Human conduct

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF ETHICS

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JOHN HOSPERS *Brooklyn College*

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Preface

In what way should a person conduct his life? What things in life count most—pleasure and enjoyment, truth and knowledge, moral courage and conscientiousness? What makes some things good and others bad, some acts right and others wrong? Have we obligations to others? What are they and why should we perform them? In what circumstances can we rightly be praised, blamed, punished, or excused for our actions? Do we possess freedom—of action, of choice, of desire? How do we know any of these things, and how can we prove them?

It is to such questions that this book is addressed. The proponents of each of the major historical views on these subjects are described and assessed, although no attempt is made to treat the views in chronological order. The attempt is rather to present them in a logical order, with no acquaintance with the literature of the subject presupposed. To some extent each chapter assumes an acquaintance with those preceding, so the chapters are best studied in the order given; nevertheless the order can be changed without great damage to comprehension, except in the case of Chapters 3-7, which form a continuous series.

Every topic discussed is illustrated by numerous examples, so that the reader will be assisted in applying the principles involved to the problems of the contemporary world: problems of personal morality, political and economic problems, problems of war and peace. Numerous exercises containing further examples are to be found at the end of the numbered sections, of which there are twenty-eight in all. Where controversial issues arise, dialogues have been constructed which represent each of the main positions on the problem under discussion.

I am enormously indebted to Professors Elizabeth Beardsley of Lincoln University and Paul Taylor of Brooklyn College, who read painstakingly through the entire manuscript and gave me the benefit of many valuable suggestions; and to my colleagues Professors Howard Hintz, Martin Lean, and Julius Portnoy, all of Brooklyn College, who read some of the chapters and gave me advice and encouragement.

John Hospers

Los Angeles, California
January, 1961

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1. Moral problems

Would you be willing to put your arm into a blazing fire and keep it there for ten minutes if by so doing you could save the life of your next-door neighbor? Would you want him to do so to save your life?

If someone irritates you continually and needles you to the point of madness, and if you could give him a painless but lethal poison without the slightest chance of ever being found out, would you do it?

If someone approached you with a gun and there was a 50 per cent chance that he would shoot, would you shoot him first?

Suppose that you are promised a million dollars in cash for just pressing a button, with the result that a person somewhere in the United States, entirely unknown to you, dies instantly. No one can ever trace the cause back to you. You don't even have to see the man die. Would you press the button?

To relieve all the hunger in India for one day, would you be willing to walk naked down the street in broad daylight for two hours (or until the police caught you) without any explanation to anyone then or at any time in the future?

Would you be just as willing to give to a worthy cause if the gift were strictly anonymous — no one would ever know that you gave it so no one would praise you or think better of you for it? Would you do it even if you knew you would be hated for it?

Would you rather be dishonest and thought honest, or be honest and thought dishonest?

The hero of a movie by herculean efforts extricates the beautiful heroine from an impossible situation, thus saving her life. He later marries her. Now suppose the situation were the same except that the person to be rescued is an ugly old hag. Would you admire the hero the same, less, or more for saving her? If you were the hero, would you still have saved her?

An old person condemns the enjoyments of the young. Would he still condemn them if he himself were young again and able to have another fling?

You are not likely to find yourself in many of these situations. Nevertheless, it is of some interest to ask yourself these questions to find out how far your sense of duty or heroism would extend.

In the next set of problems, ask yourself not what you *would* do but what you honestly think you *should* do.

1. You are a brilliant student with a great talent for medicine, and your aim is to become a physician. But medical school is expensive, and costs are so high that even by working eight hours a day you can earn only a fraction of the amount needed. Your parents can help you just enough to get you through, *if* they do not help your grandmother. But your grandmother has a chronic illness which requires constant care and expensive medication and which may continue for five or ten years. If your parents declared their inability to provide for her, she *might* be able to get into a free hospital, where, however, she would not be nearly so well taken care of. Should you forego medical school for years and perhaps forever so that your parents can provide your grandmother with the kind of care and attention they want her to have?

2. You are sitting alone on a high rock overlooking the ocean, and suddenly you hear, or think you hear, a scream for help uttered by someone drowning in the turbulent waters below. You are a reasonably good swimmer, but you doubt your ability to get far in such choppy water, and there is a good chance that if you tried to rescue the person, both of you would drown. It will take at least two minutes, even at top speed, for you to get down the rocky slope to the water's edge, by which time it may be too late. Besides, you aren't sure you hear someone calling; twice before, you thought you heard the same thing and you turned out to be mistaken. Should you wait for another call to make sure you heard right the first time? But that may mean a fatal delay. If you do go at once and really do see someone crying for help, should you risk your life in a perhaps vain attempt to save his? Would it make any difference if you knew that the person drowning was a confessed murderer who had recently escaped from the penitentiary?

