

FIFTH EDITION

Sociological Theory



Classical Statements

DAVID ASHLEY
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*To our mothers
Jill Clarke
and Edith Orenstein*

PREFACE

This book tries to make social theory come alive by showing that it is the product of individuals who were creatures of their era and of their place and who were responding to issues and concerns that became significant in the context of their time. We have not tried to organize our text around various themes (e.g., "class," "religion," "crime," etc.), or types of theory (e.g., "functionalism," "conflict theory," "symbolic interactionism," etc.). Instead, we have elected to introduce the eleven individuals (Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, Hegel, Marx, Weber, Simmel, Freud, Pareto, Veblen, and Mead) who seem to have played the most influential intellectual role in the institutionalization of contemporary sociology. We have also included one social philosopher (Nietzsche) who doubted the value of modern social science from its very inception and who seems to have foreseen its decline.

The approach we have chosen to follow does not try to suggest that the history of sociological theory reflects increasing convergence and closure along lines of scientific discovery. But we might as well make it clear from the very start that the twelve theorists described in this book never believed they were engaged in a unified or common project of intellectual closure. All of them were capable of great insight, and, directly or indirectly, they all helped shape the course of modern sociology. Yet their work as a whole is not only disparate but also—and quite often—contradictory.

This theory text includes the following:

1. Two introductory chapters—Chapter 1, which sets the context (historical, ideological, national, etc.) of classical sociological theory, and Chapter 2, which discusses the nature and types of theoretical orientation in social theory.
2. A concluding chapter (Chapter 15) that discusses the heritage of classical sociological theory, taken as a whole. This chapter emphasizes that the "classical" theorists were all responding to, and trying to steer, *modernity* (something that will become apparent as readers work through this text).
3. A description of the background affecting each of the twelve people discussed in this book, and an analysis and description of their most important ideas (Chapters 3–14). Each of these particular chapters is organized in a consistent format to facilitate comparison. The divisions and subdivisions of each chapter deal with (1) biography; (2) social environment; (3) intellectual influences; (4) view of society; (5) view of the individual in society; (6) methodology; (7) other themes and foci of attention, where warranted; and (8) the significance of each theorist's work, as perceived by subsequent generations.
4. Text that is readable but not simplistic. Although major theoretical terms are defined in the text where they first appear, glossaries are also provided for each chapter. In addition, annotated bibliographies of primary and secondary works in English have been supplied. We have tried to include the most useful and informative books that are most readily available.

5. Theorists from all of the major national schools of classical theory (French, British, German, Italian, and American), who are introduced chronologically within each national grouping. The exception is Nietzsche, who, more than any other person discussed in this book, can be placed in a group of his own.
6. A brief guide to classical theorists on the World Wide Web, which should aid students in locating primary classical theory works written both by authors discussed in this book and by others of their era. Such sources can serve as supplemental readings and provide useful material for inclusion in student term papers.

Readers familiar with previous editions of *Sociological Theory: Classical Statements* will note numerous changes in the fifth edition. Several minor corrections, improvements, and updates have been included. In addition, we have moved the "postmodernity" section from Chapter 1 to Chapter 15, where we believe it more properly belongs. Also, in response to comments from readers, we have completely redrafted Chapters 1 and 2. The foci of these chapters remain primarily the same, but through organizational and stylistic changes, we have attempted to make their content more easily apprehensible and to clarify links to arguments in later chapters. Also, a number of chapter conclusions have been rewritten (e.g., those in Chapters 3, 5, and 13) to reflect recent scholarship.

David Ashley had primary responsibility for Chapter 2 and for the chapters on Hegel, Marx, Weber, Freud, Pareto, and Nietzsche. David Orenstein had primary responsibility for the chapters on Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, Veblen, and Mead. The chapter on Simmel was written jointly by David Ashley and Barbara Renckovsky. The introductory and concluding chapters (Chapter 1 and Chapter 15) were written jointly by Ashley and Orenstein.

We wish to acknowledge the colleagues, students, friends, and dozens of reviewers who aided us in the production of this and previous editions. In particular, we would like to thank Glenna Buchholtz and Kristine Zamora. We owe special thanks to Julie E. Orenstein and Yarong Jiang Ashley, and to our editor, Sarah L. Kelbaugh, at Allyn and Bacon.

