




MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

A PICTURE HISTORY



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

A P I C T U R E H I S T O R Y

by
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Foreword

One hundred years have passed since the establishment of a permanent military intelligence organization within the War Department in 1885. Publishing a history on the role which modern military intelligence has played in the life of the Army and the nation seemed a fitting way to mark the anniversary. Because of the nature of the subject matter and the limited amount of accessible research sources, official Army histories have tended to integrate the contribution of intelligence into more general works and have not isolated it as a specialized topic. A picture history of military intelligence is believed to be a suitable format for an introductory study. The use of images permits the telling of a story which might otherwise remain untold while at the same time preserves a balance in coverage between the early and recent years.

The photographs selected for *Military Intelligence: A Picture History* represent each of the major intelligence and security disciplines and reflect the continuity between today's intelligence functions and those of the past. The accompanying text traces the birth of military intelligence and its transformation into a recognized professional discipline within the Army. While the definitive history of military intelligence remains to be written, it is felt that this book at least begins to fill what has been a significant gap in American military history.

The present volume is in partial fulfillment of the mission of the History Office, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, to help military intelligence specialists be prepared for today's challenges by a better understanding of the past. This history is designed as a tool to perpetuate the rich heritage of military intelligence for the individual soldier. It is hoped that it will be found useful at all levels of command and in various training programs.

James L. Gilbert
Command Historian
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Arlington, Virginia
24 October 1984

The Author

John Patrick Finnegan graduated *magna cum laude* from Boston College in 1957 with an A.B. in English Literature. After a period of civilian employment with the National Security Agency and military service in the U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps, he went on to receive a Ph.D. in American History from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Between 1964 and 1979, Dr. Finnegan taught United States History at a number of institutions of higher education, including Ohio University, the overseas divisions of the University of Maryland, Chicago State University, and Texas Tech University. He also served as a Principal Education Officer with

the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Education and as Senior Lecturer in History with the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Joining the Federal Civil Service in 1979, the author worked as an archivist at the U.S. Army Cryptologic Records Center and as an historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History before accepting his present position as historian with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Dr. Finnegan is also the author of *Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign for American Military Preparedness, 1914–1917* (Greenwood Press, 1974) as well as articles on military intelligence and Army organization.

Preface

This book is not intended to be a definitive scholarly history of military intelligence, but an introduction to the subject. Its scope has been deliberately restricted to the years after 1885. Although some intelligence-related photography is extant from the Civil War period, it was decided to begin the account in 1885 because that year marked the establishment of the first permanent U.S. military intelligence organization. There are other limitations to the work. Photographs on some aspects of military intelligence, especially production and analysis, are just not available for certain periods. The text has been kept to a minimum, out of security considerations and out of a desire to let the photographs themselves tell the bulk of the story. However, it is hoped that the photographs selected do portray the diversity of military intelligence activities and their historical continuity. Because the history of military intelligence has often been shaped by outside forces, the narrative attempts to place the evolution of military intelligence organizations and functions in context with developments in the Army as a whole and with events in the life of the nation.

Many people contributed to the success of this book. I would especially like to thank the staffs of the National Archives; the Library of Congress; the Defense Audiovisual Agency; the National Security Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the George C. Marshall Foundation; and the U.S. Army Cryptologic Records Center for

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During the progress of this volume, COL Richard J. Powers, Jr., Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and Mr. Jimmie B. Garrett, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (DCSOPS), have provided oversight and unfailing support to the project. Mr. James L. Gilbert, INSCOM Command Historian, not only originated the concept for this picture history but also gave helpful guidance in the selection and arrangement of photographs. Ms. Diane L. Hamm, writer-editor of the INSCOM History Office, helped with proofreading and provided editorial assistance. Invaluable advice on the mechanics of producing a photo history was given by Mrs. Phoebe Russo of the INSCOM Public Affairs Office.

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John Patrick Finnegan


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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

A P I C T U R E H I S T O R Y



Introduction

The history of U.S. military intelligence goes back to the very beginnings of the nation. During much of the American Revolution, George Washington personally directed the Continental Army's intelligence system, running a number of highly successful intelligence operations. Nathan Hale, the unfortunate amateur spy with but one life to give for his country, may have been the most publicized intelligence agent of the American Revolution, but he was not the best. One of Washington's spy networks penetrated the highest levels of the British headquarters in occupied New York City; the intelligence provided by this group led to the discovery of Benedict Arnold's treason. Nor was operational security neglected. The campaign that led up to the British defeat at Yorktown succeeded due to Washington's orchestration of a masterful deception operation that left the enemy baffled about American intentions until it was too late.