3. You, a physician, are examining a patient suffering from poor blood circulation; you conclude that the patient has advanced arteriosclerosis. There is a partial block in the thigh where the arteries branch out to carry blood to the legs. By means of an arterial graft the condition can be corrected, but it is first necessary to locate the exact position of the block. This can be done by means of a dye injected into the bloodstream, which will make the block visible under X-rays. There are medical risks, but they seem well worth taking.

Nevertheless, you hesitate. Once before, confronted by a similar case, you used the dye, and something went wrong: the patient was paralyzed from the waist down. He sued both you and the hospital for malpractice, and the jury returned an award of a quarter of a million dollars to the patient. It clearly

seems foolish to stick your neck out and take such a risk again. The safest thing for you to do is not even to tell the patient that the technique is available. Still, there is a 95 per cent chance of recovery if the technique is used. What should you do?

4. A famous German musician is going to play his first concert in America after World War II. Though he had known that before and during the war the Nazis had tortured and killed millions of Jews and political prisoners in concentration camps, he had not openly opposed them. True, if he had opposed them, he would probably have been killed; and his resistance wouldn't have stopped the Nazis anyway. Besides, he wasn't an active Nazi; he was just a musician who wanted to go ahead with his work unmolested. He could do so by declaring his allegiance and keeping quiet, letting others fight the battles. So that's what he did. Can you blame him? Still, some men did resist, and many of them were artists just as great as he. Should you condemn him now, five years later, or should you let bygones be bygones? After all, the dead won't come back to life if you judge him harshly now. Yet it doesn't seem as if you should welcome him with open arms the way you do more courageous men. Furthermore, he is without doubt a great musician, Nazi sympathizer or not; and isn't music music whoever plays it? Should you join the picket line that is boycotting and protesting the concert (the pickets won't succeed, but concert-goers passing the picket lines will at least know that others are supporting a principle), or should you attend the great musician's performance of the compositions you love and try not to think of his past affiliations?

5. T. E. Lawrence describes his engagements in a military expedition with the Arabs against the Turks during World War I. When the army was encamped for the night at Wadi Kitan, Hamed the Moor, in a rage, murdered Salem, a member of the Ageyl tribe. Although Lawrence was sick and very weak, he had tried to prevent Hamed. Lawrence knew of the Arab custom of seeking justice through the feud. When the relatives of the dead Salem demanded blood for blood, he realized that to prevent endless future violence, Hamed must die. Lawrence therefore killed Hamed.

Did Lawrence do wrong? He had not wished to commit murder, but he felt that it was his first duty to keep unity in the army. His act did succeed in preserving unity. Still, he had doubts. What if the blood cry of the relatives was only a threat? Then Lawrence had destroyed a life needlessly. But in view of the Arab custom, it was very unlikely that their demand was a mere threat. What if Hamed's relatives had then issued a blood cry for Lawrence? Would that not have been worse?

He might, of course, have sent Hamed away and told the relatives that he was dead. This plan might have worked. Hamed would have been getting away with a crime, but isn't one death better than two? Then, however, Hamed might have continued his rages and killings. Or, Lawrence might have tried to explain the Western procedure of trial before punishment.

Although it wouldn't have convinced them, he might have made a bit of progress. But even that bit was not very probable. Or perhaps the situation was none of his business at all?

What would you have done in Lawrence's place?

1. The scope of ethics

The preceding examples are only a few of the countless moral problems which may or do confront people. The study of moral problems is called *ethics*. But before we embark on this study, it will be well to dispel a few confusions at the start.

A. A definition of ethics

1. Some people have said, "Ethics is the study of right and wrong." This definition is too narrow; ethics is concerned with much more than that. Ethics is concerned not only with the question "When is an act right and when is it wrong?" but with much more besides. Specifically, ethics is also concerned with the following questions:

a. One question is, "What things are good?" (Or, in other words, "What things are desirable?" "What things are worthwhile?") For example, if an increase in human knowledge is something desirable or worthwhile, then it would, presumably, be right to aim at such an increase; but if an increase is not desirable, then the rightness of attempts to achieve knowledge would be questioned. What *acts* are right, then, would seem to depend on what *things* (objects, processes, events, states of mind, goals) are good. We cannot decide what is right or wrong without considering what things are worth having or striving for. (This is not the only possible view of the relation between the right and the good, as we shall see in later chapters. But, whatever may be the relation between them, this example will help to show that they are not the same.)

