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Crafting State-Nation



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
Crafting State-Nations

India and Other Multinational Democracies

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The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore

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Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
2 4 6 8 9 7 5 3 1

The Johns Hopkins University Press
2715 North Charles Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21218-4363
www.press.jhu.edu

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Stepan, Alfred C.
Crafting State-Nations : India and other multinational democracies /
Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz, and Yogendra Yadav.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-8018-9723-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-8018-9723-8 (hardcover : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-8018-9724-5 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-8018-9724-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Multinational states—Case studies. 2. Democracy—Case studies.

I. Linz, Juan J. (Juan José), 1926– II. Yadav, Yogendra. III. Title.

JC311.S827 2010

321'.8—dc22 2010006887

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

*Special discounts are available for bulk purchases of this book. For more
information, please contact Special Sales at 410-516-6936 or
specialsales@press.jhu.edu.*

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Preface

The territory of the world today is divided into 195 states; 192 of them are members of the United Nations, and their boundaries are internationally recognized by other states.¹ Such internationally recognized states are presumed to have the right to exercise authority over the population within their borders, whether the people are citizens, subjects, or even foreigners. In many cases, this authority has little to do with the population having a “we-feeling” as members of a community or as members of a nation, because the states were not created by a coherent nation, instead arising as the result of rulers successfully imposing themselves, often by wars or international settlements following wars. No new independent state was created by a national movement without some other existing states supporting it and without very important states, normally the international system of states, recognizing it. What we see as “nation-states” all have had a major component of being “constructed” by existing powers. A nation-state without a prior state helping construct it is inconceivable. The major functional alternative to a nation-state is what we will call a “state-nation.” But note: both “nation-states” and “state-nations” are states, and must be states if they are to work.

This leads us to the major theme of this book, which is “state-nations.” This may seem an awkward term. We have considered many alternatives, but we keep returning to “state-nations,” because both the state and the nation are indispensable elements for modern democracies but stand in an opposite relationship to each other in our state-nation model than they do in the standard nation-state model.

Democracy entails the democratic management of a specific territorial state and its citizens. For too long, the normatively privileged model for a modern state

1. The Vatican is recognized as a state by many states but is not a member of the United Nations. Kosovo is recognized by the United States, but it is still not a member of the United Nations. Taiwan is not a member state of the United Nations but even the divided states North Korea and South Korea are.

has been the nation-state. However, in some countries, more than one group thinks of itself as a nation and has leaders who strive for independence. In this book, we call such states “robustly politically multinational.” We are convinced that in some circumstances, especially if a polity is “robustly multinational,” a politics of nation-state-building is in conflict with a politics of inclusionary democracy and societal peace. In our judgment, therefore, the complexities, conflicts, and identities of citizens require the theoretical, normative, and political imagining of alternatives to the nation-state model.

In this book, our major alternative is what we call the state-nation model. In chapter 1, we present the core assumptions of the standard nation-state model in Weberian ideal-type terms and then create a normatively and institutionally coherent alternative ideal type, the state-nation model, and show how it stands in sharp contrast to the nation-state’s core assumptions.² Since we are interested in realizable and observable political alternatives, we then propose a “nested set” of six policies that we believe are supportive of the crafting of state-nations.

We believe our model can, and should be, subject to empirical testing. We thus stipulate that if a polity is close to a state-nation ideal type—even if the state recognizes and supports numerous different languages, cultures, and indeed, nations within the polity—its citizens should have four empirically documentable characteristics. These four characteristics are: (1) a high degree of positive identification with the state; (2) multiple but complementary political identities; (3) a high level of trust in the state’s institutions; (4) a high degree of positive support for democracy among all the extremely diverse groups of citizens in the country.³

A central claim of nation-state theorists is that only the nation-state can cultivate the trust and identification with the state that a functioning democracy requires. In an opening test of this hypothesis, we explore, using data from the World Values Survey, the degree of trust in six key political institutions found in the eleven longstanding federal democracies in the world. We divided these eleven longstanding federations into those closest to the state-nation pole (Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and India) and those states closest to the nation-state pole (Germany, Austria, the United States, Australia, Argentina, and Brazil). We find that states closer to the state-nation pole actually score higher on trust than states closer to the nation-state pole. We also show that in Spain, even in regions like Catalonia, where Catalan and Spanish are official languages and where there

2. For the reader who would like to see these two ideal types side by side in one table before going further, please see table 1.1.

