


# CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO CANADIAN HISTORY

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Carl Berger

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New Canadian Readings

# CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO CANADIAN HISTORY

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Edited by  
Carl Berger



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Toronto

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# FOREWORD

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*New Canadian Readings* is an on-going series of inexpensive books intended to bring some of the best recent work by this country's scholars to the attention of students of Canada. Each volume consists of ten or more articles or book sections, carefully selected to present a fully-formed thesis about some critical aspect of Canadian development. Where useful, public documents or even private letters and statistical materials may be used as well to convey a different and fresh perspective.

The authors of the readings selected for inclusion in this volume (and all the others in the series) are all first-rank scholars, those who are doing the hard research that is rapidly changing our understanding of this country. Quite deliberately, the references for each selection have been retained, thus making additional research as easy as possible.

Like the authors of the individual articles, the editors of each volume are also scholars of note, completely up-to-date in their areas of specialization and, as the introductions demonstrate, fully aware of the changing nature of the debates within their professions and genres of research. The list of additional readings provided by the editor of each volume will steer readers to materials that could not be included because of space limitations.

This series will continue into the foreseeable future, and the General Editor is pleased to invite suggestions for additional topics.

J.L. Granatstein  
General Editor

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# INTRODUCTION

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The last twenty years have witnessed a virtual revolution in historical writing about Canada. This change was most obvious in the enormous expansion of the historical profession and a vast increase in research and publication; it was evident also in the emergence of new fields of study and the relative decline of national history. Up to the mid-1960s, successive generations of historians had concentrated upon the origins, evolution, and character of Canada as a national community. They surveyed the rise of self-government and relations with Britain and the United States, and they traced the unique patterns in the country's economic development. In the 1950s and the 1960s, historians devoted their best efforts to political biography as a vehicle for examining the nation-building process and the maintenance of national unity. This tradition was hardly homogeneous, for it contained competing points of view on the nature of Canada's national experience, as well as a rich diversity of themes and subjects. Still, it did highlight political events and personalities.

This tradition of historical writing came under criticism in the mid-1960s by historians who were in some respects representatives of it. Both J.M.S. Careless and Ramsay Cook censured the preoccupation with nation-building and national unity, not only as wishful thinking, but also for obscuring the complexity of the past. And both urged historians to pay greater attention to the more "limited identities" of regions and provinces and the distinct worlds of working people, women, and ethnic groups other than those of French or British origin. These critics recognized the beginning of tendencies already underway, and correctly anticipated the themes that would dominate the "new" history of the 1970s.

The emphasis upon regionalism was hardly an abrupt break with previous historical writing. French-Canadian historians had persistently focussed upon the origins of a separate national collectivity. As far back as the mid-1940s, William L. Morton had protested against one rendition of Canada's history, which accorded priority to the businessmen and politicians of the St. Lawrence system in creating the country, and which relegated the West to the status of a peripheral hinterland. And as Allan Smith's essay on British Columbia illustrates, that province's history had been the subject of long-standing investigation. What was novel about regional and provincial studies in the 1970s was the intensity of enthusiasm for these fields and the explicit and sometimes strident justifications for the approach. The exponents of regional studies accepted as an axiom that "Canada is a country of regions. Whether one is referring to historical development or to current realities, it is a truism to observe that Westerners, Ontarians, Quebecers, and Maritimers are products of distinctive regional communities whose differences from one another often seem more striking than their similarities."\* Others went much further by reasserting the claim that certain parts of the country — usually the

\*Peter Oliver, *Public and Private Persons: The Ontario Political Culture* (Toronto, 1975), 2.

West and the Maritimes — had paid an inordinate price for national unity and continued to do so.

This renewed appreciation for regional history involved much more than a change of fashions in historical scholarship. The regionalism of the historians reflected a more general, positive appreciation for localities as centres of loyalties and identities, and a feeling that their histories were as important as what had happened in distant places. The acknowledged importance of these limited identities was sustained, too, by the recognition that provincial governments had become far more powerful and prominent in Canada in the years after 1960. Historians (and historical geographers) who were not primarily concerned with discovering regional character also reinforced this tendency towards the local by examining social groups through community studies. The net impact of these influences was to impart to regional studies a legitimacy and purpose. The recovery of distinct regional perspectives was not an end in itself: it was rather a step towards bringing those perspectives into general histories of Canada in a more integrated and sustained fashion.

