KAREN E. ROSENBLUM TONI-MICHELLE C. TRAVIS

The MEANING *of* DIFFERENCE

American Constructions of Race, Sex and Gender, Social Class, and Sexual Orientation

THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE

American Constructions of Race, Sex and Gender, Social Class, and Sexual Orientation

Karen E. Rosenblum
George Mason University

Toni-Michelle C. Travis
George Mason University

The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.

New York St. Louis San Francisco Auckland Bogotá Caracas
Lisbon London Madrid Mexico City Milan Montreal New Delhi
San Juan Singapore Sydney Tokyo Toronto

This book was set in Times Roman by The Clarinda Company.
The editors were Jill S. Gordon and Katherine Blake;
the production supervisor was Paula Keller.
The cover was designed by Edward Butler.
Project Supervision was done by Tage Publishing Service, Inc.
Quebecor Printing/Fairfield was printer and binder.

THE MEANING OF DIFFERENCE
American Constructions of Race, Sex and Gender, Social Class, and Sexual Orientation

Copyright ©1996 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a data base or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Acknowledgments appear on pages 433–435, and on this page by reference.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

4 5 6 7 8 9 0 FGR FGR 9 0 9 8 7

ISBN 0-07-053962-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The meaning of difference: American constructions of race, sex, and gender, social class, and sexual orientation / Karen E. Rosenblum, Toni-Michelle Travis.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p.).
ISBN 0-07-053962-6
1. United States—Social conditions—1980– 2. Pluralism (Social sciences)—United States. I. Rosenblum, Karen Elaine. II. Travis, Toni-Michelle, (date).
HN59.2.M44 1996
306′.0973—dc20 95-36974

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Karen E. Rosenblum is Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of Women's Studies at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. She is also a faculty member in American Studies and Cultural Studies. Professor Rosenblum received her Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Colorado, Boulder. Her areas of research and teaching include sex and gender, language, and deviance. Professor Rosenblum's work has appeared in many scholarly collections and in journals such as *The British Journal of Sociology, The Journal of Family Issues, Semiotica, Sociological Forum, Sociological Inquiry, and Women's Studies International Forum.*

Toni-Michelle C. Travis is Associate Professor of Government and Politics at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. She is also a faculty member in the Women's Studies and African American Studies Programs. Professor Travis received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago. Her areas of research and teaching include race and gender in political participation, women and politics, and interest group politics. Professor Travis' work has appeared in numerous scholarly collections. She has served as the President of the National Capital Area Political Science Association and the Women's Caucus of the American Political Science Association, is on the editorial board of *Urban Affairs Quarterly* and *Women & Politics*, has served as a grant reviewer for the American Council of Learned Societies, and is a frequent news commentator on Virginia politics.

PREFACE

This book examines the contemporary American constructions of race, sex and gender, social class, and sexual orientation. It is premised on the idea that while each of these statuses is distinctive in many ways, an understanding of their shared features provides conceptual and practical insights that are useful for all of us.

The volume combines the features of both a textbook and a reader. It is divided into three main sections. Each section begins with a Framework Essay that offers a "generic" conceptual frame and is followed by a set of readings that illustrate and extend the points made in the essay. The readings have been specifically selected for the generalizability of their analyses to race, sex, class, and sexual orientation statuses. For example, Deborah Tannen's article on women as a "marked category" can be extended to consider how people of color, gays, and those who are poor are also "marked." The Framework Essays are not introductions to the readings in the usual sense. Rather, they are intended to frame and supplement the selections; generally they offer material *not* addressed in the readings. Thus, the Framework Essays and readings may be used jointly or independently of one another, just as the book's three main sections may be treated as freestanding units.

The volume has especially been designed with an eye toward the pedagogic difficulties that accompany the topics of race, sex and gender, social class, and sexual orientation. Our aim has been to provide a fresh look at a set of issues that many say they are tired of talking about. Thus, we have included several original accounts written by students (and presented here as boxed inserts) and a chapter explaining the historical and legal context of ten key Supreme Court cases affecting America's race,

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com

sex, social class, sexual orientation, and language minorities. To move beyond what are often well-entrenched positions, we have also tried to minimize use of the terminology that currently predominates in campus discussions of racism, sexism, and homophobia.