In daily conversation the words "right" and "good" are not always used in this clear-cut manner: they are not used interchangeably (it would sound strange to say "a right thing" rather than "a good thing"), but they are not carefully distinguished either. In ethics, however, we shall try to observe this distinction carefully: we shall use the word "right" to refer only to actions and "good" to refer to whatever is desirable as the aim, end, or goal of actions.

We shall not use the word "good" only for this purpose: we shall also speak, as we do in daily life, of a good person, a good moral character, a good character trait, and also of good motives, good intentions, good desires. What makes a goal or end a good one to aim at will not necessarily be the same as what makes a person or character good, or a motive or desire good.

The difference between the good and the right can perhaps be illustrated

best in this way: imagine a race of beings on Mars whose behavior we could examine in detail through powerful telescopes but with whom we had no chance of communicating in any way. We might say that it would be good if they were happier than they are; but since, according to our hypothesis, there is nothing we can possibly do about it anyway, the question of right or wrong action on our part does not arise. We might say that it *would* be right to help them *if* we were able to do so; but since we cannot, there are no actions of ours with regard to them that we can speak of as right or wrong. The situation is even clearer with regard to the past. Suppose that ten million years ago on this very spot, a lion was eating an antelope, causing the still living antelope great pain. We might believe that it would have been better if this incident had not occurred (or at least if the antelope had died suddenly, so that it would not suffer pain); but since there is absolutely nothing we can do to change the past once it has happened, it would be pointless to say that it is wrong of us *now* not to try to snatch the antelope from the lion's clutches. The most we can say is that it would (or might) have been wrong of us not to have done so *if* we had been there at the time.

One other point of terminology is this: there is, in ordinary moral discourse, some difference between saying "This act is right" and "You ought to do this." The second is the stronger of the two. When we say that it is right to do something, we usually mean no more than that it is permissible — in other words, that it is *not wrong* to do it. But when we say that you ought to do it, or have a duty or an obligation to do it, we are saying something more: that it is *wrong not* to do it. Since it is the second of these two concepts that has most concerned ethical thinkers, this part of ethics is called "theory of right" less often than it is called "theory of obligation."

b. Another question we shall ask in our study of ethics is, "When does a person deserve blame, praise, punishment, or reward?" This question introduces a whole new area of considerations — moral responsibility, avoidability, determinism, and freedom of the will. These questions will concern us only after we have discussed the good and the right in some detail.

At first it may seem that this topic falls under the heading of right action or obligation. When we ask whether someone deserves blame for some act he has performed, aren't we simply asking, "Would it be right to blame him?" Sometimes the question is interpreted in this way. But it may mean something else as well: not "Should he be blamed?" but "Does he deserve to be blamed?" This will take us into the difficult problem of deserts.

2. Other people say, "Ethics is not the same as morals but is the *study* of morals." As far as it goes, this distinction is correct. Morals — people's beliefs about right and wrong, good and bad, punishment and desert, and so on, together with their actions in consequence of these beliefs — are human phenomena which are there to be studied and would be there even if nobody were interested in studying them. Ethics uses them as material for study, just as biology uses living organisms as its material for study.

But ethics is not just any study of morals. Anthropology studies morals too — the moral beliefs, customs, and practices of past and present cultures, tribes, and civilizations. Anthropologists describe these morals and sometimes find patterns and regularities amongst them which can be used to state scientific generalizations. But anthropologists, as scientists, pass no judgment upon them; they do not even say, in their professional capacity at any rate, that some morals are better than others. But ethics is not content merely to say, "This is what the ancient Etruscans did, and that is what the Australian bushmen do." Using the data of anthropology, ethics goes on to ask, "When one culture considers a certain practice, such as killing the aged, right and another considers it wrong, are they both right, and if not, which really is right?" "If one person or group considers pleasure the object most worth striving for in life and if another eschews pleasure and values only resignation and retirement from the world, which of these ideals is more worth pursuing?" In other words, ethics is concerned with pronouncing judgments of value upon human behavior, not merely in describing the behavior. Anthropology, psychology, and sociology, whose findings are all of interest to ethics, are *descriptive;* ethics is *prescriptive.* This distinction leads to still another suggestion.

