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袁易明 著

# 平等

## 效率的替代与选择

XIAOLÜ DE TIDAI YU XUANZE

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THE TRADE-OFF & CHOICE OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY

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## 内容提要

所有制改革是中国经济体制改革的重要内容。本书旨在探讨中国现行所有制结构对“效率优先、兼顾平等”原则的适应性，并在效率-平等框架内寻找所有制结构调整的途径。本研究的主要内容包括：中国所有制结构变动趋势；中国经济的技术效率和影响技术效率的因素；中国社会收入分配的差距和所有制对收入分配差距变动的影响；中国经济运行效率与收入分配平等性的替代关系；所有制结构变动的福利效应。

本书具有创新意义的成果主要有以下几点：

1. 1981~1998年间，中国所有制结构变动以国有经济和集体经济的公有经济内部调整为主要内容，公有经济与非公有经济的结构调整速度缓慢。所有制结构变动呈较大的差异性：基础领域的国有垄断与制造业、批发零售贸易业的多元经济成份；中西部相对于东部、北部相对于南部所有制改革滞后。

2. 将一般生产函数 (Average Production Function) 和随

机边界生产函数的 Cobb-Douglas 函数形式以及受限转移对数函数形式用于中国经济运行技术效率的估计, 通过 OLS (Ordinary Least Square) 和 ML (Maximum Likelihood) 两种拟合技术对上述生产函数的参数进行估计, 再通过对误差项的“两项”分解(正态分布项和半正态分布项)估计技术效率, 并进一步分析了中国经济增长的来源。

1952~1959 年中国经济的平均技术效率为 0.766, 1960~1969 年为 0.765, 1970~1979 年为 0.75, 1980~1989 年和 1990~1999 年分别为 0.793 和 0.822。计划经济时期(1952~1977 年)为 0.762, 改革时期(1978~1999 年)为 0.801。

1981~1990 年, 中国经济增长的 64% 的贡献来自物质投入要素的增长, 36% 的贡献来自综合要素生产率的增长。1991~1999 年, 资本、劳动投入量增加贡献了 69.8% 的经济增长, 剩余的 30.2% 来自于综合要素生产率的提高。计划体制时期(1952~1978 年) 86% 的中国经济增长是因为投入要素的增加, 综合要素生产率的贡献率为 14%, 而 1979~1999 年, 投入要素和综合生产率的贡献分别为 63.5% 和 36.5%。由此说明中国经济增长的基本途径是“外延式”的, 综合要素生产率提高速度依然缓慢。综合要素生产率上升缓慢的引致原因是经

济运行效率和技术进步率的低下：1952~1978年、1979~1999年的年均技术效率增长为-0.2%、0.6%，技术进步率为1.14%和2.9%。

3. 所有制结构变动是影响中国经济技术效率的重要因素。国有经济比重上升引起技术效率的下降，而集体经济、非公有经济比重均对技术效率具有显著的正向效应。

中国社会整体收入分配差距在1981~1998年间呈先上升再下降的变动。农村居民收入差距明显地大于城镇内部。引起农村居民收入分配差距扩大的主要原因是非农就业，而城镇内部收入差距扩大是由于国有经济、集体经济、非公有经济比例变动产生的收入分配结构效应和差距效应。

回归分析表明，所有制结构对中国整体收入分配具有重要影响。国有经济比重上升，收入分配差距减小，集体经济、非公有经济对收入分配平等性均有显著的负向效应。

4. 本研究构建了效率-平等的结构模型，并运用 Seemingly Unrelated Regression 技术进行分析。研究表明，对于中国经济而言，存在着关于所有制结构的效率与平等替代关系，即所有制结构的调整将会引起经济运行效率和收入分配平等性的反向变动：国有经济比重上升，经济运行效率下降，收

入分配平等程度提高，集体经济或非公有经济比重上升，经济运行效率提高，收入分配平等性下降。

不同所有制构成具有不同的平等—效率替代率，非公有经济替代率 (3.104) 高于国有经济 (2.328)，集体经济的平等—效率替代率最小 (2.131)。

5. 运用阿玛蒂亚·森福利公式对中国社会福利水平进行了估算，结果表明，经济改革过程使社会福利水平不断提高。但 90 年代后期，社会福利的提升速度却在下降。

研究表明：中国现阶段的所有制结构不能充分地实现“效率优先、兼顾平等”的原则，实现效率优先、兼顾平等的原则必须降低国有经济比重，提高非公有经济的份额；中国所有制结构改革的路径选择应为公有经济比重减小，非公有经济比重上升，其中减低国有经济比重，增加非公有经济比重的选择将优于集体经济与非公有经济间比重的调整，所有制结构的这一改革将带来中国社会福利水平的改进。