Many colleagues and friends have helped us clarify the ideas we present here. David Haines provided a thoughtful critique of the Framework Essays and was an endless source of conceptual and technical insight. Theodore W. Travis provided insight on Supreme Court decisions, their relationship to social values, and their impact on American society. Our colleague Victoria Rader reviewed several versions of the manuscript, lending us the vision and encouragement of a master teacher on these topics. We also owe special thanks to our George Mason students who shared with us their understanding of American constructions of difference, and to Sheila Barrows, Mark Colvin, Cybele Eidenschenk, Kathi George, Beth Gordon, Joshua Haines, Lois Horton, Elaine Hyams, Susan Kent, Barbara Knight, Michelle Massé, Paul McLaughlin, Rose Pascarell, Louise Rosenblum, and John Stone for their review and comments on the material. The support provided by Katherine Blake, Jill Boggs, Phil Butcher, and Jill Gordon at McGraw-Hill was much appreciated. Finally, it was the work of Joan Lester and the Equity Institute in Emeryville, California that convinced us of the progress that could be made through a comparison of race, sex, class, and sexual orientation.

The review process conducted by McGraw-Hill reaffirmed our faith in the publishers of textbooks. McGraw-Hill provided a panel of accomplished scholars with broad expertise, thus allowing us a chance to tap the range of fields a volume such as this addresses. Joe Feagin, Linda Grant, Allan Johnson, Mari Molseed, Joyce Nielsen, Brenda Phillips, Suey Spivey, Becky Thompson, and several anonymous reviewers offered excellent suggestions for readings as well as a vision of the project as a whole. Becky Thompson in particular reviewed multiple versions of this material. Her enthusiasm and inspired suggestions for improvement gave us hope that a volume such as this would be useful.

Karen E. Rosenblum
Toni-Michelle C. Travis

CONTENTS

Preface ix

SECTION 1

Constructing Categories of Difference

FRAMEWORK ESSAY 1

WHAT IS RACE? 35

1. **Who Is Black? One Nation's Definition**
   F. James Davis 35
   Boxed Insert: "A Wonderful Opportunity," R.M.A 43
2. **La Raza and the Melting Pot: A Comparative Look at Multiethnicity**
   Carlos A. Fernández 43
3. **Asian American Panethnicity**
   Yen Le Espiritu 51
   Boxed Insert: "I Thought My Race Was Invisible," Sherri H. Pereira 61
4. **Whiteness as an 'Unmarked' Cultural Category**
   Ruth Frankenberg 62

WHAT IS SEX? WHAT IS GENDER? 68

5. **The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough**
   Anne Fausto-Sterling 68
6. **The Berdache Tradition**
   Walter L. Williams 73
7. **Gender Stereotypes and Roles**
   Susan Basow 81
   Boxed Insert: "He Hit Her," Tim Norton 96

WHAT IS SOCIAL CLASS? 97

8. **Rewards and Opportunities: The Politics and Economics of Class in the U. S.**
   Gregory Mantsios 97
   Boxed Insert: "I Am a Pakistani Woman," Hoorie I. Siddique 104
9. **The Undeserving Poor**
   Michael B. Katz 104

WHAT IS SEXUAL ORIENTATION? 120

10. **Homosexuality: A Social Phenomenon**
    Barbara Sherman Heyl 120
11. **The Development of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identities**
    Heidi Levine and Nancy J. Evans 130
    Boxed Insert: "An Opportunity to Get Even" Carol A. Mabry 136

