

Marriage and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies

Areas of Legal, Social and Ethical Change

**an international and
interdisciplinary study**

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Sanford N. Katz**

**With an introduction
by William J. Goode**

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BUTTERWORTHS
Toronto

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Printed and bound in Canada

The Butterworth Group of Companies

Canada:

Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd., Toronto

Butterworth & Co. (Western Canada) Ltd., Vancouver

United Kingdom:

Butterworth & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, Borough Green

Australia:

Butterworths Pty. Ltd., Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth, Norwood

New Zealand:

Butterworths of New Zealand Ltd., Wellington

South Africa:

Butterworth & Co. (South Africa) Ltd., Durban

United States:

Butterworth (Publishers) Inc., Boston

Butterworth (Legal Publishers) Inc., Seattle

Butterworth & Co. Ltd., Ann Arbor

Mason Publishing Company, St. Paul

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Marriage and cohabitation in contemporary societies

Papers presented at the third world conference of the International Society on Family Law, held June 5-9, 1979 at Uppsala, Sweden.

Includes some text in French.

ISBN 0-409-82860-2

1. Marriage — Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Unmarried couples — Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Divorce — Addresses, essays, lectures. 4. Family — Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Eekelaar, John. II. Katz, Sanford N. III. International Society on Family Law.

HQ734.M37

306.8

C80-094848-3

Printed by Bryant Press

Preface

In recent years, the law governing the family and analogous units has been in a state of transition throughout the world. At the same time there have been radical changes in the nature and structure of domestic relations. Legal changes, however, are not the cause of institutional change as much as they are a manifestation of shifts in underlying values. In particular, the last decade has seen an ever-increasing focus on the needs and desires of individuals in contrast to the traditional emphasis on family and other personal relationships. While this focus on the individual may tend to operate to the detriment of the family as a unit, this same focus has led to the equality of the marital partners. Similarly, concern for the rights of individuals may lead to a lessening of parental authority over children but at the same time has resulted in the blurring of the legal distinction between legitimate and illegitimate birth.

The increasing tendency of government to provide the kind of economic and social security support which historically has been a principle function of the family has tended to render the family less significant and may have increased family instability. As economic factors have lost their coercive force, ties holding relationships together rest increasingly on the sentiments of the individuals involved. Thus, loss of affection alone is a more common ground for dissolving a relationship.

Finally, and perhaps as a result of the previous two tendencies, there has been a substantial increase in the number of couples living together without benefit of a ceremonial marriage or the requisites of an informal one.

The law has tended to respond to this phenomenon by treating married and unmarried couples similarly. Indeed, it has been suggested that marriage as a legal concept may no longer be necessary.

Although these changes may have been dormant for some time, it is only relatively recently that scholars and other observers throughout the world have taken notice. A desire to discuss, and ideally to direct these changes, led to the choice of "Family Living in a Changing Society" as the theme for the Third World Conference of the International Society on Family Law convened by Professor Anders Agell of Uppsala University in Sweden. The papers published in this volume were presented at Uppsala from June 5th to June 9th, 1979, and represent the thoughts and insights of representatives of the academic communities throughout the world.

In preparing this volume for publication, the editors wish to thank William A. Schroeder, Esq. for his critical comments and advice. They also wish to acknowledge the secretarial assistance of Mrs. Mary Nardone and the editorial assistance of Jonny J. Frank and Phillip L. Weiner of the Class of 1980 of Boston College Law School.

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Introduction

The Resistance of Family Forces to Industrialization

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At least as early as Marx's great work *Das Kapital*, it has been argued that under some circumstances the traditional family system might be weakened by industrialization, specifically by a productive system in which family members must go out from the family to work for individually earned wages, and who therefore derive far less benefit from their communal, shared contributions to the household unit. Since that time, commentators and social philosophers have been prophesying the disintegration of the family, or arguing that it has 'lost its functions', and have pointed to continually increasing divorce rates, rising rates of illegitimacy, the breakdown of parental authority, sexual permissiveness, communes, cohabitation without marriage, and even the Women's Liberation Movement as proof of that dissolution.

