


# CHINA'S RISE TO POWER

Conceptions of State  
Governance



Edited by  
**Joseph Tse-Hei Lee,**  
**Lida V. Nedilsky,**  
and **Siu-Keung Cheung**



# CHINA'S RISE TO POWER

---

Conceptions of State Governance

*Edited by*


*Joseph Tse-Hei Lee*

*Lida V. Nedilsky*

*Siu-Keung Cheung*



palgrave  
macmillan



CHINA'S RISE TO POWER

Copyright © Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, and  
Siu-Keung Cheung, 2012.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2012 by  
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,  
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world,  
this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited,  
registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,  
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies  
and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,  
the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978-1-137-27673-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

China's rise to power : conceptions of state governance / edited by  
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, Lida V. Nedilsky, Siu-Keung Cheung.

p. cm.

ISBN 978-1-137-27673-5 (hardback)

1. China—Politics and government—2002– 2. China—Politics and  
government—Public opinion. 3. China—Economic conditions—2000–  
4. China—Economic policy—2000– 5. China—Economic development—  
Social aspects. 6. Public opinion—China. I. Lee, Joseph Tse-Hei, 1971–  
II. Nedilsky, Lida V. III. Cheung, Siu Keung.

DS779.46.C4714 2012

320.951—dc23

2012019315

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully  
managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing  
processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the  
country of origin.

Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: November 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

# CHINA'S RISE TO POWER

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We initiated this book project through a three-day symposium in summer 2011 in which scholars from Australia, Canada, China, Finland, Great Britain, Hong Kong, Macau, South Korea, and the United States gathered in Hong Kong to discuss the appeal of state-led capitalism against domestic discontents in a rising China.

Always supportive of our efforts, Hong Kong Shue Yan University, especially the Centre for Qualitative Social Research under the Department of Sociology, hosted the symposium participants and ensured an intimate and collegial setting for collaboration. Warm, gracious, and welcoming, Shue Yan professors, especially Raymond Chi-Fai Chui, Yinni Peng, and Chak-Wing Lam served as co-organizers and discussants, while their students were symposium helpers. Together, Pace University and Shue Yan University provided the financial support necessary to complete the manuscript for publication.

Contributors to this volume include all symposium participants, R. G. Tiedemann, who sharpened discussion over the course of the three days, and authors of the case studies contained herein. Their careful preparation ensured that each stage of our collaboration was both pleasurable and rewarding. Farideh Koochi-Kamali and Sarah Nathan at Palgrave Macmillan deftly directed us through to publication, while the anonymous reviewer provided useful suggestions for the book's improvement. For all this, the editors are most grateful. More importantly, without our families' constancy none of this would have been possible.

# CONTENTS

<i>List of Illustrations</i>	vii
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
1 Appeal and Discontent: The Yin and Yang of China's Rise to Power <i>Joseph Tse-Hei Lee and Lida V. Nedilsky</i>	1
2 Appropriating Confucianism: Soft Power, Primordial Sentiment, and Authoritarianism <i>Kelvin C. K. Cheung</i>	31
3 Harmony and Critique: Chinese Modernity, Harmonious Society, and Contemporary Chinese Feminist Perspectives <i>Sharon R. Wesoky</i>	49
4 Promoting a Harmonious Society through CCTV's Music-Entertainment Television Programming <i>Lauren Gorfinkel</i>	71
5 Harmonious Online Society: The China Model in the Information Age <i>Sidney Y. Liu</i>	91
6 The Harmonious Language of Young Hans in Urumqi, Xinjiang <i>Elena Caprioni</i>	111
7 Invoking the Ghosts of Blagoveshchensk: Massacre, Memory, and the Post-Mao Search for Historical Identity <i>Martin Fromm</i>	139
8 Chinese Nationalism in Harmony with European Imperialism: Historical Representation at the Macau Museum <i>Kam-Yee Law</i>	165

9	Health Care in a Harmonious Society: Crises and Challenges in Post-1978 China <i>Ka-che Yip</i>	181
10	Controlling Lives and Bodies: Water and Food Security in Hong Kong <i>Siu-Keung Cheung</i>	207
	<i>Glossary</i>	229
	<i>Notes on Contributors</i>	235
	<i>Index</i>	239