SECTION 2

Experiencing Difference

FRAMEWORK ESSAY 137

12. **Oppression**
    Marilyn Frye 163

13. Talking Past Each Other: Black and White Languages of Race
Bob Blauner 167

Boxed Insert: "Where Are You From?" C. C. 176

14. Wears Jump Suit. Sensible Shoes. Uses Husband's Last Name.
Deborah Tannen 176

15. Secrets and Anger?
David Mura 179

16. A Question of Class
Dorothy Allison 184

Boxed Insert: "That Moment of Visibility" Rose B. Pascarell 193

17. Teleology on the Rocks
Patricia J. Williams 193

Boxed Insert: "Play Some Rolling Stones," Mark Donald Stockenberg 208

18. Why Are Droves of Unqualified Kids Getting Into Our Top Colleges? Because Their Dads Are Alumni
John Larew 208

19. Toward a New Vision: Race, Class, and Gender as Categories of Analysis and Connection
Patricia Hill Collins 213

Boxed Insert: "I Am Legally Blind," Beth Gordon 224

20. Black Sexuality: The Taboo Subject
Cornel West 225

SECTION 3

The Meaning of Difference

FRAMEWORK ESSAY 231

LAW AND POLITICS

21. Ten Key Supreme Court Cases 251

22. The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action
James E. Jones, Jr. 272

23. English in a Multicultural America
Dennis Baron 286

24. The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison
Jeffrey H. Reiman 292

THE ECONOMY

25. The Wage Gap: Myths and Facts
National Committee on Pay Equity 304

26. The Racial Income Gap
Andrew Hacker 308

27. Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s
United States Commission on Civil Rights 315

28. Making Sense of Diversity: Recent Research on Hispanic Minorities in the United States
Alejandro Portes and Cynthia Truelove 330

SCIENCE

29. The Mismeasure of Woman
Carol Tavris 336

30. Homosexuality: From Sin to Sickness to Life-Style
Peter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider 353

31. The Health of Black Folk: Disease, Class, and Ideology in Science
Nancy Krieger and Mary Bassett 376

POPULAR CULTURE

32. Backlash
Susan Faludi 382

Boxed Insert: "Just Something You Did as a Man," Francisco Hernandez 399

Boxed Insert: "Basketball," Andrea M. Busch 400

33. A Field Trip to Straight America
Marshall Kirk and Hunter Madsen 400

Boxed Insert: "A White Male Rescued Me," Meticia Watson 411

Boxed Insert: "You Can't Forget Humiliation," Amy L. Helm 412

LANGUAGE

34. Racism in the English Language
Robert B. Moore 413

35. Gender Stereotyping in the English Language
Laurel Richardson 420

36. To Be and Be Seen: The Politics of Reality
Marilyn Frye 426

As we prepared this volume, we were struck by how frequently the topics of race and racism, sex and sexism, sexual orientation, homophobia,[1] and poverty appeared in the news, as themes in popular films and music, as the subject of talk shows and soap operas, as research themes in scholarly journals and monographs, in sermons, as issues of practical concern in work and educational settings, and as simply topics of everyday conversation. There is much intensity evident around these subjects; that intensity inevitably promotes both the desire to talk about these topics and the desire to avoid them.

As a consequence, readers may have strong reactions to the material included here. Whatever the reaction, however, it provides key analytic information. In broadest terms, one is likely to discover oneself taking either an "essentialist" or "constructionist" approach to this material.

The Essentialist and Constructionist Orientations

The difference between the constructionist and essentialist orientations is illustrated in the tale of the three umpires, first apparently told by social psychologist Hadley Cantril:

> Hadley Cantril relates the story of three baseball umpires discussing their profession. The first umpire said, 'Some are balls and some are strikes, and I call them as they are.' The second replied, 'Some's balls and some's strikes, and I call 'em as I sees 'em.' The third thought about it and said, 'Some's balls and some's strikes, but they ain't nothing 'till I calls 'em' (Henshel and Silverman, 1975:26).

The first umpire takes an essentialist position. In arguing that "I call them as they are," he indicates his assumption that balls and strikes are entities that exist in the world independent of his perception of them. For this umpire, "balls" and "strikes" are distinct, easily identified, mutually exclusive categories, and he is a neutral and relatively powerless observer of them. In all, he "regards knowledge as objective and independent of mind, and himself as the impartial reporter of things 'as they are'" (Pfuhl, 1986:5). For this essentialist umpire, balls and strikes exist in the world; he simply observes their presence.

Thus, the essentialist orientation presumes that the items in a category all share some "essential" quality, their "ball-ness" or "strike-ness." For essentialists, the categories of race, sex, sexual orientation, and social class identify significant, empirically verifiable similarities among and differences between people. From the essentialist perspective, for example, racial categories exist apart from any social or cultural processes; they are objective categories of essential difference between people.