Despite its noteworthy successes during the American Revolution, military intelligence was largely neglected in the years that followed. Military institutions and intelligence practices did not fit in easily with American values. The American Revolution had

been won by a professional regular force, the Continental Army, amply supported by an intelligence system as sophisticated as the 18th century would allow. However, this fact seemed too uncomfortable for Americans to accept. A national myth developed that the Revolution had been fought by patriotic amateurs. As a corollary, it was widely accepted that the country had scant need of permanent military institutions or of a permanent military intelligence organization. In case any conflict developed, it was felt citizen armies would rise up and overwhelm the foe. Since Providence was on America's side, it was unnecessary to know anything about potential enemies in advance.

The circumstances of American life tended to reinforce this myth. Although the young nation faced serious menaces on the North American Continent in its early years, the Pax Britannica that followed the war of 1812 allowed the United States to develop in an environment of unparalleled security, protected by wide oceans and facing only feeble resistance to its continental expansion. For most of the early 19th century, until the Civil War broke out, the United States was able to survive with a Regular Army of only 10,000 men. Under these conditions, the chances for the development of a professional military intelligence service were slight.

The picture during the first hundred years of American history was not completely bleak. President Thomas Jefferson's establishment of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1802 not only ensured the Regular Army a supply of professional officers, but also encouraged topographic intelligence as an Army specialty, because of the strongly engineering-oriented nature of the academy's curriculum. The transcontinental expedition of Lewis and Clark was a noteworthy example of topographic intelligence, as were the subsequent explorations undertaken by Captain Zebulon Pike in the Southwest. The Army formed an elite Corps of Topographic Engineers in 1838; this organization, which lasted until the Civil War, mapped the American West. One of the most famous members of the corps was John C. Fremont, the "Pathfinder" who figured so prominently in the early history of California. Engineer-trained Academy graduates provided invaluable intelligence to the army of General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War as it marched to Mexico City.

Nevertheless, the hard fact was that for most of the early period of U.S. history, the nation had neither an adequate military nor adequate military intelligence. Despite the existence of intelligence collection mechanisms such as cavalry, scouts, and topographic engineers, intelligence within the Army lacked permanent organization and a directing brain. When war came, intelligence organizations were mobilized on an ad hoc basis, in much the same fashion as the mass citizen armies that did the fighting. When peace was restored, everyone went home, and the vestigial Regular Army returned to its normal bureaucratic procedures. The inevitable result was that the Army was handicapped at the beginning of every conflict and sometimes suffered from intelligence shortfalls until well into the war. The abortive American invasion of Canada staged at the beginning of the War of 1812 was carried out in an intelligence vacuum. In the Mexican War, General Zachary Taylor was tactically surprised at Buena Vista; only the fighting skills of his hard-pressed troops led to victory.

The great national drama of the Civil War illustrates the point perfectly. The early efforts of both Union and Confederate forces in the intelligence field were stumbling. The raw new Union Army was particularly handicapped. It lacked good cavalry for reconnaissance, and Alan Pinkerton, the private detective who served for a time as intelligence chief of the Army of the Potomac, provided mostly misinformation. Promising innovations like the use of observation balloons were squelched by commanders indifferent to intelligence. However, in time, the situation improved. Armies in the field developed efficient intelligence staffs. Spies supplemented the reports of cavalry patrols. Observers intercepted enemy semaphore messages, and attempts were made to obtain enemy message traffic by tapping telegraph lines. In self-defense, both sides resorted to the use of simple codes and ciphers.

After the Civil War, however, things went back to normal. The huge Union Army was demobilized, and the intelligence resources that had supported it were discarded. Once the military's role in the reconstruction of the post-Civil War South had ended, the Regular Army was cut back to a force of 25,000. The late-19th century Army was a force designed for Indian-fighting, not for major conflict. Under these conditions, every commander served as his own intelligence officer, and the only specialized assets that seemed to be needed were the familiar collection mechanisms of cavalry and Indian scouts.

Surprisingly, amid these unpromising conditions, military intelligence at last came into its own. Tides were sweeping over the country that would end American isolation and necessitate the formation of a permanent military intelligence organization for the first time in American history.

Modern MI: The Beginnings



BG John J. Pershing leading the Mexican Punitive Expedition in 1916.

By the 1880's, a rapidly industrializing America found itself moving into a new era. This was a period of profound change which witnessed the beginnings of large scale business organizations, the professionalization of the learned disciplines, and an increasing tendency for the nation to edge into the international arena. These same currents also affected the nation's small Regular Army. In 1881, the Army set up its first professional school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to give advanced training to infantry and cavalry officers, and in 1885, the Army created its first permanent intelligence organization, the Military Information Division of the Adjutant General's Office. An alert and professional Army needed to keep itself informed about military developments in the rest of the world. In 1889, the Army instituted a military attache system which, among other functions, submitted intelligence reports on events of military interest occurring overseas.

The 1890's witnessed a series of foreign policy crises which culminated in the Spanish-American War of 1898. The war proved to be a watershed for both the United States and its Army. America emerged from the conflict as a world power of the first rank with a foreign empire in the Philippines and the Caribbean. The new responsibilities brought about a dramatic increase in the strength of the Regular Army; by the end of the Taft Administration, there were 100,000 U.S. troops, some of whom were deployed

as far away as Tientsin, China. The Army also achieved a modern organization when a War Department General Staff was set up in 1903. The increasing importance of intelligence to the Army was recognized by the fact that the Military Information Division was made one of the three functional elements of the General Staff.