The readings in Section 1 of this collection suggest the numerous influences that impinged on regional studies, present the distinct historical problems that have preoccupied historians of specific areas, and allude to common themes linking them together. These papers also implicitly illustrate the varied meanings and definitions of region that historians have assumed and employed, and invite the reader to consider whether “region” has become as much an abstraction as “nation” once was.

The second, and closely related, dimension of the new history has been the rise of social history, an approach that has been defined and practised in quite different ways. Some historians have emphasized the analysis of anonymous processes and structures in the material foundations of life and the ways in which these shaped behaviour, perceptions, and class relations. A very few have applied statistical analysis to information derived from census documents to isolate patterns in social mobility, marriage, and family composition. On the whole, however, social history in Canada has been cultivated as a series of distinct subfields devoted to the working class, native peoples, women, ethnic groups, urban centres, and education. Historians who write about these subjects were initially moved by an impatience with accounts of the past that dwelt upon the activities of exceptional members of elites, especially politicians, and they were determined to understand the conditions of life of “ordinary” people who had figured only fleetingly, if at all, in received history. They have shown how groups once considered passive historical actors possessed a certain autonomy and ability to shape their own lives. Social historians in general had an acute sensitivity to dominance and conflict in class and ethnic relations, and to the repressive functions of such institutions as the public school.

As the essays in Section 2 indicate, each of the sub-themes in social history possessed its own rationale and research agenda. Indeed, in one case, that of labour history, two approaches diverged rather drastically. These essays, however, are apt to convey an exaggerated impression of differences and fragmentation. For they are not merely reflections on the new subject matter of history or progress



reports calling attention to significant trends: they are also, to varying degrees, justifications for certain lines of inquiry. The divisions within social history were the necessary result of specialization; but they were magnified by the process by which certain subjects attained scholarly recognition and legitimacy. The fragmentation of social history was much more pronounced in essays in historiography than in such syntheses as *The Canadian Prairies* (1984) by Gerald Friesen, or *Quebec: A History, 1867–1929* (1983) by Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, and Jean-Claude Robert. It is instructive, also, to consider how many times certain key books are judged in these essays to constitute fundamental additions to several of the subdivisions of social history.

The following essays represent approaches to the past that most emphatically differentiate current work from what existed before. It would be quite wrong, therefore, to conclude that the so-called traditional fields of biography or political history have vanished from the scene. It is simply that historians working within established conventions feel less need to explain or justify what they do than those who seek to break the hold of custom. It is worth keeping in mind, too, that more books have in the last two decades been published on military than on women's history, and, as the papers in Section 3 indicate, the study of politics has hardly remained frozen in the mold of the 1950s.

In spite of the obvious biases of these articles, they provide a guide to aspects of the transformation in recent historical writing and contain hints and clues that help us come to terms with the central themes in the history of history—why do historians' viewpoints change at all, and why have the subjects explored since the mid-1960s become so important?

# SECTION 1

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## REGIONS

## “LIMITED IDENTITIES” IN CANADA†

J.M.S. CARELESS

A suitable text for the present disquisition may be found in a review article by Professor Ramsay Cook discussing some works of 1967 that deal with Canada's perennial problem, its lack of national unity and identity. On this topic Professor Cook remarks: “Perhaps instead of constantly deploring our lack of identity we should attempt to understand and explain the regional, ethnic, and class identities that we do have. It might just be that it is in these limited identities that ‘Canadianism’ is found, and that except for our over-heated nationalist intellectuals Canadians find this situation quite satisfactory.”<sup>1</sup> What follows here, then, is a commentary on this theme in twentieth-century Canada: if one nation, eminently divisible.

Canadian historiography has often dealt too wishfully with nationalism — and *ergo*, with unification — thus producing both expectations and discouragements out of keeping with realities. We may be somewhat past the colony-to-nation epitome of the Canadian story (“and with sovereignty, everybody lived happily ever after — see Africa”), but we are still considerably hung up on the plot of nation-building. There are the good guys and the bad, the unifying nation-builders and their foes; though one trouble is that the characters often change hats and whiskers in the French-language version. There are also the good eras and the bad, largely seen in terms of nation-building. In this sense, during the twentieth century, Canada's years before the testing of World War I were golden years of national expansion; the twenties a decade where blotchy prosperity was further marred by the federal government abdicating national leadership; the depressed thirties a time of crisis in federal, more than class, relationships; the forties an era of national triumph arising out of national trial; and the booming fifties a new noonday of nation-building, unity, and harmony — after which the darkening discord of the sixties follows as a decided shock.

