



PROOF, KNOWLEDGE, and SCEPTICISM

Essays in Ancient Philosophy III

JONATHAN BARNES

OXFORD

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edited by
Maddalena Bonelli



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3. 'Reason and faith': *Studia Philosophica* 56, 1997, 183–209.
4. 'Socrates and the jury': *PAS* supplementary volume 54, 1980, 193–206.
5. 'Aristotle on knowledge and proof': M. Mignucci (ed), *Aristotele: Analitici secondi* (Rome, 2007), pp.VII–XXX.
6. 'Proof and the syllogism': E. Berti (ed), *Aristotle on Science: the Posterior Analytics* (Padua, 1981), pp.17–59.
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15. 'nova non philosophandi philosophia': *OSAP* 6, 1988, 231–254.
16. 'Sextan scepticism': D. Scott (ed), *Maieusis: essays in ancient philosophy in honour of Myles Burnyeat* (Oxford, 2007), pp.322–334.

17. 'Pyrrhonism, belief, and causation': *ANRW* II 36.4 (1990), pp.2608–2695.
18. 'Scepticism and the arts': R.J. Hankinson (ed), *Method, Medicine and Metaphysics* (Edmonton, 1988), pp.53–77.
19. 'Scepticism and relativity': *Philosophical Studies* 32, 1988/90, 1–31.
20. 'Scepticism and scandal': *Atti e Relazioni dell'Accademia Pugliese delle scienze* 45, 1988, 11–30.
21. 'An Aristotelian way with scepticism': M. Matthen (ed), *Aristotle Today* (Edmonton, 1987), pp.51–76.
22. 'Scepticism and the Book of *Ecclesiastes*': *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* 131, 1999, 103–114.

Preface

The four volumes of these *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* collectively contain most of the things I have published on the subject over the last forty years or so. Short reviews of books have, almost all, been excluded; so have pieces which were written for encyclopaedias and companions and the like; and I have suppressed one or two items which repeat or anticipate what I have written elsewhere — and one or two items which are better forgotten.

The essays have been assigned to volumes on thematic rather than chronological principles; but of course, the thematic character of an essay is, often enough, plural or indeterminate, and its assignment to one volume rather than to another may be pretty arbitrary. Similarly, the ordering of the essays within each volume is determined primarily by the nature of their subject-matter — though in this case a chronological principle is also present. If none of the volumes has sufficient unity to constitute a book, nevertheless each of them (I think) hangs together in an informal sort of fashion; and in any event, no other arrangement would have been more instructive or more diverting.

Several of the essays were originally written and published in French, and one in Italian. They have all been Englished. (The translations are often very free.)

All the papers have been dusted down: I have corrected misprints and other trivial errors where I have noticed them; I have eliminated a few infelicities of style; and I have imposed a certain uniformity in the modes of reference to ancient texts and to modern literature. In the original publications, a piece of Aristotle or of Cicero was cited sometimes in Greek or in Latin and sometimes in English: in the present volumes ancient texts are regularly (but by no means always) quoted both in the dead language (at the foot of the page) and in the living (in the body of the text).

Many of the papers have been revised, some more substantially than others. There are a number of new references, both to the primary texts and to the scholarly commentary upon them; occasionally a proposition, or an argument, has been added (or subtracted); and paragraphs have sometimes been reorganized — expanded or contracted or transmuted. The revisions are neither uniform nor systematic: in particular, my acquaintance with the more recent literature is haphazard.

The page-numbers of the original publication are indicated within square brackets and in a lighter type. Some of the original footnotes have been suppressed or incorporated into the text: those — the large majority — which survive carry their original numbers. New notes are signalled by an asterisk or two. As a result, the sequence of footnote markers sometimes has a dotty air to it. References to ancient texts use abbreviations which I hope are perspicuous — and which in any event are explained in the Index of Passages. References to modern literature are given in full on their first occurrence within a chapter, and thereafter in a truncated form. The few abbreviations which are used throughout the volume are explained at the start of the Bibliography.

