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# Private Company Law Reform

International and European Perspectives

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Joseph A. McCahery  
Levinus Timmerman  
Erik P.M. Vermeulen  
editors

# PRIVATE COMPANY LAW REFORM


International and European Perspectives

*edited by*

Joseph A. McCahery

Levinus Timmerman

Erik P.M. Vermeulen



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**PRIVATE COMPANY LAW REFORM**  
**International and European Perspectives**

## PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Tilburg/Rotterdam/Tilburg, September 2009

*Joseph McCahery*  
*Levinus Timmermans*  
*Erik Vermeulen*

## ABBREVIATIONS

ABA	American Bar Association
AG	<i>Die Aktiengesellschaft</i>
All ER	All England Law Reports
BGBI	<i>Bundesgesetzblatt</i>
BGH	German Federal Supreme Court
BGHZ	<i>Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen</i>
Bpb	Bill on private companies
CBC	Center for Business and Corporate Law
CJEC	Court of Justice of the European Communities
CLRFC	Company Legislation and Regulatory Framework Committee
CMLR	Common Market Law Reports
CREDA	<i>Centre de recherche sur le droit des affaires de la Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de Paris</i>
DCC	Dutch Civil Code
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EC	European Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECR	European Court Reports
ECFR	European Council of Foreign Relations.
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EEIA	European Economic Interest Association
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EHUG	<i>Gesetz über das elektronische Handelsregister und Genossenschaftsregister sowie das Unternehmensregister</i>
EP	European Parliament
EPC	European Private Company
EU	European Union
EwIR	<i>Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht</i>
EWS	<i>Europäischer Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss</i>
FCJ	Federal Court of Justice
GmbH	<i>Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung</i>
GmbHG	<i>Gesetz über Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung</i>
GP	General Partnership
HR	<i>Hoge Raad</i>
ICCLR	International Company and Commercial Law Review
IPO	Initial public offering
IRC	Internal Revenue Code of 1986
IRS	Internal Revenue Service

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JBL	Journal of Business Law
J. Corp. L.	Journal of Corporation Law
JOR	Journal of Online Research, Journal of Oriental Research.
LLC	Limited liability company
LLP	Limited liability partnership
LLLP	Limited liability limited partnership
LP	Limited partnership
MBCA	Model Business Corporation Act
MEDEF	<i>Mouvement des Entreprises de France</i>
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
MSSCALA	Model Simplified Stock Corporations Act for Latin America
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NCCUSL	National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
NJ	<i>Nederlandse Jurisprudentie</i>
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJ	Official Journal of the European Communities/Union
Rebels Z	<i>Rebels Zeitschrift für Ausländische und Internationales Privatrecht.</i>
RGZ	<i>Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen</i>
RULPA	Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
RUPA	Revised Uniform Partnership Act
SA	<i>Société Anonyme</i>
SARL	<i>Société à Responsabilité Limitée</i>
SAS	<i>Société par Actions Simplifiée</i>
SAS	<i>Sociedad por Acciones Simplificada</i>
SEC	Securities and Exchange Commission.
S-LLP	Singapore LLP
SMEs	Small and medium-sized enterprises
SORP	Statement of Recommended Practice
S. Tex. L. Rev.	South Texas Law Review.
Stan. L. Rev.	Stanford Law Review
TVVS	<i>Tijdschrift voor vennootschappen, verenigingen en stichtingen</i>
UCLA Law Review	University of California Los Angeles Law Review
U.L.A	Uniform Laws Annotated.
ULLCA	Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
ULPA	Uniform Limited Partnership Act
UPA	Uniform Partnership Act
U.S.C.	United States Code
WLR	Weekly Law Reports
Yale LJ	Yale Law Journal
ZHR	<i>Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht</i>
ZIP	<i>Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht</i>

## LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Stephen M. BAINBRIDGE is William D. Warren Professor of Law at UCLA.

Scott A. BAKER is Professor of Law at Washington University School of Law.

Michael BEURSKENS is Assistant, Heinrich Heine University of Düsseldorf, Germany.

Robert DRURY is Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter; Member of CREDA/MEDEF Drafting Group for the EPC Regulation.

Henry HANSMANN is August E. Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School.

Masato HISATAKE is Professor of Policy Analysis, Tohoku University School of Law.

Peter HOMMELHOFF is Professor of Law, University of Heidelberg.

Reinier KRAAKMAN is Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.

Kimberly D. KRAWIEC is Professor of Law, Duke Law Faculty.

Maarten J. KROEZE is Dean and Professor of Company Law, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam.

Saul LEVMORE is Dean and William B. Graham Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

Joseph A. McCAHERY is Professor of International Economic Law, Tilburg University Faculty of Law and Professor of Financial Market Regulation, Tilburg Law and Economics Center, Research Associate ECGI (Brussels).

Ulrich NOACK is Professor of Law, Heinrich Heine University of Düsseldorf, Germany.

Richard W. PAINTER is S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law, University of Minnesota Law School.

Francisco REYES is Professor and Director of Graduate Program in Corporation Law, Universidad Javeriana in Colombia.

Larry E. RIBSTEIN is Mildred van Voorhees Chair in Law, University of Illinois College of Law.

Jun SAITO, member of the Executive Staff, Corporate Technology Management, Nikon Corporation, Japan.

Richard SQUIRE is Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law.



Levinus TIMMERMAN is Professor of Company Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Advocate General at the Netherlands Supreme Court.

Erik P.M. VERMEULEN is Professor of Law and Management, Tilburg University Faculty of Law, Fellow Center for Company Law and Tilburg Law and Economics Center, and Legal Counsel at Philips International B.V.

Allan W. VESTAL is Dean and Professor of Law, Drake University Law School.

Jan Berend WEZEMAN is Professor of Company and Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, University of Groningen.

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