# ILLUSTRATIONS

## MAP

5.1	Proposed Optical Cable Network in the Great Mekong Sub-region Information Superhighway Project, 2004	101
-----	--	-----

## FIGURES

6.1	Exterior of Kadeer Trade Center in Urumqi Covered with Propaganda Posters about Interethnic Harmony, Summer 2011	125
6.2	Public Bus with Slogan, Seize the Opportunity to Develop and Build a Prosperous City ( <i>meihao jiayuan</i> ), Urumqi, Summer 2011	126
6.3	Elderly Ugyhur Man Looking at Chinese Slogans about Interethnic Harmony and Economic Development, Urumqi, Summer 2010	127
10.1	Comparison between the Yield in Hong Kong's Reservoirs and Dongjiang Freshwater	212

## TABLES

10.1	Guangdong Province Freshwater Supply to Hong Kong	211
10.2	Hong Kong's Import of Staple Foodstuff from China	218
10.3	Unit Price for Dongjiang Freshwater	223
10.4	Ng Fung Hong Limited's Annual Turnover and Profit	224



## Appeal and Discontent: The Yin and Yang of China's Rise to Power

*Joseph Tse-Hei Lee and Lida V. Nedilsky*

On Chicago's northwest side, in a neighborhood that has for decades served as the site of first settlement for refugees, a museum founded by survivors houses a rare exhibit and genocide memorial. With slogans and photographs, artifacts and maps, it documents the fervor of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge and the devastation of millions in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978. "Intelligence is of no value; manual labor is priceless," one banner announces like something out of a parallel, twisted universe. Cambodia's socialist experiment was inspired first by Maoism, and later, by Pol Pot's belief in cultural purification. Yet, like the Maoist inspiration, it cannot be relegated to some distant place and time. From the 1930s to the 1970s, Maoism attracted admiring followers in tens of millions from around the world. In China, Cambodia, and elsewhere, people mobilized themselves in work and recreation, in recitation and song, in self-criticism and public protest, as well as in open warfare. Apart from a handful of remote places and cases, Maoism today appears to be an abandoned, archaic philosophy that was interred with the man. But look again. In their new home of Chicago, those who fled the country renamed Kampuchea—whether they fled as soldiers or laborers, artists or shopkeepers, Buddhists or Muslims, victims or perpetrators—re-live, as they rework the violent experiences and memories that they brought with them. A healing garden is bold in its irony, occupying museum space after the main exhibit yields the contradictions of Pol Pot's peasant utopia and

infamous killing fields. Tilling the earth might yet mend the wounds suffered from mass mobilization around agrarian, manual labor.

Whether in Pol Pot's Cambodia or Mao's China, the Chinese Communist state has demonstrated the power of both appeal and discontent—seemingly contradictory tendencies that many have struggled to put behind them, but which actually augur the ongoing struggle for China and its admirers. In each particular instance, the state has appealed to the masses with promises of concrete as well as intangible benefits. But the human and social sacrifices involved in striving for such utopian visions have yielded only disillusionment, and even horror. Moreover, the irresistible attraction of a revolutionary utopia has, in fact, been proportionate to the level of tension and conflict already existing in these societies. With deeper understanding achieved through historical and empirical analysis, today we can see how the widespread appeal of Mao's radical and transformative ideology revealed the presence of long-standing disharmonies, discontents, and disorders. Likewise, in this book, ten scholarly essays address how a twenty-first century contradiction—the combination of authoritarian rule and market-oriented economy—reveals the paradox of state-led capitalism's global appeal against growing domestic discontent. Such an understanding is essential for diagnosing the fragile foundation of Chinese politics and dispelling the myths surrounding China's recent emergence as a global powerhouse.