---

[1]The term homophobia was coined in 1973 by psychologist George Weinberg to describe an irrational fear of, or anger toward, homosexuals. While the psychological application has been abandoned, the word remains in common usage as describing a strong opposition to or rejection of same-sex relationships. The term leaves much to be desired, but the alternative that has emerged, heterosexism, is not yet in conventional usage. Heterosexism has been defined as the presumption that all people are heterosexual and that heterosexuality is the only acceptable form of sexual expression.

Though somewhat removed from pure essentialism, the second umpire still affirms that there is an independent, objective reality, though it is one which is subject to *interpretation.* For him, balls and strikes exist in the world, but individuals might have different perceptions of which is which.

The third umpire, who argues "they ain't nothing till I call 'em," is unabashedly constructionist. He argues that "conceptions such as 'strikes' and 'balls' have no meaning except that given them by the observer" (Pfuhl, 1986:5); balls and strikes do not exist until an umpire names them as such. While the essentialist presumes an external world with distinct categories existing independent of observation, the constructionist argues that reality cannot be separated from the way that a culture makes sense of it. From the constructionist perspective *social* processes determine that one set of differences is more important than another, just as social processes shape our understanding of what those differences *mean.* The constructionist assumes that "essential" similarities are conferred and created rather than intrinsic to the phenomenon, that the way that a society identifies its members tells us more about the society than about the individuals so classified. Thus, the constructionist perspective treats classifications such as race as socially constructed through political, legal, economic, scientific, and religious institutions. Although individuals do not on their own create such classifications, macro-level social processes and institutions do. That this textbook asks *how* we have arrived at our race, sex, sexual orientation, and social class categories signals our use of the constructionist perspective.

Few of us have grown up as constructionists, however. More likely, we were raised as essentialists who believe that master statuses such as race or sex encompass clear-cut, immutable, and in some way meaningful differences. From an essentialist perspective, one simply *is* what one *is:* someone with African ancestry is black, and a person with male genitalia is male even if he does not feel like a male. It is fairly unsettling to have these bedrock classifications questioned—which is what the constructionist perspective does.

However, not all of us have grown up as essentialists. Those from mixed racial or religious backgrounds are likely to be familiar with the ways in which identity is not clear cut. They grow up understanding how definitions of self vary with the context; how others try to define one as belonging in a particular category; and how in many ways, one's very presence calls prevailing classification systems into question. For example, being asked "What are you?" is a common experience among mixed-race people. Such experiences make evident the social constructedness of racial identity.

Still, few of us are likely to take either an essentialist or constructionist perspective exclusively. Our own perspective as authors has been constructionist, and our goal in this book—to examine the social processes that create the categories of race, sex, sexual orientation, and class—is a constructionist one. Nonetheless, we have sometimes had to rely on essentialist terms we ourselves find problematic. The irony of simultaneously questioning the idea of race, but still talking about "blacks," "whites," and "Asians"; or of rejecting a dualistic approach to sexual identity, while still using the terms "gay" and "straight" has not escaped us. Indeed, throughout our discussion we have used the currently favored essentialist

phrase "sexual orientation" over the more constructionist "sexual preference" (a topic to which we will return shortly).[2]

Further, there is a serious risk that a text such as this falsely identifies people on the basis of either their sex, or race, or sexual orientation, or social class, despite the fact that master statuses are not parts of a person that can simply be broken off from one another like the segments of a Tootsie Roll (Spelman, 1988). Each of us is always simultaneously all of our master statuses, and it is that complex package that exists in the world. While Section I of the readings may make it seem as if these were separable statuses, they are not. Indeed, even the concept of master status suggests that there can be only one dominating status, though we would reject that position.

Both constructionism and essentialism are used in the social sciences. While we are offering constructionism here as a useful approach to contemporary master status formulations, essentialism has nonetheless been a critical element in the development of modern science. It has been the basis of probability theory and statistics (Hilts, 1973) and forms the bedrock for most social scientific research. While in its common uses, essentialism carries static, ahistoric, and determinist connotations, these are not inevitable parts of the perspective (McLaughlin, 1994; Sober, 1980).

