

市场结构

与

政府经济行为

杨灿明 著

MARKET
STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR OF
GOVERNMENT



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内容简介

政府行为在社会经济生活中的重要性日趋明显,政府的活动已被大多数经济学家们视作经济生活的内生变量,而非外生变量。正因如此,研究作为经济领域一个重要组成部分的市场结构,也不应脱离开政府的行为问题。笔者认为,政府经济行为不仅会影响市场结构,而且它本身就是市场结构的一个组成部分。本书正是将市场结构与政府行为作为一个整体来进行研究,探讨两者之间内在的逻辑统一关系。

本书在作者的博士论文的基础上写成,它通过理论与实证相结合的分析,形成的一个重要观点是:所谓市场结构,既可以描述为竞争与垄断的程度,或者说市场结构的不同状态就是从完全竞争到独家垄断的一系列过渡形态,又可以描述为市场、企业、政府等不同交易类型(制度安排)的替代组合关系,或者说市场结构的不同状态就是从市场组织到科层组织(包括企业科层和政府科层)的不同过渡形态。正因如此,我们就可以用各种交易类型替代组合中的效益与成本的关系,来评价市场结构的优劣。也可以通过合理界定各种交易类型(特别是政府内交易)在经济生活中的功能与作用,来不断优化市场结构。本书对市场结构与政府经济行为关系的研究正是以此为主要线索而展开的。

MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF GOVERNMENT

Abstract

The significance of government behavior in social economy has been considered to be more and more obvious, and it has been regarded as the internal economic variables rather than the external economic variables by most economists. For this reason, it's impossible to study the market structure which is viewed as one of the important parts of the economic realm without paying attention to the government behavior. In the author's opinion, the economic behavior of government not only influences the market structure, but more importantly, it originally is the component of the market structure. This dissertation is attempt to research the market structure and the government behavior as a whole and to explore their internal logical and coordinate relations.

With the theoretical and empirical analyses united, this

dissertation would like to present such a major viewpoint: The market structure could not only be described as the extent of competition and monopoly, but also as the relation formed from different substitution and combination of transaction categories (institutional arrangements) involving markets, firms and governments. Accordingly, the states of market structure exactly imply the transitional forms from the perfect competition to the exclusive monopoly or from the market organization to hierarchy. The dissertation starts just from this mainline:

The dissertation consists of 9 chapters, and the main contents are as follows:

In chapter 1, through the reviews upon the current theories about the market structure and the economic behavior of government, the author attempts to explore their internal logical relation, and additionally, provides the theoretical basis for the further research.

The first section starts with the retrospects on the theories about the market structure including the perfect competition theory, the perfect monopoly theory, the non — perfect competition theory, the competition theory from Marx. At the same time, it points out that the concept of monopoly defined by Edward Chamberlin, which is factually derived from the specialization and the market segmentation, is far different from that of Marx. Marx's competition theory comes from the control and the rigment of the market by giant firm, which is caused by the scales expansion on the vertical intergration

from the capital accumulation and the production concentration. Hence, the concept of monopoly in this dissertation means the market rigment related to the changes of the institution of firm organization and the degree of the government control. Additionally, the latest development of the theories about market structure would be briefly recommended, involving those about the contestable market structure theory, the dual competition market theory and Buchanan's points about competition. Of course, the new features of the competition and monopoly in modern market economy would be deeply analysed as well.

Secondly, this section also reviews the viewpoints about the economic behavior of government. It not only makes overall analysis for the theory about the governmental classification which contains four categories: Service government, Welfare government, Public government and Defect government, but also introduces the theory about the decentralization from the aspect of the structure. It points out that the decentralization is to increase the efficiency of the resource allocation.

At the end of this section, with the market structure theory and the government behavior theory united, the author explores the internal logical relation between them. In the author's opinion, the competitive extent is closely related to the market institution, and the monopolistic extent is directly relevant to the scale of the hierarchy and the way of integration to great extent. Therefore, different market structures from the competition to the monopoly not only mean the forms

and the ways which people use in transaction activities, but also mean the transition states from the market organization to hierarchy. In the past, the study of the market structure and that of the institutional arrangements were made separately in two different fields, but in this dissertation, the two are united. In other words, it's the institutional economists that drew on the concept of hierarchy and matched it correspondingly with the different extent of monopoly. Moreover, they emphasised that the government was an important hierarchy. The government, as a kind of institutional arrangements, was similar to the enterprise. In this way, the governmental actions is connected with the market structure by their internal logicity.

In chapter 2, given the premise that the market structure could be defined as the substitution or combination of different transaction categories, the author studies the definitions of the basic transaction categories, the sub—classification of government transaction and its influence upon the market structure. Additionally, the author propounds the key concept of "the substitutional net benefit".

In this section, the comparative analyses are made on the way of classification of transaction. Commons divided the transaction into 3 categories: Bargaining transaction, Managerial transaction, Rationing transaction. Coincidentally, Corse divided the transaction into another 3 categories: Market transaction, Enterprise transaction and Government transaction. The author believes that the two ways of classification are closed related and the latter is originated from the former.

It's obvious that the ways of classification used by Commons and Corse were different. According to Commons' way of classification; 1) There is no transaction cost in market transaction. 2) Managerial transaction includes both the enterprise transaction and partial managerial actions of government. 3) Rationing transaction includes the indirect macro — adjustment measures of government.

Corse paid less attention to indirect macro — adjustment and control of government, which was considered to be an universal means of governmental adjustment, and he believed that inner government transaction mostly should be regarded to be the direct management of the government.

But in the author's opinion, the difference mentioned before could be unified if suitable regulations are made on the classification of transaction produced by Commons and Corse. Generally, the author stands for that transaction should be divided into three major categories: Market transaction, Enterprise transaction and government transaction, and various intermediaries.

