探讨自由时多从其政治涵义与斗争、法律实施与沿革、国际现实困境等方面入手，少有通过文化艺术创作来探讨自由观念的尝试。本书从文化角度考察哲学政治理念，从看似松散的联系中剥丝抽茧，廓清了文化、社会和政治哲学等不同层面之间的互动关系，从中提取了法国启蒙自由观的核心要素，通过揭示艺术创作所承载的政治思想与哲学理念，全方位展示自由观念形成期的社会文化与政治哲学图景。这对既有的政治、法律视角是一个重要而有益的补充。第二，以跨文化视角考察西方核心理念，凸显了不同时期、不同地域的文明对法国启蒙自由观的塑形作用。启蒙时期，古典文明和世界其他文明与欧洲间的接触已经非常广泛而频繁，在社会的方方面面都留下了显著的印记。本书从异域文明与古典文明对自由观念形成的影响角度来审视启蒙自由观，丰富了以往主要以西方视角来考察西方观念的做法，凸显了他在形成西方自由观念中起到的关键性作用，扩展了讨论视野，呈现出西方自由观的形成不是一个封闭过程，而是西方与其他文明互动的结果，这也更符合历史本身的发展情况。第三，本书用跨学科方法进行综合分析。为更全面地呈现法国启蒙自由观，本书广泛采用多种学科的研究方法，将建筑、美学、戏剧、社会学、哲学等领域的方法综合运用，多角度、全方位展现了法国启蒙时期的文化政治图景，使论证更全面、更具说服力，体现了专业性与科学性。

Contents

Introduction / 1

1. Significance of Research / 1
2. Content, Research Questions and Methodology / 2
3. The Metamorphosis of Freedom as a Concept / 4
4. Evaluation of French Enlightenment in the 20th Century / 11
5. Désert de Retz: A Garden of All Times and Places / 16

Chapter I Désert de Retz / 26

1. Where Did the Name Come From / 27
2. The Garden: Construction and Features / 30
3. The Owner: Personality and His Circles / 34
4. History of Garden after the French Revolution / 43

Chapter II Changing Tides of Aesthetics / 46

Chapter III Garden of Resurrected Nature and Reconstructed Freedom / 84

1. Désert de Retz: A Garden of Nature / 84
2. Sentimental Representation of Nature as Social Ethos / 99
3. French Philosophical Ideas on Nature and Natural Law / 105
4. The Concept of Freedom in French Enlightenment / 111

Chapter IV Garden of All Times and Places and Useful Freedom / 130

1. Fabriques of All Times and Places / 130
2. Embracing All Times and Places since Mid-18th Century / 147
3. Implication of Changed World View for Freedom / 159

Chapter V Garden of Imagined Otherness and Self-Centered Freedom / 169

1. Historical Other: the Broken Column / 170
2. Geographical Other: the Chinese House / 177
3. Implication of the "Other" for Freedom / 195

Conclusion / 199

Bibliography / 203

Introduction

1. Significance of Research

Since the French rebels cried out thunderous call for freedom as one of man's inalienable natural rights, generations of revolutionaries in repressive circumstances all across the world have fought under its banner and risked their lives to realize it for formerly underprivileged people. Especially in the modern context of internal conflicts, nationalistic surge and international strife, freedom has become a concept that all parties resort to for political justification and moral mobilization, shaping the discourse of modern society and corresponding thoughts about the private, public, cultural and spiritual lives of its people. Standing at the fountainhead of the modern era, the Enlightenment was a critical period when the concept of freedom was defined, analyzed and debated in modern terminology with modern questions directed at modern problems. Such zealous discussion boosted freedom from its once secondary position to leading prominence to rally the attention of the most talented minds of its time and subsequent centuries. Therefore, it is a highly meaningful endeavor to explore the Enlightenment ideas of freedom at our time when the concept permeates every aspect of people's lives.

However, despite the critical role the Enlightenment played in the conceptualization of freedom, pundits in the twentieth century have disagreed, sometimes diametrically, about what to make of the Enlightenment liberal tradition. As will be reviewed later in this chapter, scholars commenced from their own perspectives to examine a variety

of subjects with different analytical emphases and offered a kaleidoscope of theories. What was not fully discussed, however, were the cultural sentiments and artistic expressions that intimately interacted with the intellectual and political domains in which the concept of freedom was heatedly debated in the Enlightenment. Art creation might sometimes be considered an indirect, and therefore non-optimal channel to access an intellectual and political concept, but given the close ties between aristocrats, intellectuals, scientists, artists and politicians in Parisian salons and their frequent visits to private pleasure estates and public performances, it is probable that the diversity of ideas, from political and intellectual to cultural and aesthetic, are all “in the air” so that they were available to everyone in the circle. This assumption of the mutually-reflective nature of the relationship between art creation and intellectual concept is the framing basis of this book.