I owe very much to very many. The individual essays acknowledge some few of their individual debts. The volumes themselves are particularly indebted to two people: to Peter Momtchiloff, who first proposed that I should collect some of my ancient papers, who then prodded me when I slowed or stuck, and who was from start to finish a source of sympathetic advice; and to Maddalena Bonelli, who offered to act as general editor of the volumes, and who — in addition to undertaking the various ungrateful tasks which fall to an editor — encouraged me with unflagging goads and carrots.

This third volume turns about epistemological matters; and after three pieces in the form of a prologue, it divides into two parts, the first concerned chiefly with proof and the second concerned chiefly with scepticism.

The prologue deals with certain ancient views about the function of logic and about its relation to knowledge and science: Chapter 1 considers what some of the late Platonists had to say on the subject; Chapter 2 turns back to Galen, and to the 'logical utilitarianism' of which he — like Alexander of Aphrodisias — was a champion; and Chapter 3 sets out some of the ideas advanced by the early Fathers of the Church when they came to speculate on the connection between faith and reason.

The part of the volume concerned with proof consists of eleven pieces. Chapter 4, 'Socrates and the jury', analyses a short passage in Plato's *Theaetetus*. There follow five essays on Aristotle. Chapter 5 offers some general — and not uncritical — remarks about the accounts of knowledge and of proof which are advanced in the *Posterior Analytics* and which determine, in

principle, the major theses of that work. Chapter 6 asks what exactly is the relation — or rather, what exactly are the relations — between the theory of the syllogism which Aristotle elaborates in the *Prior Analytics*, and the theory of proof which he develops in the *Posterior Analytics*. Chapter 7 on ‘Aristotle’s theory of demonstration’ is the oldest piece in the book: it elaborates the familiar view that, according to Aristotle, proof offers not a method of scientific discovery or a means of acquiring new knowledge, but rather a procedure by which knowledge may be systematically articulated and scientifically presented. In any event, proof serves to produce probative sciences; and Chapter 8 looks at some of Aristotle’s thoughts about such things, and in particular at the question of how such sciences are to be individuated and distinguished one from another. Chapter 9, ‘Aristotle, Menaechmus, and circular proof’, connects Aristotle’s several ruminations on circular or reciprocal proofs with some ideas attributed to one of his geometrical contemporaries.

The next three chapters concern Galen and take up, *inter alia*, some of the themes of Chapter 2. Galen, following in Aristotle’s footsteps, thought that a proof was a special sort of syllogism: Chapter 10 considers what types or species of syllogism Galen holds to be ‘useful for proof’. Galen claims that a doctor — like any other scientist — must be expert in logic and in particular in ‘the probative method’: Chapter 11, ‘Galen on logic and therapy’, looks at the nature of that claim and at its basis, and it surveys the various ways in which Galen thinks that logical expertise comes to the aid of medicine. Chapter 12, which is a pendant to Chapter 11, has a narrower focus: ‘Language in Galen’s *simp med temp*’ analyses some of the striking — and apparently contradictory — things which Galen says about the importance or unimportance to science of such things as definitions and linguistic precision.

The Epicurean philosophers had no theory of proof. But they did have something close to one, namely a theory of ‘signs’ or ‘sign inferences’: Chapter 13 examines some of the problems raised by the theory as it is explained by Philodemus in his *On Signs*. The last essay on proof forms a bridge to the second main part of the volume: Sextus Empiricus argues at considerable length, and twice over, that there can be no such thing as a proof — Chapter 14, ‘Proof destroyed’, examines some of his reasons for that contention.

