




A DECLARATION of INTERDEPENDENCE



WHY AMERICA SHOULD JOIN THE WORLD



WILL HUTTON

A Declaration of Interdependence

Why America Should Join the World

WILL HUTTON



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A Declaration of Interdependence

To
Jane, Sarah, Alice, and Andrew

Preface and Acknowledgments to the American Edition

Ever since Ed Barber, my editor at Norton, agreed that in the United States we should retitle *The World We're In* as "A Declaration of Interdependence," I have been reproaching myself. It is a much better title than I used in Britain. It captures the overriding value that I believe should inform domestic and foreign policy in both the United States and the European Union and it is a call to arms against a conservative, unilateral worldview. It also has a large personal and emotional significance.

This title was my father's suggestion for what I should call my book, and he died unexpectedly, at age eighty-two, of a heart attack, just six weeks after *The World We're In* was published. Thankfully he lived to see the book reach the top ten nonfiction best-seller list in Britain. He had helped on all my other titles, and was adamant that this was my core conception and that the title should reflect it. He was right, and I feel sure he would have been delighted at this choice for the U.S. edition.

My father fought alongside American troops during World War II, an experience from which he drew two fundamental conclusions. First, Britain should never forget its geography; ordinary Europeans hold too many common values to allow crooked ideologies to spawn bitter wars. Democracy is the best defense against both fascism and communism. Second, he concluded that an engaged United States and Europe were

essential partners who together constituted the idea of the West. The health of the globe hangs upon an effective, interdependent, liberal, transatlantic relationship. Euro-skepticism in Britain and conservative unilateralism in the United States menaced this interdependence.

So if *The World We're In* attacks Euroskepticism and makes the case for European integration around a reassertion of common European values, *A Declaration of Interdependence* tries to do the parallel job in the United States—insisting that America's interests are still best served by strengthening and modernizing the multilateralist approach that followed World War II. Communism has collapsed and radical Islamic terrorism has arisen as the principal threat to the world's security. Concurrently, American power has grown and with it a capacity to act autonomously. Conservative siren voices argue that the rules are now different. America is on the front line; America is most at risk; America must look after itself.

My view differs—I see multilateralism as more important than ever. Globalization requires an assertion of international law, and legitimate law can never hold that might is right. It must emerge from a consensual, legitimate process—and this extends to the initiatives necessary to combat terrorism. A paradox lurks here, for the more legitimately it acts, the safer America will be, and legitimacy is grounded in a recognition of interdependence.

This flies in the face of American conservative tradition, which holds that America's exceptionalism and economic and social successes are built around independence, individualism, and a ruthless assertion of self-interest.

In modifying my book for an American audience, chapter 1 and the Conclusion have been rewritten, and I have combed through the middle eight chapters, both to update and rewrite where necessary. The last two chapters of *The World We're In*, where I set out the history of the European Union and how European policy might develop from here, have been omitted to keep the book to a more manageable length. Such detail is not of overwhelming interest to American readers. I have been helped by new research from William Davies, and commentaries from Sam Wells, Phillipa Strum, Jerome Karabel, and Nina Planck. Sidney Blumenthal offered wise advice about framing the argument in an American context. Mary Koi did sterling work editing chapter 1 and the Conclusion, and thanks both for

Preface and Acknowledgments to the American Edition

that important work and for her comments on the content. Thanks also go to Ann Kirschner, who showed extraordinary care and meticulousness in Americanizing the English text. And of course to Ed Barber, whose steadfastness and faith in the book was remarkable.

The challenges ahead for both the European Union and the United States are formidable. I hope *A Declaration of Interdependence* helps to remind Americans of their European roots and their liberal vocation.

Americans, we Europeans need you back—as reengaged, as generous, and as farsighted as you once were. This is an essential American and, indeed, global interest. I hope this book persuades at least some of you of my case.

—Will Hutton
London
September 15, 2002

Acknowledgments

There are many to thank in the writing of a book this length and with this degree of perhaps foolhardy ambition. At many times over the last eighteen months I have wondered whether I had bitten off more than I could chew, and wished that I had decided on something more modest. But in the writing I became more convinced that one of the book's central contentions—that in today's world it is impossible to conceive of a national economic, political, and social program in isolation—is correct. Developments in Britain are governed to so great an extent by events and ideas outside our borders, particularly by those in the United States, that the only way to capture what is happening is to offer an international context and analysis. Unless we do, we comprehend only a small fraction of the reasons why we make the choices we do and of the political and economic battles we need to fight.

