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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Enduring Concepts and
Contemporary Issues

TENTH EDITION


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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

International politics: enduring concepts and contemporary issues / [edited by]
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis. — 10th ed.

p. cm.

ISBN-13: 978-0-205-77876-8 (pbk.)

ISBN-10: 0-205-77876-3 (pbk.)

I. International relations. 2. World politics—1989– 3. Globalization. I. Art, Robert J.
II. Jervis, Robert, 1940–

JZ1242.I574 2010

327—dc22

2009049562

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10—DOC—13 12 11 10

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
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


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PREFACE

The first edition of *International Politics* appeared in 1973, and now, with the tenth edition, *International Politics* celebrates its 37th birthday. We are pleased that this reader has been so well received, and we hope instructors and students find the tenth edition as useful as they have found the previous nine.

NEW TO THIS EDITION

The tenth edition retains the four major parts of the ninth edition, and contains 54 selections, fourteen of which are new, giving this edition 25 percent new material. Three important organizational changes have been made in the tenth edition:

- We have moved material on the global environment and climate change to Part Four under the heading “The Global Commons.”
- We have expanded the coverage of globalization in Part Three and subdivided the readings on globalization into two sections—“The Meaning of Globalization” and “The Critics of Globalization.”
- We have added a new section to Part Four titled “Future Developments.”

In addition to these major organizational changes, we have made the following alterations:

- Part One retains the three major subdivisions, but we have added the “Melian Dialogue” by Thucydides to the first subdivision so as to incorporate Thucydides’ reflections on the relationship between might and right in international politics; and we have moved Robert Jervis’s essay on “Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma” to the subdivision on mitigating anarchy, where it more properly belongs.
- Part Two retains its three major subdivisions, but we have added an expanded version of Bruce Hoffman’s essay on terrorism; a new selection by Mary Kaldor on the difference between the wars of the contemporary world and those of the past; and a piece by Henry Sokolski that takes issue with Barry Posen’s views about a nuclear-armed Iran.
- Part Three has two new selections on international political economy: an essay by Alan Blinder that puts offshoring (the movement of production and services overseas) in historical perspective, and a selection by Robert Wade that puts the 2008–2009 financial crisis in its historic and international context.

- Part Four has nine new selections: Robert Art on what the rise of China portends for Sino-American relations; Audrey Cronin on how terrorism ends; Alan Kuperman on the nature of humanitarian intervention; Barry Schwartz on how to solve commons problems; Moses Naim on an effective form of multilateralism he terms “minilateralism”; and four readings—the National Intelligence Council’s *Global 2025 Report*, Barry Posen on emerging multipolarity, Robert Kagan on the return of great power rivalry, and Richard Jackson and Neil Howe on coming demographic realities—that peer into the future to divine the contours of international politics then.

FEATURES

Originally, we put this reader together to help give the field of international relations greater focus and to bring to students the best articles we could find on the key theoretical concepts in the field. This accounts for the “enduring concepts” in the book’s subtitle. A few editions after the first, we then added a separate section on contemporary issues because of our view that these enduring concepts have more meaning for students when applied to salient contemporary issues. All subsequent editions have followed this basic philosophy of combining the best scholarship on theoretical perspectives with that on important contemporary problems.

In constructing the first edition, and in putting together all subsequent editions, including this one, we have tried to create a reader that embodies four features:

- A selection of subjects that, while not exhaustively covering the field of international politics, nevertheless encompasses most of the essential topics that all of us teach in our introductory courses.
- Individual readings that are mainly analytical in content, that take issue with one another, and that thereby introduce the student to the fundamental debates and points of view in the field.
- Editors’ introductions to each part that summarize the central concepts the student must master, that organize the central themes of each part, and that relate the readings to one another.
- A book that can be used either as the core around which to design an introductory course or as the primary supplement to enrich an assigned text.

Since the first edition, the field of international relations has experienced a dramatic enrichment in the subjects studied and the quality of works published. Political economy came into its own as an important subfield in the 1970s. New and important works in the field of security studies appeared. The literature on cooperation among states flourished in the early 1980s, and important studies about the environment began to appear in the mid-1980s. Feminist, post-modernist, and constructivist critiques of the mainstream made their appearance also. With the end of the Cold War, these new issues came to the fore: human rights, the tension between state sovereignty and the obligations of the international community, the global

environment, civil wars, failed states, nation-building, and, most recently, the search for new modes of global governance to deal with the collective action problems that are increasingly pressing upon states. The growing diversity of the field has closely mirrored the actual developments in international relations.