The possible relations between industrialization and the decline of the family are partly obscured by the conceptual looseness of the term 'industrialization', which is a ragbag of assorted, conflicting forces. Often, an asserted relationship between industrialization and some other social phenomenon is only a tautology: that is, many analysts include in that concept such broad elements as urbanization, bureaucratization, physical mobility, lengthening life expectation, more years spent in education, jobs handed out on the basis of training or skill not birth, and so on. It is clear that if we include in this term everything that is associated with the last 200 years of industrialization, there is no

scientific problem at all: that is, industrialization causes almost everything found in modern society, because it simply *is* everything.

There are, of course, somewhat more rigorous ways of defining the term. For example, one may use the number of horsepower or kilowatts available per capita within a country, the percentage of persons in the tertiary sector of the economy, or the percentage of people who work in technical and professional jobs. All three of these are correlated, and all will be correlated with various changes in family forms.

Whatever definition of industrialization one chooses, we are primarily concerned with identifying the processes through which industrialization may cause family change. That is, we seek the key elements in any industrialization process that may affect family patterns. Specifically, there are three main processes that arise with industrialization and weaken the traditional system of family controls. First, an increasing number of people earn their living from jobs, that is, positions that pay wages for a particular task. They do not depend on obtaining eventually a share of the land, or a right to rent land, both of which are usually in the hands of family elders. Second, the needs of efficiency in the industry and the economy require that jobs and promotions be given out mainly by people who basically have little stake in the familial position of the worker. Therefore, those people feel little concern

about whether the rewards they give will support any existing set of familial roles; if the worker does not fulfill his or her family obligations, the employer is not very interested. In that case, individuals who wish to avoid or defy family controls will not lose much by following their own inclinations.

Third, work positions in the market economy offer the possibility of a living as an individual, not as a member of a family. Then, if individuals can earn more in the economy by their own efforts than by pooling their labor with members of their family or their kin network, they can become independent of their kin.

In all three of these processes, the result is that the traditional flow of rewards and punishments given to the individual on the basis of his or her conformity to family wishes is interrupted or altered. It is not that these industrial processes directly and universally work against the family, but that they give much less support than did the traditional system to the maintenance of older family loyalties and contributions.

In analyzing these processes, we must try to avoid the intellectual sins of reification and anthropomorphism, and thus must not think of industrial patterns or systems as individual actors, carrying out some deliberate program of action. Industries, bureaucracies, and cities do not themselves carry out social acts; it is their human members who do that. Nevertheless, because individuals do have a personal stake in the social institutions from which they benefit, and because they guide those institutions, we can perceive some theoretical levels where it is useful to think of social institutions as competing with, undermining, or supporting one another, in the sense of industry vs. the church, the family vs. the state, and so on.¹

Moreover, the outcome of that competition or conflict among institutions need not all be harmonious, or conducive to the total welfare of the society or its members. One institution may gain at the expense of others, and may gain at the expense of the population. For example, at one time, the church may gain at the expense of other institutions; the state bureaucracy may gain at the expense

of the population at other times. Thus, we can say that the legal institutions of the state typically seek to support the traditional forms of the family, at least in western nations; for example, they have supported the dominance of the husband.

By contrast, the payoff and reward system of the industrial economy has more usually weakened some elements of kinship structures, and at best gives the family only modest support in non-economic areas. For example, a teenage factory worker in the late 19th century did not have to obey his father nearly so much as a teenage son of a farmer, or of an industrial owner. That was because the son did not have to stay on the farm in the hope of inheriting it; he could instead live off his wages. The industrial reward system does not support traditional family patterns, because it offers individuals an economic livelihood independent of family authority structures. Where it does not offer that alternative, as was the case in the 19th century Japanese and Italian spinning mills, where women worked, but were in fact not independent, that authority is not undermined to the same degree.

This new situation need not cause many great changes directly, but it does permit almost any kinds of changes that individuals as a mass may find desirable. In industrialized countries, rewards and punishments are handed out with little regard to whether the individual fulfills his or her role obligations within the family. For example, factory managers simply do not care, in general, whether their expert computer analyst obeys her husband or is respectful toward her father; or whether a hard-driving efficient manager is neglecting his children.