3. If a polity is close to what we call “pure multinational” because it has a series of virtual nation-states within its borders, these attitudes will not be found. See chapter 1, especially figure 1.1.

is some separatist sentiment, the prevailing self-identification is multiple but complementary, in this case, “equally Catalan and Spanish,” using the question designed by Linz.

India would seem to present one of the most difficult tests for our argument that multiple but complementary identities and democratic state-nation loyalties are possible even in a polity with robustly multinational dimensions and a plethora of intense linguistic and religious differences. In chapter 2 we argue that such diversity could not have been molded into a nation-state peacefully and democratically. However, many of the founders of Indian democracy, such as Gandhi and Nehru, creatively reflected on this great diversity and conceived and crafted an inclusionary discourse, as well as an inclusionary set of political institutions, very close to what we call the state-nation model.

Was the “idea of India” described above confined merely to the high traditions of political theory and legal constitutional texts? Or did this idea find resonance among ordinary Indian citizens across different religions, regions, communities, and classes? Fortunately, we are able to explore this question in great detail through the data generated by the Lokniti Network of survey analysts. Yogendra Yadav, one of the authors of this book, was its founder-director.

CSDS regularly conducts what may be the largest census-based surveys in the world in India; on occasion Yadav and Lokniti also conduct surveys in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. Lokniti’s most recent survey, the Indian National Election Study in 2009, had over 36,000 respondents. Because Lokniti’s surveys are census-based stratified random samples, all significant marginalized groups are included and in the correct proportion. These groups include Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, socioeconomic groups identified as “very poor” and “poor,” and most ethnic linguistic groups, some of which see themselves as nations.⁴ The results of these surveys, many of whose questions were designed by the three coauthors in order to explore the salient questions raised in this book, show strikingly high support for India’s political institutions.⁵ For example, 71% of Hindus and 71% of Muslims say that democracy is the best form of government for India. These surveys allow us to examine whether our hypothesis that citizens are capable of multiple but complementary identities is borne out.

4. CSDS uses booster samples in its nationwide surveys to ensure sufficient respondents from smaller states (e.g., Mizoram) or social groups. They also do surveys devoted to a single state such as Kashmir or Punjab.

5. The major exception to this is Kashmir, where respondents in the last decade have twice indicated a preference for an independent state.

In chapter 3, we attempt to submit our hypothesis about the relative success of state-nation policies in India by exploring four cases that many would consider “inconvenient facts” for our argument: the insurgencies for independence in the Punjab, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Kashmir.

In chapters 4 and 5 we create a “matched pair” between two different approaches to minority populations, those in post-Independence India and in Sri Lanka. We analyze how India treated its Tamils, and how Ceylon (today Sri Lanka) has treated its Tamil population. What is interesting in this matched pair is that Sri Lanka started in a somewhat more favorable position vis-à-vis its Tamil population than India. For example, in the hundred years before independence in Sri Lanka, there had been no riots between Sinhalese/Buddhists and Tamil/Hindus.⁶ In contrast, Dravidian leaders, in what is now Tamil Nadu in India, burned the Indian flag at Independence and burned the constitution upon its publication. Yet within a quarter-century of independence, the issue of Tamil independence had become a non-issue in India, while in Sri Lanka the one-time non-issue of Tamil secessionism had become the source of a civil war that eroded democracy and almost disintegrated the state. Why? A major constitutive ingredient of peaceful integration in India is the creative utilization of all six of the “nested” policies we argue in chapter 1 would be useful for creating state-nations. In sharp contrast, in Sri Lanka, aggressive nation-state policies were a constitutive part of the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war that led to more than a hundred thousand deaths.

The goal of this book is not to extol state-nations over nation-states but rather to expand our collective political imaginations about what is feasible, and unfeasible, in different contexts. We document how there are some cases where neither full nation-state nor state-nation policies are feasible. We have explored alternative formulas for dealing with robust multinationalism beyond either of these two ideal types.

In chapter 6 we analyze the case of Ukraine, where territorially based federalism, a core policy normally associated with state-nations, was, for geopolitical reasons, risky. Because of the possibility of Russian irredentism, a unitary state was more prudent. The questions we explore are how to utilize many state-nation policies *within* a unitary state, and whether a *mixture* of state-nation and nation-state policies can enhance inclusionary democracy and ethnic peace.