The first person whom I must thank is William Davies, who has worked for me as my principal researcher for fifteen months. Research is a demanding and sometimes solitary activity, and I was lucky to find William, who is intelligent, dedicated, thorough, and capable of sustained research. He understood the thesis and directed his efforts to support it. There is no chapter where his research has not been impor-

Acknowledgments

tant. He offered considered feedback and honest criticism as the book unfolded, and I hope he is pleased with the result.

Charlotte Beaupère worked as an additional researcher for some eight months, largely on chapter 2 and the European chapters of the book. I hoped she would bring a distinctive French perspective on Europe, and access to a different literature. I was not disappointed. Charlotte's work was thoughtful and original. Together, she and William provided the depth of research from which the book could be written.

I was also lucky in my friends in Britain, the United States, and Europe who have read draft chapters or sequences of draft chapters and offered invaluable feedback, corrections, and advice. Halfway through I held a seminar at the London School of Economics on the first five chapters (excluding chapter 2), and I owe thanks to Richard Layard, Richard Sennett, Adam Swift, Nina Planck, and David Held for their constructive criticism. Adam in addition read no fewer than three drafts of chapter 2, and his knowledge of political philosophy is awesome. My huge thanks to him; if there are still problems with the chapter then they are wholly mine. David Held, who helped with *The State We're In*, proved to be a no less loyal and wise supporter of this effort. By the end he had read the entire first and second drafts, and I profited enormously from his detailed comments as well as his view of the shape of the overall argument.

None of my American friends should take any responsibility for my thesis or any row that may ensue. It's all my fault. Three seminars in July 2001 on the first half of the book were invaluable. At the University of Berkeley, Jerome Karabel put together a group who gave me intelligent feedback and counsel; my thanks to him, Issac Martin, Michael Reich, Fred Block, and George Lakoff and their detailed written comments afterward. It was Todd Gitlin who led to Jerome; thank you for the suggestion! Laura Tyson and John Zysman at Berkeley took time out of their hectic schedules to offer comment and critical feedback.

Bob Kuttner, the editor of the American *Prospect*, organized a seminar at his wonderful summer house in Wellfleet, on Cape Cod. Robert Reich, Barry Bluestone (and his father), Richard Rothstein, and Bob gave me a concentrated and critical appraisal—thanks again for their comments at the time and afterward.

In Washington, John Judis, Gene Sperling, Larry Mishel, Tom Edsall,

John Schmitt, Roger Hickey, and Kathleen Thelen all offered important reactions and insights. Samuel Wells, a friend of nearly twenty years, kindly organized a seminar at the Wilson Center. This was again an opportunity for constructive critical feedback and commentary, and my thanks go to Martin Albrow, Jodie Allen, Joseph Bell, Matthew Holden, Kent Hughes, Bruce Stokes, Philippa Strum, Michael van Dusen, and Sam and Sherry Wells for investing so much time in putting me if not right, at least less wrong. Philippa Strum and Matthew Holden made detailed comment afterward, and later in December I was lucky to find an insomniac Philippa, who cast an eye over my second draft of the first five chapters, again to my profit. Thanks also to Sidney Blumenthal, who gave a very useful critique of the central thesis.

In October Timothy Garton Ash, and David Miliband joined a small seminar on the European chapters at what was then the Industrial Society (now The Work Foundation); together with commentary from Charles Grant, this was a crucial benchmark in showing where the argument needed to be strengthened. Three of my then fellow directors at the Society—Richard Reeves, John Knell, and Patrick Burns—offered important feedback and comment, as did Robin Cook, Andrew Oswald, Mary Koi, James Long, Ian McEwan, Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz, and Noreena Hertz. My thanks also to the anonymous reader arranged by Little, Brown.

In early November I was privileged to have a short tour of Germany, arranged by Gero Mass, director of the London office of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung. My thanks to him, and to Martin Behrens, Ludiger Pries, Hagen Lesch, Wolfgang Streeck, Martin Hopner, and Wolfgang Üllenberg. All provided important feedback and comment on the book, offering a German dimension on the issues raised that came at a critical juncture in my thinking. I must also include the Venice Seminar, which I attended at the invitation of the Italian ambassador to London, Luigi Amaduzzi, and the British/Italian colloquium in Potignano, in March and September of 2001, respectively, as important moments when I was able to test-run some arguments. My thanks for inclusion at both. Jim Garrison of the State of the World Forum and Marcello Palazzi—two doughty campaigners for a better world—offered important encouragement.