In sum, industrialization affects the family in three structural ways. First, at various points in the structure of the conjugal family or of the larger extended kinship network, industrialization reduces the authority of those who have traditional statuses, such as parent or husband. Second, it offers the less powerful, such as the young and women, alternative sources of the rewards that they used to be able to get only in families; for example, sexual pleasures, social

security, personal services, etc. Third, industrialization has not created additional supports for family life, while it undermines the authority of older institutional supports for the family, such as the church, schools, and the state.

In general, the technical and economic market needs of industrialization emphasize four new factors: first, skills rather than family connections; second, the privacy and rights of the individual rather than those of the family group; third, geographic mobility, which becomes more important than family stability; and fourth, an alertness to self interest, which supersedes familial loyalty.

For all these reasons, we can suppose (and indeed for the most part find) that time comparisons or cross-national comparisons confirm the rough hypothesis — that traditional family systems change with industrialization. In fact, group kin structures and large extended households do become less prevalent with industrialization. Some family indexes rise and others fall (divorce, birth-rates), but generally the wide range of family structures over the world moves toward a single common pattern throughout the world; the pattern is that of the western conjugal family system.

Since that general thesis was enunciated, in *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (1963), later data have generally confirmed it. More recent data have also brought out more clearly the resistance of various kinds of family patterns or forces to industrialization, which were also noted in that monograph.

Before proceeding to those patterns of resistance, however, it may be useful for me to sketch briefly the 13 major trends in family patterns which I outlined in that earlier work. Here is a list: (1) A decline in matriliney. In matrilineal kinship structures, property and power descend through the mother's line, with a number of important structural consequences that have been generally outlined in the anthropological literature. My analysis suggested that the people in matrilineal societies would increasingly move toward a patrilineal (or bilineal) pattern.

(2) A decline of the influence generally

of corporate kin groups such as lineages and clans. The Chinese *Tsu*, the Japanese *Dozoku*, and the wide range of lineage systems in tribal societies could be expected to decline in power and importance. (3) A decrease in the prevalence of the dowry or bride price. This is not a prediction that the amount will decline, since where such systems are maintained, inflation alone would increase the sums of property demanded. Both dowry and bride price can, in modern settings, approach more closely the western pattern of gift exchanges on both sides but the prediction is nevertheless that there would be a decline in the prevalence of the dowry or bride price. (4) An increase in age homogamy; that is, the average difference in age between husband and wife would be narrowed over time. (5) A decrease in kin marriages; that is, a smaller percentage of marriages would occur between people who are relatively close kin, such as cousins of various degrees.

(6) A movement from extremely high or very low divorce rates to medium or high. The earlier work recorded both directions of change, a downward movement in systems of extremely high rates (Japan, Arab countries); an upward movement of very low divorce rates. (7) An increase in the number of women holding jobs independent of their husbands, fathers, or male kin. In all societies, throughout world history, women have worked. In many societies they have also held jobs paying wages. Until very recently in world history, very few women got those jobs, or were promoted in them, without the permission or the active help of their male kinsmen. The modern movement is toward greater independence in this area. (8) An increase in women's rights. This descriptive statement will occasion some controversy, since many ardent feminists may argue that there has been no significant change under industrialization, while others have argued that women were given equality with men in some legendary period of the past. No such historical epoch exists, as far as our present knowledge goes. However, if we confine ourselves only to the period preceding industrialization, and to the period of relatively moderate or advanced industriali-

zation, the trend toward greater equality of women's status seems clear enough.

(9) Less control by parents over the courtship and mate choice of their children; that is, parents steadily lose the ability to decide whom their children will court or marry. (10) More sexual freedom in societies where that was low; here it may be necessary to remind western readers that most tribal societies have been sexually more liberal than the great civilizations of the past, and more than western societies. In any event, where sexual freedom was highly restricted, industrialization brings greater freedom with it.

(11) Where women married at very early ages, an increase in that age; that is, child marriages steadily decrease in societies where that was common.² (12) A decline in the birth-rate; as people experience industrialization they do exhibit a downward secular trend in the birthrate, aside from the usual rises and falls that accompany prosperity or depression. (13) In new nations and less developed nations, the passage of family laws that are far ahead of general public opinion on these topics. That is, as new nations are formed, and less developed nations write new constitutions and codes of laws, it will be typical that these laws express a set of wishes or aspirations (the equality of women, the protection of children, freedom of mate choice, etc.) that will be far in advance of the day-to-day attitudes and wishes of ordinary people in the society.