The 20th century confronted the United States with more international threats than ever before. In 1911, revolution broke out in Mexico, resulting in a long period of turbulence that threatened the American border. U.S. forces were twice committed against Mexico: in Vera Cruz in 1914 and in Northern Mexico in 1916. Even more ominously, a general war broke out in Europe in 1914, arraying Britain, France, and Russia against Germany and her allies. As the war became a bloody deadlock, Germany began to employ submarines against the sea lanes used by her adversaries, creating a situation that threatened U.S. trade and lives. A peace-minded Wilson administration at first attempted to deal with the situation through diplomacy. Legislation to build up the Army was not passed until the middle of 1916. Meanwhile, the structure of Army intelligence was allowed to fall to its lowest state in a generation. By 1916, the Army was less prepared in this area than it had been in 1898. When the storm finally broke upon America in 1917, the Army would once again have to improvise an intelligence organization.



Scouts and Cavalry

The Army's main task for most of the late 19th century was pacifying the Great Plains. Serious Indian warfare did not end until the clash at Wounded Knee in 1890, and the Army still had to cope with occasional Indian problems until as late as 1914. Under these circumstances, commanders relied upon the Army's traditional reconnaissance arms, scouts and cavalry, to provide intelligence.

The diversity of Indian tribal structure made Indians allies as well as foes in the struggle for the West. A 1,000-man strong Corps of Indian Scouts had been authorized by legislation passed immediately after the Civil War. The scouts were locally recruited under allotments made to the various military geographic departments. The special skills of Indians in tracking proved invaluable on the frontier. The Army employed Indian scouts as late as the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916.

The 10 cavalry regiments of the late-19th century Regular Army also had a reconnaissance role in addition to serving as mobile shock troops. During the Spanish-American War, however, because of the hasty conditions of mobilization and embarkation, most of the cavalry units committed fought on foot as infantry. When the demands of policing America's new colonial empire led to an expansion of the Regular Army after the Spanish-American War, cavalry strength was increased to a total of 15 regiments. Cavalry units performed valuable service in patrolling the troubled Mexican border.

Traditionally, the cavalry served as the Army's principal reconnaissance arm.





A group of Indian scouts at Fort Wingate, New Mexico. Congress passed legislation creating a Corps of Indian Scouts in 1866.



An Indian scout on the Great Plains in 1874. The tracking skills of the Indians made them invaluable to the Army in the West.

Intelligence Staff and Attaches



The ornate State, War, and Navy Building in Washington, D.C., (now the Executive Office Building) became the first home of Army intelligence in 1885.

Army intelligence began to move into the modern era in 1885, when a Military Information Division was set up within the Adjutant General's Office. The division had the mission of monitoring military developments abroad and was also charged with keeping track of the strength of the U.S. militia system. By the time the Spanish-American War broke out, there were 11 officers on duty in the division and 16 attaches sending in reports from overseas. The Military Information Division successfully mounted clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) missions against both Cuba and Puerto Rico during the war. The most famous of these was the sending of Lieutenant Albert Rowan to collect intelligence inside Cuba from insurgent leader Calixto Garcia. The episode was popularized (and distorted) in Elbert Hubbard's famous story "A Message to Garcia." After the war, the Military Information Division worked closely with the intelligence office set up in the newly acquired Philippine Islands to help combat Filipino rebels.



Intelligence hero LTC Albert Rowan.



An early attaché, MAJ Charles Young held posts in both Haiti and Liberia. Young, here shown on duty with the Mexican Punitive Expedition, was the Army's highest ranking black officer before World War I.



Intelligence product: One of the photos taken by CPT John J. Pershing while he served as a military observer for the War Department during the Russo-Japanese War. Reports from specially assigned military observers supplemented those of the regular attaches.

Aerial Collection



This experimental aerial collection system was developed at Madison Barracks, New York, in the 1890's. The camera shown above was suspended from the giant kite.

The Army also began to investigate alternative techniques for intelligence gathering. During the 1890's, an enterprising officer experimented with hanging a camera from a large kite. Although this particular expedient did not prove to be of lasting use, other techniques were more successful. For the first time since the Civil War, the Army showed a renewed interest in the observation balloon. A balloon was used at the Battle of Santiago during the Spanish-American War. The fact

that this balloon chiefly served to draw enemy fire did not discourage the Army from continuing balloon development. Venturing into a newer area of technology, the Army acquired its first plane from the Wright Brothers in 1909. By 1916, the Army was able to field a whole squadron. Its commander was Major (later Major General) Benjamin D. Foulois, an officer who had made the first military flight in U.S. history with Orville Wright.

