

Current Issues in Linguistic Theory

Between Grammar and Lexicon

EDITED BY
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Yishai Tobin

BETWEEN GRAMMAR AND LEXICON

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JOHN BENJAMINS PUBLISHING COMPANY
AMSTERDAM/PHILADELPHIA

BETWEEN GRAMMAR AND LEXICON

AMSTERDAM STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND
HISTORY OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE

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Series IV – CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY

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Volume 183

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Between Grammar and Lexicon

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Introduction

This volume has its origins in a theme session entitled: "Lexical and Grammatical Classification: Same or Different?" organized by the editors at the Fifth International Cognitive Linguistics Conference held at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam on July 18th, 1997. We have included almost all of the theme session presentations as well as additional papers from that conference and some invited contributions. All the analyses in this volume explore the relationship between lexical and grammatical categories. Some illustrate the close interaction between lexical and grammatical categories in interpreting linguistic expressions; some provide data that call into question the strict dichotomy between lexicon and grammar that is sometimes assumed, which in turn suggests the need to question the value of the dichotomy itself.

In one form or another, virtually every linguistic theory makes a distinction between lexicon and grammar, though the basis for the distinction varies from one theoretical approach to another. The seeds of the modern distinction may already be seen in Aristotle, whose influence on theorizing language can hardly be overstated. Aristotle distinguished between substance (*phýsis*) and accidents (*ptōseis*) in the parts of speech now known as 'noun' and 'verb': the substance being the notion, or lexical content, expressed by the word, and the accidents being modifications of the word that according to Aristotle have no independent meaning (i.e. the cases of nouns or the tenses of verbs). He also distinguished between the individual word which signifies a concept or thought, but which by itself cannot be true or false, and the composition of words into a *logos*, or proposition, which has the property of truth or falsity (see e.g. Arens 1984, chs. 2 and 3). Later Alexandrians such as Dionysius Thrax included the discovery of "analogies" (what we might now call rules) in the scope of *grammatikē* (cf. Dinneen 1967, ch. 4). Although Aristotelian terminology does not coincide with that of modern linguistics, it is not difficult to see conceptual parallels with classical thinking in 20th century descriptions of the lexicon/grammar distinction. In general, modern approaches base the distinction on three broad themes: a

division between different types of notional content, a division between optional and obligatory elements or between ‘open class’ and ‘closed class’ elements, and/or a division between content and form. As an example of the type-of-content distinction, Boas (1966 [1911]: 29–30) states:

In the discussion of a language, the parts expressing the material contents of sentences appear to us as the subject-matter of lexicography; parts expressing the modifying relations, as the subject-matter of grammar.

Sapir’s treatment of this topic is reminiscent of his teacher, but he also explicitly includes the proposition-building function in grammar. Sapir distinguishes between “radical concepts” that name “objects, actions, qualities to talk about”, and “relational concepts” that “moor the concrete concepts to each other and construct a definite, fundamental form of proposition” (1921: 93).

Both Boas and Sapir acknowledge that the distinction between lexicon and grammar may be difficult to draw in particular cases, but both clearly regard the distinction as fundamental. An additional point in common is that both Boas and Sapir emphasize the centrality of “obligatory categories” in grammar — that is, categories that must be expressed in order to produce a correct sentence in a given language, though they vary from language to language (Boas 1966 [1911]: 31–39; Sapir and Swadesh 1964 [1946]). By contrast, lexical elements are optional: speakers are not forced to choose one rather than another.

It should be noted that Sapir’s notion of “grammatical element” subsumes both individual morphemes with relational meaning, such as the English present tense suffix *-s*, and more abstract processes such as word order (see, for example, his famous analysis of “The farmer kills the duckling” in Chapter 5 of *Language*). Other linguists, such as Bloomfield, draw the distinction somewhat differently. Bloomfield (1984 [1933]: 162) states that “the total stock of morphemes in a language is its *lexicon*.” For Bloomfield grammar is not the morphemes themselves but the principles of their arrangement, such as order and phonetic modification (1984 [1933]: 163–4), i.e. his distinction is based on content vs. form. He also notes that no actual utterance is devoid of grammatical form, since all utterances minimally involve selection of (a member of) a lexical class and modulation such as a pitch-contour, both of which carry grammatical meaning (1984 [1933]: 168–169). Bloomfield also noted a further characteristic of the lexicon, in a view which remained influential in linguistic thinking for generations: its status as repository of what is unpredictable or unproductive. “The lexicon is really an appendix of the grammar, a list of basic irregularities” (1984 [1933]: 274). Aronoff (1994: 18) sees Bloomfield as the originator of this understanding of the lexicon, which he calls “idiosyncratic-lexical”.

