

美国人的中国观

Americans' Perspectives on China

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华夏出版社

前 言

中国,一个正在崛起的东方大国,成了当今世界的焦点,更引起世界头号强国美国的警觉和关注。美国如何看待中国的繁荣和强大?美国政府的对华政策是什么?商业巨头如何评价中国入世以来的经济发展?社会精英又是如何看待中国的?带着这些问题,我们编注了《美国人的中国观》一书,希望与读者一道从书中找出答案。

本书汇集了40余篇美国人评价中国的精心佳作,通过美国人的眼光和思维方式从政治、外交、经济及社会与文化等方面透视改革开放给中国带来的巨大变化。作者分别为美国政要,商界巨头和学术名家等。书中既有美国数任总统就中美关系的在华演说,也有美国商会会长及著名跨国公司总裁对中国当前经济体制、入世后经济和商业发展的评价和展望,更有学术及新闻界名流对中国社会变革的透视性分析。总之,本书在很大程度上体现了当今美国上层社会的中国观。

全书采用全英文形式,每篇配有中文导读和语言难点注释,所选文章观点客观新颖,语言规范,具有代表性、时代性和可读性。本书既是了解美国对华政策及美国上层社会中国观的窗口,又不失为一本适合大学生等具有高中级英语水平的学习者不可多得的英语读物,并将为中美两国人民的相互了解带来裨益与启迪。

本书的顺利出版得到了华夏出版社的大力支持,在此表示衷心感谢。

编者 2003年8月8日

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
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Chapter I

Sino—American Relation



Toast for Peace

by Nixon *

冷战期间，无论是中国人还是美国人都将对方视做敌人。然而，在1972年的初春中国和美国之间发生了一件具有历史意义的大事件，那就是美国总统尼克松访问中国。这一事件奠定了未来中美关系发展的基础。

Mr. Prime Minister and all of your distinguished guests this evening,

On behalf of your American guests, I wish to thank you for the incomparable hospitality for which the Chinese people are justly famous throughout the world. I particularly want to pay tribute¹, not only to those who prepared the magnificent dinner, but also to those who have provided the splendid music. Never have I heard American music played better in a foreign land.

Mr. Prime Minister, I wish to thank you for your very gracious and eloquent² remarks. At this very moment through the wonder of telecommunications, more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world. Yet, what we say here will not be long remembered. What we do here can change the world.

As you said in your toast, the Chinese people are a great people, the American people are a great people. If our two people are

* Nixon, former American President

enemies the future of this world we share together is dark indeed. But if we can find common ground to work together, the chance for world peace will immeasurably increase.

In the spirit of frankness which I hope will characterize our talks this week, let us recognize at the outset³ these points: We have at times in the past been enemies. We have great differences today. What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend⁴ those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles. But while we cannot close the gulf between us, we can try to bridge it so that we may be able to talk across it.

So, let us, in these next five days, start a long march together, not in lockstep⁵, but on different roads leading to the same goal, the goal of building a world structure of peace and justice in which all may stand together with equal dignity and in which each nation, large or small, has a right to determine its own form of government, free of outside interference or domination. The world watches. The world listens. The world waits to see what we will do. What is the world? In a personal sense, I think of my eldest daughter whose birthday is today. As I think of her, I think of all the children in the world, in Asia, in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, most of whom were born since the date of the foundation of the People's Republic of China.

What legacy shall we leave our children? Are they destined to die for the hatreds which have plagued the old world, or are they destined to live because we had the vision to build a new world?

There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other; neither of us seeks domination over the oth-

er, neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world.

Chairman Mao has written," So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the world rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years are too long, seize the day, seize the hour!"⁶

This is the hour. This is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.

In that spirit, I ask all of you present to join me in raising your glasses to Chairman Mao, to Prime Minister Zhou, and to the friendship of the Chinese and American people which can lead to friendship and peace for all people in the world.

Notes

1. *tribute*: 崇敬
2. *eloquent*: 雄辩的
3. *at the outset*: 起初, 开始时
4. *transend*: 超越
5. *in lockstep*: 陈旧古板的做法; 因循守旧; 步伐一致
6. " *So many deeds cry out to be done, and always urgently; the world rolls on, time presses. Ten thousand years are too long, seize the day, seize the hour!*"
"多少事, 从来急, 天地转, 光阴迫。一万年太久, 只争朝夕!"

