


**U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA**


**HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WARS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**



GLENN J. ANTIZZO

**U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA**

**HOW TO WIN AMERICA'S WARS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**



GLENN J. ANTIZZO

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS



BATON ROUGE

PUBLISHED BY LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2010 by Louisiana State University Press

All rights reserved

Manufactured in the United States of America

First printing

DESIGNER: Michelle A. Neustrom

TYPEFACE: Chaparral Pro

PRINTER AND BINDER: Thomson-Shore, Inc.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Antizzo, Glenn J.

U.S. military intervention in the post-Cold War era : how to win America's wars in the twenty-first century / Glenn J. Antizzo.

p. cm. — (Political traditions in foreign policy series)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8071-3642-3 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. United States—Military policy—20th century. 2. United States—Military policy—21st century. 3. Intervention (International law)—History—20th century. 4. Intervention (International law)—History—21st century. 5. United States—Foreign relations—1989– I. Title.

UA23.A836 2010

355'.033573—dc22

2009048383

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources. ©

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORIES OF

Joseph D. Antizzo

Imogene Lawrence

Dr. Cecil V. Crabb Jr.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are so many people who helped make this book possible, and I would like to give them the credit they deserve.

First is my mentor, the late Dr. Cecil V. Crabb Jr. His wisdom and sage advice are evident throughout this work. I am especially indebted to him for his role in developing the structure of the book that follows.

With heartfelt gratitude, I want to acknowledge the support of my mother, Jeanne Judge. For nearly a decade, she has acted as my editor, critic, and sounding board.

Thanks are also due to Stacey Allemand, who for years has served as my informal research assistant and confidant.

In addition, I am deeply indebted to Anita Tully and David Middleton, both professors of English at Nicholls State University. Their help with improving the technical aspects of certain passages has greatly improved this book's flow and readability.

Many other people, too numerous to name here, supported me throughout this process. Their love and encouragement sustained me and challenged me to produce my very best work.

Finally, as a Christian, I want to thank my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ.

**U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE
POST-COLD WAR ERA**

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments > ix

INTRODUCTION > 1

1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. DIRECT MILITARY
INTERVENTION > 12

2. PRECONDITIONS FAVORING THE SUCCESS OF MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA
A Typology > 29

3. OPERATION JUST CAUSE
The Invasion of Panama > 41

4. OPERATION DESERT STORM
Iraq and the Liberation of Kuwait > 69

5. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
Humanitarian Relief in Somalia > 105

6. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
The Air War in Kosovo > 141

7. EVALUATING THE INTERVENTIONIST TYPOLOGY > 209

EPILOGUE

The "Somalia Syndrome" and the War on Terror > 236

Bibliography > 249

Index > 255

INTRODUCTION

As Cecil V. Crabb Jr. points out in his book *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*, the doctrines that have guided U.S. foreign policy are not static. Rather, despite recurring themes, such as anti-communism, they are pragmatically adjusted on a “need” basis. That is to say that they evolve, adapting to circumstances as the international environment and changing perceptions of national interests dictate. Bearing this in mind, it would seem that American foreign policy has undergone a gradual, yet discernable, evolution since the end of World War II.

Like nothing before it, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 forced Americans to face the fact that, whether they liked it or not, U.S. security requirements absolutely compelled defense of the nation’s interests abroad. This became even clearer when, shortly after the allied victory, the Soviet Union began to indicate that it would be neither an ally nor even a friend to the United States.

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, while condemned by the West, was in fact tolerated and accepted. Soon afterward, however, communist designs were perceived against areas outside the conceded Soviet sphere of influence. The U.S. response to this challenge, the Truman Doctrine, seems to have set into motion a series of phases through which American policy has passed. They are approximately as follows:

1947–1957 The use (or at least the implied threat) of direct U.S. military intervention in order to defend established friendly governments from “armed minorities” acting with the aid, or at least the blessing, of the USSR and its allies. Examples of this included U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey, as well as direct military intervention in Korea. In defense of core U.S. interests, particularly Western Europe, the United States invoked the doc-

trine of “massive retaliation,” a policy that remained in place until the 1960s.