Post-Bloomfieldian and generative theorists have generally echoed Bloomfield's content vs. form approach in separating lexicon from grammar, though they have not necessarily agreed with him in regarding principles of grammatical arrangement as meaning-bearing units. Furthermore, in theories that have focussed on discovering universal properties of formal syntax, the "idiosyncratic-lexical" perspective has often been emphasized. Just as Dionysius Thrax saw grammar as a search for "analogies", so have generative grammarians defined grammar as the locus of productivity/predictability. By contrast, the lexicon is seen as an inventory of unpredictable features, including phonetic forms and their associated notional content, that must be memorized individually (see for example Chomsky 1965: 87, cited in Aronoff 1994: 18). The metaphors of "computation" (grammar) vs. "storage" (lexicon) have been widely used to describe this distinction (e.g. Pinker 1991). There is variation among generative theories in the properties and scope of the lexicon, as compared with syntax, but most theories agree on the premise that irregularity/regularity is central to the lexicon/grammar distinction.

Over the past decade or so, proponents of Cognitive Grammar have often challenged traditional dichotomies, including the distinction between grammar and lexicon. For example, Langacker (1988: 19) states:

Grammar (both morphology and syntax) is describable using only symbolic elements, each of which has both a semantic and a phonological pole. The symbolic units characterizing grammatical structure form a continuum with lexicon: while they differ from typical lexical items with respect to such features as complexity and abstractness, the differences are only a matter of degree, and lexical items themselves range widely along these parameters.

Similarly, those working under the rubric of grammaticalization theory typically recognize lexicon and grammar as poles separated by a continuum rather than a sharp boundary (e.g. Lehmann 1986; Heine et al. 1991, ch. 1; Hopper and Traugott 1993: 6–7). Nevertheless, some cognitive linguists find the distinction useful. For example, Talmy (1988: 165) asserts that "a fundamental design feature of language is that it has two subsystems which can be designated as the grammatical and the lexical". In a conception strongly reminiscent of Sapir, he states (*ibid.*) that "the grammatical elements of a sentence determine the majority of the *structure* of the C[ognitive] R[epresentation], while the lexical elements together contribute the majority of its *content* [emphasis in original]".

Psycholinguistic findings both support and undermine the grammar/lexicon dichotomy. In support of it, some neurolinguistic studies have suggested that there are differences in the way 'closed class' vs. 'open class' items are stored in the brain. According to Pulvermüller et al. (1995), for example, "content

words” in German correspond to neuronal assemblies equally distributed over both brain hemispheres, whereas “function words” are strongly lateralized to the left hemisphere. Research on lexical decision tasks in French by Cole and Segui (1994) found differences in response time between closed class and open class words. On the other hand, Bates and Goodman (1997) strongly advocate the inseparability of grammar and the lexicon, based on evidence culled from a plethora of experimental studies in first language acquisition, aphasia and real-time processing:

We conclude that the case for a modular distinction between grammar and the lexicon has been overstated, and that the evidence to date is compatible with a unified lexicalist account. Studies of normal children show that the emergence of grammar is highly dependent upon vocabulary size, a finding confirmed and extended in atypical populations. Studies of language breakdown in older children and adults provide no evidence for a modular dissociation between grammar and the lexicon; some structures are especially vulnerable to brain damage (e.g. function words, non-canonical word orders), but this vulnerability is also observed in neurologically intact individuals under perceptual degradation or cognitive overload. Finally, on-line studies provide evidence for early and intricate interactions between lexical and grammatical information in normal adults.

Bates and Goodman do not claim that grammatical structures do not exist, nor that their underlying representations are identical with those of individual content words, but rather argue that heterogeneous linguistic phenomena are acquired and processed by a single, unified processing system motivated by a common set of activation and learning principles. They claim that there is no need for discontinuous boundaries separating the grammar and the lexicon and advocate a unified lexical approach to grammar which is compatible with various current, functional (Fillmore et al 1988; Goldberg 1995), cognitive (Langacker 1987), and formal (Pollard and Sag 1994) linguistic approaches. Like Bates and Goodman, the papers in the present volume support a more holistic approach to the traditional grammar/lexicon dichotomy, but most of them consider this question from a sign-oriented perspective.

