

**Volume 7**

# **Industrial Organization & Regulation Reading Lists**

**Economics Reading Lists,  
Course Outlines, Exams,  
Puzzles & Problems**

# **Volume 7**

## **Industrial Organization & Regulation Reading Lists**

**Economics Reading Lists,  
Course Outlines, Exams,  
Puzzles & Problems**



Compiled by Edward Tower, *Duke University*, August 1990

## NOTES TO USERS AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS

*These teaching materials are drawn from both undergraduate and graduate programs at 93 major colleges and universities. They are designed to widen the horizons of individual professors and curriculum committees. Some include suggestions for term-paper topics, and many of the lists are useful guides for students seeking both topics and references for term papers and theses. Thus, they should enable faculty members to advise students more effectively and efficiently. They will also be useful to prospective graduate students seeking more detailed information about various graduate programs; to those currently enrolled in programs who are preparing for field examinations; and to librarians responsible for acquisitions in economics. Finally, they may interest researchers and administrators who wish to know more about how their own work and the work of their department is being received by the profession.*

*The exams, puzzles and problems include both undergraduate and graduate exams contributed by economics departments and individual professors. They should be especially useful to professors making up exams and problem sets and to students studying for comprehensive exams. They may also serve as the focus for study groups.*

*From time to time we will reprint updated and expanded versions. Therefore, we would welcome new or updated teaching materials, especially those which compliment material in this collection or cover areas we missed. Potential contributors should contact Ed Tower, Economics Department, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27706, U.S.A.*

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### Acknowledgement

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# INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION READING LISTS

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\* \* \*

U = Undergraduate G = Graduate  
R&E = Reading Lists & Exams and/or Problems

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

R.J. ARNOULD  
SPRING 1989

Antitrust Economics  
Economics 481

This reading list is to provide a survey of a number of antitrust topics. Do not panic as a result of its length. Not all topics will be covered. An attempt is made to provide balance among theoretical and empirical issues. Also, after many topics readings are provided that contain detailed analyses of particular (recent) cases. Most of these are taken from Kwoka and White, The Antitrust Revolution, (Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989). Sometimes these cases will provide a basis for class discussions.

I strongly suggest that you read chapters 19-21 in Scherer, Industrial Markets Structure and Economic Performance and Chapter 3 in Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective during the first week to get an overall perspective of antitrust issues. Citations that refer to Posner are from the same book; those referring to Tirole are found in The Theory of Industrial Organization, 1988; citations that refer to Singer are in E. M. Singer, Antitrust Economics and Legal Analysis, Grid Publishing, Columbus, OH, 1981; those referring to New Developments are from J. Stiglitz and G. Mathewson, New Developments in The Analysis of Market Structure, MIT Press, and those referring to Spulber are in Regulation and Markets. Readings with an asterisk are more important and are on reserve in the Commerce Library.

I. Antitrust Policy: Introduction and Overview

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- \*R. Schmalensee, "Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics" American Economic Review, May 1982.
- \*R. Posner, "Chicago School of Antitrust Enforcement," U. Pa. Law Review, April 1979.

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### III Collusion (Sherman act, Section 1 and 2)

#### A. STRAIGHT-FORWARD PRICE FIXING

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Case 9: "Collusion Predation: Matsushita v. Zenith (1986)," Kenneth Elzinger

Case 6: "Dominant Firm Response to Competition Challenge: Peripheral Equipment Manufacturings: Suits against IBM (1979-1983)," Gerald W. Brock.

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Tirole, Ch. 4.

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Singer, Ch. 3

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## VII. Mergers (Clayton Act, Section 7)

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- Case 3: Application of the Merger Guidelines: The Proposed Merger of Coca-Cola and Dr Pepper (1986), Lawrence J. White.
- Case 4: The Importance of Entry Conditions: Texas Air's Acquisition of Eastern Airlines (1986), George W. Douglas

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### 1) Theory and Empirical Evidence

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Econ 541: Industrial Organization and Public Policy

Fall Term 1985

William Baumol  
Robert Willig

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