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Beyond India: The Utility of Sino-Pakistani Relations in Chinese Foreign Policy, 1962-1965

By Christopher Tang, November 2012



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**Beyond India:
The Utility of Sino-Pakistani Relations in Chinese Foreign Policy, 1962-1965**

Christopher Tang

As scholars increasingly explore the People's Republic of China's (PRC) diplomacy toward the Third World throughout the Cold War, Sino-Pakistani relations have remained curiously outside this purview. This lacuna is particularly striking considering the importance of Pakistan in facilitating the Sino-American rapprochement in the long-term, but also for the myriad benefits it offered Beijing in navigating the early 1960s in the short-term after relations were significantly enhanced. Though the relationship has by no means been ignored, scholars have instead overwhelmingly interpreted its establishment and significance for China almost exclusively through the lens of prolonged Sino-Indian tension after 1959. As such, these studies have largely failed to situate the Sino-Pakistani relationship within the larger context of China's foreign policy at the time.

In excessively filtering this bilateral relationship through the lens of India, scholars have obscured the degree to which Chinese leaders saw benefits in Pakistan that went far beyond tending to Sino-Indian issues. To be sure, India was *the* salient factor bringing Pakistan and the PRC together in 1962, but India alone cannot sufficiently explain Beijing's interest in cultivating and sustaining the Sino-Pakistani relationship. Instead, Pakistan fit neatly within Beijing's larger foreign policy trajectory at the time. The relationship thus implicated and alleviated China's India problem while also transcending this single issue. It is therefore critical to consider the consolidation and meaning of Sino-Pakistani ties within the wider scope of Chinese foreign relations in the early 1960s.

In response to this perceived oversight in the existing literature, this paper argues that cordial relations with Pakistan greatly aided Beijing's daunting task of appearing as a country that was at once both revolutionary and peaceful. In aiming to challenge the U.S. and the USSR and secure leadership of world revolution on the international stage while also reigniting class struggle at home, by 1962 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong was eager to embrace a revolutionary foreign policy. At the same time, the need to court international legitimacy and Third World friends across the Afro-Asian-Latin American world encouraged

Beijing to cultivate an image as a peaceful defender of developing world interests. In seeking to carve out this, at times contradictory, international image, the Sino-Pakistani relationship proved particularly useful for CCP leaders. Through Pakistan's embrace of revolutionary Afro-Asian discourse, its ongoing national liberation struggle in Kashmir, and its 1965 war with India, China's support for Ayub Khan's regime allowed it to claim a revolutionary foreign policy. Furthermore, in China's quest to self-identify as a defender of international peace, Pakistan proved helpful by also painting India's Jawaharlal Nehru as a hostile opponent to Third World unity, actively promoting China as a pursuer of international peace, and aiding PRC efforts to deter U.S. expansion of the Vietnam War.

Most studies of the Sino-Pakistani relationship offer scant attention to the nuances of China's larger foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Pakistan. A large number of these works summon the notion of a 'special relationship,' which asserts that the two states share a mutual understanding rooted in their common enmity toward India.¹ Though these studies offer a more detailed analysis than the 'mono-causal' school, which refuses to look beyond the contextual vacuum of the India factor, they nevertheless ignore alternative or larger foreign policy motivations for the PRC's embrace of Pakistan in 1962.² John Garver's comprehensive study of Sino-Indian relations recognizes Pakistan's value to the PRC outside of India, but the nature of Garver's focus precludes further exploration of these issues.³ In Taylor Fravel's groundbreaking study of China's border relations, the 1963 Sino-Pakistani border settlement and subsequent bilateral relations are presented as Beijing's response to unrest in Tibet, the insecure Sino-Indian border, and domestic Chinese instability following the Great Leap Forward.⁴ Fravel thus fails to consider how additional influences including Sino-Soviet rivalry, China's broader Third World

¹ See B.N. Goswami, *Pakistan and China: A Study of Their Relations* (New York: Allied Publishers, 1971); Anwar Hussain Syed, *China & Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale* (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); P.L. Bhola, *Pakistan-China Relations* (Jaipur: R.B.S.A. Publishers 1986).