Consequently, as for the previous editions, in fashioning the tenth, we have kept in mind both the new developments in world politics and the literature that has accompanied them. Central to this edition, though, as for the other nine, is our belief that the realm of international politics differs fundamentally from that of domestic politics. Therefore, we have continued to put both the developments and the literature in the context of the patterns that still remain valid for understanding the differences between politics in an anarchic environment and politics that takes place under a government.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In putting together this and previous editions, we received excellent advice from the following colleagues, whom we would like to thank for the time and care they took: Linda S. Adams, Baylor University; David G. Becker, Dartmouth College; Andrew Bennett, Georgetown University; Chelsea Brown, Southern Methodist University; James A. Caporaso, University of Washington; Timothy M. Cole, University of Maine; Jane Cramer, University of Oregon; David Edelstein, Georgetown University; Joseph Foudy, Hunter College; Sonia Gardenas, Trinity College; Robert C. Gray, Franklin & Marshall College; Robert J. Griffiths, University of North Carolina at Greensboro; James Hentz, Virginia Military Institute; David Houghton, University of Central Florida; Benjamin Judkins, University of Utah; Sean Kay, Ohio Wesleyan University; Mary McCarthy, Drake University; Timothy McKeown, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; James A. Mitchell, California State University, Northridge; Ronald Mitchell, University of Oregon; Layna Mosley, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Mueni W. Muiu, Winston-Salem State University; Kathy L. Powers, Pennsylvania State University; Philip Schrodtt, University of Kansas; Randall Schweller, The Ohio State University; Margaret E. Scranton, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Roslin Simowitz, University of Texas at Arlington; Veronica Ward, Utah State University; and Ken Wise, Creighton University.

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PART

1

Anarchy and Its Consequences

Unlike domestic politics, international politics takes place in an arena that has no central governing body. From this central fact flows important consequences for the behavior of states. In Part 1, we explore three of them: the role that principles and morality can and should play in statecraft; the effects that anarchy has on how states view and relate to one another; and the ways that the harsher edges of anarchy can be mitigated, even if not wholly removed.

POWER AND PRINCIPLE IN STATECRAFT

Citizens, students, and scholars alike often take up the study of international politics because they want their country to behave in as principled a way as possible. But they soon discover that principle and power, morality and statecraft do not easily mix. Why should this be? Is it inevitable? Can and should states seek to do good in the world? Will they endanger themselves and harm others if they try? These are timeless questions, having been asked by observers of international politics in nearly every previous era. They therefore make a good starting point for thinking about the nature of international politics and the choices states face in our era.

In his history of the Peloponnesian War, the Greek historian Thucydides made the first, and perhaps the most famous, statement about the relation between the prerogatives of power and the dictates of morality. In the Melian dialogue, he argued that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (more frequently stated as “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”). For Thucydides considerations of power reigned supreme in international politics and were the key to understanding why the war between Athens and Sparta began in the first place. At root, he argued: “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” Fearing that Athens’ power was growing more quickly than its own, Sparta launched a preventive war to stop Athens from becoming too powerful. Herein lies the first written insight that changes in relative power positions among states, in this case “city-states,” can be a cause of war. The forcefulness with which he argued for the “power politics” view of international relations makes Thucydides the first “Realist” theorist of international politics.

Hans J. Morgenthau, a leading twentieth-century theorist of international relations, also takes the “power politics” position. He argues that universal standards of morality cannot be an invariable guide to statecraft because there is an “ineluctable tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action.” Rather than base statecraft on morality, Morgenthau argues that state actors must think and act in terms of power and must do whatever it takes to defend the national interests of their state. J. Ann Tickner, commenting on the primacy of power in Morgenthau’s writings, explains that what he considers to be a realistic description of international politics is only a picture of the past and therefore not a prediction about the future, and proposes what she considers to be a feminist alternative. A world in which state actors think of power in terms of collective empowerment, not in terms of leverage over one another, could produce more cooperative outcomes and pose fewer conflicts between the dictates of morality and the power of self-interest.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANARCHY

Even those who argue that morality should play a large role in statecraft acknowledge that international politics is not like domestic politics. In the latter, there is government; in the former, there is none. As a consequence, no agency exists above the individual states with authority and power to make laws and settle disputes. States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punishes deviations. This—the absence of a supreme power—is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics. Anarchy is therefore said to constitute a *state of war*: When all else fails, force is the *ultima ratio*—the final and legitimate arbiter of disputes among states.

The state of war does not mean that every nation is constantly at the brink of war or actually at war with other nations. Most countries, though, do feel threatened by some states at some time, and every state has experienced periods of intense insecurity. No two contiguous states, moreover, have had a history of close, friendly relations uninterrupted by severe tension if not outright war. Because a nation cannot look to a supreme body to enforce laws, nor count on other nations for constant aid and support, it must rely on its own efforts, particularly for defense against attack. Coexistence in an anarchic environment thus requires *self-help*. The psychological outlook that self-help breeds is best described by a saying common among British statesmen since Palmerston: “Great Britain has no permanent enemies or permanent friends, she has only permanent interests.”

Although states must provide the wherewithal to achieve their own ends, they do not always reach their foreign policy goals. The goals may be grandiose; the means available, meager. The goals may be attainable; the means selected, inappropriate. But even if the goals are realistic and the means both available and appropriate, a state can be frustrated in pursuit of its ends. The reason is simple but fundamental to an understanding of international politics: What one state does will inevitably impinge on some other states—on some beneficially, but on others

adversely. What one state desires, another may covet. What one thinks its just due, another may find threatening. Steps that a state takes to achieve its goals may be rendered useless by the countersteps others take. No state, therefore, can afford to disregard the effects its actions will have on other nations' behavior. In this sense state behavior is contingent: What one state does is dependent in part upon what others do. Mutual dependence means that each must take the others into account.