In this introductory chapter to *China's Rise to Power* we critically examine from both historical and contemporary perspectives China's global appeal. First, we conceptualize the framework of appeal as complement to discontent—much as yang is to yin in Daoist cosmology. Such a lens clarifies the politics of perception and misperception in top-down propaganda campaigns, the growing detachment of the state from civil society, and the public resistance against official indoctrination. Consequently, the so-called China model (*Zhongguo moshi*), or China developmental model (*Zhongguo fazhan moshi*), is rendered not monolithic, but dialectical: full of contradictions, discrepancies, and space for maneuvering in the nation- and state-building process. Second, we highlight the evolution of China's political appeal as well as the profound continuities and changes from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the Reform period (1976 to the present). Appealing to sympathetic audiences among radical intellectuals in the First World, supporters of its bid to replace the Soviet Union as leader of the Second World, and Third World countries seeking a hand in modernization encouraged China to define and demonstrate “the good life” both for

itself and for others. Resonating with diverse audiences, moreover, required wielding more than one rhetorical discourse and speaking more than one language. The residual elements of such rhetoric are still available for use today, and so third, we shift from a historical focus to the contemporary uses of appealing frames. Finally, we discuss the structure of this book.

## THE YIN AND YANG OF CHINA'S RISE

Today China claims the twenty-first century for itself, projecting rising economic and political strength to not only rival, but surpass that of the United States. Combining the transformative power of market economy and the super-stability of authoritarian rule China's Communist leadership adapts certain tenets of capitalism such as opening up to foreign investment, deregulating its labor market, and building infrastructure, while maintaining firm control over government, military, public security, and information. This has enabled China to overtake Japan to become the world's second largest economy in 2010. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that by 2016 China will replace the United States as the largest economy. Paralleling the success of China's economic miracle, notably, is the consolidation of authoritarianism. Accompanying authoritarianism's prominence, however, has also been escalation of domestic conflict: from Xinjiang to Tibet, and from coastal Wenzhou to inland Chongqing.

Creating an appealing rhetoric in a discontented society is an integral part of statecraft. Such discourse has to appear coherent and unitary. In the past, Maoism fired up radicals at home and abroad. It seemed that the more the US-led anticommunist alliance and the Soviet bloc tried to undermine the Maoist state, the more Maoism appealed to those leftist progressives in the First, Second, and Third World. Mao's Red Guards may have caused countless human deaths during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), for example, but for Slavoj Žižek, the scale of violence and terror was excusable because it sustained revolutionary enthusiasm among the masses and rejuvenated the pursuit of pure revolutionary truth worldwide (Žižek, 2007). In contemporary China, the discourse of building a harmonious society (*hexie shehui*) and promoting the country's peaceful rise (*heping jueqi*) have replaced Maoist vitriol. Yet, to overlook the instability and fragility of such a construct is to err. From the reinvention of Confucianism to the co-optation of feminism various discourses entangle a wide range of management strategies meant to fortify power, including soft propaganda in state media and cyberspace,

standardized historical memories, constructed interethnic harmony in a deeply divided frontier, and control over body and health.

Appeal and discontent may represent two extreme ends of the government spectrum, yet they are complementary, even bound together. Methodologically this conceptualization of appeal and discontent reconciles two distinct approaches to the study of contemporary China: the fields of political science and international relations concentrating on geopolitics, balance of power, and *realpolitik* (Shambaugh, ed., 2005; Odgaard, 2007, 2012; Lampton, 2008; Foot and Walter, 2010; Callahan, 2012) versus the fields of humanities and social sciences emphasizing historical context, deep structures, and a closer reading of many different kinds of texts (Weston and Jensen, eds., 2000; Wasserstrom, ed., 2002; Wasserstrom, 2010).

Most conventional studies on China's rise have addressed the orthodox and intentional aspects of the country's transformation—what might be called the *yang* side, or the political and behavioral control of the people by a powerful state. They focus, specifically, on the Chinese state's discourse of building a harmonious society, the creation of the world's largest Internet police force, and the promotion of state-led capitalism as an alternative to free market economy protected by the rule of law (Cai, ed., 2010). These intentions and policies fit Communist leaders' vision and propaganda of what China should strive to be, and which constraints, risks, and difficulties ought to be overcome in order to achieve modernization. By reinventing traditional cultural values and historical memories, a handful of powerful individuals envision the state as a unifying and autonomous moral agent capable of neutralizing various local initiatives and preventing overt resistance (Thornton, 2007: 14–21, 202–205).