Chapter 15 deals with the ‘Academic’ form of ancient scepticism, a subject for which the evidence is often puzzling. Chapter 16 discusses some general

questions about the nature of the 'Pyrrhonian' form of scepticism, a subject for which the evidence — though abundant — is also puzzling. In Chapter 17, 'Pyrrhonism, belief, and causation', some of those general questions are taken up again; but the main burden of the essay concerns scepticism about causation, one element of which is the startling suggestion that the concept of a cause is essentially incoherent. In *Against the Mathematicians* I–VI (as the work is misleadingly known) Sextus sets out some sceptical thoughts about the 'liberal arts' — about grammar, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astrology, and music: Chapter 18 examines some of those thoughts. Scepticism and relativism, two utterly different isms, often enough get put into the same basket: Chapter 19 takes them out again, explains their chief differences, and (for good measure) examines the several texts in which ancient sceptics take a stand on relations and relativity and relativism.

Aristotle has something to say about — or rather, against — scepticism, and that something is pretty blunt. Chapter 21, 'An Aristotelian way with scepticism', attempts to develop something a little sharper, on the basis of certain of Aristotle's teleological notions. Finally, 'Scepticism and the Book of *Ecclesiastes*' examines the claim that the Preacher was influenced, directly or indirectly, by Greek scepticism; and, alas, it finds the claim wanting.

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1 Logic and the imperial Platonists*

In his racy *History of Philosophy*, which we call the *Life of Isidore*, Damascius has this to say about the education of his half-hero:

He touched lightly on rhetoric and poetics, and then turned to the more divine philosophy of Aristotle. But when he saw that it relied on necessity rather than on apposite insight, and that it strove to be perfectly technical and did not at all favour the inspired and the intellective, Isidore came to hold it in very little account. (Photius, *bibl* 242, 337b9–15)¹

He did not change his mind; for

this too marked Isidore off from other philosophers: he was unwilling simply to compel by syllogisms either himself or his companions to follow an unseen truth, herded along by reason down a single path, like blind men led along the right way. Rather, he strove to persuade them and to put vision into their souls — or better, to clean the vision which was already there. (Photius, *bibl* 338a28–34)² [14]

Isidore didn't care for Aristotle, who was a mere technician; and he didn't care for logic and its rational necessitations. He cared — of course — for Plato; and for the clear eye of the soul.

It is an odd attitude. After all, no syllogism has ever exerted or could ever exert a compulsion on anyone; and what is wrong with technique? But it was

* First published as the 'Prefazione' to Angela Longo, *Siriano e i Principi della scienza*, Collana Elenchos XLI (Naples, 2005), pp.13–27. The last few paragraphs, which were the genuine preface to Angela Longo's book, have been omitted.

¹ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ποιητικῆς πολυμαθίας μικρὰ ἤψατο, εἰς δὲ τὴν θειοτέραν φιλοσοφίαν ἐξώρμησε τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους. ὁρῶν δὲ ταύτην τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ οἰκείῳ νῶ πιστεύουσιν, καὶ τεχνικὴν μὲν ἱκανῶς εἶναι σπουδάζουσιν, τὸ δὲ ἔνθεον ἢ νοερὸν οὐ πάνυ προβαλλομένην, ὀλίγον καὶ ταύτης ὁ Ἰσίδωρος ἐποιήσατο λόγον. — The text is printed as fragment 35 in C. Zintzen (ed), *Damascii Vitae Isidori reliquiae*, Bibliotheca graeca et latina suppletoria 1 (Hildesheim, 1967), and as fragment 34C in P. Athanassiadi (ed), *Damascius: The Philosophical History* (Athens, 1999).

² ἐξαίρετον δ' ἦν αὐτῷ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καὶ τοῦτο φιλοσόφους· οὐκ ἤβούλετο συλλογισμοῖς ἀναγκάζειν μόνον οὔτε ἑαυτὸν οὔτε τοὺς συνόντας ἐπακολουθεῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ ὁρωμένη, κατὰ μίαν ὁδὸν πορεύεσθαι συνελαυνομένους ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου, οἷον τυφλοὺς τὴν ὁρθὴν ἀγομένους πορεῖαν. ἀλλὰ πείθειν ἐσπούδαζεν αἰεὶ καὶ ὅψιν ἐντιθέσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐνοῦσαν διακαθαίρειν. — frag 43 Zintzen, 38B Athanassiadi.

