

§ Law in Context

ALAN NORRIE

# Crime, Reason and History

A Critical Introduction to  
Criminal Law

Second Edition

CAMBRIDGE

# **Crime, Reason and History**

## **A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law**

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If you call me brother  
Forgive me if I inquire  
Just according to whose plan?

*Leonard Cohen*

Our external symbols must always express the life within us with absolute precision; how could they do otherwise, since that life has generated them? Therefore we must not blame our poor symbols if they take forms that seem trivial to us, or absurd for . . . the nature of our life alone has determined their forms.

A critique of these symbols is a critique of our lives.

*Angela Carter*

*To Gwen,  
with love and respect*

# Preface to the second edition

It is eight years since the first edition of this book was published. Where relevant, I have sought to update the argument with new case and statute law. I have also developed the analysis, especially in Chapter 3, where a closer link between the two main sections, on motive and intention and indirect intention, is established. There, I have sought to bring out the conflict between 'factual and cognitivist' approaches to intention on the one hand and 'morally substantive' approaches on the other. This seems to me to involve a conflict central to criminal law, as is evidenced by its repetition in many areas. It is paralleled in the law of recklessness (Chapter 4), in the law of strict liability (Chapter 5) and in the law of acts (Chapter 6). Its existence spills over into defences like necessity and duress (Chapter 8) and the principles of sentencing (Chapter 10). Elsewhere, I have argued that it also underlies acute problems in the law of provocation (Norrie, 2001). Recognising the problem helps explain tensions in the law between formalism and informalism (below, pp 44–6), and many logical inconsistencies and contradictions with which criminal lawyers grapple.

The idea that the general principles of criminal law might be founded on conflicts or contradictions seems hard to grasp. It runs up against the assumption that arguments of underlying principle should resolve problems by finding a better, or even a right, solution. Analyses of the moral significance of motive, or generally of a morally substantive approach, to formulating intention are assumed to lead directly to proposals for legal reform (see eg Clarkson and Keating, 1998, 144; Horder, 2000; Smith, 2001, 402). My argument is that such analyses are indeed relevant to the law, but are at the same time repelled by its structural tendency to deny moral substance through its general principles. The law has a complex dilemmatic structure involving inclusion and exclusion of the morally substantive within an overall framework based on the psychologically factual and cognitive.

The name given to the dominant psychologistic approach is 'orthodox subjectivism'. It informs the great post-war textbooks on criminal law, as it does the work of the early law reformers, the Victorian Criminal Law Commissioners. My argument is that its dominance stems from how it reflects the historical, legal and political value structure of modern Western societies. It is this that explains its enduring importance even if it is seen by many as problematic for its evasion of issues of moral substance. My own position is that both orthodox subjectivism and

moral substantivism have value, though both are also morally inadequate. It is this complex relationship of the positive and the negative, of the legal, the historical and the moral, that makes legal change inherently problematic.

*Crime, Reason and History* has turned out to be the second of three books on modern Western ideas of criminal law, responsibility and punishment. The relationship between it and its predecessor, *Law, Ideology and Punishment* (1991) is described in the Preface to the First Edition below. Its successor, *Punishment, Responsibility and Justice* (2000) is a more ambitious philosophical and theoretical work. It advances what I call a relational theory of justice against both the orthodox subjectivists and the moral substantivists referred to above. It seeks in brief to identify and explain the ambivalence and ambiguity which accompany judgments of individual responsibility in modern law and morality. It does so by revealing the intrinsic yet occluded links (relations) between individual and social responsibility, between doing individual and doing social justice. The broad connection between these two books is that *Punishment, Responsibility and Justice* develops, underpins and defends the analysis presented here. I briefly refer to it at various places in this edition, but I have in general not sought to rewrite the earlier book in the light of the later one. The exception to this is Chapter 3, where the argument of the first edition needed development. I stress, however, that no knowledge of the later book is presupposed below.

Once more, I would like to thank the many academic friends and colleagues who through their agreements and, as important (and more frequent!), disagreements support the intellectual dialogue of which this book is a part. I also thank once more Gwen, Stephen and Richard for being there.

Alan Norrie  
September 2001

# Preface to the first edition

The impetus to write this book came from an earlier work (Norrie, 1991) which considered the broadly 'Kantian' historical development of the modern philosophy of punishment, and explained the concept of justice and the contradictions within it in terms of the ideological premises upon which it was based. Those premises, I argued, stemmed from the ideological form of the abstract juridical individual at the heart of modern legal theory. Towards the end of that work, I began to develop the central argument of the present book. If the philosophy of punishment is essentially contradictory in its forms, and if these forms are based upon legal ideology, then it ought to be possible to understand not only the philosophy of punishment but also the theory and practice of the criminal law as contradictory.