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1

Ideology, History, and Classical Sociological Theory

THE RISE OF SOCIOLOGY

How best to define “classical sociological theory”? Is it whatever the specialists or experts in sociology say it is? Or, can we use sociological insights themselves to help explain why certain theoretical insights have become foundational?

✂ We suggest that certain sociological statements are “classical” first because they have an ideological significance, and second because they have been instrumental in helping to build sociology as an autonomous discipline and as an institutionalized profession. These two characteristics are not mutually exclusive. To some extent, classical sociological theory was always ideologically interested in its own legitimation.

The theoretical statements discussed in this book were written largely between the time of the great French Revolution of 1789–1799 and World War I, which officially

ended in 1919. During this period, both European and North American societies were transformed. At the end of the eighteenth century, most Europeans were rural, conservative, uneducated, isolated, lacking in organizational affiliation, and—unless they were criminal—largely ignored by the state. By the beginning of the twentieth century, Europeans tended to be relatively liberal and relatively well educated; were quite likely to be members of a union, a professional association, or some other kind of organization; and were relatively closely supervised by governmental and non-governmental bureaucracies. In other words, these latter individuals lived in a modern, bureaucratic nation-state. The most dramatic change that occurred in the nineteenth century involved a transformation in the way subjects viewed the social world and their place in it. For instance, feudal conceptions of a natural distinction between commoner and aristocrat were replaced by the popular ideals of democracy and equality of rights. Sociology itself was both a part of and a response to this shift in human self-conception.

By the 1920s, most of the salient characteristics of our present (or modern) age had been established. For instance, by 1920, the typical American had become urban rather than rural. (This same threshold was crossed a little earlier in Britain, Germany, and France.) During the 1920s, people's life-styles were dramatically altered by modern industrial technology, widespread bureaucratization, and a massive increase in governmental intervention in their lives. Weapons of mass destruction were invented and used in the Great War of 1914–1918, and people were forced to adapt to the onset of total war. Also, by the 1920s, the competing social and political ideals of capitalism and socialism had displaced the eighteenth-century clash between monarchic and republican forms of government. During this decade, women's rights became a significant political issue, mass unions tried to consolidate their position in economic life, and distinctions between suburban white-collar and urban blue-collar life-styles took shape. At the same time, a popular youth culture involving pop music, an ideological rejection of traditional sexual and aesthetic mores, and drug experimentation came to the fore. The flappers of the 1920s were the antecedents of the zoot-suiters of the 1930s and 1940s, the beat generation of the 1950s, the hippies and flower children of the 1960s and 1970s, the punks of the 1980s, and the "grunge" adherents of the 1990s.

It would, of course, be misleading to suggest that growing up in the United States or England in the year 2000 is like growing up in these countries in the 1920s or 1930s. Still, the most salient characteristics of modernity either were institutionalized or had become readily observable by the 1920s. Thus, for the contemporary individual, a Western society in the 1920s would be familiar and understandable, though backward in many respects. On the other hand, the gulf between the experiences of twentieth-century individuals and the life-style and orientations of a French peasant living during the reign of King Louis XVI (1774–1792) is so enormous that it would seem to us that the latter individuals were inhabitants of a distant planet.

In brief, we suggest that the modern world came into existence between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The thirteen decades between 1790 and 1920 mark the definitive watershed that separates our modern world from the totally unfamiliar traditional and feudal system that existed prior to the French Revolution. In part, classical sociological theory was an attempt to come to terms with the problems and issues of the emerging modern era. Among other

things, these included social atomization, alienation, and loneliness (Hegel, Marx, Durkheim); social disorganization (Comte, Durkheim); secularization and the decline of traditional religious belief (Weber, Comte, Durkheim); a growing pessimism about individuals' capacity to take rational control of their destiny (Freud, Pareto); and widening class division and class conflict, together with many other types of social fracture and social dissension (Simmel, Pareto, and others). Although classical sociology attempted to come to grips with what were seen as typically modern problems, sociology itself is a product of the modern era. Indeed, we believe that the development of a sociological way of looking at the world is one of the most definitive characteristics of the modern age.

Sociological theory is often said to have attained its maturity between 1880 and 1920. During this period, sociology was established in its own right both in the United States and in many Western European societies. In this book, however, we have included not just those major theorists who wrote during the decades when sociological theory reached its maturity (Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, Pareto, and Mead), but also earlier sociological theorists such as Comte and Spencer who developed ideas about emerging modern societies that are likely to strike the contemporary reader as curiously naive and optimistic.