2. Content, Research Questions and Methodology

This book focuses on the Enlightenment concept of freedom in France by way of interpreting a French picturesque garden which is a typical manifestation of the social and cultural spirits of middle French Enlightenment, and which facilitates understanding of the connotations and features of the concept of freedom. Specifically, the time span is the three decades before the French Revolution, for this was when the ideas of second-generation philosophes were well developed and Enlightenment exerted its most far-reaching influence on a global scale. The focus of observation is a French picturesque garden named Désert de Retz, which can well express the cultural preference of the time and reflect the intellectual thinking that shapes the outlook of the time. The book aims to explore questions concerning the artifact, the interplay between the multiple layers of social life, and the concept of freedom. The specific questions are:

- A Interpretation of the garden
- What are the distinct features of this garden?
 - What are the architectural and aesthetic bases of these features?
 - Can these features find echoes in the social life and conceptualization of freedom during the period under study?

- B Interaction between layers of social life
- What are the possible channels of communication that transmit ideas from all domains?
 - Are there evidences of constant communication across layers? If so, what are they?

- C The concept of freedom in the context under discussion
- What are the connotation and denotation of the concept?
 - What did major players in the intellectual discourse argue about the concept?
 - What are the implications of the similarities and differences between their arguments?
 - What are the implications of these discussions on the philosophes' ideas of freedom for understanding the concept in general?

The book adopts a three-layered structure: analysis of the garden, the cultural ideas reflected in the garden, and the concept of freedom constructed in this cultural background. Each layer is based on findings from the previous one, and elevates the discussion on the garden to the cultural and then the political levels. Given the interdisciplinary nature of this book, a number of methods will be employed in analysis of the garden and subsequent discussions of philosophes' conceptualization of freedom. Hermeneutic reading will be the main approach in interpretation of Désert de Retz, as well as application of architectural principles and garden design theories and semiotic reading of the garden's symbolization paradigm. The book will also analyze key ideas and features of the socio-cultural scenario of the middle French

Enlightenment as are reflected in the hermeneutic reading, and it will discuss their role in the construction of the concept of freedom. Comparison and contrast will also be a frequent method in both the analysis of the garden and cultural and political discussions of freedom.

3. The Metamorphosis of Freedom as a Concept

The desire for freedom stems from the deepest corner of the human heart. Though it did not become a concept of prime concern until the 18th century, thinkers and philosophers have long pondered it since antiquity. For example, Solon's revision of Athenian laws "introduced the idea that a man ought to have a voice in selecting those to whose rectitude and wisdom he is compelled to trust his fortune, his family, and his life", thus "by making every citizen the guardian of his own interest Solon admitted the element of democracy into the State."^① During the Roman period, the influential law book *Institutes* devoted an entry to the definition of liberty, and though the Roman Empire was essentially despotic, it nevertheless issued laws that granted its citizens some basic forms of freedom such as freedom of speech, publication and petition. However, these ancient ideas of freedom are rather spontaneous and vague, serving more as footnotes to discussions on political or legal issues than independent topics claiming special attention. Freedom never became an independent issue in the metaphysical meditations of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. As Acton observed, "The ancients understood the regulation of power better than the regulation of freedom".^② Freedom for antiquity was more a means to other ends than an end in itself, more sparsely mentioned than systematically discussed, and enjoyed more by a few than by many.

^① John Acton, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1967), 7.

^② Ibid. 16.