Mutual dependence affects nothing more powerfully than it does security—the measures states take to protect their territory. Like other foreign policy goals, the security of one state is contingent upon the behavior of other states. Herein lies the *security dilemma* to which each state is subject: In its efforts to preserve or enhance its own security, one state can take measures that decrease the security of other states and cause them to take countermeasures that neutralize the actions of the first state and that may even menace it. The first state may feel impelled to take further actions, provoking additional countermeasures . . . and so forth. The security dilemma means that an action–reaction spiral can occur between two states or among several of them, forcing each to spend ever larger sums on arms to be no more secure than before. All will run faster merely to stay where they are.

At the heart of the security dilemma are these two constraints: the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive postures, and the inability of one state to believe or trust that another state's present pacific intentions will remain so. The capability to defend can also provide the capability to attack. In adding to its arms, state A may know that its aim is defensive, that its intentions are peaceful, and therefore that it has no aggressive designs on state B. In a world where states must look to themselves for protection, however, B will examine A's actions carefully and suspiciously. B may think that A will attack it when A's arms become powerful enough and that A's protestations of friendship are designed to lull it into lowering its guard. But even if B believes A's actions are not directed against it, B cannot assume that A's intentions will remain peaceful. Anarchy makes it impossible for A to bind itself to continuing to respect B's interests in the future. B must allow for the possibility that what A can do to it, A sometime might do. The need to assess capabilities along with intentions, or, the equivalent, to allow for a change in intentions, makes state actors profoundly conservative. They prefer to err on the side of safety, to have too much rather than too little. Because security is the basis of existence and the prerequisite for the achievement of all other goals, state actors must be acutely sensitive to the security actions of others. The security dilemma thus means that state actors cannot risk *not* reacting to the security actions of other states, but that in so reacting they can produce circumstances that leave them worse off than before.

The anarchic environment of international politics, then, allows every state to be the final judge of its own interests, but requires that each provide the means to attain them. Because the absence of a central authority permits wars to occur, security considerations become paramount. Because of the effects of the security dilemma, efforts of state leaders to protect their peoples can lead to severe tension and war even when all parties sincerely desire peace. Two states, or two groups of states, each satisfied with the status quo and seeking only security, may not be able

to achieve it. Conflicts and wars with no economic or ideological basis can occur. The outbreak of war, therefore, does not necessarily mean that some or all states seek expansion, or that humans have an innate drive for power. That states go to war when none of them wants to, however, does not imply that they never seek war. The security dilemma may explain some wars; it does not explain all wars. States often do experience conflicts of interest over trade, real estate, ideology, and prestige. For example, when someone asked Francis I what differences led to his constant wars with Charles V, he replied: "None whatever. We agree perfectly. We both want control of Italy!" (Cited in Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 7th ed., New York, 1953, p. 283.) If states cannot obtain what they want by blackmail, bribery, or threats, they may resort to war. Wars can occur when no one wants them; wars usually do occur when someone wants them.

Realists argue that even under propitious circumstances, international cooperation is difficult to achieve because in anarchy, states are often more concerned with relative advantages than with absolute gains. That is, because international politics is a self-help system in which each state must be prepared to rely on its own resources and strength to further its interests, national leaders often seek to become more powerful than their potential adversaries. Cooperation is then made difficult not only by the fear that others will cheat and fail to live up to their agreements, but also by the perceived need to gain a superior position. The reason is not that state actors are concerned with status, but that they fear that arrangements that benefit all, but provide greater benefits to others than to them, will render their country vulnerable to pressure and coercion in the future.

Kenneth N. Waltz develops the above points more fully by analyzing the differences between hierarchic (domestic) and anarchic (international) political systems. He shows why the distribution of capabilities (the relative power positions of states) in anarchic systems is so important and lays out the ways in which political behavior differs in hierarchic and anarchic systems.

There is broad agreement among realists on the consequences of anarchy for states' behavior, but not total agreement. One brand of realists, who are called the "offensive realists," argue that the consequences of anarchy go far beyond producing security dilemmas and making cooperation hard to come by. They assert that anarchy forces states, and especially the great powers, to become "power maximizers" because the only way to assure the state's security is to be the most powerful state in the system. Offensive realism envisions a "dog-eat-dog" world of international politics in which power and fear dominate great power interactions and in which war, or the threat of war, among the great powers or among their proxies is a constant feature of international relations. John J. Mearsheimer lays out the tenets of this brand of Realism.

In an anarchic condition, however, the question to ask may not be, "Why does war occur?" but rather "Why does war not occur more frequently than it does?" Instead of asking "Why do states not cooperate more to achieve common interests?" we should ask "Given anarchy and the security dilemma, how is it that states are able to cooperate at all?" Anarchy and the security dilemma do not produce their effects automatically, and it is not self-evident that states are power maximizers.