We have also included five theorists who did not call themselves sociologists: Hegel, Marx, Veblen, Nietzsche, and Freud. Hegel, a professor of philosophy, lived at the very beginning of the modern era, before the idea of "sociology" was invented. We hope to show that much of his work is definitively sociological in orientation nevertheless. Marx was an intellectual giant who never attained an academic position but whose influence on contemporary sociological modes of thought has been greater than that of any other theorist. Veblen, one of the founders of modern social economics, died shortly before the economic collapse of 1929. His work has proved to be seminal for the understanding of contemporary forms of social and economic behavior. Nietzsche developed an antimodern critique that has become increasingly influential in the United States over the last decade. Finally, Freud, a medical doctor who founded the discipline of psychoanalysis and who lived until the end of the 1930s, would have rejected the label "sociologist." Nevertheless, like the other four theorists mentioned here, he made crucially important contributions to our understanding of ourselves as creatures whose experiences are shaped and fashioned by that which is recognized as socially variable or contextual. This essentially *sociological* viewpoint is shared by all the theorists discussed in this book.

SOCIOLOGY AS SCIENCE AND AS VALUE-ORIENTING CRITIQUE

Social theory is often condemned by its critics because it sometimes seems to have a not-so-hidden ideological agenda. Marxist theory, for instance, was often dismissed because it made no secret of the fact that it sought to portray history from the vantage point of an exploited and insurgent working class. By the same token, Weberian sociology has, at times, adopted a specific, if less transparent, *anti*-Marxist agenda.

We believe, however, that the undeniable intersection between ideological commitment and focus on the one hand and sociological theory on the other has not necessarily impeded the growth of sociological knowledge. Ideological commitment often is a spur for the development of new modes of knowing. Moreover, ideology itself should be acknowledged as something more than just a biased or distorted view of reality. Ideology ensues when groups try to organize conceptions of authority and shared commitments in order to deal with social, economic, and political problems that have become salient for them. This is the *creative* side of ideology—the attempt to make political society meaningful and legitimate. Ideology also has a *restrictive* side, however: It places limits on what can be thought. Although ideology is not constrained by the need to reach only those conclusions that have received experimental verification, it nonetheless loses much of its effectiveness when it becomes implausible or obviously false in its assertions. For ideology to be effective, it must, of course, appear to have at least some grasp on what is going on in the world.

Ideology is largely a modern invention because it is modernity that was responsible for the breakdown of the dogma and uncertainties associated with traditional societies. Ideology, in short, represents a refusal to accept that present conditions reflect the best of all possible worlds. To put the best possible gloss on ideology, we could say it is a striving toward truth at a time during which blind adherence to custom, tradition, and habit is loosening its grip on the human mind.

Ideology, of course, should not be confused with experimentally corroborated scientific knowledge. Not surprisingly, some social theorists (e.g., Spencer and Pareto) believed that sociology is most powerful when it is most scientific and least ideological. On a superficial level, it would seem difficult to dispute this point of view. However, we should keep the following in mind: Humans need bearings in life. Even if we cannot be certain that a particular theoretical orientation is absolutely objective, it certainly does not follow that it would be rational to jettison it. It might be most reasonable sometimes to try to develop explanations that receive the highest possible amount of empirical corroboration, that are theoretically powerful, and that provide guidelines for action. In actuality, social theory has often attempted to steer human practices and has tried to help humans choose among competing values and different social options. It would be foolish to pretend otherwise. But, nonetheless, as Hegel and Marx would insist, perhaps even value-orienting explanations can be subject to critical analysis if not experimental confirmation.

Among the theorists studied in this text, some “positivists,” such as Comte, Spencer, and Pareto, believed strongly that sociology should base its mode of inquiry on the methodology of the already established natural sciences. By contrast, critical theorists such as Hegel and Marx saw their social philosophies as negative in their effects—that is, as striving to critique and to supercede all those customs, habits, and ideologies that constrain the human spiritual quest for freedom. Both for Hegel and for Marx, it is not reason’s purpose to pursue what is, in any case, an entirely illusory “objective” mode of knowing. Rather, reason endeavors to make human practices as transparent as possible. Hence, reason must acknowledge that theoretical insight is, in part, an expression of human will and purpose. From this perspective, the goal of anti-positivistic critical theory is to enhance human freedom and to enable the emergence of

human subjects who are optimally free by virtue of the fact that they have become optimally self-reflective, hence maximally self-producing.