But there is also the *yin* side, the unregulated world of media consumers, savvy Internet users, migrant workers, and activists. This realm contradicts policymakers' image of China as they think it ought to be, and reveals a multitude of the state's broken promises. Looking at this construction of China from below, especially from the vantage point of women, migrant workers, netizens, ethnic minorities, and health-care recipients, presents a different perspective of both state and society. While we acknowledge the extraordinary capacity of the Chinese state to accommodate a wide variety of governance situations in managing both short-term crises and long-term structural problems, we question widespread predictions that China will inevitably rise to become the next global superpower and provide a unique model for the developing world. In fact, because of potentially explosive conflicts exacerbated by the state's aggressive development

strategies and reluctance to restructure its authoritarian system, the China model may not succeed at all. A rising China that denies its citizens what they desire—such as health care, job security, minimal interethnic tolerance, gender equality, and equal opportunity for all to advance by personal efforts—pushes discontented sectors to mobilize themselves for collective action to find security, solace, and justice (Fewsmith, ed., 2010; Zhang, Kleinman, and Tu, eds., 2011). If the state cannot tolerate the pressures and outcomes of its own appeal, it is bound to trap itself in a perpetual cycle of discontent.

Such a shaky state foundation—and therefore, conversely, dynamic framework—was set up by Mao Zedong long before China’s present rise and predicament. Harvard philosopher and scholar of Confucianism Tu Wei-Ming writes on the paradox of Maoism and the mayhem of the Cultural Revolution in a Confucian context: “What Mao created, as an ingenious response to the post-1949 situation, was more a cultural ‘process’ than a social ‘structure’ of control, with the specific purpose of mass mobilization for socialist construction. It was not Stalinist totalitarianism because the dynamism, though initiated by directives from above, was often fueled by enthusiastic voluntarism from below” (Tu, 1996: 17). In seeming contradiction, China’s citizens committed themselves to the destructive capacities that Mao claimed were the prerequisite for reconstruction. This dialectic suggests the perspective that appeal and discontent, too, can explain a wide range of contradictions and conflicts arising from state-led authoritarian capitalism. Moreover, a dialectic framework exists already in the Chinese Daoist tradition. By definition, the Daoist elements yin and yang, femininity and masculinity, passivity and activity, are equivalent yet opposing cosmological concepts that sustain the balance or harmony of the world. We offer yin and yang not as prescriptive behavior, what was the philosophy’s original intention, but as predictive tool. Because each object or situation gives birth to its antithesis, the relationship between yin and yang is always in flux, even as it seeks balance. Not hard, rigid categories of difference as espoused by Confucius or producing what one might characterize a harmony of submission, the opposing elements of yin and yang together provide a dynamic tension ensuring a harmony of transformation.

In referring to these philosophical insights, we seek not only to explore the discontent that stems from rigid, coercive government policies and the Chinese Communist leadership’s emphasis on control, but to anticipate new dynamisms beyond the perpetual cycle of tension and conflict. As demonstrated in our previous work, *Marginalization*

*in China: Recasting Minority Politics*, rhetorical appeal often creates space for the marginalized to critique the dominant discourse and so reveal the internal cracks and fundamental fissures in a state's foundation (Cheung, Lee, and Nedilsky, eds., 2009). Thus, it is possible for differences to emerge from within China's unifying propaganda project (Cheung and Law, November 13, 2010). In this book, we highlight the fault lines visible in China's social infrastructure and then anticipate the possibility of an alternative resolution that comes not from government and party dictate, but that comes from the people.