Essentialism and constructionism can be found both among the proponents of contemporary social movements and among those who criticize those movements. For example, some feminists argue that women are essentially different from men, as do those critical of feminism. Similarly, constructionism dominated the gay rights movement of the 1970s, but now characterizes the perspective of those opposed to gay relationships. During the 1970s many took a constructionist approach to sexuality, arguing especially that women could choose same-sex relationships (Faderman, 1991); some in the women's movement debated whether one could be a good feminist and be a practicing heterosexual. The phrase common among both gay and heterosexual people at the time was a constructionist one: "sexual preference."

Over the years, however, "sexual preference" has been replaced by "sexual orientation." Thus, an essentialist perspective has come to dominate both the heterosexual and gay communities. Whereas "preference" conveyed active, human decision-making with the possibility of change, "orientation" is understood as something people are "born with," something that is constant over time. While many religious groups opposed to same-sex relationships maintain a constructionist approach—arguing that sexuality exists within the realm of personal control—the prevailing view in both the popular culture and among gay activists now appears to be essentialist.

One explanation for this shift is that essentialist explanations emerge as a defense when levels of prejudice are high (Faderman, 1991). Journalist and gay activist Darryl Rist makes the appeal of essentialist explanations clear in this description:

[2]"Sexual identity" may now be replacing sexual orientation. It could be used in either an essentialist or constructionist way.

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com

> [Chris Yates's parents were] . . . Pentecostal ministers who had tortured his adolescence with Christian cures for sexual perversity. Shock and aversion therapies under born-again doctors and gruesome exorcisms of sexual demons by spirit-filled preachers had culminated in a plan to have him castrated by a Mexican surgeon who touted the procedure as a way to make the boy, if not straight, at least sexless. Only then had the terrified son rebelled.
>
> Then, in the summer of 1991, the journal *Science* reported anatomical differences between the brains of homosexual and heterosexual men. . . . The euphoric media—those great purveyors of cultural myths—drove the story wildly. Every major paper in the country headlined the discovery smack on the front page. . . . Like many others, I suspect, Chris Yates's family saw in this newly reported sexual science a way out of its wrenching impasse. After years of virtual silence between them and their son, Chris's parents drove several hundred miles to visit him and ask for reconciliation. Whatever faded guilt they might have felt for the family's faulty genes was nothing next to the reassurance that neither by a perverse upbringing nor by his own iniquity was Chris or the family culpable for his urges and actions. "We could never have condoned this if you could do something to change it. But when we finally understood that you were *born* that way, we knew we'd been wrong. We had to ask your forgiveness" (Rist, 1992:425–26).

It is understandable that those under attack would find essentialist orientations appealing, just as the expansiveness of constructionist approaches would be appealing in more tolerant eras.

Why have we spent so much time describing the essentialist and constructionist perspectives? Discussions about racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty generate the intensity they do partly because they involve the clash of essentialist and constructionist assumptions. Essentialists are likely to view categories of people as in some important way "essentially" different; constructionists are likely to see these differences as socially created and arbitrary. An essentialist asks what causes people to be different; a constructionist asks about the origin and consequence of the categorization system itself. While arguments about the nature and cause of racism, sexism, homophobia, and poverty are disputes about power and justice, from the perspective of essentialism and constructionism they are also disputes about what differences in sex, color, sexuality, and social class *mean.*

Both perspectives may be used as a justification for discrimination, but there is one clear advantage to the constructionist approach: It is from that perspective that one understands that all the talk about race, sex, sexual orientation, and social class has a profound significance. These are conversations about what it means to be a particular kind of person, a member of a particular category. The topics carry the intensity that they do because they are about who we *are.* This talk is not simply *about* difference and similarity; it is itself the *creation* of difference and similarity. In the sections that follow, we will examine how categories of people are named, aggregated, dichotomized, and stigmatized—all toward the construction of difference.

Naming and Aggregating

Classification schemes are by definition systems for *naming* categories of people; thus constructionists pay special attention to the names people use to refer to themselves and others—particularly the points at which new names are asserted,

the negotiations that surround the use of particular names, and those occasions when categories of people are grouped together or separated out.