关键词：所有制结构 平等 效率 社会福利



## THE TRADE-OFF & CHOICE OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY

### ABSTRACT

The determination of ownership structure has been an important issue in China's economic reform. This book has two objectives: one is to find out whether the prevailing ownership structure supports the principle of "efficiency comes first with consideration to equity", the other is to jointly determine optimal ownership structure in the framework of choice of equity-efficiency. The main contents included are: picture of China's ownership reform in the past two decades; technical efficiency and its determinants of Chinese economy; income distribution and its relationship to ownership structure change; trade-off between equity and efficiency in Chinese economy; and finally, the effects of ownership structure change on social welfare in China.

Average production function and stochastic frontier production function in the forms of both Cobb-Douglas and Restricted

Translog were estimated by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method and Maximum Likelihood (ML) techniques. By decomposing the error term into two components, one with normal distribution and the other with truncated normal distribution, the technical efficiency was estimated. Finally, the growth of China's economy was accounted.

Gini coefficient was estimated and applied as indicator for income distribution. Based upon the estimated efficiency and Gini coefficient, a structure model of equity-efficiency was constructed and estimated by using Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) technique.

At last, Amartya Sen welfare index was employed to calculate China's social welfare.

The new findings are as follows:

Firstly, during the period of 1981 - 1998, China's ownership structure adjustment was done with proportions of state-owned down and of collectively-owned up as the main content, non-public sector was developing with a slower pace, regional differences existed in ownership reform: the west fell much behind

the east, and the south was much ahead of the north. Sector differences were also observed: mixed ownership elements have been emerging in manufacturing, whole-sail, retail and trade while the fundamental fields were still monopolized by the state.

Secondly, in 1952 - 1959, the average technical efficiency of China's economy was 76.6%, in the period of 1960 to 1969 it was 76.5%, in 1970 - 1979 it was 75%, the periods of 1980 - 1989 and 1990 - 1999 were 79.3% and 82.2% respectively. In the planned economy period (1952 - 1977), the average technical efficiency of China's economy was 76.2%, while in the transitional period (1978 - 1999), the figure was 80.1%.

In 1981 - 1990, inputs increase accounted for 64% of total GDP growth, the rest was due to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) increase, in the next period (1991 - 1999), inputs increase contributed 69.8% to total economic growth, 30.2% was from TFP increase. In planned economy period (1952 - 1978) 86% of the growth came from inputs use increase, 14% from TFP growth, while in reforming period (1978 - 1999), the figures were 63.5% and 36.55%, respectively. The results indicat-

ed that China's economic growth has been relied heavily on the expansion of production scale. The slow increase in TFP was due to low efficiency and low rate of technical change: the rates of annual average technical efficiency improvement were  $-0.2\%$  and  $0.6\%$  for the periods of 1952-1978 and 1979-1999, while the average technological change rates annually were  $1.14\%$  and  $2.9\%$  for the same two periods.

Thirdly, the change in ownership structure was an important factor affecting technical efficiency of China's economy, specifically, increase in state sector leads to decrease in technical efficiency. However, both collectively-owned and non-publicly-owned sectors have their positive effects on technical efficiency at significant level.

Fourthly, for the period of investigation (1981-1998), the unequal income distribution of China as a whole tended to be enlarging for most of the years, and declining for the last two years. Income distribution gap within the rural was wider than the town and city. Non-agricultural employment was the dominant contributor to the income distribution gap. In town and city, the reason

for unequal income distribution was the effect of income structure change from different types of ownership and “unequal effect” from difference in ownership reform in towns and cities.

The research revealed that ownership structure imposed its important effect on income distribution in Chinese society; the unequal income distribution would be down with stated-sector increase, while both the collectively-owned and non-publicly-owned have their negative significant effects on equity.

Fifthly, the research indicated that trade-off between equity and efficiency in relation to ownership in China existed, that means each ownership component affects both efficiency and equity, ownership structure change would cause changes in efficiency and equity simultaneously in different directions. Concretely, the higher the proportion of state ownership, the lower technical efficiency and meanwhile, the more equal in income distribution; the higher the proportion of collective and non-public ownership, the higher the technical efficiency, and the lower the equity of income distribution.