Now I would not seek to deny a good deal of validity even to this oversimplified, partial version of the nation-building account. I mean rather to say that it is merely one assessment, which does not necessarily have to be equated with the working out of historical destiny for Canada. This is not to condemn it as too readily subjective — and thereby enter into the bottomless debate as to whether there is objective history. It is to assert instead that the theme of nation-building has an unfortunately teleological cast. One looks for the end to be achieved; one measures developments, pro or con, in terms of the goal — a strong, united nation. One anticipates the re-enactment of the American success story and, when it does not come, particularly blames the presence of the huge American neighbour itself. Again this is not to deny all validity to that account. Obviously, a transcontinental Canadian union has been established and has been constantly

†*Canadian Historical Review* L, 1 (March 1969): 1–10. An earlier version of this paper was presented to a meeting of the American Historical Association held in Toronto, December 1967.

subjected to powerful American influences. But it still can be contended that the nationbuilding approach to Canadian history neglects and obscures even while it explains and illuminates, and may tell us less about the Canada that now is than the Canada that should have been — but has not come to pass.

Viewed in a different context, accordingly, the years of the early twentieth century can appear as the period when a vigorous new western region emerged to join the existing coterie of Canadian regions; the twenties, as the time when forces of modern industrial society began to shape the present powerful provincial empires; the thirties, when class and ethnic strains proved at least as potent in disrupting the Canadian political fabric as the constitutional decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; the forties, when external crisis undoubtedly brought resurgent national sentiment — but two nationalisms, in two Canadas; the fifties, an era when rapid industrial and urban growth greatly strengthened regional orientations and ethnic pressures — and helped bring on the divisions of the sixties as a natural consequence.

This is not an attempt to replace a success story with a failure story — nor, indeed, is it very new, since it essentially puts forward elements long recognized. What may be newer, however, is the notion that if the Canadian people have fallen short of the Canadian dream (held, that is, chiefly by historians and intellectuals) it could be because their interests were elsewhere — and that they nevertheless shared in a viable Canada, if not that laid up in heaven for them. Accordingly, it might be worth investigating what their Canadian experience was, observing that it did not greatly focus on Ottawa and the deeds of hero federal politicians, or on the meagre symbols of some all-Canadian way of life.

How, then, is this Canadian experience to be discerned and defined? Some of it is doubtless common to all as citizens in one political sovereignty, with many economic and social interconnections besides. But much of it surely lies in the “limited identities” of region, culture, and class referred to by Professor Cook. These represent entities of experience for Canadians no less than the transcontinental federal union; indeed, it is largely through them that Canadians interpret their nation-state as a whole. Of course — emphatically — regional, ethnic, and class factors apply in other national histories; and of course they have scarcely gone unnoticed in Canada as well. But what still is needed is more study of their roles in this country of relatively weak nationalizing forces: a land of two languages, pluralized politics, and ethnic multiplicity, yet all so far contained within one distinctive frame of nation-state existence.

It is impossible to do more here than sketch some outlines of this study or, because of the limitations of space, to go much beyond one aspect of the limited identities, the regional, while touching on ethnic and class factors in passing. It may be hoped, however, that enough can be done to make plain the significance of such a view of Canada throughout its development as a nation-state.

In taking up a theme of regionalism, one is conscious that it may suggest a somewhat dated environmentalist approach by analogy with the history of the United States. There, it can bring to mind implications of Turner and the frontier school: of the pouring of people into sectional moulds to harden in the frontier's advance across the various physiographic regions of the continent. Through the

inevitable workings of revision in American history, from critics of Turner who urged other factors than the moulding power of the frontier environment down to Louis Hartz, whose special stress on cultural importation leaves little to the landscape, a regional treatment can come to seem rather old-hat, tending perhaps to the parochial or antiquarian.<sup>2</sup> This may be so, to an extent, for a country where national forces have worked mightily, the powers of One Big Market, One Big Government, and the Americanizing Dream having proved so paramount. But the Canadian context is almost antithetical. Whether one moves, accordingly, with Turnerian or Hartzian waves, the experience of regionalism remains prominent and distinctive in Canadian history — and time has tended less to erode it than to develop it.