an attitude characteristic of the Platonist philosophers, or at least of the late Platonist philosophers. When Syrianus undertook Proclus' philosophical schooling,

he read with him in less than two years all the works of Aristotle — on logic, ethics, politics, physics, and the science of theology which is above them; and once he had been sufficiently led through them — as it were through some preliminary rites and minor mysteries — he led him to the mystagogy of Plato. (Marinus, *v Procli* xiii 1–6)³

And so Proclus

became an eye-witness of the truly blessed sights which are found in that other place: he no longer syllogized a science of them discursively and demonstratively but rather saw the paradigms in the divine mind by the direct application of intellectual activity, as though by sight. (Marinus, *v Procli* xxii 8–12)⁴ [15]

Aristotle is for neophytes. Syllogisms are for intellectual kittens whose eyes are not yet open to the real world. And look at the catalogue of Syrianus' writings:

He wrote a complete commentary on Homer in seven books; four books on Plato's *Republic*; two books on the theology of Orpheus; *On Homer's Gods*; *The Concordance of Orpheus, Pythagoras and Plato*; *On the Oracles*, ten books; and various other exegetical works. (Suda, s.v. *Συριανός*)⁵

There is nothing remotely logical there, nothing remotely Aristotelian — indeed, there is not much which is remotely philosophical.

There are parallels to all that in several texts and several authors. And not only in pagan texts and pagan authors; for although Syrianus and his people were no lovers of the Galilean religion, on this matter — as on many others

³ ἐν ἔτεσι γοῦν οὔτε δύο ὅλοις πάσας αὐτῷ τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους συνανέγνω πραγματείας, λογικὰς ἠθικὰς πολιτικὰς φυσικὰς καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ ταύτας θεολογικὴν ἐπιστήμην· ἀχθέντα δὲ διὰ τούτων ἱκανῶς ὥσπερ διὰ τινων προτελείων καὶ μικρῶν μυστηρίων εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἦγε μυσταγωγίαν.

⁴ αὐτόπτης ἐγένετο τῶν ἐκεῖ μακαρίων ὄντως θεαμάτων, οὐκέτι μὲν διεξοδικῶς καὶ ἀποδεικτικῶς συλλογιζόμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ δὲ ὅψει ἀπλαῖς ἐπβολαῖς τῆς νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας θεώμενος τὰ ἐν τῷ θεῷ νῶ παραδείγματα.

⁵ ἔγραψεν εἰς Ὅμηρον ὅλον ὑπόμνημα ἐν βιβλίοις ἑπτὰ, εἰς τὴν Πολιτείαν Πλάτωνος βιβλία τέσσαρα, εἰς τὴν Ὀρφείως θεολογίαν βιβλία δύο, Περὶ τῶν παρ' Ὀμήρῳ θεῶν, Συμφωνίαν Ὀρφείως Πυθαγόρου Πλάτωνος, Περὶ τὰ λόγια βιβλία δέκα· καὶ ἄλλα τινὰ ἐξηγητικά. — On the list, and the several problems it raises, see K. Praechter, 'Das Schriftenverzeichnis des Neuplatonikers Syrianos bei Suidas', *Byzantinischer Zeitschrift* 26, 1926, 253–264 [reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften*, Collectanea VII (Hildesheim, 1973), pp.222–233].

— they stood shoulder to shoulder with the Christian philosophers. Here, for example, is a snippet from Gregory of Nyssa:

As for confirming our doctrines in accordance with the art of dialectic and by way of syllogistic and analytical science, that is something we abjure, taking that sort of reason to be both rotten and a suspect way of demonstrating the truth. For it is clear to everyone that dialectical devices have an equal strength in each direction — to overturn the true and to convict the false. That is why we often look with suspicion on the truth itself when it is advanced by way of such art. (*an res* 52B)⁶

Syllogisms are to be avoided: if you offer to prove a truth by logic it is more likely to be suspected than swallowed. Who shuns syllogisms shuns Aristotle; and Gregory was quick to denounce his arch-enemy, the heretical Eunomius, as a man in thrall to the wizard of Stagira.