Contemporary sign-oriented theories of language share with Cognitive Grammar the view that all linguistic units, whether lexical or grammatical, are semiotic in nature. However most of these theories establish a theoretical distinction between lexical and grammatical signs, primarily on the basis of type of content as well as type of paradigmatic opposition (closed class vs. open class). Although sign-oriented theories are deeply indebted to the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, in fact a lexicon/grammar dichotomy may have been only

implicit in the *Cours*. Saussure cites both lexical signs (e.g., *arbre* “tree” in his famous diagram exemplifying the linguistic sign, 1986 [1916]: 67) and grammatical signs (e.g., the plural in de Saussure 1986 [1916]: 119–120) without officially distinguishing between them, despite the fact that he discusses both the meanings of signs and syntagmatic versus paradigmatic oppositions.

Guillaumean sign theory, *The Psychomechanics of Language*, distinguishes between the ‘word base’, which expresses a particular idea or lexical content and is the product of a mental operation of “discrimination” or “particularizing”, i.e., the abstraction from the general to the particular, and grammatical forms expressing concepts such as gender, number, and case, which reflect the mental operation of “generalizing”, i.e., are “mediating, vector forms which provide a support for thought as it advances toward the final form [i.e., the part of speech]” (Guillaume 1984: 117). In short, the mental operations associated with lexical signs “particularize” meanings while the mental operations associated with grammatical signs “generalize” (Guillaume 1984: 113–114, 116, 117; Hirtle 1975: 5–6). The Guillaumeans do not provide an explicit argument as to why these two converse mental operations should exist or why these (or other possible mental operations) should create two different categories of grammatical versus lexical signs other than the fact that particularizing and generalizing are well-accepted thought processes which logically imply each other.

Diver (1995: 95–98) of the Columbia School distinguishes between tight-knit systems of oppositions which exhaustively subcategorize a shared semantic substance (grammar) versus more loosely organized systems with a decreased importance of mutual opposition (lexicon). He further distinguishes the kind of relationships these different classes of signs may have. Grammatical signs stand in a ‘satellite’ relationship, i.e., they provide information about lexical items, while lexical signs do not stand in such a relationship. Of the two criteria defining grammatical signs — exhaustive classification of a semantic substance versus standing in a satellite relationship — the former is the more important of the two because it is always present while the latter may not necessarily be present (e.g., in pronouns and deictics). Diver (1995: 98–99) further attributes meaning differences between grammatical and lexical signs to the differences in the nature of the oppositions and how they are learned:

The success of the speaker in working out appropriate uses for the grammatical meanings... suggests that the grammatical system, with its semantic substance and its relations of value, has in some sense been “learned” as an entirety. The appropriate use depends crucially on this overall awareness. Recall the instance of the Sanskrit and Latin systems of number, in which the dropout of one member brings with it a reshuffling of the value relations of the remainder

[viz. Tobin this volume].

But successful use of any one link in a lexical chain does not seem to depend on a comprehensive grasp of the chain as a whole. If you learn just one link you can use that link “correctly”. A later encounter with another link seems to have no effect on the use of the first one; compare the various senses of *galvanize* [first used to describe production of an electric shock, then a process of electroplating iron with zinc, and later for a process of coating iron with zinc that does not involve electricity]. And we can hardly expect that the dropout of one link in the chain would have any particular effect on the use of the others.

One consequence of establishing this distinction between grammatical versus lexical meanings is that Diver himself attributes invariant meanings to grammatical signs but remains agnostic on the question whether lexical items have invariant meanings or not, whereas other sign-oriented linguists of his own school assign invariant meanings to lexical signs as well (e.g., Reid 1991; Tobin 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995). However, Diver does not provide an explanation as to why linguistic signs should “sort themselves” (1995: 96) into separate lexical and grammatical classes.