² For 'mono-causal' explanations of Sino-Pakistani relations, see J.P. Jain, *China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1974), and Sailen Chaudhuri, *Beijing-Washington-Islamabad Entente: Genesis and Development* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1982).

³ John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).

⁴ M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

diplomacy, and Mao's call for a revolutionary foreign policy might also have influenced Beijing's interest in Pakistan.

In attempting to determine the full array of, and meaning behind, Beijing's interests in consolidating bilateral relations, this paper draws upon a close reading of Chinese behavior and rhetoric vis-à-vis Pakistan between 1962 and 1965. This study draws heavily from Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive documents, including internal Foreign Ministry reports on Pakistan, and memoranda of conversations between Chinese and Pakistani leaders and officials.⁵ After ties were strengthened following the Sino-Indian border war of October 1962, by late 1965 the Sino-Pakistani alignment had demonstrated its ability to present the PRC as both the leading force of world revolution and also a responsible defender of international peace. In so doing, the relationship effectively displayed the degree to which Chinese interests in Pakistan implicated, but were by no means limited to, the India factor.

Pakistan in the PRC's Revolutionary Foreign Policy

The Context of the PRC's Revolutionary Foreign Policy

When Sino-Pakistani relations were first consolidated following the Sino-Indian border war in late 1962, the PRC had already begun embarking on reasserting revolutionary ideology both at home and abroad.⁶ This effort emerged from both international and domestic origins. In the international realm, the Sino-Soviet split was not only common knowledge by late 1962, but had also come to occupy a central concern for Beijing alongside persistent Sino-American tension. In 1959, Mao was dismayed by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's cozying up to Washington through the 'spirit of Camp David,' as well as Moscow's failure to back the PRC's actions in the 1959 Sino-Indian border crisis.⁷ When, the following year, Khrushchev recalled

⁵ The Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive, Beijing, The People's Republic of China. (hereafter *CFMA*)

⁶ Though Pakistan had been among the first non-socialist states to diplomatically recognize the PRC, which it did in January 1950, its relationship to the U.S. and its membership in both SEATO and CENTO precluded close Sino-Pakistani ties. While Zhou Enlai's conduct at the Bandung Conference in 1955 went a long way toward reducing mutual suspicion, and though both sides exchanged high level visits through the late 1950s, Sino-Pakistani relations failed to produce any substantial bilateral pacts before the 1963 boundary agreement, originally negotiated in mid-late 1962.

⁷ See Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 138-150.

all Soviet technical advisors from China, the rift deepened considerably. For Mao, the Soviets had abandoned socialist revolution, and the capital of world revolution was thus shifting from Moscow to Beijing.⁸

Domestically, the fallout of the disastrous Great Leap Forward (GLF) had a profound effect upon top-level politics within the CCP leadership. Personally discredited by the GLF calamity, Mao was reduced to the sideline of everyday decision-making in the late 1950s and more pragmatic leaders, including Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, began to guide economic recovery. By 1962, however, Mao was growing wary of these leaders and, succumbing to the influence of the perceived Soviet abandonment of socialism, was suspicious of their seeming jettison of class struggle in tending to the dismal Chinese countryside.⁹ Seizing the moment of an August 1962 CCP work conference at Beidaihe, Mao insisted on the need to avoid the Soviet slide toward capitalism.¹⁰ For Mao, Soviet-revisionist style leadership was threatening the Chinese revolution at home. To correct this, the Chairman was determined to reinvigorate class struggle and personally return to the decision-making helm. At the CCP Central Committee's Tenth Plenum that October, Mao again insisted on the need to combat revisionism both at home and abroad.¹¹ In 1963, the Party thus initiated the Socialist Education Movement, a critical forerunner to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution designed to reassert the importance of class struggle in the process of social transformation.¹² For Mao, Soviet revisionism was a threat requiring comprehensive vigilance in the PRC's foreign and domestic policy.