The amounts of trade-off are 3.104 for non-public owner-

ship, 2.328 for state-ownership, and 2.131 for collective ownership.

Sixthly, China's economic reform has been improving social welfare since the initiation of the reform, however, the growth rate of social welfare tended to decline in the last two years of 1990's.

Based on the research, the following conclusions could be drawn: the existing ownership structure in China can not fully support the principle of "efficiency comes first with consideration to equity", to realize the principle requires certain decrease in state ownership, and some increase in non-public ownership. The rational choice of ownership structure adjustment is to lower proportion of state ownership, but not collective ownership and at the same time, to increase the proportion of non-public ownership. The above choice of ownership structure reform would create to more social welfare in China.

Key words: Ownership structure, Efficiency, Equity, Social welfare.

## 前言

平等与效率是经济学一个经典研究课题，因为平等和效率两者对任何一个社会而言都是有价值的，问题在于这两者间存在着此消彼涨的矛盾冲突，或者选择平等，要么选择效率，经济学理论家们在这一对相互替代的经济现象面前试图探寻帕累托改进的路径；另外一个重要原因使得这一问题如此经典是，经济学家们显然没有能在平等、效率的认识、理解、界定以及研究方法上形成共识。当赋予平等以价值色彩时，就可能因为价值判断尺度的不同，出现成百甚至上千种平等的概念、界定和尺度，一旦进入价值领域（更不要说研究者个人的感情色彩），在平等的探讨上就会进入一个仅仅停留在概念争论的深渊里，这注定会将更重要，对社会而言更有价值的问题丢在了另一边，比如，平等与社会福利水平的关系、影响平等的制度因素、平等的调节政策工具……，等等。

类似的现象存在于对“效率”的分析上。由于在传统计划

经济体里，经济的效率就是政府官僚机构的行为效率，虽然效率重要，但对于作为整个经济主体的政府而言，他们感兴趣的不是一些具体经济活动（比如某一项目的计划与实施）的效率，而是一定时期后政府能获得的总收益数字的大小，政府作为经济主体，承担着经济过程中的一切费用（成本），在投资总额计划已经完成之后，人们极度关心的就是总收益的高低，因此，政府是计划体制下效率的描述单位，而不是单个的国有企业。这就是为什么计划经济里的企业实际上并不注重效率。出于这一原由，计划经济理论那里，效益与效率完全等同，混淆不清。效率没有得到清楚的界定，被权威性地理解为财富的生产水平与能力。在上述这些原因面前，平等与效率被直觉地感知是一对矛盾的两个因素，并在此基础上从价值判断角度展开规范分析与讨论，这必然就会出现大量的争论。仔细地分析，有些争论的对象显然不是同一问题甚至不是同一内涵和外延的概念，使得平等与效率的争论旷日持久。

我从来没有否定从社会价值角度去分析、探讨平等——效率这一对问题的作用，因为我承认法律、基本权利、基本义务、机会的获得性、资源获得性等的平等对于一个社会来说的重要意义，我只是想表明一点：在这基础上的深化研究必须继



续。我更想进一步说明的是，将平等与效率界定于经济学领域的研究，其理论与现实意义更显突出。这出于下述原因：

第一，如果承认与接受经济活动的目的是不断改进社会的总体福利，那么研究决定总体福利的物质财富水平和社会财富分配的平等程度的意义重大。物质财富水平中的财富存量是维持现有福利的基础，物质财富的增量才能提升现有福利水平。类似地，财富的现有分配状态是过去收入分配均等性的结果，只有新增收入分配平等性才是影响社会总福利水平的因素。因此，社会总福利的改进问题实质上就是效率——分配问题。

第二，社会的收入分配平等性在一定程度是一个反映社会权利、义务、机会、资源获得性等内容的一个综合测度。显然，权利、义务、法律、资源获得性的平等不是收入平等的一个充分条件，但它近乎于一个必要条件。

第三，在社会福利水平的函数里，有众多的影响因素，这些变数中间，效率和收入分配均等性是两个主要因素，构成福利水平的约束变量，对发达经济如此，对发展中经济更是这样。再者，在一个“交易”主导的经济社会中，拥有平等的收入分配，是大多数人获得其他社会平等的基本条件，失去这一条件，其他的一切的平等都仅是形式，甚至是欺骗。因为收