3. The statement "Ethics is not the study of what *is* but of what *ought* to be" is another conception of ethics. In a sense this statement is true, but, like most slogans, it is misleading. First: in a way, the study of what is right and wrong is the study of what is; if it is a fact that murder is wrong, then this is a fact about what *is.* "Is" is such an inclusive word that every study that has some object-of-study (and what study has not?) could be described as a study of some aspect or other of what is. Second: "what ought to be" is not a very clear phrase. As we have just observed, we usually employ "ought" words when we are talking about human actions: you ought to do this but not that. But when we say that this or that ought to *be,* what do we mean? that one or another person ought to *do* it or bring it about? What meaning can "ought" have if it isn't applied to actions that someone ought to perform? But if "X ought to exist" means the same as "Someone ought to do or bring about X," then the definition is much too narrow; for ethics is also concerned with what is good and what is deserved.

In any event, the statement is correct insofar as it points out the difference between judgments of fact and judgments of value. There are many ways of putting this distinction, but this one is perhaps the easiest: "Ethics is concerned not only with what a certain individual or group considers right but with what *is* right. Ethics not merely describes moral ideals held by human beings but asks which ideal is *better* than others, more worth pursuing, and why." Here we see clearly the difference between ethics on the one hand and empirical science on the other. If you say that more promises are broken than kept, this is an empirical statement, that is, one that can be verified (discovered to be true or false) by observing people and com-

piling statistics concerning the keeping and breaking of promises. But if you say that promises *should,* or ought to, be kept, you cannot test your assertion by observing people's actions or compiling statistics. Even if 99 per cent of all promises made were broken, this fact would not prove that promises *ought* not to be kept; in fact the defender of promises might make his defense more vigorous than before, since he would feel that his defense was more needed. It may be an empirical fact, that is, empirically verifiable, that Smith is incurably ill, and every physician may agree that this is true. But this does not settle the question whether the physician *ought* to keep Smith alive as long as possible no matter how much he suffers, or whether he should be given the slight overdose of morphine that would put him out of his misery, or whether he should merely be kept under heavy sedation which will relieve him of some of his pain but weaken his heart and thus shorten his days. All these are moral questions. Two people might agree on the empirical facts of the case and yet disagree about what course of action to follow in view of these facts. Here lies the great difference between ethics (along with its sister discipline, aesthetics) on the one hand and the empirical sciences — physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and so on — on the other.

"If statements about good and bad and right and wrong cannot be verified empirically," one may ask, "how *can* they be verified?" This is a large and difficult question, which we must postpone until the last chapter of the book, after we have surveyed all the major theories concerning the problems we have outlined. The question is so complex that adequate treatment of it would require another book. It is complex because to ask, "How do you know that this statement is true?" presupposes another question, "What do you mean by the terms in your statement?" There are many theories about the meanings of "good," "right," and other ethical terms, which have to be fully thrashed out before we are in a position to answer the question "How do you know?" This difficult and highly technical discipline of the meanings of ethical terms is called *metaethics,* or, sometimes, ethical theory, as opposed to the study of *normative ethics,* a critical study of the major theories about what things are good, what acts are right, and what actions deserve blame. Normative ethics will occupy us throughout all but the last chapter of this book.

4. "Ethics is the study of what is moral and what is immoral." As it stands, this statement is most misleading. The term "moral" is ambiguous. It has two opposites, "immoral" and "nonmoral." (1) In one sense, to call a person or an action "moral" is to use a term of praise or commendation, and to use the opposite term, "immoral," is to use a term of condemnation and disapproval. "Immoral," when applied to actions, usually means very much the same as "wrong," and when applied to situations and people, usually means the same as "bad"; but in either case it is a term of condemnation. (2) In another sense, the term "moral" simply puts a question or issue into the category of ethics as opposed to other questions which are not in this domain. Thus, on the one hand, committing murder is said to be immoral;

but the *question* whether it is immoral is a moral question, it is one of the questions in the domain of ethics. On the other hand, whether I put my right foot or my left foot down first when I get out of bed in the morning is a nonmoral matter which is no concern of ethics. We distinguish moral from immoral *behavior* and moral from nonmoral *questions,* issues, controversies, problems. (The word "amoral" has still a different use. People, not issues, are described as amoral. A person is said to be amoral when he has no sense of right and wrong, or acts as if he didn't.)