In Jakobsonian sign theory, grammatical meanings or categories differ from lexical in a way similar to the Columbia School: grammatical elements are considered to occur in closed sets (similar to Diver’s exhaustive categorization) which are “obligatory categories” in the Boasian sense (cf. Jakobson 1959), whereas lexical elements constitute an open set (Sangster 1982: 105). A rationale for this distinction is suggested by van Schooneveld, who has consistently explored the connection between language and perception (van Schooneveld 1983, 1987, 1991, 1994). According to van Schooneveld, all linguistic acts are acts of perception: the meanings of linguistic signs act as “identification cues needed to identify objects in extralinguistic reality” (1994: 68). However, the use of grammatical and lexical signs involves different kinds of perception. Lexical signs help identify referents in the narrated situation by providing cues for perception that remain relatively stable from one communicative act to another, and from one “observer” to another, i.e., they need not be tied to participants/properties of a particular utterance. On the other hand, grammatical signs “are operations on lexical meaning and involve therefore *necessarily* [emphasis in original] speaker and addressee. They are marked with respect to lexical meaning since they involve the spoken chain.” (ibid., 67). That is, grammatical signs give instructions (similar to Diver’s satellite relationship) about how to integrate a given lexical sign into the ongoing communication: “lexical meaning sets up a narrated situation; grammatical meaning identifies that narrated situation and

poses the question as to what that narrated situation has to do with the speaker and addressee" (van Schooneveld 1983: 159; see also Tobin 1990: 74–77). This account is reminiscent of Sapir's distinction between 'radical concepts' that name "objects, actions, qualities to talk about", and 'relational concepts' that "moor the concrete concepts to each other and construct a definite, fundamental form of proposition" (1921: 93). The important point here is that there is a communicative motivation for the lexicon/grammar distinction, which is connected to the 'satellite relationship': the lexicon designates what is being talked about, and the grammar tells the receiver how to interpret the lexical signs in a given utterance (referred to as "the synergetic relationship between lexicon and grammar" in Tobin 1990: 62–64).

The semiotic or sign-oriented definition of language underlying these theories revolves around the linguistic sign as its unit of analysis. The sign itself is represented as a dyad: a Janus-like duality inseparably composed of a signal and an invariant meaning. This relationship between signal and invariant meaning and the role each plays in the communicative act may also be viewed synergetically, i.e., there may be a cooperative interrelationship between both parts of the linguistic sign as they function together in the communicative act of creating messages. Furthermore, the relationship is often iconic: the smaller and less salient the signal is in a sign, the more vague its invariant meaning, and, therefore, the greater its 'polysemic potential'. That is, the vaguer the invariant meaning, the more potential discourse messages and possible syntactic and pragmatic functions the sign may have. "Small words" (such as the preposition *in*) may often begin as "locatives" (*in the room*), are then extended metaphorically from concrete spatial messages to the more abstract realm of "temporal" messages (*in the morning*), to the even more abstract realm of "existential" messages (*in trouble/in pieces*), to the point at which they may even change their categorial status (*to be "in"*; *the "in"-group*; *to be an "inny" or an "outy"*). This point resembles an observation made by Bybee and Pagliuca (1985: 76): that there is a relationship between generalization of meaning/widening of range of use and phonological reduction as part of the process of grammaticalization. However, they see the phonological reduction as a result of increased frequency of use as opposed to an iconic relationship between signal and meaning.

Cognitive grammarians (e.g., Herskovits 1986) and grammaticalization theorists (e.g., Heine et al. 1991) analyze such extensions as a form of polysemy. Yet it is possible to account for all the various spatial-temporal-existential messages, both literal and metaphoric, and the various syntactic and pragmatic functions such a word may obtain by positing an invariant meaning (e.g., *in* = LIMITED BY BOUNDARIES) as it is exploited in different linguistic and

situational contexts along a universal cognitive spatio-temporal-existential cline developing from more concrete to more abstract messages (Tobin 1990: 61, 1994: 23–25, this volume).

Conversely, the larger and more salient the signal of a sign, the more specific its invariant meaning may be. Therefore, its ‘polysemic potential’ may be correspondingly lower: it has fewer potential discourse messages and syntactic and pragmatic functions. This synergetic principle may be related to other lexical and grammatical phenomena as well. In many words containing stems and additional bound and/or inflectional suffixes, the larger the words, i.e., the more linguistic signs a word may be composed of, the more specific its meaning, and, therefore, the more limited its “polysemic potential” and the number of its potential syntactic and pragmatic functions (*nation–national–nationalize–nationalization*) (see also Jakobson 1971).