Sustenance for this view was derived from the North American Critical Legal Studies approach, but such work remained peculiarly 'legal' in an inverted way: it retained an insider's commitment to law at the same time as it challenged law's central premises. Critical Legal Studies has had surprisingly little to say about criminal law, but the leading work in the field (Kelman, 1981) does not move significantly beyond the activity of 'trashing', simple negation, of the rationalist premises of orthodox criminal law theory. This work is important, but in presenting a systematic critical introduction to the law's general principles, I try to move beyond it. I have sought to synthesise a critical 'internal' account of criminal law which 'takes doctrine seriously' with an 'external' commitment to presenting law as a social and historical practice emerging in the first half of the nineteenth century.

I regard the practical work of the penal reform movements of this period as crucial in establishing a criminal law project that was deeply influenced by the philosophy of the Enlightenment. That influence remains at the heart of orthodox legal practice and scholarship through the commitment to liberal subjectivist and legal positivist analysis. It is the marriage of social practice and philosophical ideology that links my earlier concerns in the philosophy of punishment with the present work, and which provides the bridge for an analysis that seeks to break down any inside/outside distinction in legal scholarship.

The main title of this book reflects these concerns, but perhaps a word is required about the subtitle. The idea of 'critique' as in 'Critical Introduction' is that of starting from the forms of law in orthodox usage and showing the contradictions within that usage. From there, one moves to examine the fault lines that underlie the



operative forms and to explain their existence in a particular social and historical context. In this way, one shows how the legal forms 'hang together' within criminal law discourse, and that there is an historical logic which underlies, suffuses and explains its intrinsic illogic.

This is, however, a 'Critical Introduction' and not an 'introductory critique'. I have sought to make the argument as accessible as I can, in particular by developing it slowly in the first few chapters. My aim, however, has been to develop it to meet some of the very sophisticated orthodox analyses head on, and this requires an approach that cannot be too simplistic. Where the work is introductory is in the scope of its coverage of the law's general principles. I examine the most important areas of criminal responsibility, and treat them to critical analysis. These are also the central areas that need to be covered, alongside the substantive crimes, in an undergraduate criminal law course.

This book is in many ways a companion volume to the other criminal law text in the *Law in Context* series (Lacey, Wells and Meure, 1990). Although the two works share many sympathies, they are also remarkably different. Lacey, Wells and Meure deal primarily with the substantive crimes and the contexts which generate the particular shape of the laws that protect and control (some forms of) social life. I start with the central categories of the orthodox approach to criminal law, and seek to locate them in a social and ideological context. The former approach locates criminal laws in the diversities of social life and the differentials of social power, while I begin with the ideal of unity within orthodox scholarship, and show both its intellectual limits and the social conditions of its possibility. At the risk of considerable oversimplification, it might be said that Lacey, Wells and Meure's primary focus is the *content* of the criminal law, whereas mine is its *form*. It may be that neither approach tells the whole story, and that therefore the two books genuinely complement each other. Perhaps subsequent work will be in a position to seek a further, deeper synthesis of form and content, in part on the basis of these two books.

In writing this book, I have incurred a large number of debts to friends and colleagues. At Warwick, I would like to thank Roger Burridge and John McEldowney who welcomed me onto the criminal law course some years ago, and encouraged me in the development of the arguments presented here. I would also like to thank Davina Cooper, Robert Fine and Linda Luckhaus for reading and commenting on specific chapters, and a number of colleagues for their comments at staff seminars I gave at the beginning and end of the project. These include Hugh Beale, Julio Faundez, Laurence Lustgarten, Sol Picciotto and Geoffrey Wilson. More generally, I would like to acknowledge the value of being in a Law School like Warwick which has a self-conscious tradition of encouraging innovative approaches to legal study. Beyond Warwick, I would like to thank a number of people for their help, including Andrew Ashworth, Antony Duff, John Gardner, Peter Glazebrook, Jeremy Horder, Nicola Lacey, Roger Leng, Peter Rush, Stephen Shute, Clive Unsworth, Tony Ward and Celia Wells. Roger Leng in particular read and commented on every chapter except the last to my great benefit. From Andrew Ashworth (1991), I have borrowed the realist usage of the male-gendered pronoun to denote the criminal subject. William Twining and Chris McCrudden were supportive Series Editors, while Benjamin Buchan at Weidenfelds was both patient and cracked the whip at appropriate times. Versions of Chapters 3, 4 and 7 have appeared in the *Criminal Law Review* [1989] 793, the *Oxford Journal Of Legal Studies* (1992) 12, 45 (and appears

here by permission of Oxford University Press), and the *Modern Law Review* (1991) 54, 685.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Gwen for her love, support and encouragement, particularly in the trying final stages of writing. Stephen and Richard were understanding and unselfish in letting me disappear for hour upon hour when I could have been doing other things with them. I hope their view of academic life has not been too coloured by observing the process of book-writing at close proximity. I am grateful to Stephen for his increasingly mordant wit, and to Richard I owe the Prologue from bedtime reading of *The Phantom Tollbooth*. It is an indication of how long I have been working on the book that he was recently created a High Court judge. Without them all, I doubt if this book would have been written; for them, it is the best I could do.

Alan Norrie  
December 1992

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