It is true that the Christian Fathers were incurably addicted to rhodomontade and rhetorical exaggeration; and it is true that the *Lives* of Proclus and of Isidore are not — and do not pretend to be — dry and factual histories. Nonetheless, all fiction and [16] bombast discounted, the message is plain: fly logic and the Stagirite, for they are both no good.

In reality, things were not quite so simple. (They never are.) In one of his shorter and more approachable essays, Plotinus had asked:

What art or method or practice leads us up to where we must voyage? (*enn* I iii 1.1–2)⁷

He had answered: The art of dialectic. It was an unsurprising answer; for Plotinus was echoing one of the best-known passages in Plato:

So, I said, the dialectical method alone voyages in this way, removing the hypotheses, to the first principle itself, in order that it may be secured; and it gently draws on and leads upwards the eye of the soul which has truly been buried in a sort of barbaric mud. (*Rep* 533CD)⁸ [17]

⁶ τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν τέχνην διὰ συλλογιστικῆς τε καὶ ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης βεβαιουῦσθαι καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα δόγματα, ὥς σαθρόν τε καὶ ὑποπτον εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθείας τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τοῦ λόγου παραιτησόμεθα. πᾶσι γάρ ἐστι πρόδηλον τὸ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν περιεργίαν ἴσῃ ἐφ' ἑκάτερα τὴν ἰσχύον ἔχειν, πρὸς τε τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀνατροπὴν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψεύδους κατηγορίαν. ὅθεν καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅταν μετὰ τίνος τοιαύτης τέχνης προαγγηται δι' ὑποψίας πολλάκις ποιούμεθα.

⁷ τίς τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος ἢ ἐπιτήδευσις ἡμᾶς οἷ δεῖ πορευθῆναι ἀνάγει;

⁸ οὐκοῦν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιωσῇται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυσμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω.

Dialectic is the supreme science:

Don't you think that dialectic sits for us on top of the sciences like a sort of coping-stone, and that no other science could properly be placed higher than it? (*Rep* 534E)⁹

Later Platonists might sometimes suppose — against the plain run of the text — that *θρυγκός* there means 'defensive wall' rather than 'coping-stone', so that dialectic is supposed to guard and protect the sciences rather than to consummate them. But they all allowed — *Platonisme oblige* — that dialectic ruled the scientific waves.

True, Plotinus shows no interest at all in dialectic outside this one essay; and he hastens to assure himself and us that Platonic dialectic is not at all the same thing as Aristotelian (or Stoic) logic:

Well then, is philosophy the most honourable thing? Or are philosophy and dialectic the same? Or is it the honourable part of philosophy? Certainly you shouldn't think that it's a tool of philosophy — it's not empty theorems and rules. Rather, it's about things, and it has existing things as its material, so to speak. And it proceeds methodically towards them, grasping the things along with the theorems. (*enn* I iii 5.8–13)¹⁰

The empty rules and theorems are the sort of thing which the Peripatetics will offer you; and they will tell you, [18] explicitly and with reasons, that logic is not a part of philosophy which merits study in its own right but rather a tool or instrument of philosophy and the other sciences. What is the *Organon* but Aristotle's tool? Platonic dialectic, Plotinus insists, is not like that: it is about things — it is a substantive science.

Nonetheless, Platonic dialectic is in some fashion or other a logical science. Plotinus does not trouble to describe it. He suggests that the so-called method of division will be at its centre. But any Platonist must also have agreed that it would encompass syllogistic. After all, once a man has crawled laboriously out of the cave, once he has gradually accustomed his eyes to the real world, and once he has gazed upward to the heavens and the bright sun, what does he do next?