Where is the line between moral and nonmoral questions to be drawn? This is a difficult question, which we cannot attempt to answer here, for different people have different views on this point. Some say that a question or problem is a moral one if it concerns behavior that affects the happiness or well-being of any other person (or, sometimes, of any other living creature). Others say that it is a moral question only if it concerns behavior that can be universalized, behavior of which one can legitimately ask whether everyone else in the same position ought to do the same. In any event, moral questions are very inclusive, and we shall not be at a loss to discover a vast array of questions which are moral by anyone's criterion.

It would be easy to resolve the problem of how a moral problem differs from a nonmoral one simply by saying that moral issues are those in which such terms as "right," "good," and "ought," are used. But all of these words are used in contexts which everyone would agree are nonmoral. We ask not only, "Is this act right?" but also, "What is the right answer to this algebraic problem?" We say, "You ought to do this," but we also say, "There ought to be a side road just about here" and "This problem in long division ought to have come out without a remainder." As for "good," its nonmoral uses far exceed the moral ones: we speak of a good baseball player, a good day, a good school, a good way to solve a problem, a good way to relax, even a good way to murder someone. In most, if not all, of these examples, we are concerned with an activity that has some aim or function, and we call something or somebody "good" if it regularly or efficiently fulfills that function. The function may have nothing whatever to do with morality. It is, of course, the moral use of these terms that we shall be concerned with in ethics. But it will not do to define moral questions as those employing moral terms, since all these terms are also used in nonmoral contexts. We still haven't answered the question "When is the term being used in a moral way?" It would be circular to define moral questions in terms of their use of moral words and then distinguish the moral sense of these words by referring back to moral questions.

5. "Ethics is concerned with encouraging people to do what is right." This statement is not only misleading but false. We shall try to come to some true and defensible conclusions about what is right and what is good, but finding true principles is not the same thing as acting upon them. People can be made to act in certain ways by moral advice, exhortation, persuasion, sermons, propaganda, hypnosis, or psychiatric therapy. But none of these

means is the concern of ethics; ethics is concerned to find the truth about these moral questions, not to try to make us act upon them. We may, in fact, honor our moral principles more in the breach than in the observance; and nobody, of course, always practices what he preaches. Perhaps *doing* right is more important than *discovering* what is right. But at least the second is a necessary means to the first. Unless you first know what is right, how will you know what to do or what to persuade others to do? You cannot act upon knowledge unless you first have the knowledge. Of course, you may act without knowledge at all; many people act ignorantly, and many do not even care what is right but just do as they please. Nevertheless, acting in moral matters without knowledge is surely just as dangerous as an engineer's trying to build a bridge without knowledge of the principles of engineering. Before you drink what's in the bottle, it is wise to know what the bottle contains.

Ethics, then, is interested in discovering true statements, just as is any other domain of inquiry. But ethics, unlike other disciplines, is interested in finding these truths in the special area of the right and the good. It is concerned not directly with practice but with finding true statements about what our practices ought to be — statements which, it is hoped, will then be acted upon. "Propositions about practice are not themselves practical, any more than propositions about gases are gaseous."[1] Nevertheless, ethical propositions can be said to be practical in an indirect way that the others are not, just *because* they are propositions about practice. It is difficult to think of questions which, in the long run, are more practical than questions about how to live, how to conduct oneself, how best to spend the few short years that are the most that anyone can enjoy in this world.

6. "Ethics should be able to tell you exactly which acts are right and which ones are wrong." But even this statement is a mistake. We shall search for moral *principles,* i.e., rules of behavior, (we shall be more precise about this later on) having to do with matters of right and wrong. But it would be hopeless to attempt to answer every moral question confronting every human being; for in order to do so, we would have to know not only true moral principles but also a vast array of empirical facts about the person and his situation and the circumstances of his action and the probable effects of the action. Suppose that we take as an example of a moral principle, "The infliction of needless suffering is wrong." (There are questions we could raise about when something is needless, but let that pass for the moment.) Let us assume for the moment that the principle is true. The full argument would be as follows:

1. The infliction of needless suffering is wrong.
2. This act is a case of the infliction of needless suffering.

Therefore, 3. This act is wrong.

[1] Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in Sellars and Hospers, *Readings in Ethical Theory,* p. 1.