Asserting a Name The issues surrounding the assertion of a name are similar whether we are talking about individuals or categories of people. A change of name involves, to some extent, the claim of a new identity. For example, one of our colleagues decided that she wanted to be called by her full first name, rather than by its abbreviated version because the diminutive had come to seem childish to her. It took a few rounds of reminding people that this was her new name, and with most that was adequate. One colleague, however, argued that he simply could not adapt to the new name; she would just have to tolerate his continuing with the previous version. This was a small but public battle about who had the power to name whom. Did she have the power to enforce her own naming, or did he have the power to name her despite her wishes? (Eventually, she won.) A more disturbing example was provided by a young woman who wanted to keep her "maiden" name after she married. Her fiancé agreed with her decision, recognizing how reluctant he would be to give up his name were the tables turned. When her prospective mother-in-law heard of this possibility, however, she was outraged. In her mind, a rejection of her family's name was a rejection of her family: she urged her son and his fiancé to reconsider getting married. (We do not know how this story ended.)

Thus, the assertion of a name can yield some degree of social conflict. On both the personal and a societal level, naming can involve the claim of a particular identity and the rejection of others' power to impose a name. All of this applies to individual preferences. For example, is one Chicano, Mexican American, Mexican, Latino, Hispanic, Spanish-American, or Hispaño; Native American, American Indian, or Sioux; African American or black; girl or woman; Asian American or Japanese American; gay or homosexual? This list does not begin to cover the full range of possibilities, or include geographic and historical variations.

> Geographically, *Hispanic* is preferred in the Southeast and much of Texas. New Yorkers use both *Hispanic* and *Latino*. Chicago, where no nationality has attained a majority, prefers *Latino*. In California, the word *Hispanic* has been barred from the Los Angeles *Times*, in keeping with the strong feelings of people in the community. Some people in New Mexico prefer *Hispaño*. Politically, *Hispanic* belongs to the right and some of the center, while *Latino* belongs to the left and the center. Historically, the choice went from *Spanish* or *Spanish-speaking* to *Latin American, Latino,* and *Hispanic* (Shorris, 1992:xvi–xvii).

Thus, determining the appropriate name by which to refer to a category of people is no easy task. It is unlikely that all members of the category prefer the same name; the name members use for one another may not be acceptable when used by those outside the group; nor is it always advisable to ask what name a person prefers. We once saw an old friend become visibly angry when asked whether he preferred the term "black" or "African American." "Either one is fine with me," he replied, "*I* know what *I* am." To him, such a question indicated that he was being seen as a member of a category rather than as an individual.

As we have said, on both the individual and collective level naming may involve a redefinition of self, an assertion of power, and a rejection of others' ability to impose an identity. For this reason, social movements often claim a new name, just as those who continue to use the old name may do so as a way to indicate opposition to the movement. For example, in the current American setting, we may be in the midst of a change from "black" to "African American." "Black" emerged in opposition to "Negro" as the Black Power movement of the Black Panthers, Black Muslims, and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came to distinguish itself from the more mainstream Martin Luther King wing of the civil rights movement (Smith, 1992).

The term "Negro" had itself been born of a rejection of the term "colored" that dominated the mid- to late-nineteenth century. The term "African" had preceeded "colored," and was used as late as the 1820s. Led by influential leaders such as W. E. B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington, " 'Negro' was seen as a 'stronger' term [than "colored"] . . . despite its association with racial epithets. 'Negro' was defined to stand for a new way of thinking about Blacks" (Smith, 1992:497–8).

On the same grounds, president of the National Urban Coalition Ramona H. Edelin, proposed in 1988 using "African American" instead of "black." The campaign to adopt the term, led by Coalition spokesman Jessie Jackson, met with immediate success among black leaders and now both terms are in use (Smith, 1992).[3]

Ironically, the phrase "people of color" is emerging now as a reference encompassing all non-white Americans. White students unfamiliar with the historical background of "colored" will sometimes use that term interchangeably with "people of color." Unaware of the historical distinction, they are surprised by the anger with which they are met.