⁹ ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θρυγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ διαλεκτικῇ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κείσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι;

¹⁰ τί οὖν; ἡ φιλοσοφία τὸ τιμιώτατον; ἢ ταῦτόν φιλοσοφία καὶ διαλεκτική; ἡ φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ τίμιον; οὐ γὰρ δὴ οἰητέον ὄργανον τοῦτο εἶναι τοῦ φιλοσόφου· οὐ γὰρ ψιλὰ θεωρήματά ἐστι καὶ κανόνες, ἀλλὰ περὶ πράγματά ἐστι καὶ οἷον ὕλην ἔχει τὰ ὄντα· ὁδὴ μέντοι ἐπ' αὐτὰ χωρεῖ ἅμα τοῖς θεωρήμασι τὰ πράγματα ἔχουσα.

And after that, he will syllogize about the sun, showing that it is the sun which produces the seasons and the years and which oversees everything in the visible world and is in a way a cause of everything which they used to see. (*Rep* 516BC)¹¹

In order to syllogize about the sun, you need more than long divisions: you need syllogistic.

Plotinus was, of course, aware of the fact. His Platonic dialectician will, of course, have studied syllogistic — just as he will have studied grammar; and the study will have enabled him to produce good arguments and to unmask bad ones — just as his knowledge of grammar will have enabled him to speak Greek and to detect barbarism. In effect, although Plotinus doesn't quite say so, a Plotinian Platonist will treat his logic in the same way as a card-carrying Peripatetic does — he will use it as a tool, an instrument.

And logic was taught, as an instrument or tool of [19] philosophy, in the Platonist schools. There is a nice story about Isidore and one of his pupils:

Dorus from Arabia — so Damascius says in his *Philosophical History* — was a most remarkable seeker after truth. Isidore the philosopher found him, at the start, enmeshed in Aristotelian hypotheses — since he had been brought up on them from childhood to maturity — and unable, because of his ignorance of the grand science of Plato, to fly up to the lofty and brilliant thoughts. But having learned that he was in that case, Isidore gradually rallied him and spread his soul for the great sea of truth, so that he exchanged the pedantry of the Peripatetics, which syllogizes trifles, for that dialectic which some Prometheus sent down to us with the brightest of fires and which is the purest eye-witnessing of the intellect and of wisdom, and ran upwards and established in his soul the hopes of philosophical life. (*Suda*, s.v. Δωρος)¹²

Dorus, the Peripatetic, was persuaded to swap Aristotle for Plato, syllogistic for dialectic.

¹¹ καὶ μετὰ ταύτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τὰς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτούς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ καὶ ἐκείνων ὧν σφεῖς ἐώρων τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος.

¹² Δωρος ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀραβίας, ὡς φησι Δαμάσκιος εἰς τὴν Φιλόσοφον ἱστορίαν, δεινότατον εἶναι ζητητὴν τῆς ἀληθείας. τοῦτον Ἰσίδωρος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἤσθανετο μὲν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπὶ ταῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ὑποθέσεσιν ἐνδεδεμένον ἅτε ἐκ παίδων ἐν αὐταῖς τεθραμμένον πορρωτέρῳ τῆς ἡλικίας, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀήθειαν τῆς Πλάτωνος μεγαλοπρεποῦς ἐπιστήμης οὐ δυνάμενον ἀναπηγῆναι πρὸς τὰ ὑψηλὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ τῶν νοημάτων. οὕτω δὲ ἔχοντα καταμαθὼν ἀνεκαλέσατό τε κατὰ βραχὺ καὶ ἀνεπέτασεν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ μέγα πέλαγος τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε ἀποσκευασάμενον τὴν τὰ μικρὰ συλλογιζομένην ἀκρίβειαν περιπατητικὴν εἰς τὴν διὰ Προμηθέως τινὸς ἅμα φανοτάτῳ πυρὶ καταπεμφθεῖσαν διαλεκτικὴν, αὐτοψίαν τε καθαρώτατον οὖσαν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, ἀναδραμεῖν τε καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ εἰσοικίσαι τὰς τοῦ βίου φιλοσόφου ἐλπίδας. — frag 338 Zintzen, 134A Athanassiadi. (The penultimate word is transmitted as 'φιλοσόφους'.)