- 1957–1973 The use of direct U.S. intervention in the Third World for two distinct, yet complementary, objectives. First, to contain communist expansion by whatever means necessary, including armed force. Second, to help immunize newly emerging nations from communism through the process of U.S. sponsored “nation-building” and Rostowian development policies. Prominent examples included Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965), and most clearly South Vietnam (1962–1973).
- 1973–1981 This was a period of relative dormancy in U.S. foreign policy, perhaps bordering on neo-isolationism. Public paranoia over getting involved in “another Vietnam” as well as a general distrust of government due to ten years of lies from both the Johnson and Nixon administrations culminated in congressional micromanagement of U.S. foreign policy. The passage of the War Powers Act, as well as the Clark and Tunney amendments, virtually tied the hands of the chief executive for two administrations. Though there were some uses of armed force (freeing the “Mayaguez” in 1975, the attempt to rescue the hostages from Iran in 1980, supplying Israel in 1973) and threats to use force (ongoing commitments to NATO, South Korea, etc.), the United States avoided the type of prolonged interventions that characterized earlier periods.
- 1981–1989 The era of the Reagan Doctrine. This policy took account of the fact that the USSR was a superpower only in the military sense. Furthermore, during the 1970s the Soviet “empire” had become overextended. Consequently, the United States sought to exploit the many weak points, thereby rolling back communism in the Third World while simultaneously bleeding Moscow by forcing it to engage in the costly task of defending its allies for a change. This task was accomplished by funding pre-existing indigenous rebel groups that could cost-effectively press U.S. claims without the need to commit U.S. land forces in a prolonged Vietnam-style conflict. Examples of this included U.S. aid to rebels in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. (It is interesting to note that, in the case of Nica-

ragua, while the Reagan administration denied any involvement, it used the CIA to mine Nicaraguan harbors and financed the rebels through the Iran-Contra arms sales to Iran as well as actively sought the financial support of friendly Gulf emirates.)

1989–2010 This period was characterized by the threat and/or use of direct U.S. military power for the achievement of two goals that seem, on the face of it, to be at odds with each other: (1) the protection of national interests, such as Middle East oil and the Panama Canal, and (2) humanitarian concerns in areas of the world whose value to vital U.S. interests cannot be readily demonstrated. Examples of the former include the 1989 intervention in Panama, U.S. participation in the 1991 and 2003 Persian Gulf wars, and the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan. Examples of the latter include the U.S. mercy mission in Somalia, the food airlift to Bosnia, and the air campaign in Kosovo.

2010–? Anticipated challenges to U.S. foreign policy:

1. The need to deal militarily with terrorists and the states that sponsor them (for example, Libya, Iran, Sudan).
2. The need to deal with “loose cannons” that acquire nuclear weapons (for example, North Korea).
3. The need to intervene again in the Persian Gulf so as to defend U.S. allies, to maintain access to oil, and to ensure freedom of navigation within the Gulf.
4. The need to intervene militarily so as to restore order, to promote democracy, and to prevent mayhem (Haiti, post-Castro Cuba).
5. The need to take direct military action to deal with drug lords.
6. The need to engage in peacekeeping and/or humanitarian relief duties.
7. The need to deter Beijing from attempts to intimidate American friends in the Far East, such as Taiwan, Japan, South Korea (or a weak Russia?).

It is these two most recent “periods” that will be the focus of this study.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

Literature regarding intervention as a general topic of discussion is abundant. However, the task of building a body of literature that develops a typology of the number and nature of specific preconditions for successful intervention has largely been neglected. This is regrettable, especially in light of the fact that military options, by their very nature, “require more preconditions in place, for the options to have a reasonable chance of success at reasonable cost, than do non-military options” (Smoke, 1977: 39).

The central purpose of this work is to develop a new framework for undertaking successful direct military intervention consistent with the needs and priorities of the post-cold war world, as articulated by the Bush and Clinton administrations in the 1990s, as well as by the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama in the first decade of the new century. This study will demonstrate that when the principles presented are adhered to, American forces will tend to enjoy success. Conversely, when these principles are deviated from, military failure, while perhaps not preordained, is made substantially more likely. Furthermore, the political aspects of such a policy failure may become either a domestic albatross for the president as American soldiers die for nebulous purposes that their families cannot understand (Somalia) or a source of decay of international credibility as the president makes threats that he cannot keep (early stages in Bosnia) or perhaps had no serious intention of keeping (North Korea in 1994).