Not all classical sociological theorists, though, focused so intently on the question of whether sociology should be value-orienting or “value-free.” Unlike Hegel and Marx, Simmel and Mead, for instance, made seminal contributions to sociology that treat broader ideological issues as tangential. Nevertheless, the era of classical sociological theorizing is bounded at one end by the gradual awareness of modernizing trends that brought chaos, disruption, and dislocation. Although this was most obvious in the area of political authority, it was observable in all areas of social life. Thus Hegel, Nietzsche, Weber, and Simmel addressed the problem of the bureaucratization of life in the emerging modern nation-state. Durkheim, Comte, and Spencer examined the difficulties of social relationships in a world increasingly characterized by functionally specialized roles and diverse modes of consciousness. Unlike Pareto, who believed social inequality was a fixity in *all* societies, Veblen showed how it might be overcome one day. The optimist Marx and the pessimist Freud both studied the way in which modern societies mandate a “distorted” or “false” consciousness in order to function effectively. All these concerns reflect an ideological interest in restructuring modes of consciousness and social commitments for the purpose of dealing with salient social problems. It is archetypically sociological to believe that organized *social action* can make a difference in addressing problems such as these.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIOLOGY

Few of the scholars discussed in this book taught in sociology departments. Nevertheless, most of them helped to institutionalize sociology as an acceptable academic discipline. Whereas Comte and Spencer were academic outsiders, **Durkheim broke** ground in being the first professor of sociology in France. Weber and Simmel were instrumental in organizing the first sociological association in Germany, whereas Durkheim helped create the first sociological research institute in France.

Although teaching, founding journals, and training a younger generation of researchers are of obvious importance in the development of a field, such institution building also requires a legitimization of the practices of a college of experts or members of a profession. This was clearly understood both by Durkheim and by Weber. Whereas Durkheim had ambitious ideas about the professional sociologist’s role in the social and political hierarchy of the nation, Weber was careful to place certain limitations on what society could reasonably expect from the sociologist. Weber emphasized that sociologists had special skills that could help resolve some issues but that these skills did not enable them to make authoritative judgments about all human concerns. By emphasizing the *limitations* of sociological knowledge, Weber believed he would strengthen the impact of professional sociology by not permitting it to make promises it could not fulfill.

The arguments for sociology as a legitimate and independent discipline are most forcefully presented in the writings of Comte, Durkheim, Spencer, Pareto, and Simmel. With the exception of Simmel, these men all favored positivism. As we have seen, positivists maintain that scientific method can ensure that scientific explanations, *per se*,

are value-free. According to Durkheim, Comte, and Spencer, sociology is an instrumental science, capable of providing knowledge about cause-effect relations that is useful in understanding and adapting to a social system that is external and coercive for individuals. In Comte's and Durkheim's work, sociological knowledge is presented as capable of restructuring social relationships and organizations on lines perceived by their authors to be both moral and harmonious. Thus both Comte and Durkheim wanted to believe that ideological disputes could be settled by the scientific method. In Spencer's writings, "scientific" social knowledge is treated as useful in isolating areas of life in which governmental intervention and regulation would disturb the "natural" balance. Although they all argued for a science of society along positivistic lines, Comte and Durkheim thus favored interventionistic reform, whereas Spencer preferred anti-interventionistic, antigovernmental *laissez-faire*.

During the twentieth century, sociology was able to establish itself with least difficulty in the United States. Although sociology developed from European intellectual roots, the earliest departments of sociology in the world were founded at such places as the University of Chicago, the University of Wisconsin, the University of Kansas, and Ohio State University. Americans in these departments were interested in the instrumental use of sociology in social reform; thus they tended to emphasize the scientific or positivistic nature of the discipline. Mead, for example, emphasized the utility of social science in providing a basis for scientifically grounded reformism. In the 1920s, the famous "Chicago School" provided detailed studies on slum life, race relations, immigration, and urbanization, and, to this extent, Mead (like Marx, perhaps) was most successful in combining—but *not* melding—critical and positivistic approaches.