Invariant meanings are systematically and synergetically opposed to each other in two fundamental ways: paradigmatically, based on their value relationships within lexical and grammatical systems and syntagmatically, in discourse, to produce coherent messages. As we have seen, grammatical signs are usually considered to be in exhaustive, mutually exclusive relationships within tightly organized paradigmatic systems based on their semantic value (e.g., singular versus plural within a grammatical system of Number, or past versus non-past in a grammatical system of Tense, etc.). Lexical signs, on the other hand, are generally considered to be less systematically ordered and much less tightly organized within larger semantic fields; they exhibit relationships such as antonymy, polarity, ambiguity, synonymy, homonymy, etc. There may very well be, however, a synergetic relationship between these two fundamental categories of linguistic signs. Communication is based on these different kinds of sign systems, the lexical and the grammatical. Speakers of languages exploit each kind of sign for different communicative purposes. In general, the brunt of communication is on the lexicon. Lexical signs usually provide us with the most basic information, i.e., what we are talking about. The grammar, on the other hand, provides us with additional information or further refines the relational aspects of what is being talked about (the lexicon). Indeed, both in first and second language acquisition, lexical signs usually play a greater communicative role than grammatical signs. There is abundant anecdotal evidence of people claiming “to understand” or “speak” a language without “knowing its grammar”. In short, it may safely be assumed that the grammar is imposed on the lexicon. Iconically speaking, lexical signs are usually independent morphemes or words composed of relatively independent and autonomous roots and stems to which bound morphemes, often in the form of affixes, are attached. The grammatical

signs of the language, on the other hand, are oftentimes those very same bound morphemes or affixes which are added to the more relatively independent roots and stems (see also Haiman 1980).

The relationship between lexical and grammatical signs and their different roles in communication has been outlined above. The fact that linguistic signs can and do span the opposition between the lexicon and the grammar — as this volume claims — contributes even further to the synergetic cooperation between encoders and decoders in establishing more efficient and successful communication. The more that signs can align and realign themselves along a holistic and dynamic continuum combining lexical and grammatical properties, the better chances both encoders and decoders have in working together to communicate more effectively.

The contributors to this volume explore a range of linguistic phenomena that span the grammar/lexicon continuum and move beyond the traditional dichotomy in a number of different ways. Taken together, they promote a more holistic view of classification based on theoretical and methodological criteria reflecting cognitive aspects of human language, which can be applied to both the realms of the grammar and the lexicon. A further connection uniting the chapters in this volume is that they all share a functional, cognitive, communication-oriented approach to linguistics despite their theoretical diversity: the papers by Contini-Morava, Otheguy and Stern, Klein-Andreu and de Jonge follow the sign-oriented tenets of the Columbia School; Andrews promotes the semiotic-oriented precepts of Charles Sanders Peirce and belongs to the Jakobsonian-van Schooneveldian School of linguistics; Hirtle and Morris represent the Guillaumean School of the Psychomechanics of Language; Tobin and Gorlach present an eclectic view of linguistic sign systems combining theoretical aspects of the three abovementioned schools; Kirtchuk adheres to the structuralist view of the Jerusalem School in general and the morphogenesis of language in particular; while Janda, Ryder, and Ravid and Shlesinger define themselves as Cognitive Linguists. Therefore this volume may be compared to other anthologies which combine various sign-oriented linguistic theories with other cognitive and functionalist-oriented approaches (e.g., Andrews and Tobin 1996; Contini-Morava and Goldberg 1995; Klein-Andreu 1983; Reid and Otheguy (forthcoming), and Tobin 1988, 1989).

The volume itself is divided into two parts. Part I, *Number and Gender Systems Across Languages*, is further subdivided into three sections dealing with (1) Noun Classification; (2) Number Systems; and (3) Gender Systems. Part II, *Verb Systems and Parts of Speech Across Languages*, is divided into two sections: (1) Tense and Aspect and (2) Parts of Speech. Various theoretical and methodological approaches illuminating the holistic and cognitive perception of

language are exemplified in a diverse range of languages and language families: Bantu (Swahili); Guaykuran (Ge-Pano-Caraib: Pilagá); Indo-European (English, Russian, Polish, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Spanish); and Semitic (Hebrew).

Each of the thirteen papers in this volume, regardless of its specific theme, theoretical approach, or language(s) analyzed, possesses a very basic expositional line. It first presents a sign, or a set, or a system of signs and then examines their uses and functions, pointing out how they span the opposition of the traditional dichotomy of lexicon and grammar. We, the editors, were struck by the close interrelationships among the papers. This is not surprising if we consider the synergetic, holistic, and cognitive principles outlined above as fundamental *leitmotifs* underlying all of the papers in this volume.