In the face of Soviet revisionism abroad and the need for mobilization through struggle at home, Mao emphasized the PRC's need to pursue a more revolutionary foreign policy. Directly challenging the head of the CCP's International Liaison Department and fellow Long Marcher, Wang Jiaxiang, and his call for "three reconciliations and one reduction" (*sanhe yishao*) under which the PRC would conciliate with its enemies (imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries)

⁸ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 212.

⁹ See Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: Volume 3 – The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 276-277.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 277.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 283. See also Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 220-224.

¹² Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 273; MacFarquhar, *Origins* 3: 334.

while reducing its aid to world revolution, Mao argued for precisely the opposite.¹³ In the fall of 1962 at the Sixth All-Country Foreign Affairs Conference, Mao stipulated a PRC foreign policy premised upon the dissemination of ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ overseas and support for national liberation movements across the Afro-Asian-Latin American world.¹⁴

Indeed, supporting national liberation in the Third World was central to the revolutionary foreign policy Mao envisioned. As Chen Jian describes, Mao came to view the developing countries of the Afro-Asian-Latin American world as the “world’s countryside,” and China was thus encouraged to play a leading role in the liberation struggles of these regions.¹⁵ This preeminent role was fundamentally tied to the Sino-Soviet split, and Mao’s belief that the spirit of revolution had moved from Eastern Europe to the developing world.¹⁶ After 1962, therefore, Mao had advanced a new paradigm to replace his earlier “two camps” theory.

Now, the Chairman asserted, between the two superpowers there existed “two intermediate zones.”¹⁷ The first included the economically backward countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, while the second was comprised of the advanced capitalist countries of Europe. For China, it was imperative to promote revolution in the first of these zones, while seeking to neutralize those countries of the second zone. By leading national liberation in the first intermediate zone, Mao hoped to forge a “broad international united front” against the superpowers.¹⁸ For both international and domestic reasons alike, therefore, China’s foreign policy veered distinctly to the left after 1962. It was within this context that Sino-Pakistani relations first began to take on tangible substance and meaning.

Pakistan and the PRC’s Revolutionary Rhetoric

¹³ See Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 83, 211; Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 28.

¹⁴ Lorenz M. Lüthi, “Chinese Foreign Policy, 1960-1979,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa ed., *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991*, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 154.

¹⁵ Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 212.

¹⁶ Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens*, 81.

¹⁷ Lorenz M. Lüthi and Chen Jian, “East Asia, 1962-1972,” *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points*, (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, forthcoming), 3.

¹⁸ Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 146.

Though Pakistan and the PRC had shared formal diplomatic relations since 1950, the relationship only truly took on coherence midway through 1962. At this time, with a view toward negotiating the shared border and therein dealing a blow to their mutual Indian enemy, Chinese and Pakistani officials began regular contact, eventually leading to a border settlement in early 1963. Throughout their exchanges, Chinese leaders regularly deployed the language of Third World revolution, decrying the hegemony of the two superpowers, and striving to situate the PRC at the head of world revolution. Though the revolutionary rhetoric Chinese leaders summoned was often sanitized of its typical socialist jargon for the benefit of non-communist Pakistan, Pakistani leaders and officials welcomed the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-reactionary thrust of Beijing's words. Pakistan was particularly responsive to Chinese verbal attacks on the Americans, who had dramatically stepped up aid to India after 1959, and the Soviets, who themselves had been cozying up to India by the late 1950s. As such, Sino-Pakistani exchanges proved a forum in which the PRC could articulate the revolutionary foreign policy trajectory it sought after 1962.

In a July 1962 discussion with then Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Ali Muhammad Rashidi, Mao argued that although Afro-Asian countries including Pakistan and the PRC suffered from backward economies, the hardworking nature of the Afro-Asian people meant that if they united together, they could surmount superpower hegemony.¹⁹ This critique of superpower interference was also prevalent in the joint communiqué issued following the March 1963 Sino-Pakistani border agreement, in which the two countries "reaffirmed their belief in the national sovereignty and equality of all countries and in the basic right of all peoples to decide their own destinies in accordance with their free will."²⁰ In an interview with Pakistani reporters following the agreement, Zhou Enlai criticized American economic aid to Pakistan, dismissing it

¹⁹ "Conversation between Mao Zedong and Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Rashidi," 15 July 1962, *CFMA*, 105-01799-01, 2.