Each of these changes—from "Negro" to "black" to "African American"—was first promoted by activists as a way to demonstrate their commitment to change and militance. Many of the same themes are reflected in the history of the terms "Chicano," and "Chicanismo." As reporter Ruben Salazar wrote in the 1960s, "a chicano is a Mexican-American with a non-Anglo image of himself" (Shorris, 1992:101).

> [Chicanismo] had no official beginning. It may have started in the mid-sixties with the Brown Berets or in 1967 with the publication of the epic poem *I Am Joaquin* by the former professional boxer, Rudolfo 'Corky' Gonzales. The chicanos showed their power for the first time in Los Angeles in March of 1968, when ten thousand students walked out of barrio high schools. . . . Chicano students protested in Colorado, Texas, and Arizona. The complaints were always the same: poor facilities, racism, cultural bias, and a tracking system that prepared Latino students for the worst, lowest-paying jobs (Shorris, 1992:103).

Presently, it is unclear whether "Chicano" continues as a favored name among Mexican Americans (or Mexicans as many prefer to call themselves).

---

[3]One can find Black Studies, Afro-American Studies, and African American Studies programs in universities across the country.

Similar themes emerge in the history of the gay rights movement. As Peter Conrad and Joseph Schneider describe in selection 30, the term "homosexual" was coined in 1869 by a Hungarian physician in an effort to thwart the criminalization of same-sex relationships. The term dominated the medical and psychological literature until the emergence of the contemporary gay rights movement, which argued for rejecting the term homosexual as a way to reject the medico-psychological treatment of same-sex relations as pathological. Presently "gay" is used both as a generic term encompassing men and women and as a specific reference to men.[4]

The 1990 founding of Queer Nation (which grew out of the AIDS activist organization, ACT UP) may signal the eventual demise of "gay," however. This use of "queer"—as for example in the slogan "We're here. We're queer. Get used to it."—attempts to transform an epithet into a label of pride and militance. Nonetheless, use of the word is also much debated within the gay community: Those against it argue that it reflects the internalization of homophobic imagery, those who favor it argue that it offers an appropriate defiance of straight culture.

Just as each of these social movements has involved a public renaming that proclaims pride and a changed attitude, the women's movement has asserted "woman" as a replacement for "girl." The significance of these two terms is revealed in the account of a student who described a running feud with her roommate. The student preferred the word "woman" rather than "girl," arguing that the application of the word "girl" to females past adolescence was insulting. Her roommate, who was also female, just as strongly preferred the term "girl" and just as regularly applied it to the females she knew. Finally, they tried to "agree to disagree," but each of them had such strong feelings on the matter it was clear they could not be roommates much longer.

How could these two words destroy their relationship? It appears that English speakers use the terms "girl" and "woman" to refer to quite different qualities. "Woman" (like "man") is understood to convey adulthood, power, and sexuality; "girl" (like "boy") connotes youth, powerlessness, and irresponsibility (Richardson, 1988). Thus, the two roommates were asserting quite different places for themselves in the world. One claimed adulthood; the other saw herself as not having achieved that. This is the explanation offered by many females: It is not so much that they like being "girls," as that they value youth and/or do not yet feel justified in calling themselves "women." Yet this is precisely the identity the women's movement has put forward: "We cannot be girls any more, we must be women."

---

[4]In the seventeenth century *gay* became associated with an addiction to social pleasure, dissipation, and loose morality and was used to refer to female prostitutes (e.g., gay girl). The term was apparently first used in reference to a male homosexual in 1925 in Australia. "It may have been both the connotations of femininity and those of immorality that led American homosexuals to adopt the title 'gay' with some self-irony in the 1920s. The slogan 'Glad to be Gay,' adopted by both female and male homosexuals, and the naming of the Gay Liberation Front, which was born from the Stonewall resistance riots following police raids on homosexual bars in New York in 1969, bear witness to a greater self-confidence" (Mills, 1989:102).

The Negotiation and Control of Names While individuals and social movements may assert a name for themselves, government agencies also control access to such categorizations. Still, these agencies are not impervious to social movements and social change. The recent history of U.S. Census Bureau classifications offers an example of the negotiation of a categorization system.