Not all of these are self-explanatory. Some are fairly secure as trends, but why they occur is not certain. Others are fairly secure if we consider populations as wholes, but there are many exceptions within specific sub-groups, ethnic groups, or classes. These exceptions should stimulate us to seek more closely the exact relationship between industrialization and family change. If we consider all of these exceptions, even at the most cautious we can nevertheless reformulate some of those trends negatively. That is, we can at least predict that over any extended period of industrialization certain family changes such as the following will not occur. Here are some of them: Any steady rise in

fertility is not likely to occur. It is not likely to occur, because industrialization brings a steady drop in the death rate, especially among infants and children, so that parents can count on a higher proportion of their children surviving through much of adulthood, thus guaranteeing at least a minimum of economic or social security for those parents. Phrased differently, the advantages of high fertility are decreased even for the individual family, under industrialization.³

Second, we can predict that there will not be a continued increase in the size of the conjugal family and in the percentage of extended, multigenerational households. That is, it is not likely that the family unit made up of parents and children will continue to grow larger, or that more and more generations of families will live in the same household. On the other hand, over the short run, if infant mortality drops quickly, there may be a temporary rise in the number of living children (and thus the size of the family). Similarly, if the death rate drops by much, for a time there may be an increase in the number of living grandparents, who may or may not live within the same household. Third, there will not be any continued move toward a higher percentage of teenage marriages. This pattern is the result of two sets of counter forces. On the one hand, younger people can get married because they can obtain jobs of some kind at early ages, and do not need to wait until they can obtain land from their parents or in-laws. On the other hand, the opportunity for better jobs with higher education means that more people wish to wait until they have completed their education (and are thus older). In addition, the benefits of marriage, as opposed to the single state, drops somewhat, since so many alternative sources of help, meals, personal services, and so on are available in the market. When almost everyone was engaged in farming, it was very difficult to live well without a spouse.

Fourth, it is unlikely that we will ever have a really low rate of divorce under industrialization. The processes involved in this transition are quite complex, and they are determined by two sets of forces, the values

of individualism, self-seeking, and personal advancement; and the opportunity for both men and women to live well as individuals, even if their marriages break up. Fifth, it is unlikely that there will be any steady increase in the percentage of marriages in which parents have a primary voice in the mate choices of their children, again because children do not depend upon their parents so fully as in the past for their livelihood. Six, related to the foregoing point is the low likelihood that there will be any decrease in the number of women who get jobs and promotions independent of their male relatives. This is unlikely to occur, because employers have no great stake in those kinship relations, and do prefer that their employees make decisions that will be based on individual economic benefits.

Seven, except in formerly matrilineal societies, there will be no steady increase in the authority of males. This trend is of course related to the two previous trends, in that women who can be economically independent are less likely to be willing to give increased authority to males, whether kinfolk or their husbands. Finally, there will be no continued trend toward greater political and economic power in the hands of corporate kin groups such as clans or lineages primarily because those kin structures offer various kinds of group benefits that can be more effectively achieved by the bureaucracies of corporations and the state, such as banking, police protection, courts, and jobs. This is only a limited list, but it suggests that at a minimum, we can not expect certain types of trends to occur.

Industrialization Is Not a Universal Cause of Family Change

Now, let us move on to the second major topic of this paper, having noted some of the major world trends in family changes. The second topic is that it is theoretically loose to suppose that industrialization, even when it is defined as some conglomeration of numerous processes, causes everything that we now witness. First, some family patterns that are popularly associated with industrialization were widespread in time and space long

before that new economy appeared. For example, in western nations most households were not extended; they were neolocal, and adults started independent households rather than living with their elders until their elders died. In eastern nations such as India, China, Japan, and Arabic Islam, only a modest percentage of households were multi-generational extended families.⁴ Often, as in Arabic Islam and India, a fairly high percentage of individuals lived at some point in their life cycle within an extended family household, but most of their years were spent in conjugal families of modest size (four to six members). Second, some family changes occurred in different historic epochs of the past; that is, change is endemic in all societies, and not only under industrialization. For example, almost certainly the private ownership of land, whenever it began in different parts of the world, did alter family forms considerably. This change very likely put much greater power in the hands of husbands.