This chapter also gives a sub — classification of government transaction and indicates that as the defender and referee for market transaction, the government is supplementary to the market, but as the allocator of the resources, the government is a substitution for the market and the enterprise. The replacement for the market and the enterprise transaction by the government transaction includes acknowledging the business guild, hardening the entry into business registry, bidding for

charted rights, assigning charted rights, controlling price, participating in competitive businesses and seeking governmental monopoly from weak to strong, and all these have an effect on the market structure by different degrees. This chapter suggests that to check whether the market structure is rational or whether the ways of substitution of transaction are reasonable largely depends on the comparison between the cost and the benefit. Besides, the transaction cost and production cost should be all taken into account. So, the author propounds the concept of "substitutional net benefit" which means the savings of the transaction cost and the production cost when the different substitution categories are replaced to each other. The concept could also be described as follows: how to choose monopoly, competition or a neutral form depends on the balance upon whether it brings about net benefit after deducting the transaction cost and production cost.

The chapter 3 turns to analyse the basic features of Chinese market structure in the traditional planned economic system. This kind of market structure is closely relevant to the intensive substitution for the market and enterprise by the government. In this regime, the government's economic managerial functions are saturated with those of social administrative management. The government almost controlled the operation of whole social economy. As far as the relation between the government and the enterprise is concerned, it produced "the integration of government administration with enterprise". There hardly exists any enterprises, because the floatation, the opera-

tion and the marketing are all directly controlled by the governmental organizations. The enterprises are just the administrative attachments and their single aims are just to act on the wills of the government.

On the relation between the government and the market, the substitution by government for market is also widespread. The typical example is the replacement for market mechanism by government plan. In this system, the price mechanism, as the core of market system, is replaced by planned price approach, which shows the wrong market signals and suffocates the real market. In the author's opinion, the market structure in the traditional system is basically an intensive administrative monopoly. The enterprise and the market are replaced by the government for their main duties and responsibilities, i. e. , 1) The resources are distributed according to quality grade. 2) The enterprise produces goods under the administrative orders. 3) The economic factors are not permitted to move from place to place. 4) It fails to separate the administrative functions of government from those of market.

This kind of market structure results in the low efficiency of economy in the long run, although at a time it got a better result. With the special concern about the relation between the enterprise and the government in transition period, the chapter 4 displays the framework of the market structure which would be closely relevant to the economic behavior of the government.

In this chapter, the author believes that, in the transition

process, the market structure has been gradually improved, compared with that under the traditional planned economy system. However, there are still a lot of problems to resolve. Firstly, as far as the enterprises located at different districts are concerned, they are not allowed to make any independent decisions under the control of the local administrative authorities, which provides the poor foundation for the decentralization reform. Since the changes of government function have lagged behind the decentralization reform, the disputes between the central and local government come to be more and more evident. Moreover, because the competition among the enterprises attached to different districts finally transfers to that among the local governments, the selfishness departmentalism and the regional blockade tends to be more and more widespread.

Secondly, as far as the enterprises attached to different lines are concerned, they attempt to seek the administrative monopoly. Another issue should be also aroused attention to. The agriculture, industry and commerce are not treated equally, and consequently, there is no fair competition between each of the three.

Thirdly, as far as the enterprises of different ownerships are concerned, there also exists unfair competition.

Fourthly, as far as the enterprises of different administrative rank are concerned, it's impossible to get a fair competition.

Fifthly, as far as the enterprises with asset specificity are

concerned, we more or less neglect the special characteristics of the transfer among the transaction categories.

This chapter suggests that it's necessary to choose the proper transaction organization when conducting the transaction of intensive asset specificity. In fact, it concerns about how to join the institutional structure of transaction with the technological structure of transaction. It's also needed to point out that due to the blurred definition of property—rights, the benefit of reform is shared by the different benefit subject, but the cost of reform is burdened by the nation singlely. This imbalance between the benefit and the cost always leads to the indifference about the selection of transaction categories.

In chapter 5, the author puts his eyesight upon the international market so as to study the relation between the market structure and the governmental behavior. The section 1 gives a supplementary introduction to some relevant theories about the market structure and foreign trade, including the traditional international trade theory, the neo—international trade theory, the strategic trade theory, the strategic growth theory and etc.. Besides, the analysis on how to combine the theoretical model with the practice in China is also made.

China being a big country, the extent of opening to outside varies from area to area. In terms with the specialty of different regions, the government chooses the so—called "Stratified Development Strategy". So in chapter 2, the attentive observation is made for the "Stratified Development Strategy". The author finds that the government in market economy nation

tends to indirectly implement its opening policy. Besides, how to arrange the procedure of local development and how to choose the mobility of the factors are always decided by the benefit — cost principle. Of course, the governmental adjustment is also indispensable when the market fails, but the focus of government intervening policy is turned on how to carry out its macro — trade policy. As regards to the practice in China, the administrative measure played a very important role when the opening policy was carried out in local area. The strong intervening power and its extensive influence led to unfair competition finally from area to area. This problem has to be given special attention so as to prevent the market power from being replaced by the administrative power. In the third part, the author analyses the elements which would influence the governmental behavior in international trade and briefs the reforms about the tariff, the exchange rates, the tax drawback approach, the quantitative control and the operation system of foreign trade enterprise.

The last section makes a summary on the problems aroused from the administrative monopoly in foreign trade. 1) The power to make independent decisions was not really given to the foreign trade enterprises and the administrative functions of government were not separated from those of enterprises. 2) Excessive administrative intervention distorted the trade competitive mechanism, i. e., the division of labor for administrative purpose among the state — owned trade companies gave a rise to business monopoly, which hindered the enter-