Census classifications and census data are significant for a variety of reasons. The census determines the apportionment of seats (among states) in the U.S. House of Representatives, and it affects the distribution of federal monies to states, counties, and cities for "everything from feeding the poor to running mass transit systems" (Espiritu, 1992:116). Since the census is conducted only once every ten years, its results shape policy for a decade.

Most important to our discussion, events in the 1960s and 1970s elevated the importance of census data:

> There were the civil rights movement and its offshoots such as the Mexican-American Brown Power movement. In addition, the federal government initiated the War Against Poverty and the Great Society programs. These movements and programs stated clearly that poor minority groups [specifically, Hispanics, Native Americans, blacks, and Asian or Pacific Islanders] had a legitimate claim to better conditions in cities. Several of the social welfare programs of President Johnson's Great Society distributed dollars by means of statistically driven grant-in-aid formulas. The proliferation of federal grants programs and the cities' increasing dependence upon them tended to heighten the political salience of census statistics. Such formulas often incorporated population size, as measured or estimated by the Census Bureau, as a major factor. By 1978 there were more than one hundred such programs, covering a wide range of concerns, from preschool education (Headstart) to urban mass transportation (U.S. Congress 1978). . . . [T]he single most commonly used data source was the decennial census (Choldin, 1994:27–8).

The census offered an important source of information by which the courts, Congress, and local entities could gauge the extent of discrimination. "Groups had to prove that they had been discriminated against in order to qualify for federal help under the Voting Rights Act. . . . To receive help in the form of an affirmative action plan from the newly established Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, each minority had to demonstrate its disproportionate absence from certain categories of employment" (Choldin, 1986: 406). As legislation raised the stakes involved in census data, disputes regarding its structure escalated. In response, the Census Bureau—for the first time ever—established minority committees to advise the government on the content and implementation of the 1980 census (Choldin, 1986).

On the Hispanic Advisory Committee, representatives argued strongly that the census "differentially undercounted" the Hispanic population, i.e., that the census missed more Hispanics than it did those in other categories. Undercounting primarily affects those who are low-income, non-English speaking, and live in inner cities—those who are poor often lack stable residences and are thus difficult to reach; those who cannot read English cannot answer the questions (only in 1990 did the census provide for Spanish-language surveys); those who are illegal immigrants may be unwilling to respond to the questionnaire. (The Constitution

requires a count of all the people in the United States, not just those who are legal residents.)

While the Census Bureau might use birth and death records to determine the undercount of blacks, representatives on the Hispanic Advisory Committee pointed out that the Latino undercount could not be determined by this method since birth and death records did not record Hispanic ancestry. As a way to correct for an undercount, the advisory committee argued for the introduction of a Spanish/Hispanic origin *self-identification* question in the 1980 census. Thus, negotiation produced a new census category. (Figure 1 shows the 1990 version of this question.)

But self-identification is also a problematic way to classify a population. It lacks scientific validity because people may classify themselves by different criteria or use inconsistent criteria over time. Nonetheless, the census actually began moving toward the self-identification of race as early as 1960. By 1980, it fully relied on that approach.

Thus, while many treat census classifications as if they were fixed categorizations grounded in scientifically valid distinctions, that is not the case as even the Census Bureau admits: "The concept of race as used by the Census Bureau reflects self-identification, it does not denote any clear-cut scientific definition of biological stock . . . the categories of the race item include both racial and national origin or sociocultural groups" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). Indeed, the federal guidelines that regulate research and policy-making in health, education, employment, civil rights compliance, school desegregation, and voting rights are similarly clear that the classifications "should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature" (Overbey, 1994).

Still, when we consider "official counts" of the population, we risk believing that what is counted must be real. While the Census Bureau and other federal agencies operate from explicit constructionist premises, the data they produce may

FIGURE 1

7. Is this person of Spanish/Hispanic origin? Fill ONE circle for each person. If Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic, print one group. →	○ No (not Spanish/Hispanic) ○ Yes, Mexican, Mexican-Am., Chicano ○ Yes, Puerto Rican ○ Yes, Cuban ○ Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic (Print one group, for example: Argentinean, Colombian, Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, Spaniard, and so on.)

此为试读，需要完整PDF请访问：www.ertongbook.com