In the later centuries of the medieval period, scholars disputed over the essence of freedom under basically two banners: reason and will. Disciples of Boethius maintained that man acted with free will after rational judgment concerning what was best for him in the circumstances. Rational deliberation preceded the will's decision to forestall it from becoming mere animal instinct. Therefore, freedom lay in the *liberum iudicium* (free judgment) of reason and was a function of reason. This line of argument was in accordance with Aristotelian theories on meditation and choice and found sympathy among Aristotelian professors. Opposed to these arguments for the supremacy of reason were those for the supremacy of will in explanations of freedom. In an effort to emphasize men's responsibility for their sins, scholars of this school contended that the root cause of sins was not so much the lack of knowledge as the spontaneity of will. A man who wills is the sole cause of his own acts. Therefore, freedom stems from *liberum electionem* (free choice) and is a function of will. This line of argument won support among Augustinian scholars. In his attempt to reconcile the two camps of rival theories, Thomas Aquinas insisted that reason and will were not contradictory but complementary in the metaphysical explanation of freedom. He believed in the existence of some general ends as goals of goodness in God's grand design of the universe. These general ends were decided by the exercise of will and were mainly in the realm of volition. However, the means by which to achieve these ends were multiple, and the exercise of rational judgment is essential to choosing the most desirable means to those ends. This synthetical feature of Aquinas's theory was very well summarized by Gilson: "Like Boethius he will say that an act of free will is a free judgment, but then adds (so to speak,) since it is essentially an act of will willing, not of reason judging. Like Duns Scotus he would readily admit that free will is to be referred essentially to the will... but refuses so to define it without taking into account the judgment of the practical

reason.”^① While defending God’s supremacy in generating the ultimate goodness, this theory also opened up new terrains for the free exercise of human reason. Developments in the political scenario also echoed the upsurge of human reason in theological and metaphysical discussions, notably the promulgation of Magna Carta in 1215. Exacted from King John after a massive revolt against his increasingly objectionable tyranny and political failure, this “great charter” upheld individual liberty in various forms, including political, judicial, and economic liberties for free citizens. Though most power was still preserved for the monarchy under this document, it was nevertheless a big step forward towards civil liberty and disseminated the first seeds of a liberal tradition that was to shape the course of development in England and the western world in centuries to come.

In the 17th century, discussions on freedom intensified and developed towards new directions. The first key phrase for 17th century theories of freedom is human reason. The intellectual dominance of the church crumbled with mounting protest against the priesthood’s neglect of religious matters, horrible revelations of church corruption and endless religious wars. To fill in the intellectual vacuum left by the discredited church and counter the resulting expansion of state power, a new authority, that of man, was earnestly constructed to support individuals’ struggle with the tyranny of the state. Descartes’ ringing claim “I think therefore I am” bequeathed authority to reason as the only reliable source of human existence and cognition. All external impositions, be it religious, political, cultural or social, were disregarded as prejudices that should be inspected and reexamined by human reason. This rationalist confidence in the power of human reason and belief in the infinity of freedom emancipated man from the whims of the church and placed him on an equal footing with the state.

^① Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A. Downes (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1936), 313.

However, despite the revolutionary spirit of Cartesian rationalism that dealt fateful blows at the yokes on individual freedom, its insistence on metaphysics as the roots of human cognition posed a potential threat to the realization of freedom. Knowledge originated from the human mind, from which deductive inquiries were conducted to verify the truth and validity of ideas through self-reflective meditation based on mathematic principles. A system thus constructed was logical and consistent, but the deductive methodology precluded any significant role for experience and tradition in the construction of such a system. Consequently, a political system championing liberty could be highly orderly and uniform, requiring de facto submission of individual feeling and questioning to maintain the consistency of the system. Therefore, its preference for order and logic might reduce the system to its very negation, from liberty protecting to liberty oppressing.

Another key phrase in 17th century theories of freedom is natural right. Different from Cartesian rationalism which emphasized human mind as the origin of cognition, British empiricists looked to the experience of nature as the source of knowledge. Freedom was not an innate idea conceived by the omnipotent mind, but a fact of being in man's natural condition, or a natural right. In Thomas Hobbes' paradigm, "the right of nature... is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature...".^① Since competition was a common state of living, this unfettered natural freedom would inevitably lead to chaos and mutual destruction. To preserve their very existence, men entered into covenant with one another, agreeing voluntarily to transfer all his rights, except the right to life, to a chosen sovereign. The foremost responsibility of the sovereign was to sustain peace and protect the lives of its member contractors, even, and possibly, at the expense of individual liberty.

① Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 103.