In chapter 7, we turn to the question of whether there can be a political

6. Sri Lanka also began its democratic experiment with greater per capita income and greater literacy than India.

formula that allows a unitary nation-state to respond to the demands of a potentially secessionist, territorially concentrated minority by creating constitutionally embedded federal guarantees. We propose a strongly revised theory of “federacy” to address this situation. In this chapter, we empirically examine how federacies have actually been used to democratically manage “robust multinational” problems by the otherwise unitary nation-states of Finland (with the Åland Islands) and Denmark (with both Greenland and the Faroe Islands). We also show that the “scope value” of federacy arrangements can extend to the postwar reconstruction of Italy (with its once-separatist 86% German speaking population of South Tyrol) and to Portugal’s 1975 response toward the emerging secessionist movement in the Azores. We show how it was also of use in negotiating the Helsinki Agreement that brought a relatively consensual, peaceful, and inclusionary end to the civil war in Aceh in Indonesia in October 2005. We argue that if China were ever to become democratic, a federacy formula could conceivably be of use in Tibet, Hong Kong, and possibly even in Taiwan. But what is the relationship between our concept of state-nation and our concept of federacy? In a federacy, the unitary nation-state follows nation-state policies everywhere in the state *except for the federacy itself*, where it employs state-nation policies.

We conclude our book in chapter 8 with a discussion of the extremely influential federal model of the United States. We question the very common assumption that U.S.-style federalism is the most authentic type of federalism, the “best” for any type of diverse democracy. In this chapter we identify seven core components of U.S. federalism and demonstrate how *each* of these components—by themselves, and more especially when combined—create obstacles for managing democracy in robust multinational contexts. Indeed, our conclusion is that the U.S. model of federalism, if attempted in robust multinational settings, would produce close to the worst possible set of constraints for a democratization effort.

We have not aspired to write a “cookbook” for policy-makers or constitution-makers. Although some countries have roughly similar characteristics and similar problems, the policies adopted to solve these problems must inevitably deal with a range of historical, social, cultural, and geopolitical specificities that will have a great impact on the policies’ appropriateness or inappropriateness, their relative success or failure. We can perhaps be more certain of what might be possible, improbable, or very difficult to achieve. Social scientists and policy-makers should not deceive themselves that all problems are solvable. However, we should also be aware that more appropriate, more timely actions might prevent some solvable problems from *becoming* unsolvable. The timely imagining of alternatives is crucial.

One problem that the present work has left out as a central concern, except for our small final chapter on the United States, is the complex relationships between federalism and democracy, between federalism and fraternity, and especially between federalism and equality. This problem cannot be studied without comparativists addressing why the United States has some of the highest rates of inequality in the democratic world. Inequality in the United States deserves monographic study. Indeed, the great difficulty of passing fundamental welfare legislation like health reform in the United States would seem to make this a major subject for further work by us and other scholars and practitioners.

A final comment here on the long genesis of this book is in order. In 1995, when Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan were completing their book *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, they had already turned their attention to their next book, on federalism, democracy, and nationalism.

Linz and Stepan had been drawn to this theme because they were aware of the relative success of federalism in the case of Spain, on the one hand, and the much less successful post-Soviet and Yugoslav experiences, on the other. Linz and Stepan were also uneasy with the standard treatments of federalism in the literature and felt that they should aim at a new and more general theory.⁷ Linz and Stepan agreed that one of the major theoretical and political problems of our time was to conceptualize and realize political arrangements whereby deeply diverse cultures, even different “nations,” can peacefully and democratically co-exist within one state.

One of the most interesting cases of the successful solving of this problem appeared to be India, and Stepan began to make almost yearly research visits to that country starting in the late 1990s. During these visits, Stepan began to work with Yadav, the founder and convener of the Lokniti Network. Yadav invited Linz and Stepan to work with him in drafting questions for CSDS surveys.

As a result of the exciting findings that began to emerge from this process, Linz and Stepan decided to abandon their idea of writing a theoretical and comparative book that would have covered the entire world in a necessarily abstract way in favor of a more focused, comparative analysis of key countries, situations, and models, that could be empirically richer and based on their own original research.

7. Linz, as a social scientist and as a citizen of Spain, has been drawn to issues of nationalism since the late 1960s. Indeed, the second volume of his seven volume collected works is devoted entirely to nationalism and to federalism. See Juan J. Linz, “Obras Escogidas,” in *Nación, Estado y Lengua*, ed. José Ramón Montero and Thomas Jeffrey Miley (Madrid: Centro De Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008).

Linz and Stepan found the exchanges with Yadav, which opened up such rich and often quite counterintuitive findings, so intellectually exciting that they eagerly invited Yadav to join them in the writing of what has become this book. The long and very collaborative process, which we hope has been fruitful for the book, has certainly been fruitful for us.