Third, we can suppose that some types of role patterns or relationships within the family have a considerable staying power, and do not easily yield even under industrialization. For example, I suggested some time ago that the rather close emotional relationship between mother and son in India would not be easily weakened.

Fourth, whether or not the industrial system supports the traditional family, it cannot undermine it fully, since that system simply cannot function at all unless the human output from the family system is adequate to meet the needs of the economy. This includes adults who are motivated to work well and to obey a wide range of rules, who are competent to interact with other human beings, who are willing to contribute to a collective endeavor and so on much of the time, and viewed throughout their lifetime.

Thus, despite the considerable power of the forces of industrialization to shape other institutions to fit their needs more fully, we can already see that there are some limits to that influence. In a very general way, we can say that resistance to the apparently overpowering forces of industrialization may be observed in the most industrialized of

western and eastern countries, and the social patterns that resist are not residues of ancient custom, not holdovers from some bygone phase of traditional society. These family patterns are as necessary to the existence of an industrial society as to the functioning of a traditional one.

Effectiveness of Families vs. the Effectiveness of the State or Corporate Bureaucracies

However, that general statement only puts broad historical limits to the shaping forces of industrialization. In more theoretical and universal terms, the institution of the family is supported by its human members and thus resists destruction by the industrial economy because it can do many things more effectively than can the rational, impersonal, or expert instrumentalities of the modern economy or state. It is displaced and undermined in some areas and activities, but many of its seemingly outdated forms continue because in still other activities it offers greater advantages.

First, let us consider the advantages of the conjugal or domestic family, some version of which seems to re-emerge against all kinds of pressures, in prisons, during conquests or epidemics, or even when nations attempt to support various communal systems. What are some of these advantages?

Perhaps the most fundamental is found in the division of labor, and the resulting possibility of social exchanges, between husband and wife, as well as between and among children and parents. This includes not only material goods, but help, nurturance, protection and affection. Contrary to many textbook versions, the modern domestic household is very much an economic unit.⁵ People are actually continuing to produce goods and services for one another. They buy objects in one place and transport them to the household, where they are allocated to members. That is, they create time and place utility. They transform food into meals. They clean houses, mow lawns, repair gadgets, transport each other, give counsel, offer emotional support, love, sexual favors, and even at times psychiatric help to one another. In short, they offer a wide array of services

that would have to be paid for if some member of the family did not do them.

There are also some small economies of scale. When there are two or more members of a household, some kinds of activities can be almost as easily done for everyone as for a single person, repairing, housecleaning, preparing meals, etc. Contributions from all may make the task lighter, as well; and larger tasks can be accomplished by a family unit, which would be too large for a single individual, digging a well on a farm or redecorating an apartment in the city.

All the historic forms of the family, including some communal group marriages, are also attractive because they offer some degree of continuity. In technical terms this means that if one wishes to avoid the cost of searching, the cost of looking for a substitute, or seeking further information about alternative mate shifts, then even a modest set of rewards from the existing household may be enjoyable. This continuity means that husband and wife, as well as children, enjoy a much longer line of social credit than they would have if they were engaged in random social interaction with strangers. It also means that an individual can give more at one time to a family member, knowing that in the longer run this will not be a loss, for the other person (or someone else) is likely to reciprocate at some point.

It will be noted that the foregoing advantages apply to both the small family of the industrial west as well as multi-generational extended households, or even extended family networks. By pointing to these advantages, we emphasize the strength of family ties in the face of industrializing forces, simply because people find that family ties will give them better rewards, compared to the payoffs from living along.

The General Effectiveness of Informal Groups

Next, the familistic mode of living in all its forms offers the advantages of any informal group. The four major advantages of informal groups are the following. First, its members enjoy a very short line of communication with all other members, unlike the situation within a bureaucracy

or a corporation. Everyone can get his or her message through to any other person with relatively little difficulty. One can speak face to face with one's daughter, but perhaps not with the president of one's corporation.