From World War I until the Vietnam era U.S. sociologists exhibited relatively little understanding of sociology's ideological roots, and they tended to emphasize their discipline's promise as a legitimately scientific discipline. At the middle of the twentieth century, many American practitioners looked forward to the day when sociology would seem as authoritative as more established fields such as physics or chemistry. By the end of World War II, sociology in the United States had developed a preoccupation—some would say an obsession—with methodological issues and the development of statistical measurements and scales that, while limited in their scope and explanatory bite, would be demonstrably scientific and provide reliable data for instrumental manipulation and control.

In the 1950s, social scientists were most interested in second-level concerns (e.g., how people could be helped to adjust to paramount social reality), and they focused largely on how existing social relations could be strengthened and reformed, rather than transformed. Nonetheless, ideas abstracted or adapted from classical theorists still did form a basis for the development of much contemporary theory (see Chapter 15). For example, critical theorists (mostly French and German until the 1960s) drew heavily on Hegel, Marx, and Freud; functionalists on Spencer and Durkheim; action theorists on Weber and Pareto, conflict theorists on Marx and Simmel; symbolic interactionists on Mead, and so on.¹ But in this country and in Britain it was not until the mid-1960s that intellectuals were ready once again to pay some attention to large-scale issues of power and domination and ask if there was something fundamentally wrong with the structure of modern societies. Not surprisingly, Marx was rediscovered

(perhaps reinvented) during this period by U.S. sociologists eager to take a more critical stance towards what was happening to their own nation state.

Compared with their Anglo-American counterparts, continental (i.e., French and German) theorists were always more interested in broad theoretical and philosophical issues. They also were more ready to acknowledge that the institutionalization of sociology depended on the new discipline's ability to demonstrate that it could help fulfill national or political goals. Whereas U.S. sociologists were often naive and unreflective about how social-scientific knowledge would be used by a power elite, French and German social theorists were more likely to recognize that the authorized development of any kind of knowledge—including scientific knowledge—is something that can come about only as a result of wider social and political backing. Recognizing this, Durkheim at the end of the nineteenth century allied sociology in France with the liberal and reform-oriented wing of the French political establishment.² In Germany, Weber had to deal with a long-standing intellectual tradition that emphasized the uniqueness of human existence *vis-à-vis* the world of nonhuman things. Moreover, Weber attained his maturity as a scholar at a time when Germany was struggling to establish a sense of national identity.³ It is not surprising, then, that Weber showed particular sensitivity to the question of how a sociologist might mediate between the competing goals of value-relevance and "the plain duty of intellectual integrity."

In sum, classical sociology was both part and product of changes in social existence that led to the contemporary social world. We can readily understand the concerns of the classical theorists because, for the most part, they were writing about a world we still inhabit. In many instances, classical theory was instrumental in helping to persuade governmental and educational bureaucracies that sociology was a useful and legitimate academic subject. Although all sociologists attempted to account for social change and the structure and processes of modern society, some borrowed heavily from the methodology of the natural sciences, whereas others were more self-conscious about sociology's value-relevance and the discipline's unique status as a mode of human inquiry. In the United States, where positivism held greatest sway, the institutionalization of sociology as an academic discipline was most successful. The price of this success was a turning away from larger questions to a narrower emphasis on statistical practice and toward studies aimed at the limited production of effective instrumental knowledge.

Two important intellectual developments that particularly influenced classical sociology were the "Enlightenment" and the idea of social evolutionism. In the following two sections, we present a brief discussion of their influence upon sociology.

ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHY AND CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

The "Enlightenment" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had its beginnings in the European Renaissance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but it was given force and direction by the development of modern, natural science during the 1600s.

Broadly speaking, the Enlightenment was a critical reaction against traditional authority. Enlightenment philosophers argued that neither knowledge of nature nor self-knowledge could derive from obedience to authority and tradition. Neither could they result from practical, everyday experience.

Although they were not, themselves, social theorists, the two greatest progenitors of Enlightenment thought were, perhaps, René Descartes (1596–1650) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727). The Frenchman Descartes demonstrated that rationalistic control over phenomena could be obtained through a rigorous use of the mathematical method. Descartes believed that careful observation and clarity of expression served the pursuit of knowledge more faithfully than did blind obedience to the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church. Characteristically, in 1663, the church's reaction to Descartes was to place his writings on the *Index* of forbidden books, which the faithful were enjoined from studying.