This study provides a new framework that will greatly facilitate the scholarly study of actual and potential military intervention. It provides criteria that can be used to dissect the various elements of motivation, action, and completion of such operations. As such, we can assess each phase of such operations and diagnose problems that, as a result, need not be repeated later. In a word, the key scholarly contribution of this work is *clarity* of understanding.

SETTING THE STAGE

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter, once noted that “war has become a luxury that only poor nations can afford” (Brzezinski, 1991: 5). This is because the post-cold war world is characterized by a dichotomy. On one hand, the deterrent threat of nuclear weapons still restrains the actions of the world’s “major players.” On the other hand, many countries, due to a variety of reasons, have had the restraints

formerly imposed on their external behavior loosened. At the same time, many of these same states have had their dictatorial domestic foundations undermined. The resultant instability, both internal and external, has made these states (primarily, but not exclusively, in the Third World) into sources and/or venues of conflict. Due to the ever-increasing interdependence of the world community, "it is just as likely that major threats could originate from within states, either through civil conflicts or because of the increased technological sophistication of terrorist acts" (Brzezinski, 1991: 6).

Brzezinski implies that pragmatically guided, prudently pursued intervention may be an answer to this challenge (Brzezinski, 1991: 6, 20). However, there is a question of sovereignty and its possible violation under such circumstances. The United States clings to what may be an antiquated notion: that sovereignty places absolute limits on circumstances where intervention is possible (recall that the United States was "asked" to "assist" in Vietnam, Korea, Grenada, etc.). Brzezinski, however, sees a possible opening: that the decision of when and where to intervene may necessarily have to downplay a strict view of sovereignty in favor of an appreciation of the scope of a given threat. Specifically, "there may develop situations in which external intervention in the seemingly internal affairs of a state . . . may be necessary and justified by the potential consequences of activities that are otherwise of internal character and that do not, of themselves, involve interstate collision" (Brzezinski, 1991: 5-6).

Steven E. Goldman takes this argument further. In essence, he argues that our traditional notions of sovereignty are not only antiquated, but also unduly legalistic. He argues that it is ridiculous to assume that all states are equal, especially when it comes to this very central issue. Goldman believes that, in order to exercise full sovereignty, a condition that would legally proscribe foreign intervention, a state must be legitimate in the eyes of modern legality. This legitimacy, of necessity, is predicated on the exercise of political self-determination within the state in question. This self-determination is clearly evident in liberal democracies, as manifested by the conduct of their political institutions and constitutional safeguards. "By contrast, states that are not democratic should not be viewed as possessing the same full untrammelled sovereignty, since the civil population, the nation that is the source and the possessor of sovereignty, has not been allowed even the rudimentary opportunity of expressing its political will. Sovereignty in such cases may be said to be in a *state of suspension* or *impaired*. The state in such circumstances is illegitimate and is not the bearer of any degree of sovereignty" (Goldman, 1994: 127, emphasis added).

Since, in such cases, full sovereignty is said not to exist, democratic states are free (and in some specific circumstances may be morally obligated) to intervene in the internal affairs of undemocratic states when conditions there represent a threat to the world community, or if the state in question directly threatens its own citizens' human rights (for example, the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, 1975–1979). It should be noted that Goldman clearly states that while a “right of” intervention exists legally in such circumstances, the “decision to” actually intervene is and “must always remain fundamentally a political judgement” (Goldman, 1994: 128).

INTERVENTION DEFINED

To the practitioner of political science, the clarity of terms is important. Words are his tools, so their precise use is essential. The term “intervention” is particularly troublesome to pin down. Its meaning dramatically shifts depending upon the situation presented. Eight common uses of this term in a political context may be identified:

1. In general terms, “intervention” can be defined as the involvement, by whatever means, of one state in the domestic affairs of another state.
2. The term may also be used to denote the entry of a previously uninvolved party into a conflict between states.

