


*Lucian Pye*

*The Dynamics of  
Chinese Politics*



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## Preface

The tension between consensus and faction is in large measure the most basic dynamic of Chinese politics. Pulling in one direction is the cultural imperative of conformity and consensus—within the ranks of the elite there should be only harmony and cooperation, never unseemly competition and disagreements. Yet there is an equal, if not stronger, cultural imperative that pulls in the other direction, which says that security is to be found only in personal, particularistic relations that ensure that one is not just a part of the common herd but that one has special ties with both superiors and inferiors.

In this book we seek to examine the ramifications of this basic contradiction that is the driving force for so much of Chinese political behavior. On the one hand, there is the ideal of unanimity, the principle of collective conformity, of never causing waves or being out of step. On the other hand, there is the irresistible compulsion to find security by seeking out special relationships. The consequence is that behind the curtain of consensus there is an endless process of forming and reforming of clusters and networks of officials, which at times consolidate into fairly coherent factions. Since all Chinese leaders know that this process takes place, those upholding the consensus of the moment tend to be quickly suspicious that others are acting against it, and therefore they are inclined to threaten the others and thereby cause them to do the very things they are suspected of doing.

Our approach in this book is a search for the general principles and patterns that underlie Chinese political behavior, particularly factional politics. Our focus is on the period beginning with the succession struggle following the rule of Mao Zedong and ending with Deng Xiaoping's successful removal of Hua Guofeng as both premier and chairman. We shall not seek to tell this story chronologically. That history will have to await the resolution of certain mysteries relating to specific events, decisions, and agreements. (We do, however, have a brief summary of those years on pp. 244–257.) Our analysis, nevertheless, does explain why Hua Guofeng, with all of his apparent advantages as Mao's designated successor and the leader who ordered the arrest of the Gang of Four, who had excellent contacts with rural cadres and the public security apparatus, who first dramatized the great goals of the Four Modernizations, and who personally heralded China's opening to the world by his tours of Europe and Japan, could not hold on to power; and why Deng Xiaoping, with an initially narrower power base, was successful in gaining domination.

The success of the one man and the failure of the other was not rooted in profound policy matters—on the record, Hua was even more verbally enthusiastic about the Four Modernizations than Deng, and in his desperate efforts to maintain his offices he was in some respects more “pragmatic.” Hua's basic problem, beyond any limitation in wits and skill, was that, like most Chinese leaders, he found that he could not be a national leader without compromising the particularistic ties that lay at the base of his substantive power. Every effort Hua made to identify himself as a leader with interests greater than his particular web of cadres compromised his relations with them, created confusion as to exactly what and whom he represented, and failed to win him new supporters among those already committed to others. Our prediction is that Deng Xiaoping will in his turn be confronted with the same problem, for we see no reason to expect an end to factional politics—their dynamics are far too deeply rooted in the very essence of Chinese political culture.

Anyone with a feel for China's political culture will, for example, know why Chinese find nothing redeeming, only shameless conduct, in Jiang Qing's feisty behavior at her “trial.”

My own claim to understanding Chinese culture stems partly from the fact that Hua Guofeng and I were born about fifteen miles from each other in the same year, he in February and I in October, and hence we grew up knowing the same Shanxi geographical and social landscape, the same villagers and city people, the same sounds, smells, and tastes—although in other ways our socialization was no doubt profoundly different. I must acknowledge that I have never met Hua Guofeng, although I have been privileged to have had several interesting hours of discussion with Deng Xiaoping.

As an antidote to possible sources of personal bias in my own experiences with Chinese society, I have used as the data for this book a series of extensive interviews with emigrés from China and primary and secondary literature on Chinese politics. As a part of the interviews, a questionnaire was used that incorporated items from several standardized scales for measuring operationalized concepts in social psychology. Because of cultural and situational considerations, it was clearly inappropriate to use the entire set of questions employed in any one of the scales. This has meant that except for the few cases where items rather than scales have been the bases for reporting findings, no quantifiable cross-cultural comparisons are possible. We therefore have used the items for essentially illustrative and suggestive purposes. The questionnaire results have value to the extent that they supplement other evidence; by themselves, they cannot either prove or disprove any proposition. The responses of the forty-four former PRC residents now living in Hong Kong reveal, however, that two decades of Maoist attempts to change Chinese character have seemingly failed to affect those dimensions of Chinese personality that motivate political factionalism. Attitudes about authority, trust, dependency, and other key sentiments measured in the questionnaire indicate strong propensities for precisely the kinds of behavior that generate factions. The uncertainty associated with the dramatic, but unpredictable, political changes now taking place in China can be expected to cause even greater efforts to establish the personal networks that give individual Chinese feelings of security and thereby produce factions in the polity.

L. W. P.

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The manuscript was carefully and thoughtfully read by Harriet B. Braiker, Thomas P. Bernstein, Richard Baum, Jürgen Domes, B. Michael Frolic, Merle Goldman, Harry Harding, Donald Klein, Richard

Samuels, and Lynn T. White, III, all of whom suggested improvements that have added substantially to the quality of the final version. Lola Klein patiently typed near-illegible handwritten drafts into immaculate manuscripts, and then equally patiently retyped all the subsequent drafts. Mary Pye, with sensitivity but uncompromising standards, edited the entire manuscript. Janet DeLand carefully went over the manuscript, made improvements, and saved me embarrassments.

In light of all of this gratefully appreciated help, it goes without saying that all the faults in this book are the sole responsibility of the author.