Then to my editors. Philippa Harrison at Little, Brown had promised to

Acknowledgments

edit the book, but left the company before it was completed. However, she kept her promise and edited it as a personal favor. I was the beneficiary of a master craftswoman at work. Whether it was the chapter sequence, the structure of individual chapters, or questions of content and style, she was and is superb. And when I was fading toward the end, she and David Held combined to keep up my spirits and insist I find the energy for yet more redrafts. Richard Beswick took over her role at Little, Brown, so that in the closing months I was lucky to have a second fine editor, joined for the final copy edit by the meticulous Gillian Bromley. My thanks to them all; and of course to that great agent and lover of books, Ed Victor, without whom this book would not have been written. My father, as for all my books, was a valued and constructive critic and adviser; many of the views expressed he, and my mother, will recognize as those we have discussed since my boyhood. Roger Alton, editor of the *Observer*, agreed to a month's leave of absence from my column and other writing obligations to help complete the book; and Sir Christopher Wates and the trustees of the Industrial Society, in allowing me to express "time sovereignty," gave me the scope to find crucial writing time in an otherwise crowded working week.

Almost all of these 140,000 words—along with redrafts—were written in 2001 while I was simultaneously discharging my responsibilities to the Industrial Society and the *Observer*. It was physically and intellectually shattering, and inevitably my family bore some of the costs of having to make do with a distracted and obsessed father—especially toward the end. Sorry. My wife, Jane, in trying times was magnificent. All I can say is a profound and intensely felt thank-you for your love and forbearance. I hope you think it's been worth it.

—Will Hutton
March 17, 2002

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A Declaration of Interdependence

Introduction to the British Edition

With the launch of the euro and the hardening of self-confident American unilateralism in the defense of what the Republican party now calls “the homeland,” the relationship between the United States and Europe is set to become more tense. These are two enormous power blocs with different visions of how the market economy and society should be run, and with different conceptions of how the great global public goods—peace, trade, aid, health, the environment, and security—can be achieved and maintained. The relationship between the two is the fulcrum on which the world order turns. Managed skillfully, this could be a great force for good; managed badly, it could give rise to incalculable harm.

For the British, for whom this book was first written, there is a fundamental choice. European integration is accelerating: the euro is in circulation, and at the Laeken summit in December 2001 agreement was reached to establish a preparatory convention to examine the outlines of a European constitution before the 2004 intergovernmental conference. The issue will come to a head if and when the referendum on the euro is held. But the question is larger than whether Britain should join the euro. It is: on which side of this argument do we want to put our weight? And that in turn is a question about what values should underpin the building of Britain’s economic and social model. How much are we European—and

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how much do we have in common with an America increasingly in thrall to a very particular conservatism?

This question is posed as British politics drifts around a managerial centrism. There are no great political movements or inspirational causes. Voter apathy is widespread. Our political leaders are well intentioned, but they are at a loss as to how to revive a belief in politics and public purpose. As I write at the beginning of chapter 1, the public realm is in eclipse. It is almost as though citizenship has gone into abeyance.

And yet there remain great issues. The terms of society's social contract remain as vexed and contentious as ever. The rich grow richer while disadvantage remains acute. Equality of opportunity, let alone of income and wealth, remains elusive. Public services are inadequate. And since I began the book, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, are a horrifying reminder of the scale of atrocity that intercultural hatred can spawn—and of the urgent need to find some form of international settlement, along with the necessary policing, that reduces and hopefully eliminates the risk of any repeat.

This book is a response to these concerns. It is profoundly critical of American conservatism, now the dominant political current in the United States, and of its impact on the United States and the world. It sets out to correct the torrent of criticism leveled at Europe as though the United States were a paragon of all the virtues—rather than a country with some severe economic and social problems, whose democracy, where votes and office are increasingly bought, is a reproach to democratic ideals. European capitalism and its accompanying social model—and its democracy—by contrast have much to offer. The old world, contrary to the internationally accepted wisdom, has much to teach the new.

So, in part, this is a book for the idea of Europe. In my view, the quest for European union is one of the great rousing and crucial political projects of our time. It is vital in providing a counterweight to the United States and thus contributing genuine multilateral leadership in the search for securing global public goods. It is a means of advancing core European values. It is also the way to reanimate our politics and the public realm—and, indirectly, to put our economy on an upward trajectory of productivity and to build a less unequal society. We British are more European than we begin to realize, and our alliance with the United States—bound by history and