Most of the reasons here are oft given and obvious: the geographical segmentation and encumbrances of the country; the north-south orientation of many regional economic patterns and the related problem of sustaining east-west lines; the Anglo-French duality; and the lack of positive popular commitment to a strong federal union, despite the intentions of the framers of Confederation. Whatever their ideas or assumptions, in fact, the union of 1867 was in large degree a coming together of regions and so has remained: regions articulated or integrated under a central regime, but surely not reduced or unified thereby.

Yet there are other factors that must also enter to explain this persistence of regionalism. After all, the United States had a mass of geography too, not all of it advantageous, and a strong American union was not born but was made in history, in the very growth of popular commitment. Nor can the Anglo-French duality in Canada, however intrinsic, be found sufficient reason in itself for *e pluribus non unum*; there are also several English Canadas, not just one. A further fact, instead, is that the social patterning of Canada particularly tends to favour regional commitment. There is a relationship here between regional identification and broader social values that deserves investigation.

John Porter makes the essential point when he observes: "Unlike the American value system, which has always emphasized the idea of the equality of peoples within a new nation, the Canadian value system has stressed the social qualities that differentiate people rather than the human qualities that make them the same."<sup>3</sup> Porter discusses the point chiefly in regard to the persistence of immigrant groupings in Canada, where ethnic fragmentation is more the mode than assimilation and is expressed in the ideal of the mosaic instead of the melting pot. But this Canadian tendency to treat people as groups and communities rather than as individuals and citizens pertains to more than the fairly recent development of the ethnic mosaic. Its roots run deep in history.

French Canada's social values found their origins in the corporate authoritarian traditions of the seventeenth century. English Canada's were shaped in the organic, pragmatic, Victorian liberalism of the nineteenth century. In other words, one may follow Louis Hartz on the power of transferred cultural fragments to mould new societies, yet contend that for English Canada the formative power lay not in the weak remnants of eighteenth-century American empire but in the swamping force of earlier nineteenth-century British immigration. At any rate, neither French nor English Canada knew eighteenth-century rationalist democracy,

as did the United States, with its generalized precepts on the equality, rights, and powers of men as men. In the Canadian scheme of values there was no all-embracing sovereign people but rather particular societies of people under a sovereign crown. They were exclusive rather than inclusive in viewpoint. Their guide was adapted organic tradition more than the innovating power of the popular will. And they stressed the nearer corporate loyalties of religious and ethnic distinctions — Scots, English, and Irish, as well as French — instead of broad adherence to a democratic state.

Though self-government came, it developed in terms of the Canadian perception and experience, as did federal union. And while the Fathers of Confederation might devise a strong union under the crown, designed indeed to counter claims for states' rights, they could not invoke for it the power of the American belief in the sovereign people. As subsequent demands for provincial rights arose, federal leaders dealt with them pragmatically, rather than seek some broad, national counter-response. Indeed, Canadian particularist habits of mind largely favoured impulses to state sovereignty over sovereignty of the people — so that, in the Canadian union of the twentieth century, one might almost witness the gradual victory of the long defunct Confederate States of America.

Furthermore, the crown, whose supremacy the fathers of 1867 might count on to obviate pretensions of founding power in the provinces, had its place within the spheres of provincial government as well as federal. Drawing on the traditional symbol, provinces might well aspire to the rank of co-ordinate kingdoms; and most had existed as entities under the crown before the creation of the federal state. In the twentieth century, the growing demands on government in an industrializing, urbanizing society of course greatly enlarged the activities of the provinces; but, not less significantly, the process strengthened their identification with the particularist societies of Canada. They grew in status as well as function. It is not only evident that federal-provincial conferences have acquired something of the atmosphere of diplomatic exchanges between states, but it is also not inexpressive of Canadian conditions that heads of powerful provincial regimes may use the title of prime minister for their office — as in the current advance of the kingdom of British Columbia to co-equal dignity.