Second, the various social forms of the family serve well the idiosyncratic or particular needs of individuals, whereas the economy and the state and their bureaucratic forms can deal efficiently only with classes of individuals, ignoring their special needs. Third, it is at least as efficient in handling a wide range of problems for which expert guidance is not necessary (allocating household tasks, cooking, cleaning, nursing); or for which there is simply no great expertise anyway (how to rear this particular child, how to decide justly among conflicting members).

More specifically, there are some problems for which there is no real knowledge; there are problems so simple that almost anyone can do them; and there are problems so rare or special that it would be costly to maintain a set of experts to deal with them. One of the consequences of this set of advantages is that members of the family can react much more quickly than can a set of outside experts, or some part of the market economy, and can react just as effectively.⁶

Fourth and finally, of course, members of a family, like most members of informal groups, have a long-term stake or interest in the functioning of the group as a whole. As a consequence, they have far more commitment to helping one another over the longer term than strangers in the outside market or industrial system.

In summary, then, the overall world pattern is that industrialized forces offer relatively less support to traditional family forms, and undermine some kinship patterns, but the needs and advantages of these various family forms assert themselves just the same, and offer resistance to any full-scale destruction. More generally, all social structures, both traditional and modern, are held in place by sets of countervailing tensions. These forces are shifted under industrialization because new socioeconomic payoffs are available. People seek these opportunities, and can thus forego the old

gains that would have come to them under traditional arrangements. To select an obvious example, husbands increasingly enjoy the greater income from wife's employment, even though they lose thereby some of their older authority.

Nevertheless, if the responses of individuals and families are determined by the new opportunities and social forces in industrialization, we know there will be great differences in the responses among different families, because not all of them will be in the same structural position. Specifically some will be in structural positions that will continue to yield socioeconomic advantages to any who pool their skills and resources on a family basis.

Some General and Specific Processes of Resistance at Different Levels of Family Complexity

Let us now consider these processes at different levels of familial complexity. First, at the highest level of complexity, industrialization has the most destructive effect on corporate kinship groups such as lineages and clans. This statement applies to Japan and China, of course, but also to the industrializing new nations of Africa. A new economy undermines the socioeconomic foundations of corporate kin groups, that is, those that acted as a unit, by developing easier banking facilities, public schools, jobs distant from the locally based network, political protection, and many public services. It does this in a socialist country such as China, as it does in a capitalistic country such as Japan.

However, here and there in developing countries the members of a kin group may perceive that all these public facilities are not yet well developed, and kin members can best exploit the new market opportunities by continuing to pool their skills and resources. The great *Dozoku* (*Zaibatsu*) of Japan did that until after World War II. Thus, the general undermining process is visible, but many kin groups will continue to prosper as partial or truncated collectivities, within one area of activity or another.

Second, let us consider a second family form at a lower level of organization than

lineages and clans, that is, the large, multi-generational, extended households. These were not typical even under traditional systems, in China, India, Japan, Arabic Islam, and Europe, for many reasons — the mortality of children and of the older generation, the lack of adequate organizational talent, the lack of a large enough productive resource to be exploited by a large family, and so on.

To be sure, if public health measures are suddenly adopted in the modern world, so that mortality rates drop quickly, for a time a modest increase in such household units would occur, or at least no great decrease.⁷ Nevertheless, under industrialization it is unlikely that any substantial increase in the talent for family organization will occur, and a higher percentage of people will earn their living from jobs not from the exploitation of commonly held family land. Since people then depend far less on the communal group, that group controls them far less, and individual members will see fewer advantages to staying together. Thus we would expect such households to decline.

On the other hand, at less developed levels of industrialization, jobs are often poorly paid, and underemployment is common, so that individuals may well have to continue pooling their small incomes in order to survive. This happened in the early phases of English industrialization, as Marx amply documented. It is reported in a very modest way, for one small region of Moslem Libya.⁸ Doubtless, it continues to be common.

This type of pooling may occur even when some members actually object to it. It has been described in Africa as 'family parasitism', for often a successful urban worker finds that he is expected to honor his obligations to tribal relatives who come to live with him, though in fact they do not get jobs. He may have to support them in various ways, or send members to school, because of social pressures from members of his lineage or direct family line even though the members who live with him do not actually contribute much, or anything, to the household.