The practice of intervention in this century has added several, more specific connotations to this elusive term, some of which carry the implication of the use of armed force. Arranging them in a spectrum of least to most violent, we have:

3. *Diplomatic Intervention*: This idea has two variants. On the benign side, this is involvement of the good offices of the diplomatic corps of a nation, acting as an arbitrator or a mediator, to end a conflict either between or within states. For example, in the 1970s, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted, through “shuttle diplomacy,” to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1994, during the run-up to South Africa’s post-apartheid founding elections, he attempted to again use his stature as a respected diplomat to end the violent conflict between loyalists of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party.

However, diplomatic intervention is not without its more aggressive, or intrusive, side. In an effort to get China to adhere to humane standards of human rights conduct, the Clinton administration dispatched Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Beijing. Armed with evidence that much of China’s exports to the United States were manufactured with forced labor,

Christopher warned Communist authorities that continued flouting of human rights would result in the loss of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status with the United States. Furthermore, Clinton also endeavored to use diplomatic means to get North Korea to curtail its nuclear program—specifically, to abandon further nuclear weapons development, as envisioned by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

4. *Economic Intervention*: This entails the use of economic tools (often called “sanctions”) by one state to compel a change in the position and/or actions of another state (Elliot, 1992: 97). A prominent example of this was President Carter’s 1980 imposition of an embargo on grain exports to the Soviet Union. Undertaken in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter sought to use the embargo as a means of showing that “business as usual” could not be conducted with Moscow under the circumstances at that time. The policy was undercut when Australia, Argentina, and France opportunistically filled the void created by the U.S. abandonment of its market share. In 1986 economic sanctions were placed by the U.S. Congress on South Africa in an effort to persuade Pretoria to dismantle its apartheid laws. The Clinton administration placed minor economic sanctions on Taiwan in order to encourage Taipei to restrain its citizens who were trafficking in poached tigers and other endangered species. This is believed to have been the first time that such measures were used to advance purely conservationist goals.

5. *Covert Intervention*: This connotation is primarily, but not limited to, the use by a state of its intelligence agents to undermine the government of, or change the political situation in, another country (Ransom, 1992: 113). It is believed by some that in 1973 President Nixon ordered the CIA to destabilize the Marxist-oriented, yet democratically elected government of Chilean president Salvadore Allende. According to some reports, another instance occurred when the CIA had printed and distributed a large quantity of counterfeit Iraqi currency shortly before the 1991 Gulf War, so as to destabilize Iraq’s economy and stir up popular discontent against dictator Saddam Hussein.

6. *Coercive Diplomacy*: For present purposes, this may be defined as the credible threat (perhaps underscored by the pre-positioning of military units) to utilize force for the purpose of deterring an adversary from a course of action (deterrence), or to undo an action already undertaken (compellence). As Schelling notes: “coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done” (Schelling, 1966: 172). This was the purpose behind 1990–1991’s “Operation Desert Shield.” Fol-

lowing Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, the United States and its coalition allies deployed their forces in a defensive perimeter that paralleled the Iraq-Saudi Arabia frontier. This operation was an effort to deter Iraq from advancing further into the Persian Gulf oil fields; it was also intended to pre-position the forces and supplies necessary to dislodge Iraqi occupation forces from Kuwait, in the event that diplomacy and sanctions failed to do so (as proved to be the case in early 1991).

7. *Low-Intensity Warfare*: This is also referred to as "coercion by proxy." It often involves, but need not be limited to, the utilization by an outside power of a pre-existing rebel group within a country in order to attain the redress of grievances against, and/or the overthrow of, the incumbent government (Antizzo, 1992: 11).

Fearful of the geostrategic implications of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, under President Carter the United States undertook to utilize the CIA to aid covertly (and later, overtly) Islamic rebels who were fighting both the army of the communist government and Soviet occupation forces (Schraeder, 1992: 137-38). Although they did not necessarily share the same ultimate goals (the rebels sought the overthrow of the communist government, while the United States simply desired the withdrawal of Soviet troops that were too close to the Persian Gulf and to allies in the region, such as Pakistan), the United States and the rebels enjoyed a nearly decade-long marriage of convenience, wherein Washington supplied the arms and money and the rebels supplied the manpower. The 1989 withdrawal of Soviet forces, and the subsequent political mellowing of the Kabul regime, fulfilled U.S. objectives, and aid to rebel forces was terminated shortly afterward.

This pattern was repeated in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, where officials in Washington thought that they could utilize pre-existing rebel groups both to press claims against hostile governments and simultaneously to counter Soviet abilities to protect its clients (Schraeder, 1992: 141-49).