Accordingly, while it would be absurd as well as unnecessary to deny historical evidence of Canadian sentiment for the union and the country as a whole, the fact remains that basic schemes of values in both English and French Canada accord more readily with smaller, differentiated provincial or regional societies. In French Canada, too, sentiment is far more strongly focussed on the corporate Quebec community than on the whole extended French-Canadian segment of the union; it is even a question whether separatism is not best conceived as the height of Quebec communalism. As for English Canada, the habitual emphasis on particularized social groupings rather than mass citizenship, on pragmatically nearer community interests instead of some generalized, idealized, national way of life, effectively ministers to strong identification with regions or provinces delineated by geography, economics, and history.

That pervasive twentieth-century process, urbanization, has also reinforced regional identities in Canada. It was after World War I that the Canadian population became more than 50 percent urban; by the 1960s the proportion was

over 70 percent. One might conjecture that the long decline of an older, more isolated rural Canada, one of the most notable features of this century, would foster nationalizing forces — and no doubt this has been true in some degree. But the significant aspect for this study is the way in which the rise of dominant urban centres or metropolises has also aided regional orientation and the shaping of provincial power structures.

One may note that all across the country major metropolitan centres have organized broad regional hinterlands about themselves, thanks to their dominance of communication nets and of market, manufacturing, or financial facilities that serve the region. Again, this is a world as well as a North American phenomenon and has been going on in Canada for quite some time. Even in the relatively static Atlantic provinces, Halifax achieved metropolitan dominance in Nova Scotia in the later nineteenth century, largely through the building of railways; and through railways Saint John widened its commercial sway in New Brunswick. As for Quebec, another old port city — of hallowed antiquity by North American standards — its political role and cultural hold as the capital of French Canada maintained its special regional dominance, however much it continued economically to fall behind its upriver rival, Montreal. Leaving Montreal for the moment, Toronto was fully established as the metropolis of prosperous agricultural and industrial southern Ontario by the end of the nineteenth century; and in the twentieth, it added control of the huge mineral resource area of northern Ontario, so that successive opulent suburbs of Toronto spell out a veritable progression of northern mining booms.

In the West, Winnipeg's hold spread across the prairies with the wheat boom of the early twentieth century and the transcontinentals that funnelled down to its yards. Its growth was slower after World War I, as the opening of the Panama Canal route tapped off some of its western hinterland to the Pacific. But it retained an influential position as a major regional focus, even when newer western metropolises developed: Calgary with the oil boom after World War II; Edmonton with its drive to the northern hinterland of the Peace, and by air, railroad, and barge to the very shores of the Arctic. Westward again, there was Vancouver, the transcontinental outlet, soaring with its own ever-richer Pacific hinterland of lumber, minerals, and water power.

All these cities were centres of regional dynamism, identified with the economic leadership and welfare of vast sections of the country; centres, often, of political as well as of business elites, foci of public opinion in their regions, of chief media instruments like newspapers and television, seats of major provincial educational or cultural facilities. And the evergrowing pattern of urban concentration in the highway and apartment age has simply strengthened the focussing of Canadian regions around their chief metropolitan cities.

To admit the obvious once more, the metropolitan centres of the United States have grown in similar fashion — to still greater wealth and size — yet the result has not been comparable in the regionalizing of the nation. The fact is, however, that while the phenomenon of metropolitan-regional growth is wholly apparent in the United States, there are offsetting factors in that country; and it is these that are notably less evident in Canada.

For one thing, the American urban pattern is far more complex, containing many counter-pulls — with more sizable cities and tiers of cities, more regions and subregions, and also more states. There is not the relative simplicity of the Canadian scene, where a few large cities dominate huge sweeps of territory, sometimes within one provincial jurisdiction, and that perhaps centred within the city itself. For another thing, the overmastering role of the chief or “national” metropolis is not really comparable. Naturally, Montreal is Canada’s closest equivalent to New York, the greatest head-office centre, key to the national transport system, the final capital of the country’s economic life. This may be so economically. But in socio-cultural terms — in “national regard,” if one may use the phrase — Montreal is not a single great metropolis but the split capital of two Canadas: for the one, yielding to Quebec in some aspects; for the other, to Toronto and elsewhere; perhaps finding general national regard only at extraordinary occasions like Expo 67. Montreal does not fill the metropolitan headship role held by the huge American conurbation. In Canada, people do tend far more to look to their regional metropolitan centres than to Montreal — or else to New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles. As for Ottawa, as a purely political capital, a weaker Washington in a less consolidated country, its presence does not greatly alter the Canadian particularist tendency to focus on to the regional metropolis.