²⁰ "China-Pakistan Joint Communiqué, 4 March 1963," in Arif, K. ed *China Pakistan Relations 1947-1980* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd., 1984), 38.

as a form of neo-colonialism.²¹ In a conversation the following August with the new Pakistani Ambassador Raza, Zhou suggested Pakistan ought to cast off American domination just as China strives to evade Soviet interference and “great power chauvinism.”²² For Beijing, anti-American and anti-Soviet critiques were a critical component of their international struggle and defined a more revolutionary trajectory in foreign policy. As far as the Ayub Khan regime was concerned, this discourse succinctly captured Pakistan’s own sense of international isolation given the American and Soviet backing of India.

Alongside challenges to superpower hegemony, Chinese officials often drew upon the larger theme of Third World revolution in their discussions with the Pakistanis. In November 1963 talks with a Pakistani official, Zhou Enlai expressed satisfaction that anti-colonialism was on the rise in places like Vietnam and Algeria.²³ Referencing the recent assassination of South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, Zhou said the incident proved that the U.S. had officially assumed the torch of colonialism from the French and British. In a March 1965 conversation with Pakistani President Ayub Khan, Zhou claimed that as an Afro-Asian country, China was interested in opposing old rules and setting up new ones.²⁴ With Pakistan itself keen to gain international support for its struggle against India, they too shared a vested interest in engaging with the Afro-Asian community. Indeed, in its quest to convene a second Afro-Asian Conference in the mid-1960s, the PRC found Pakistan to be a particularly invested and helpful partner.

With Nehru firmly associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, Pakistan hoped to make in-roads with the Afro-Asian community to thwart its isolation and draw attention to the Kashmir issue. Though also sharing this interest in challenging Nehru in the Third World, Chinese leaders were driven more by their goal of rivaling the Soviet Union for leadership of the

²¹ “Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pakistan Associated Press Agency Reporter Safdar Ali Qureshi,” March 31, 1963, *CFMA*, 105-01846-06, 104; See also, “Chou En-lai’s Interview with the Correspondent of Associated Press of Pakistan, 31 March 1963 (Extracts),” in Arif, *China Pakistan Relations*, 42.

²² “Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Raza Regarding Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Other Issues,” 12 August 1963, *CFMA*, 113-00452-05, 21.

²³ “Record of a Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, and Head of Pakistan’s Delegation Participating in the PRC’s National Day Celebration, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani,” 18 November 1963, *CFMA*, 105-01188-03, 27.

²⁴ “Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Ayub Khan,” 5 March 1965, *CFMA*, 105-01927-02, 92.

developing world.²⁵ As early as March 1963, Zhou identified to Pakistani officials China's interest in supporting a second Afro-Asian Conference free from "Western imperialists and colonialists."²⁶ In a February 1964 Sino-Pakistani joint communiqué, both parties endorsed the need for a new Afro-Asian meeting to improve solidarity in the community.²⁷ That May, Pakistani Ambassador Raza told PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi that the Pakistanis saw the Soviets as standing side by side with the Indians, and Pakistan was thus willing to back China's call for Soviet exclusion from the meeting.²⁸ Over the ensuing year, Pakistan, alongside Sukarno's Indonesia, would become China's main force in trying to define the agenda and scope of the conference.

In a June 1964 letter to Ayub Khan, Zhou Enlai expressed his excitement in working closely with Pakistan and Indonesia to plan the conference.²⁹ An internal Chinese Foreign Ministry report written the following month highlighted the possibility Indonesia might back out of its role, and suggested Beijing promote Pakistan's involvement in conference strategizing even more enthusiastically.³⁰ With so few Third World countries willing to back China's clear effort to color the Afro-Asian agenda with Sino-Soviet power politics, Pakistan was a uniquely valuable ally on this matter. Indeed even the conference's planned host, Algerian leader Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella, was unsympathetic to Beijing's anti-Soviet campaign.³¹

After Ben Bella's June 1965 overthrow forced the delay of the conference and the Soviets were eventually permitted to participate in the rescheduled event, Beijing set out to sabotage the

²⁵ Lüthi and Chen, "East Asia," 6.