8. *Direct Military Intervention*: This has evolved into three distinct sub-groupings: active, reactive, and peacekeeping/order-restoring operations.

Active—This occurs when forces of an outside power intervene directly and forcefully in order to seek to engage and defeat enemy forces. This was the case when the United States intervened openly and massively in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and the Persian Gulf area.

Reactive—In this form of military intervention, forces of the intervening power establish a security zone within another state's territory

and seek to enforce its rules upon the “host” country within the zone. An example of such a policy would be the “no-fly” zones that the United Nations established in Iraq. It is also illustrated by the security zone that Israel established in south Lebanon during the 1980s.

Peacekeeping/Restoring Order—This occurs when forces of the intervening power (or powers) get involved out of largely, but perhaps not exclusively, humanitarian concerns. Such operations often involve separating belligerents, distributing food and medical supplies to civilians, establishing “zones of safety,” and building new, viable structures of state. Examples include American and/or UN interventions in Somalia (1992–1995) and Lebanon (1983) and the efforts to restore democracy to Haiti (1994, 2004). (Klare, 1992: 51–53)

As this review has demonstrated, a great variety of shades of meaning for the term “intervention” exist. For the purposes of this study, we will be concerned specifically with direct military intervention (item 8 above), dealing with any other forms only as they relate to the cases being discussed.

Typologies of Intervention Preconditions

Typologies of intervention are not new to political science. Only a very few authors, however, have featured such preconditions as a central concern of their writings. In many cases, the discussion of this topic is overlapped by, or buried within, literature associated with other subjects, such as deterrence, compellence, and political realism. However interesting, these subjects are beyond the scope of this study.

A concern with direct military intervention seems justified for a number of reasons. First and foremost, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there seems to be an increased reliance by the United States on such uses of direct force. Nowhere has this renewed enthusiasm for military options been more evident than in the adoption of an uncharacteristically hawkish stance with regard to Somalia, Haiti, and Darfur by the almost uniformly liberal Congressional Black Caucus.

Second, while other forms of intervention (such as economic sanctions) still have their place in the American arsenal of options, it is evident that an increasing number of dictators will respond only to military force. Whether this is due to their ability to insulate themselves from the effects of such sanctions, their fear that backing down in a confrontation with the United States would result in a loss of face that would threaten their hold

on power, simple callousness, or possibly a failure to comprehend their own interests, tyrants in the post-cold war era seem increasingly intransigent and unresponsive to lesser forms of intervention.

Finally, there is a dearth of scholarly literature identifying and examining those preconditions favoring the success of direct military intervention. Because of the advance preparations necessary, as well as the heavy investment of both military personnel and material required to undertake such operations, greater attention to the preconditions for successful intervention is a matter of utmost urgency and priority.

To be more precise, a framework should and can be developed that identifies and explains those *specific* preconditions that tend to favor successful intervention by the United States overseas. Commentators on the subject have asserted that the development of such “necessary and sufficient conditions is a *crucial task for further research*” (Levite, Jentleson, Berman, 1992: 318, emphasis added).

Furthermore, this typology should be one that reflects the realities of both the domestic and world political environments of the early twenty-first century. Ideally it should serve as a set of guidelines for the foreseeable future.

CASES SELECTED

The cases selected for detailed consideration in this study are, in chronological order, Panama (“Operation Just Cause,” 1989), Iraq (“Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” 1990–1991), Somalia (“Operation Restore Hope,” 1992–1994), and Kosovo (“Operation Allied Force,” 1999). These four cases are the most recent, fully completed episodes of military intervention and have a number of *prima facie* similarities that appear to make them highly interesting cases for study.

First, they all involved the direct commitment of U.S. forces in armed conflict. Second, all four have occurred in the period since the 1989 “Velvet Revolutions,” which effectively destroyed communism and greatly curtailed the antagonisms that marked the cold war. Third, unlike past interventions, no ideological (East-West conflict) justification was given for why intervention was necessary.

A fourth and related point of commonality is that in none of these cases was there any real fear that entry into the conflict would prompt counter-intervention by any other great powers (that is, the Soviet Union). Fifth, official justifications for using armed force seemed to cite humanitarian