Consequently, “the contract doctrine was capable of taking forms which justified tyranny”, for when citizens handed over all rights to a sovereign who was beyond the checks of the contract, he “necessarily acquired unlimited authority”.^① John Locke agreed with Hobbes that liberty, together with life and property, was a natural right. Yet different from Hobbes’ deplorable image of man’s natural state as a state of war, that natural state for Locke was a happy one, where men exercised their liberty and equality rationally. The major evil, however, was that each man was the judge in his own cause, which might lead to potential conflicts. A feasible solution to this evil was a political government, which men contracted to create and to which they transferred their rights voluntarily. Citizens should yield to the will of the government, but, contrary to Hobbes’ *Leviathan* which had unchallenged power over its subjects, in Locke’s scheme of government, beyond the power of the state “there remains still *in the People a Supream Power* to remove or *alter the Legislative*” when it failed to protect “the Liberties and Properties of the Subject.”^② By extending natural right status to property and liberty to the political scenario, Locke provided theoretical legitimacy for the American and French revolutions that revolted against oppression for the sake of, among other objectives, liberty.

During the Enlightenment the French philosophes’ contribution to the development of freedom lay not so much in innovative theoretical breakthroughs as in successful dissemination of this idea to the public and active application to moral and political struggles. Proudly inheriting a rationalist tradition and immensely interested in British empiricist arguments, French philosophes synthesized the two philosophical approaches with their newly acquired scientific outlook

① Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 630.

② John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, 2nd ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 385.

and promoted this “rational empiricism” to their own country and beyond. What might be attributed to French originality was their development of freedom from the philosophical level to the judicial and political level. Voltaire defined freedom as a right that depends on nothing but the law,^① and in his admiration of the religious and political toleration in England, he passionately introduced the historical evolution and functioning mechanism of the English parliament and government to his countrymen.^② In a more professional vein, Montesquieu defined liberty as “a right of doing whatever the laws permit, and if a citizen could do what they forbid he would be no longer possessed of liberty, because all his fellow-citizens would have the same power.”^③ It then followed that the best device to protect liberty was just laws and sound political systems to pass and administer these laws, a belief which propelled Montesquieu to envision the innovative separation of powers that was earnestly instituted by new democracies, beginning with the United States. Meanwhile, readers of Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of Laws* will probably discern his preference for order and balance. For Montesquieu, a sound political system was not a novel creation of revolution but a product of historical evolution, which, during the process of modification, arrived at order and balance that ensured the proper functioning of that system. Therefore, he was against drastic social changes, for they would destroy the order and balance so difficultly achieved and wreck an effective government. This emphasis on order might be his tactic to avoid head-on clashes with the powerful state,^④ but in general this liking for balance and the maintenance of

① Voltaire, *Oeuvres Complete de Voltaire*, vol. 23. (Paris: Garnier, 1879), 526.

② Voltaire, *Philosophical Letters*, trans. Ernest Dilworth (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1961), 30-38.

③ Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*, trans. Thomas Nugent (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914), 150.

④ Thomas Pangle, *Montesquieu’s Philosophy of Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 14.

order was evident in many of his writings. Similar arguments can be said of Voltaire, who, though widely recognized as a champion for freedom against religious and political oppression, still cherished the idea of an enlightened despot, who regulated an orderly government to advance social welfare, as the ideal form of government.

After Voltaire and Montesquieu, second generation philosophes also offered synthetic conceptions of polity in general and freedom in particular. Rousseau's love for nature and its indispensable role in man's unity with God and pursuit of freedom is too well-known to be wanting a reiteration here, but what is more tempting about his political thought is its resemblance to the Cartesian argument in terms of methodology and metaphysical solution. Rousseau shunned experience and social customs as corrupting forces on man's freedom and resorted to an imaginative origin of human history from where man's conditions and characteristics were reasoned out deductively. Also, to regain genuine freedom, Rousseau prescribed a contracted polity ruled by the Sovereignty which was by definition righteous and just and to which citizens should always yield their individual will. Once citizens delegated their rights to the Sovereignty, exertions of individual rights that might disrupt the political order would jeopardize the basis of the state and should be punished. Other philosophes such as Diderot and d'Alembert also wrote extensively on the subject of personal liberty. It was after the ardent promotion and active application of French Enlightenment that freedom was finally enshrined in the intellectual discourse as a fundamental concept inviting constant visitation and intense discussion. Whatever their evaluation of philosophes' arguments, scholars of philosophy and political economy in later centuries build their theories of freedom on these arguments and address the issue in terminology not surprisingly different from those used by the philosophes.