Why Risk Political, Economic Warfare with Asia's Colossus?

by Henry Kissinger^{*} ¹

为什么有些美国人反对给予中国正常的贸易地位？为什么美国在冷战后对外实行双重的外交政策？读过此文，您将对此有所了解。本文作者认为未来的中美领导的互访是很重要的。

In a recent visit to Beijing, I found improvement of the battered² Sino-American relations to be a key objective—perhaps the key foreign policy objective—of the post-Deng leadership.

At the same time in the United States, the debate about granting normal trade status to China becomes more venomous³ with each passing year. The opponents of normal trade are already gearing up for⁴ next year. Some seek to use the China over human rights; others want to clip China's wings⁵; many are seeking to use the China issue to restructure America's political parties. If they succeed, they will thrust America into at least political and economic war with the most populous country in the world, and one of the most dynamic. Such a confrontation is not called for by any realistic assessment of the national interest.

The Clinton administration has shown statesmanship in resisting these pressures, and it has been supported by every former president, secretary of state and national security adviser. But it has

* Henry Kissinger, former American Secretary of State.

been extraordinarily timid in dealing with the demonization of China⁶.

Seeking to placate⁷ every pressure group, it has basically accepted the objectives of its critics while asserting that it has a better way of achieving them. As a result, no positive agenda emerges. But the real challenge is to put the debate over trade behind us and to impart to our China policy a strategic dimension capable of generating broad bipartisan support.

I must inject a personal note. Many of us urging cooperation with China are being accused of doing so for commercial reasons. As chairman of an international consulting firm, I inevitably encounter clients who also do business in China, though they represent a very small part of our total income. Still, anyone who believes that my views are for salt and who is prepared to ignore nearly 40 years of my published views, long before any business was done in China by anybody, should stop reading now.

The post-Cold War world obliges America to conduct two different types of foreign policy simultaneously. In the North Atlantic and the Western Hemisphere, we are dealing with pluralistic⁸ democracies practicing market economics. They do not view each other as strategic rivals; war between them is inconceivable⁹. In these regions, American policy can be based on a sense of community and shared moral values.

It is different in Asia. There, the nations—many of continental size—consider each other, at least in part, as strategic rivals. Many reject our commitment to political pluralism¹⁰. No integrating institutions exist. Wars, while not likely, are not inconceivable. In Asia, at least for the next generation, peace will require the

conscious and deliberate managing of a balance of power—a task with which America has never felt comfortable.

That alone should cause the United States to be wary about¹¹ unnecessarily treating China as a preordained¹² adversary. For if we cannot cooperate with China, our options will shrink and the bargaining position of all other players in the region will improve. Any opponent of the United States will automatically find support in Beijing. Tensions will mount as problems in Korea and Cambodia¹³ become much more difficult to resolve.

Before embarking on so risky and irrevocable¹⁴ a course, it is necessary to define correctly the challenge being posed by China. China's growth, while spectacular, starts from the base of a far lower gross national produce than ours, according to various estimates ranging from 10 percent to 25 percent. Thus, in absolute numbers, even if China continues to grow at the rate of 10 percent indefinitely—an assumption for which there is no precedent—it will, for the foreseeable future, barely match America's absolute growth of 2.5 percent to 3 percent. The relationship is even more one-sided in the military field. China is no military colossus¹⁵ bestriding¹⁶ Asia. We devote 3.5 percent of our GNP to defense; while the precise amount China spends is unclear, most experts believe it represents some 2 percent of the gross domestic product, or at most a tenth of our effort.

Moreover, unlike the Soviet Union, China faces strong neighbors. For at least the next decade, Japan will have a more formidable¹⁷ military establishment. Nor can planners in Beijing ignore the military capacities of India, Korea, Russia, Vietnam or Taiwan. Even China's rudimentary¹⁸ capability to attack the Unit-

ed States with intercontinental missiles cannot be used effectively. An American counterblow would leave China disarmed and defenseless in the face of neighbors it has historically feared. So long as we maintain our regional alliances and a significant military presence in the Western Pacific, the Asian balance of power is unlikely to be challenged.

Under present circumstances, confronting China will not rally the neighbors of China as the containment policy¹⁹ did those of the Soviet Union. During Cold War, all of the Soviet Union's neighbors had felt threatened ideologically and militarily, and were eager to cooperate in containing it. China's neighbors either do not feel threatened or are reluctant to acknowledge it. Their probable reaction, of positioning themselves between China and America, will foster both nationalism and neutralism all over Asia. And no European nation except possibly the United Kingdom will support us. We will have succeeded in isolating ourselves. How will victory be defined in such a conflict?