In one study in the Philippines,⁹ it was ascertained that there are more extended households in some of the urban regions

than in surrounding rural regions. Closer examination discloses that these household members are often not direct descendants of a given family line; they do not form a traditional extended family household. Instead, the household has been increased by cousins, nephews, nieces, or more distant relatives who have come to live with an urban family, because there are more economic opportunities in the urban settlement, and opportunities for further education. We can suppose that this will not be a continued upward trend, but it is one example of the process we are describing; some type of family pooling when the opportunities for individual advancement or economic security are very limited, and the economy has not developed sufficiently to utilize marginal members of the society.

The continued strength of some kinds of extended households may also be observed in contemporary India, and in Taiwan, sometimes in the form of geographically separated family members who engage in both exchanges and pooling with one another. For example, rural members may give farm products to their urban brothers in India, who still legally own a share of the ancestral land, and who in turn share some of their benefits with their rural partners. This may not be quite the ideal joint Indian family of the past, but it is a partial joint family. In Taiwan some members of an extended family may farm, others hold jobs, and still others engage in entrepreneurial activities, often not living under the same roof, but pooling and investing together just the same.¹⁰ Even in the industrialized United States, the extended families within the same or separate households may pool their work by operating a small family business or farm.¹¹

After noting the partial continuation of corporate kin groups, and some large households, let us consider a third type of kin resistance, the maintenance of kin networks as active sources of help. Of course the key paradox in the apparently simple conflict between industrialization and family forces is that the most successful families and family networks in the industrial economy, that is, members of the upper class, very likely engage in more familistic behavior than almost any

other stratum. Evidently, then, industrialization does not undermine familial patterns at all class levels. To be sure, this statement runs contrary to many literary stereotypes: in much of literature it is the lower classes, especially rural people, who are described as having all the familial virtues — warmth, cohesion, stability, sacrifice for the common good; that literature is simply wrong.

Although the data on this point are not secure, it seems likely that at upper-class levels in industrialized societies more economic opportunities are determined through family-linked social connections than at lower-class levels. This applies to lucrative contracts with both corporations and governmental organizations, as well as to high-paying jobs of great prestige. This occurs in part because members of the upper class are in structural positions where substantial opportunities occur, and members of the kin network are the most easily available persons in command of enough resources to make exchanges worthwhile. For example, if one is a member of an extended Rockefeller or Rothschild kin network, it is surely as profitable to engage in exchanges within the kin network as it would be to go outside it as an individual and seek help from strangers.

This maintenance of kin network processes is only one more illustration of the general principle that in most highly developed societies, at the highest levels of economic activity, where one might suppose that bargains are determined almost wholly by economic rationality, precisely at that point one will observe that kinship and friendship ties play a larger role than at intermediate levels of the economy. A note on this general point, see my several arguments in *The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Social Control System*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.

This relationship between the maintenance of the kin network and success in industrialization at upper-class levels illustrates another large principle that deserves to be repeated: there is no mechanical relationship between industrialization and the undermining of specific kin agencies. Instead, the destruction is less likely to occur when the socioeconomic environment does not offer

better alternatives than various types of kinship pooling can offer; on the other hand, quite generally in advanced industrialization, for most people in most positions, pooling does not pay off as well as alternatives outside the multi-generational family, or the extended kinship network.

Finally, as further evidence of the vitality of kinship network processes, in the most industrialized of western societies, a wide array of research since the 1950s has disclosed that extended kinship networks are very much alive. Almost everyone seems to maintain continued relations with a substantial number of kin, in some researches, from 50 to 150 persons.¹² This occurs for the same reasons we have already outlined. That is, for some activities, exchanges, help, advice, and even loans, the aid from kin may be easier to obtain, and less costly, than attempting to get it from the relatively awkward and inefficient bureaucracies of the state or the corporation.

Moreover, it is clear that a good number of occupational decisions are made on the basis of family needs, and these often run contrary to the requests or the pressures of corporations. For example, corporations often learn that promising young executives will not accept a promotion that requires their families to uproot their established social and kinship ties.