The Puritan scientist Newton was a devoutly religious man who believed that there was no contradiction between his Protestant faith and his use of reason and observation to understand the universal and necessary laws of nature. For Newton, scientific investigation was a form of worship. After all, science upheld the dignity of man—God's most sublime creation on earth—and enabled the individual to wonder at the grandeur and subtlety of the magnificent universe that the Deity himself had set in motion.

For those who followed Descartes and Newton, it was but a short step to subjecting historical and social phenomena to the same kind of rational analysis that had proven so successful for physics, optics, and mechanics. The French *philosophes* Voltaire (1694–1778), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Denis Diderot (1713–1784) all believed that both the physical and social worlds could be understood by means of reason. In other words, the universe was held to follow natural laws that could be revealed by rational inquiry and scientific investigation. Thus the philosophy of the Enlightenment emphasized the possibility of social progress and the "perfectibility" of humankind. The *philosophes* extended notions of reason and natural law to all areas of existence—including the social. Their acceptance of natural laws, reason, and social analysis, and their belief in progress through rational self-understanding, provided an intellectual foundation for much of classical sociological theory.

Diderot, the editor of the great French *Encyclopédie*, held that religious dogmatism was truth's worst enemy. Like the other *philosophes*, Diderot was deist in orientation, though he ended his life as an atheist and materialist. According to Diderot, no person has a natural right to govern another. This theme was taken up by Rousseau and analyzed at length in his *Social Contract* (1762). In this famous and influential work, Rousseau inquired after the basis of all *legitimate* authority. Agreeing with Diderot that no person has natural authority over another, and dismissing the possibility that force gives rise to any right, Rousseau concluded that civil liberties derive their legitimacy from a social contract to which individuals must consent freely. For Rousseau, the social contract is the sole foundation of the political community. By virtue of this social contract, individuals lose their natural liberties (limited merely by their ability to exercise force over one another). However, man's natural liberty promoted unlimited acquisitiveness and avarice and thus encouraged individuals to

destroy the freedom of others weaker than they. By submitting to a law vested in a social contract—a mandate that can be withdrawn at any time—individuals find in the laws to which they consent a pure expression of their being as civilized human entities. Rousseau's social philosophy had a major impact, especially on Hegel and Marx. For instance, Marx's assertion that capitalism destroys the individual's human social essence is informed by Rousseau's understanding that human freedom and human potential are not realized individualistically. Rather, they are obtained by means of an ensemble of social relations that has been exposed to reasoned and rational modes of critical self-reflection.

Perhaps the greatest Enlightenment theorist was the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). If Rousseau was the most radical of Enlightenment thinkers, Kant's philosophy was representative of the more conservative and cautious modes of thought that developed later in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, Kant's answer to the question "*Was ist Aufklärung?*" (What is Enlightenment?) is deservedly famous:

Enlightenment is man's leaving his self-caused immaturity. . . . Such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use one's intelligence without being guided by another. *Sapere Audere!* Have the courage to use your own intelligence! is therefore the motto of the Enlightenment. . . . All that is required for this enlightenment is *freedom*; and particularly the least harmful of all that may be called freedom, namely, the freedom for man to make *public* use of his reason in all matters.⁴

In this statement we see the main features of Enlightenment thought: the appeal to reason over authority and tradition; the claim that the individual can take control by means of the critical faculty of the intellect; and the powerful idea that freedom and truth are complementary, mutually reinforcing principles in life. Perhaps of greatest significance is this latter belief that there need be no contradiction among truth, freedom, individual development, and the social good.

Rousseau had suggested that the individual not only was a product of the social milieu, but also was responsible for creating those institutions that would permit humanity to attain its full potential. Kant, who admired Rousseau greatly, but who countered some of his more radical ideas, argued that the free individual was innately capable of moral self-direction. As *objects* of investigation, the properties or behaviors of individuals could be investigated according to the same scientific methodologies that would be appropriate for any natural object. As *moral subjects*, however, individuals are not part of the natural world, for God has given the individual free choice to act in either a moral or an immoral fashion. A civilized society is one that encourages individuals to act morally. But society cannot deterministically generate morality because moral action is always, in part, an outcome of free will.

As a result of the Enlightenment—specifically as a result of Rousseau's philosophy—the humanity and perfectibility of the individual were seen as contingent upon the level of social development. This particular aspect of Enlightenment thought became absolutely fundamental for Marx. The Kantian emphasis on the dualism of the individual—the view of man as both natural object and moral subject—strongly