This book has only been possible because of the support of dozens of colleagues, students, and organizations in many countries. Let us begin with our students and colleagues. Stepan is fortunate to have had at Columbia a number of brilliant Ph.D. candidates who shared his passion for examining many of the puzzles in this book and who provided invaluable research assistance and intellectual partnership. In particular he wants to recognize the contributions of Neelanjan Sircar, Pavithra Suryanarayan, Israel Marquez, and Enrique Ochoa Reza. Thomas Jeffrey Miley, the author of an important book on nationalism, *Nacionalismo y política lingüística: el caso de Cataluña*, who is now on the faculty at Cambridge University in the United Kingdom, helped all of us, particularly Juan Linz, in developing the foundations of this book. While Miley was working on his dissertation at Yale, he was involved in virtually all of the early discussions of this book.

We thank the World Values Survey for opening their datasets to us. We are grateful to the extraordinary scholars in the Lokniti Network whose support we continuously drew upon, including Sanjay Kumar, Dhananjai Joshi, Sanjeer Alam, and Himanshu Bhattacharya and Kanchan Malhotra of the CSDS Data Unit for their help in accessing and analyzing the vast datasets at the CSDS. We thank Rekha Chowdhary of the University of Jammu and G. K. Prasad of the University of Madras for sharing their ideas and data to help us understand the politics of their states. Suhas Palshikar, of the University of Pune, and Peter deSouza, director of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, were two of the principal investigators of the State of Democracy in South Asia study, and we thank them for sharing their insights and data with us. Yadav also thanks the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, where he was a fellow and had an opportunity to work on the final drafts of this book.

Many of the ideas in this book were presented to large groups of theorists and practitioners, including at the United Nations Development Program where we helped to conceptualize and write *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, working closely with Amartya Sen.

The first joint article of Stepan, Linz, and Yadav was produced for a volume edited by Ambassador Shankar Bajpai, titled *Democracy and Diversity: India and the American Experience*. Bajpai brought together, over the course of a decade,

many theoreticians interested in comparative approaches to the questions of democracy and deep diversity. We also thank Sudipta Kaviraj for his thoughtful critique of an early version of this book at the Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) in Paris at a special session arranged for us by its director Christophe Jaffrelot and the founder of the Network on South Asian Politics and Political Economy (NETSAPPE), Ashutosh Varshney.

We would not have had the temerity to write a book like this if not for the special help from experts on many of the countries we discuss in this book and whose help and publications are cited in the relevant chapters.

We would like to explicitly acknowledge the late Neelan Thiruchelvam and the late Laksman Kadirgamer for sharing their vision of a pluralist Sri Lanka, which cost them their lives. In addition, we want to acknowledge Philip Oldenburg for sharing his insights into Indian politics with Stepan and Yadav, Harish Puri and Pramod Kumar for discussing the Punjab crisis with the authors, Ved Marwaha for discussing the situation in India's northeast with Stepan and for inviting him to Manipur when he was the governor of the state, and N. Ram, editor-in-chief of *The Hindu*, for discussing Tamil Nadu politics with Stepan and allowing him to use the newspaper's archives.

We would also like to thank the Ford Foundation for funding the convening of a conference at All Souls College, Oxford, and for generously supporting, through a grant on Federalism, Multinationalism, and Governance in the Modern World, Stepan's multiple research visits to India, Sri Lanka, Russia, Ukraine, Indonesia, and even to the borders of Burma to speak with political and military leaders from seven nationality groups. The Ford Foundation also supported the Lokniti Programme for Comparative Democracy at CSDS by funding their 2005 survey that was published as *The State of Democracy in South Asia*. This 2005 survey of India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal would not have been possible without additional funding from the EU-India Cross Cultural Program and the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Stepan received grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which allowed him to carry out research in many countries and to bring key scholars for meetings at Columbia University and for meetings with Linz and Yadav.

Stepan would also like to acknowledge the generous support of the Henry R. Luce Initiative on Religion and International Affairs, whose support allowed Columbia to create the Center for the Study of Democracy, Toleration, and Religion. He would also like to acknowledge Mark Kingdon, who gave a major endowment that allowed the creation of the Institute for Religion, Culture, and Public Life at Columbia University. Working together, these two organizations

allowed us to explore in much greater depth than we otherwise could have, the relationship of religions, democracies, and state-nations.

We dedicate this book to Rocío de Terán, Madhulika Banerjee, and Nancy Leys Stepan, all of whom have their own projects but who always inspired and helped us in our attempts to imagine better futures.

Crafting State-Nations

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