### HISTORICIZING CHINA'S APPEAL UNDER MAO

Since 1949, the People's Republic of China has worked to cast an attractive image to lead others on a common path of development. Toward this end it has employed economic resources and political muscle but mostly revolutionary ideas. Maoism and its component parts—liberation from imperialism, peasant revolution, Third World unity—have provided hope, purpose, direction, and rationale among the oppressed. At the same time it fed the imaginations of various interested parties, unifying them in an imagined community of moral action, Maoism fueled factionalism and created contradictions among the people. This it did intentionally and purposefully. Orthodox Marxism identified capitalism and the proletariat as the principal contradiction that begot revolution. In contrast, writes Maurice Meisner, Mao Zedong developed and maintained the notion that imperialism's intimate relationship with capitalism in China made imperialism and the nation the principal contradiction and thus the impetus for revolution in a largely agrarian society (Meisner, 1982: 54). Rather than the capitalist class Mao identified multiple and diverse enemies of the people: classes and groups, foremost among them landlords, complicit with the imperialist and alien agenda, and thus regarded as internal foreigners. Preconditions for communism according to Karl Marx, urbanization could be bypassed, capitalism and its corrupting tendencies avoided, the city as but a foreign-dominated stage abandoned, if one followed Mao's advice to tap the voluntarism, morality, and energy of the masses in China's countryside.

Competing as an alternative framework for communist revolution and rule, labeled a revisionist ideology, Maoism asked and answered the questions that distinguished it from its rivals and stoked commitment from its supporters: What leads and inspires action? How is commitment demonstrated? Who or what is the enemy of the people? Who is more Red, thus more deeply grounded in class struggle

and mass mobilization? Answers to such questions required direct and personal engagement, and among the first outsiders to pursue them was the American journalist, Edgar Snow. When Edgar Snow made his momentous journey first by boat as a stowaway across the Pacific, and then like a rank-and-file soldier on foot as a journalist to Yan'an, he set the standard in the 1930s for adventurous, tenacious war correspondents after him. In many ways Snow applied his standards of manhood to the Communists he met in China. Out to break a nine-year news blockade he would “risk his foreign neck” to reach the only men who could tell the stories that mattered about the world’s most populous country. Whether writing about rebel leaders who he encountered in the villages under Nationalist control or Communist Party chiefs and military strategists he interviewed in the revolutionary oasis at Yan’an, Snow judged these men according to the qualities that inspired him personally, and which distinguished them from their fellow Chinese. He found among the warriors and strategists and future heads of state Reds he could relate to—bold and daring, dignified, egalitarian, loyal, disciplined, and happy (Snow, 1938/1968). These qualities, moreover, stood in sharp contrast not only to the majority of Chinese folk, but with the Nationalists who ruled, if not controlled China. Writing of his first encounter with a gun-toting Red bandit, whose presence signaled to Snow that he had crossed the Red Rubicon from the White world of the Guomindang, he expressed awe (later deemed *naïveté*): “With relief, I saw the young farmer’s face soften and then I noticed that he was really a good-looking young man, with fine bronzed skin and good white teeth. He did not seem to belong to the race of timid peasants of China elsewhere. There was a challenge in his sparkling merry eyes, and a certain bravado. He slowly moved his hand away from his revolver butt and smiled” (Snow, 1938/1968: 58).

Besides Edgar Snow, other politicized American progressives who were engaged in the battle for democracy looked to China with wonder and admiration. For W. E. B. Du Bois, who visited China first in 1936 and then again in 1959, China was the sterling example of a Third World country rising up to compete with the First World. On the one hand, China proved that by employing strategies of collective action seemingly powerless people could actually achieve popular liberation. People’s Democracy (*renmin minzhu*) was more than a slogan to gain political power; it was an echo of the desires of the masses, long exploited and silenced within China. Du Bois heralded the arisen Chinese worker as an example worthy of emulation, for “[h]e exorcised the Great Fear that haunts the West, the fear of

losing his job; the fear of falling sick; the fear of accident; the fear of inability to educate his children; the fear daring to take a vacation. To guard against such catastrophe Americans skimp and save, cheat and steal, gamble and arm for murder” (Mullen and Watson, eds., 2005: 193). On the other hand, China projected the anticolonial, anti-imperial call that appealed to African Americans like W. E. B. Du Bois and to people of color the world over. Maoism, according to Bill V. Mullen and Cathryn Watson, resolved for Du Bois the dilemma that Marxism (although ideologically commensurate with his goals) was an invention of white Europeans, concerning the exploitation of white workers. Being yellow skinned the Chinese including their theoretical guide, Mao Zedong, represented an opposing identity to the colonial, imperial powers of Europe. In fact, Du Bois informed his African audience, “China is flesh of your flesh and blood of your blood. China is colored and knows to what a colored skin in this modern world subjects its owner” (Mullen and Watson, ed., 2005: 199). For these reasons he urged Africa to recognize China as the true spiritual leader of the colored world.