Thus, although the main body of evidence, and most trends in most societies disclose the same general patterns as we have pointed out before; an undermining by industrializing forces of the large-scale, corporate, or multi-generational family units, along with many other traditional family patterns, nevertheless family forces themselves have some independent influence. They have some influence, primarily by virtue of their importance for the maintenance of an industrialized system. In addition, however, under various socioeconomic circumstances, family structures possess advantages that the modern bureaucracies and formal agencies cannot achieve. For these reasons, we need not deny the massive impact of industrialized forces, in order to recognize the independent importance of family forces in successfully resisting that impact at various points.

Notes

1. The sociologist, Lewis Coser, refers to 'greedy' institutions in Lewis Coser, *Greedy Institutions; Patterns of Undivided Commitment*, (New York: Free Press, 1974)
2. For a rather striking confirmation of that general thesis, see Ruth Dixon, "Explaining Cross-Cultural Variations in Age at Marriage and Proportions Never Marrying", *Population Studies*, 25 (July, 1971), pp. 215-233; and "Late Marriage and Non-Marriage as Demographic Responses: Are They Similar?", *Population Studies*, 32 (Nov. 1978), pp. 449-466.
3. A strong confirmation of this is found in the recent World Fertility Survey, in a monograph published by the Population Information Program at Johns Hopkins University.
4. See relevant sections on the extended family system in the chapters on India, China, and Japan in William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: The Free Press, 1963).
5. For some fruitful analyses of this fact, see Staffan B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class*, (N.Y.: Columbia University, 1970).
6. For a discussion of these issues, see Eugene Litwak, "Technological Innovation: An Ideal Form Of Nuclear Family Structure in an Industrial Democratic Society", in D. Narain (ed.), *Explorations in the Family and Other Essays*, (Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1975), pp. 472ff.
7. For example, in modern Yugoslavia, there are probably more grandparents 'available' for children to know and to interact with, than, say, a century ago. For some speculations about these changes, see E.A. Hammel, "The Zadruga as Process", in Peter Laslett and R. Wall, *Household and Family in Past Time*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 333-373.
8. John Paul Mason, "Petroleum Development and the Reactivation of Traditional Structure in a Libyan Oasis Community", in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 26 (July, 1978), pp. 763-776.
9. See William F. Stinner, "Modernization and Family Extension in the Philippines: A Social-Demographic Analysis", in *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 41 (Feb. 1979), pp. 161-168.
10. See Myron L. Cohen, *House United, House Divided*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 96ff. For India, see A.A. Khatri, "The Adaptive Extended Family in India Today", *Journal of Marriage and Family Living* 37 (August, 1975), pp. 633-642; see also Peter Marris, "The Family and Business: Comparison of Asian and African Experience in Kenya", in D. Narain, *op cit*, pp. 344-358; as well as the analysis of 19th century England in Michael Andersen, *Family Structure in 19th Century Lancashire*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), Ch. 12.
11. Of course, the literature on the black extended family network in the United States is substantial: see for example, Carol B. Stack, *All Our Kin*, (New York: Harper, 1974); and Joyce Aschenbrenner, *Lifelines*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1975). Winch has analyzed the conditions under which extended families may occur, in many societies; see Robert F. Winch *et al.*, *Familial Organization*, (New York: Free Press, 1977); See also R.F. Winch and R.L. Blomberg, "Societal Complexity in Familial Organization", in R.F. Winch and L. Goodwin (eds.), *Selected Studies in Marriage and the Family*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968). Objections to my general thesis, that industrialization undermines many family patterns, may be found in Luis Lenero-Otero, *Beyond the Nuclear Family Model*, (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1976), but several of the articles confirm my thesis nevertheless.
12. For example, see Raymond S. Firth (ed.), *Two Studies of Kinship in London*, (London: London School of Economics, *Monographs on Social Anthropology* No. 15: Athlone Press, 1956); Marvin B. Sussman and Lee Burchinal, "Kin Family Network: Unheralded Structure in Current Conceptualizations of Family Functioning", *Marriage and Family Living*, 24 (August, 1962), pp. 231-240; Gerrit Kooiy has done several such studies in the Netherlands; see also the brief summary data on the United States, in F. Ivan Nye and Felix M. Berardo, *The Family*, (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 407-434.

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