²⁶ "Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pakistan Associated Press Agency Reporter Safdar Ali Qureshi," March 31, 1963, *CFMA*, 105-01846-06, 105.

²⁷ "China-Pakistan Joint Communiqué on Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan, 23 February 1964," in Arif, *China Pakistan Relations*, 46.

²⁸ "Record of a Conversation between Chen Yi and Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Raza," 22 May 1964, *CFMA*, 105-01625-01, 2.

²⁹ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi [CCP Central Documents Research Office], ed. *Zhou Enlai Nianpu, 1949-1976*. Vol. II (hereafter *ZELNP2*) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 653.

³⁰ "The Pakistani Foreign Minister Warns of the Possibility that the So-Called 'Chinese Threat' Might be Discussed at the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and Zhou Enlai's Letter to Ayub Khan Concerning Pakistani Suggestions on the Situation in Southeast Asia: Bhutto Speaks on Several Issues," 6 July 1964, *CFMA*, 105-01875-01(1), 2.

³¹ Lorenz M. Lüthi, "The Palestinians between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China," Paper presented at the conference, "The Afro-Asian World," McGill University (Montreal, Canada), March 2012, 15.

meeting.³² Though neither Pakistan nor the PRC could successfully deter Soviet participation, Pakistan had proved an impressive ally in initially promoting the conference, and aligning with Beijing against the Soviets. Though the Pakistanis had their own reasons for such behavior — namely, Soviet support for India — Chinese efforts vis-à-vis the Afro-Asian movement were more an articulation of its rift with the Soviets and its desire for leadership of Third World revolution. Nevertheless, in its embrace of Beijing's revolutionary rhetoric and promotion of the second Afro-Asian Conference, Pakistan proved its worth to a Chinese foreign policy trajectory that implicated, but also went far beyond, its struggle with India.

PRC Support for Pakistan on the Kashmir Issue

The Sino-Pakistani relationship most explicitly advertised China's revolutionary foreign policy through the PRC's support for the national liberation of Kashmir. At the heart of Indo-Pakistani animosity since the establishment of two countries, Pakistan had consistently called for a plebiscite in Kashmir which would allow the predominantly Muslim population to self-determine the fate of their homeland. Although the Pakistanis had pressured the PRC to reappraise its officially neutral stance throughout 1962-63, Beijing refused to rush such a move. Though the memoirs of former Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto misleadingly suggest consistent Chinese support on Kashmir, until early 1964 CCP leaders spoke only vaguely about the issue.³³

In a March 1962 conversation with the Pakistani Ambassador Rashidi, Zhou Enlai cavalierly advised Ayub Khan's government to resolve the 'regional dispute' quickly through bilateral negotiations with India.³⁴ In talks that September and October, Zhou and CCP Chairman Liu Shaoqi said they were reluctant to get involved in the Kashmir issue lest they further exacerbate Sino-Indian tensions, and again suggested peaceful negotiations.³⁵ Even upon

³² Lüthi and Chen, "East Asia," 6.

³³ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (London: Oxford University Press 1969), 132.

³⁴ "Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Rashidi," 8 March 1962, CFMA, 105-01799-02, 12.

³⁵ "Record of a Conversation between Liu Shaoqi and Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Raza Upon the Presentation of Credentials," 1 September 1962, CFMA, 105-01801-02, 32; "Summary of a Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Raza," 5 September 1962, CFMA, 105-01802-03, 44.

completion of the March 1963 Sino-Pakistani boundary agreement, the joint communiqué displayed an unchanged Chinese position of bilateral settlement.³⁶ As Chinese leaders made clear in discussions and reports in early 1963, the PRC was loath to encroach upon what they saw as “Pakistan’s domestic affairs,” and thereby commit a clear violation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that formed the bedrock of China’s bilateral relationships.³⁷ Moreover, following its recent struggle to retain control of Tibet and its ongoing battle with the U.S. over Taiwan, Beijing was concerned that support for Pakistan in Kashmir would set a dangerous precedent for third party interference on territorial issues.³⁸ This concern was particularly pronounced amidst the palpable Sino-Indian tension of 1962-1963.