In the main, therefore, the growth of urbanism and metropolitanism has largely worked to confirm regional identities in twentieth-century Canada. One can identify the West Coast culture of Vancouver, for example, far more explicitly than the traits of national culture, just as one can more easily depict an Albertan or a Maritimer than a Canadian. About the only strongly identifiable national urban propensity, in fact, is the wide eagerness to scorn Toronto, which is consoled by its inherent belief that all Canadian cities really do aspire to be Toronto, if they are good.

One could go on noting still more factors making for regional identification — the ethnic mosaic, for example, built up in the waves of twentieth-century immigration. Each region has virtually a distinctive ethnic composition of its own, according to the proportion and variety of immigrants it has received, with consequent effect on its political as well as cultural responses. Once more this might be said of the United States, where assimilation may be the ideal more than the complete achievement. Nonetheless, how different is the degree, when in Canada the ideal, or plain acceptance of fact, is the survival of ethnic diversity, where there is a declared distinction between “founding peoples” and later arrivals — and where “ethnic” has vulgarly become a noun to signify a member of one of the contingents of the non-French, non-British third force in Canada. Of course, acculturation has nevertheless proceeded among immigrant elements, from the mid-nineteenth-century “famine Irish” to the mid-twentieth-century Hungarian refugees. Still, the ethnic persistence fostered by Canadian socio-cultural values plainly intensifies regional differentiation, quite aside from the special French and English identifications of Quebec and Ontario. Compare the largely “old-Canadian” make-up of the Maritimes, for example, with the strong non-British, if English-accultured component in plains society, the significance of Ukrainians in Manitoba, of Italians in urban Ontario, or the still more cosmopolitan mixture of West Coast society.



Then too, class patterns may be observed as varying from region to region in Canada, no doubt complying with differing regional economic scales. At any rate, industrialism and urbanism have not yet here created strong national awareness of common class interests. Socio-economic strains have tended to be expressed in largely regional terms, or at most in non-enduring regional alliances of disadvantaged elements. This may be said of Progressivism in the twenties, a class-oriented movement which foundered amid regional diversity; of the CCF of the thirties and forties, which largely failed, beyond its western bases, to make lasting inroads on the eastern working classes; of Social Credit in the fifties and after, which essentially stayed dependent on sure provincial bailiwicks in Alberta and British Columbia. And today class discontents are still largely expressed in regional or provincial stances, as in the Maritimes, or in Quebec communalism. As for socialism, one might feel that if the hopefuls of the Second International ran headlong into nationalism, so in Canada its proponents still have to face the divisive force of regionalism.

These threads, of course, should be followed further; but for now one may assert that regional, ethnic, and class identities have all tended to fit together more than to develop national identification in Canada. The ultimate conclusion, indeed, might seem to be that the true theme of the country's history in the twentieth century is not nation building but region building. But here it is necessary to make one final point. All this does add up to a characteristic and persisting Canadian pattern, largely differentiated from the United States — and the whole may indeed be greater than the sum of its parts, producing through its internal relationships some sort of common Canadianism. At least this is the contention here: that the distinctive nature of much of Canadian experience has produced a continent-wide entity identifiable in its very pluralism, constraints, and compromises.

A key word is articulation. What has been sought, and to some degree achieved, is not really unification or consolidation, but the articulation of regional patterns in one transcontinental state. In this process, it may be said, the implicit aim of every regional community has been maximum autonomy for itself consonant with the maximum advantage to be gained from an overriding central regime. In this, indeed, these communities were simply manifesting the historical behaviour exemplified in Canadian relations with British imperial power, where the essential process was the gradual maximizing of autonomy rather than a doctrine-based conflict over sovereign independence. But the concept of autonomy involves notions of both practical adjustment and continuing association. The analogy may not be precise between the external and internal processes in Canada — at any rate, in honesty, one knows where the former led — but the real fact is, it does fit the particularist, pragmatic tradition of the Canadian communities.

And the result may be that each of them, in whatever varying degree, could exhibit something common, to be called Canadianism, as they viewed the whole country from their own regional, ethnic, or class position, seeing it largely in their own perspective but accepting its limitations and need of continual adjustment, while also feeling the shared benefits it provided. All, indeed, have tended to make a virtue of their own regional or provincial willingness to “sacrifice” to maintain Canada and most have found the concept of the general union neces-