



The Morality of **CONFLICT**

Reasonable Disagreement and the Law

Samantha Besson

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'Demander à un État libre des gens hardis dans la guerre et timides dans la paix, c'est vouloir des choses impossibles; et, pour règle générale, toutes les fois qu'on verra tout le monde tranquille dans un État qui se donne le nom de république, on peut être assuré que la liberté n'y est pas.'

MONTESQUIEU, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*, (Oxford, Voltaire Foundation, 2000) ix

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