Though, by late 1962, the PRC was eager to support national liberation movements across the globe, it was unwilling to be pushed into backing Kashmir. By November 1963, however, Ayub’s government was “pleading for Chinese moral support” for the Kashmir struggle.³⁹ Candidly portraying China’s concerns, Zhou responded by saying that at best the PRC could offer only an “abstract” statement of support. Anything more, Zhou said, would provoke India to make similar claims in Tibet.⁴⁰ Notwithstanding this concern, after buying time until Sino-Indian tensions had cooled, by early 1964 the PRC was ready to add Kashmir to its list of Third World national liberation causes.

Indeed, the Kashmir issue was the centerpiece of the February 1964 visit of Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi to Pakistan. In talks, Zhou discursively configured Kashmir as a national liberation struggle by arguing that India’s mistreatment of Muslims there demonstrated its “great power chauvinism.”⁴¹ In a private conversation between Chen Yi and Bhutto, Chen continued the

³⁶ *ZELNP2*, 538.

³⁷ “PRC Embassy in Pakistan Concise Report Regarding Sino-Pakistani, Pakistani-American, Pakistani-Indian, Pakistani-Soviet Relations over the Past Half-Year,” 20 February 1963, *CFMA*, 204-01282-01, 9.

³⁸ “Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Pakistan Associated Press Agency Reporter Safdar Ali Qureshi,” March 31, 1963, *CFMA*, 105-01846-06, 104.

³⁹ “Record of a Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, and Head of Pakistan’s Delegation Participating in the PRC’s National Day Celebration, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani,” 18 November 1963, *CFMA*, 105-01188-03, 25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ “Record of Conversation between Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Ayub Khan, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,” 21 February 1964, *CFMA*, 203-00635-01(3), 39. It is also conceivable that Zhou’s reference to mistreated Muslims was informed by the PRC’s recent endorsement of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s national liberation struggle against Israel (see Lüthi, “The Palestinians between the Soviet Union and the PRC”).

Chinese effort to define Kashmir as a struggle for liberation from oppressive, hegemonic forces. As the record recounts,

Chen: "Muslims there want liberation (*jiefang*)."

Bhutto: "No, they just want equal treatment."

Chen: "Yes, but the meaning of liberation is precisely not suffering oppression (*bushou yapu*)."⁴²

Satisfied with adequately articulating the meaning of the Kashmiri struggle, CCP leaders formally switched their policy to one of support for self-determination.⁴³ Accordingly, the joint communiqué issued was shrouded in the rhetoric of the Afro-Asian movement, in which both sides pledged support for national liberation movements throughout the Afro-Asian world.⁴⁴ In a speech concluding the visit, Chen Yi further advanced the moral aspect of the PRC's new position, arguing that Indian efforts in Kashmir "stifle and ignore justice."⁴⁵

After having waited for the dust of the Sino-Indian border war to settle, by 1964 the PRC was eager to pursue its revolutionary foreign policy posture by upholding self-determination in Kashmir. Henceforth, the PRC could showcase Kashmir alongside its support for national liberation movements in Algeria, Palestine and, most notably, Vietnam. If the PRC's policy shift on Kashmir was a discursive articulation of China's revolutionary foreign policy, its more tangible commitment to Pakistan in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war would offer Beijing a more explicit opportunity to prove its dedication to Third World struggle.

Chinese Support in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War

Though the PRC was eager to shed its hostile image after the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war offered an opportunity to stand behind a Third World ally in the face of aggression from an India backed by both superpowers. In reality, it was the Pakistanis that initiated hostilities in April 1965, after they provoked armed conflict in the Rann

⁴² "Record of Conversation between Chen Yi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto," 25 February 1964, *CFMA*, 203-00635-01(7), 87.

⁴³ *ZELNP2*, 621; "China-Pakistan Joint Communiqué on Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan, 23 February 1964," in Arif, *China Pakistan Relations*, 46.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Renmin Ribao*, 20 February 1964.