As demonstrated in the person of W. E. B. Du Bois, association of Maoist China with Third World peoples included the racial minorities living in the United States. By the 1960s Blacks, Latinos, and Asians populating urban America and manning its factories and fields and mines established their separate Maoist organizations based on their distinct racial identities. In Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Newark, and Chicago, inspired by Mao Zedong’s doctrine of revolutionary nationalism, these radical groups mobilized around the principle that nonwhites or those coming from a Third World heritage but living in a First World country—like their Third World counterparts in Africa, the Caribbean, South America, and Asia—represented workers of the greatest revolutionary potential for dictatorship of the proletariat. While revolutionary nationalism sparked further fragmentation and ideological discord, privileging as it did the concept of nation over that of class, this was not the extent of factionalism within the Marxist camp. Stridently rejecting Marcus Garvey’s Back to Africa movement, some Maoist factions favored the Stalinist concept of Black Belt Nation wherein concentration of Blacks in historic settlements in the American South demanded political recognition. Others, however, embraced Mao’s broader concept of self-determination for nationalities, extending in principle, if not in deed, the right of political autonomy to marginalized minorities such as Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Native Americans, Asian-Americans, as well as natives of Alaska and Hawai’i, the US Virgin Islands, and



US-held Pacific Islands, whether or not they represented geographic concentration, distinct language, and thus nation (Fields, 1988). And, at the same time American minorities formed their independent Maoist organizations, individuals within the Black Power movement like Huey Newton and Eldridge Cleaver of the Black Panther Party tapped selectively into the revolutionary violence espoused by Mao Zedong.

In France of the 1960s and 1970s, the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong Thought fueled what historian Richard Wolin refers to as a cultural-political intoxication of *La Gauche Prolétarienne*, the Proletarian Left (Wolin, 2010: xii). Not only did Maoism offer the youth a rationale for their own liberation from stuffy, debilitating socialist bureaucracy, but a cleansing of France's colonial guilt with a healthy dose of revolutionary promise as well. "Mao's China offered the students a way to perpetuate the intoxications of the French Revolutionary tradition—the glories of the Bastille, of Valmy, and of the Paris Commune—in an era when the oppressive nature of 'really existing socialism' had reached undeniably grotesque proportions" (Wolin, 2010: 3). Students practiced Mao-*spontex*, or spontaneity, to break free of hierarchy, classism, and elitism. They took to class struggle, love marches, self-criticism, and following the mass line. Working shoulder to shoulder with the French autoworkers and agricultural laborers they sought the human socialism China modeled for them. More than a youthful fancy, however, Mao Zedong Thought provided what Richard Wolin describes as a political chic that truly transformed France's intellectual elite. Heeding Mao's call to follow the mass line—or the notion that truth resided with the people—luminaries such as Jean-Paul Satre, Michele Foucault, Jean-Luc Godard, Simone de Beauvoir, and Louis Althusser surrendered themselves to the popular political tide. In other words, as French intellectuals embraced the logic of the mass line, they stopped being Mandarins in remote and privileged Paris, and started siding with the people, growing in tune with popular notions of justice, even justifying the violence of spontaneous justice historically associated with the mob (Wolin, 2010; Fields, 1988).

European communists first looked to Asia not to set the standard for communist revolution in the Third World, but to incite such revolution in Europe itself, though not the way Richard Wolin describes in his history of Maoism in France. As Germaine Holston has written, anticolonial agitations in China, India, and elsewhere were expected to "break the crucial link by which Western European capitalisms were nourished by imperialist expansion.