Contini-Morava presents a new perspective on noun class in Swahili as number. Oftentimes the same morphological forms simultaneously signal information about noun class or grammatical gender and number (cf. Kirtchuk). Traditionally the various aspects of these morphemes are analyzed separately and independently: noun class or gender is usually treated as a lexical feature assigned to nominal roots whereas number is viewed as a grammatical or inflectional feature. From the point of view of semantics, noun classes and number have been treated differently as well. It is commonly believed that noun classes have lost their original semantic coherence and have become more “grammatical” in nature. Number, on the other hand, has traditionally been viewed as a purely grammatical category with semantically unproblematic forms indicating familiar concepts such as “singular” and “plural” (cf. Hirtle), or less commonly “dual” or “paucal” (cf. Janda and Tobin). Contini-Morava argues against both these assumptions. She shows that the noun classes in Swahili may be less semantically arbitrary than previously assumed and specifically challenges the assumption that number is unproblematic semantically. In fact, her challenge undermines the widely held assumption that noun class and number are disparate phenomena and shows that the problem of number is intrinsically connected to the meanings of the noun classes themselves. She first outlines the asymmetry of the singular–plural morphology of the noun class system in Swahili: some classes show reciprocal singular–plural pairing whereas others do not. She then provides an innovative reanalysis of number in Swahili as a system of degree of individuation rather than a binary opposition between “singular” and “plural”. For Contini-Morava, individuation indicates a scale of relative discreteness, homogeneity, and boundedness in space. She thus proposes an alternative classification system combining noun class and number which consistently accounts for the allocation of nominal stems in Swahili as a reflection of a scale of individuation of the entities named by the nouns that comprise the various noun classes. In so

doing, she shows how a new cognitive-semantic perspective combining both lexical and grammatical phenomena can yield a more comprehensive and coherent explanation of the complex noun classification system in Swahili, and perhaps other Bantu languages as well. The analysis is supported by statistical data. Contini-Morava's concept of individuation can be compared and contrasted with the notions of the continue versus the discontinue classification of space found in Hirtle's and Morris's papers on number and gender in English based on Guillaumean theory; the cognitive concept of individuation presented by Janda for the dual number in Polish, Bulgarian, and Macedonian in its extension from meaning "dual" to meaning "virile"; Tobin's view of continuous versus discontinuous perceptions of space, time and existence related to the marked distinctive feature of 'Semantic Integrality' underlying the number system of Hebrew in general and the dual number in particular; and the concepts of discreteness and individuation found in Otheguy and Stern's and Klein-Andreu's analyses of gender in the Spanish lexicon and in third person clitic pronouns in Spanish according to the Columbia School framework. Her use of quantitative validation methods is also shared by the other Columbia School papers found in this volume (de Jonge, Klein-Andreu, Otheguy and Stern).

Kirtchuk explores the connection between deixis and noun classification in Pilagá, a language from the Guaykuruan (or Ge-Pano-Caraib) family spoken by approximately two thousand people in Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia. He combines the traditionally disparate lexical and grammatical categories of noun class and deixis in his innovative analysis of noun classification in Pilagá. Kirtchuk goes beyond Pilagá *per se* and explores the role of deixis in the development of noun class or gender systems, pronouns, demonstratives, and articles, etc. across languages, and investigates the evolutionary relationships among them. In his analysis of Pilagá, Kirtchuk brings in various lexical, grammatical, pragmatic, and cognitive criteria to describe and explain morphology which classifies nouns in the following ways: human, animate, and inanimate entities approaching a speaker; entering his/her field of vision either as a result of the speaker's movement in space, or on the time axis; when the noun's referent is a natural phenomenon affecting the speaker on the time axis; when the noun's referent is a standing person; or a plant or a tree in a vertical position; or an inanimate in a vertical position; or a person lying; or an animal lying; or a reptile; or a dead person or animal; or a course of water; or an inanimate in a horizontal position; or a piece of land; or a person sitting or squatting, or a bird or quadruped on their feet; or when a referent is in a "completed" state; or in a "heap"; or is a celestial body; or is a container; or a person moving away from the speaker; or an animate or inanimate entity doing the same; or an inanimate