What confrontation will produce is a no-win situation for both sides. For China, too, would suffer enormously in its rate of economic development, in its prospects for collaboration²⁰ with the West and in increased vulnerability to potentially hostile neighbors.

The Asian power balance is in flux²¹. China's growth, though larger than the others', is not occurring in a vacuum. For Japan, India, Indonesia, the nations of Southeast Asia and Korea are also increasing in economic strength and military power.

America should not sacrifice one of its chief diplomatic assets—that we are, or could be, closer to each of the contenders²² in Asia than they are to one another. Hence we are in a position to advance

our interests and protect the balance of power from a position of flexibility. Our obliviousness²³ to this reality is reflected in the simultaneous pressures brought on Indonesia, the third most populous Asian country, and on Japan, the most economically advanced, by some of the same single-issue constituencies—on human rights and trade—urging confrontation with China. How do these groups imagine we can maintain an equilibrium²⁴ in Asia amidst such incoherence?

As China emerges into great power status, adjustments in the Asian balance of power are inevitable. Disagreements are likely, but a permanent adversarial relationship is not foreordained²⁵. For the foreseeable future, China's challenge to America will be political and economic, not military.

We cannot prevent enhancement of Chinese influence arising from the process of economic growth—though we should devise²⁶ rewards and penalties to channel it into directions that serve our national interest. But we must resist the domination of Asia by any country, including China. If China should choose an adventurous path, we should honor existing defense commitments and take other measures to preserve the balance of power in Asia. But unless that begins to happen, we owe it to ourselves to seek to encourage the emerging giant into a cooperative approach.

In the months ahead, an exceptional opportunity exists for exploring the prospects of coexistence in the preparations for the Clinton-Jiang summit and, even more, at the summit itself.

For us, the key issues are trade, nonproliferation²⁷ and human rights. Success in dealing with the first two items depends on the ability to establish equitable rules for trade and enforceable rules for

preventing the spread of nuclear and missile technology. This would enable China to enter the World Trade Organization and to address American concerns about the spread of advanced technology into irresponsible hands.

Human rights have a legitimate²⁸, indeed inevitable, place on the Sino-American agenda. American concern on this subject reflects the kind of people we are. At the same time, the subject should be brought into a proper relationship with other objectives in our relations with China and with respect for China's many great historical achievements. In trying to encourage the pace of evolution, it is only fair to recognize that the system is much less rigid than when I first encountered it—though it retains its uncompromising insistence on a monopoly of power.

For China, the potential flash points are Hong Kong and Taiwan. Americans are concerned that the autonomous status of Hong Kong represents a leap into the unknown. But to most Chinese, and not only supporters of Beijing, Hong Kong was always a symbol of a humiliating colonialism imposed on an impotent²⁹ China 150 years ago. To them, Hong Kong's reversion to the mother country is a source of pride.

I take seriously the Chinese leaders' expressed commitment to Hong Kong's autonomy above all because it is so overwhelmingly in their self-interest. Hong Kong's economic collapse would wipe out China's single largest foreign currency earner and would strip³⁰ the reversion³¹ of much of its symbolic significance; while the political collapse of the "one-country, two-system" policy would end all hopes of peaceful reunification with Taiwan.

Even with the best of intentions, there are, however, intan-

gibles³² that can only be tested by the passage of time: (a) How will Chinese officials react on a day-to-day basis to a more open system with which they are unfamiliar, particularly with respect to the press and freedom of assembly? (b) Will it be possible to insulate Hong Kong's civil service from the different practices across the border? (c) Will the authorities and the opponents of the new institutions muster³³ the self-restraint needed to operate Hong Kong's autonomous system without resorting to violence? (d) Will Taiwan see the practice of autonomy in Hong Kong as a challenge or as an opportunity?

On these issues, the United States can play a helpful role so long as it proceeds with some sensitivity. China has been told insistently by both administration officials and members of Congress that major breaches³⁴ of the agreement will have a disastrous impact on American public opinion. The point has been made. Henceforth, the autonomy of 6 million Hong Kong residents is much more likely to benefit from workable Sino-American relations than from confrontation.

For more than two decades, Taiwan thrived and peace was maintained on the basis of principles laid down in the Shanghai Communique of 1972: American acknowledgment of one China; America's declared interest in a peaceful solution; and Taiwanese restraint in challenging this arrangement. All sides have an interest in maintaining this state of affairs, the precariousness³⁵ of which was illustrated by the minicrisis in the Taiwan Straits in the spring of 1996. The principles of the Shanghai Communique need to be reaffirmed: America must stick to the spirit of the one-China policy; China must understand that America is serious about our inter-