The third statement does give us the desired conclusion, and the first statement is, as we have agreed, a true moral principle. But the second statement is also required in order to arrive at the conclusion; and this second statement, let us note, is not a statement in ethics at all but an empirical statement about a specific act or situation. Every situation is somewhat different from every other, and no ethical philosopher could possibly be acquainted with them all. All the ethical philosopher can tell us, in the above example, is that *if* some proposed act will cause needless suffering, *then* it is wrong. He cannot, of course, tell us whether *this* particular act *is* the infliction of needless suffering. Only a person who is there at the time, such as the agent ("agent" in ethics means the doer of the act) himself, is in a position to know the particular circumstances of the individual case.

B. Moral rules

Most people most of the time assent to a conglomeration of moral rules which they do not bother to question or examine. These rules are usually those they have been taught to believe, such as "Don't tell lies" and "Don't cheat your friends," plus a few which they find convenient or agreeable, such as "Mind your own business" and "Never give a sucker an even break." Usually these rules are not stated explicitly; they come out into the open only when the person is questioned. Very often one of the rules contradicts another, thus enabling the user to resort first to one and then to the other to suit his convenience or to accord with his pre-existing prejudices.

The unspoken moral code of many Americans consists, in part, of such directives as these: It is good to help out your friends and neighbors, but not so much that it causes you any great discomfort or keeps you from buying that second television set. It is not proper to argue with others about morals or religion because argument might cause ill will and hurt people's feelings. (Implication: it is more important for people to feel comfortable all the time than to explore together the truth about life and death, God and immortality, right and wrong.) It's not a good idea to question where a person's money comes from; if he has it, you look up to him, that's all. If a person keeps a low-paying job which he likes and turns down a high-paying job which he likes less, he ought to have his head examined. If he spends his money on books instead of on lavish cocktail parties, he must really be out of his mind. Negroes should never be permitted to go beyond the eighth grade in school or to attend the same schools with whites because Negroes are an inferior race. The United States is the best country in the world, and anybody who criticizes it ought to be deported.

The following is the implicit code of large numbers of television viewers, especially of the younger generation: Giving a rotten character a break, especially if it happens to be a pretty girl, is the right thing to do even if it endangers the lives of others. A simple, direct man is the best for any job, even though he may not be very smart. A man who pretends that some political

issue is complicated is only trying to cover up his ignorance with a lot of fancy double-talk. A hard-riding square-shooting cowboy is a better judge of right and wrong or of national policy and legislation than any lawyer or professor. To think about anything is a sign of weakness; it is better just to act. The best man is the one who is fastest with a gun; that's why the right side always wins out. If you are on the right side, you'll always win out in the end. Our country is always in the right; and since the right must win, we are not in any danger and never can be. To deny this is un-American.

Perhaps the most conspicuous example of how little we think through the rules of conduct by which we profess to live runs as follows: The majority of Americans profess to be Christians and therefore to accept the Christian way of life; yet very few of them practice these rules. Few even reflect on the moral directives of Christianity which they have heard many times. They pay lip service to the moral commands found in the Gospels, but they would not dream of putting these precepts into practice; and if any of their neighbors did so, they would consider the neighbors fools. Officially these professed Christians believe it is their duty to turn the other cheek, but in daily life they retaliate even for small injuries. They consider it unmasculine to discuss anything rationally; the way to settle things is to see who wins in a fair fight. Officially they believe they should forgive, not once but seventy times seven; but in fact they seldom forgive at all, and when they do they usually make a great show of letting people know how forgiving they are. They are told in the Bible to take no thought for the morrow, what they shall eat or wear; but in fact they spend the greater part of their time in this enterprise. Although they are told that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven, their chief goal is to amass as much money and property as possible, not only for their comfort but to satisfy their exhibitionism and to cause envy among their neighbors. They believe that all men are brothers, but they associate only with those who are in an income group as high as their own. They prefer not to associate with people of different racial or religious background and feel uncomfortable in their presence. The Bible tells these so-called Christians that no man can serve both God and Mammon; but during a lifetime spent in trying to outdo their neighbors in serving Mammon, they assume that their Creator will reward them with eternal bliss for their efforts in His behalf. They are told that the meek shall inherit the earth; but if anyone they know is meek, they consider him a sissy or a sucker. They are told that of faith, hope, and charity, the greatest is charity, but they do not particularly mind that, owing to overpopulation and lack of industrialization, the world does not produce enough to feed its people one square meal a day. While millions starve, these Christians spend more money each year on liquor than on all charitable enterprises combined. They are told to beware of false gods, but they believe in "America First" and frown on any attempt to alleviate world tensions because the enemy is wicked, com-