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## Chronology of the Post-Mao Years

### 1976

- January 8* Zhou Enlai dies.
- January 15* Deng Xiaoping gives eulogy in last public appearance before his second purge.
- January 30* Hua Guofeng, fifth-ranking Politburo member, made "acting prime minister."
- April 5* Tienanmen Incident – demonstration in memory of Zhou and against "radicals."
- April 7* Deng Xiaoping stripped of all posts by Politburo, called an "unrepentant capitalist roader," and exiled to South China.
- April 30* Reportedly Mao Zedong said to Hua Guofeng, "With you in charge I am at ease."
- July 28* Earthquake destroys Tangshan.
- September 9* Mao Zedong dies.
- September 18* Hua Guofeng delivers memorial speech, saying, "The correctness or incorrectness of the

ideological and political line decides everything."

*October 6*

Wang Dongxing, acting under instructions from Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying, "arrests" the Gang of Four (Mao's widow Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wen yuan, and Wang Hongwen).

*October 22*

Hua made Chairman of the Party.

*October 26*

Hua reissues Mao's *Ten Great Relationships*.

## **1977**

*May 3*

Deng writes letter to Hua and Party leadership asking to be rehabilitated and promising his loyalty.

*July 16-21*

Third Plenum of Tenth Central Committee meets, confirms Hua's appointment as Chairman of both the Party and the Military Affairs Commission, and reinstates Deng Xiaoping as a Vice-Chairman and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

*August 12-18*

Eleventh Party Congress meets, Hua gives opening address and declares the Cultural Revolution concluded, and Deng gives closing speech, calling for "less empty talk and more hard work."

Standing Committee of Politburo, in rank order, Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing.

*September 9*

Mao's mausoleum completed.

*October 24*

Third campaign against the Gang of Four and their supporters begins. Yu Quili declares need for wage incentives and major economic changes.

## **1978**

*February 18-23*

Meeting of the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC) and the Fifth National Committee of the Chinese Peoples' Consultative Conference, preceded by the Second Plenum of

the Eleventh Central Committee, at which Hua Guofeng announces ambitious Ten-Year Plan, with targets of 120 large-scale projects, 60 million tons of steel, and 400 million tons of grain by 1985. Ye Jianying elected Chairman of the NPC. Revised state constitution gives more freedom, including the Great Four Freedoms of “speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great debates, and writing big-character wall-posters.”

- May* Sino-Vietnamese tensions rise, Chinese withdraw technicians from 72 projects, and Chinese ethnics begin to flee from Vietnam.
- May 20-23* Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's Assistant for National Security, visits China.
- August 11-September 1* Hua Guofeng visits Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran.
- August 12* Japan and China sign Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which includes an “anti-hegemony” clause.
- November* Democracy Wall Movement under way.
- December 15* President Carter and Chairman Hua announce normalization of relations will take place on January 1, 1979.
- December 18-22* Third Plenum of Eleventh Central Committee meets and proclaims the two slogans, “Seek truth from facts” and the “four basic principles,” of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Chen Yun, an economic authority, added to the Standing Committee of the Politburo as Deng's ally. The verdict on the Tienanmen Incident is reversed and the Incident is declared to have been a revolutionary event; the termination of the campaign against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four is officially proclaimed.
- 1979**
- January 1* United States and China normalize relations.

*January 29–February 4* Deng Xiaoping visits United States.

*February 17* China invades Vietnam “to teach a lesson.”

*March* Leading champions of democracy and free speech, including Wei Jingsheng and Fu Yuehua, arrested.

*April* Deng’s supporters speak of an “adverse current” in the Party. China informs Soviet Union of its intention not to extend the 30-year Sino–Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance due to expire April 11, 1980.

*June 18–July 1* Second Session of Fifth National Peoples’ Congress hears that ambitious goals of Four Modernizations have caused economic dislocations and that there is a need for three years of “readjusting, reforming, rectifying, and raising standards.” Official support given to trade negotiations with the West and Japan.

*October–December* Deng calls for law and order, clamps down on dissent. Democracy Wall closes. Hua Guofeng visits France, West Germany, Britain, and Italy—the first such tour by a most senior Chinese official.

## 1980

*February 23–29* Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee rehabilitates Liu Shaoqi, appoints Deng’s allies Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and accepts the “resignation” of Hua’s allies Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, and Chen Xilian. Hu Yaobang appointed Secretary General of Party, and Secretariat is reestablished in effort to separate Party and state functions.

*March* Economy remains sluggish, but hopes for improvements are raised by a call for the use of market forces, especially in agriculture, and

the practices initiated by Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan.

*April* Countering the move to "liberalize" the economy, the "Four Great Freedoms" are eliminated from the constitution.

*July* Pictures of Mao taken down in Peking. Widespread cryptic attacks on Hua and extensive rumors of his impending fall.

*September* Second Session of the Fifth National Peoples' Congress meets again; Zhao Ziyang replaces Hua as Prime Minister; six vice premiers, including Chen Yongqui, the model peasant from Dazhai, and Li Xiannian, leader of the veteran cadre faction, "resign." Increased press praise of market forces and criticisms of excessive central planning.

*October* Major readjustment of economy necessary; cancellation of foreign contracts begins.

*November* Gang of Four indicted on 48 counts, including causing the "death of 34,000."

## **1981**

*February* Announced budget deficit of 17 billion yuan for second year; further economic retrenchment and appeals for stronger central planning.

*June 15* Sixth Plenum of Eleventh Central Committee finally meets after repeated postponements since January; accepts Hua Guofeng's "resignation" as Chairman; appoints Hu Yaobang to the post; and makes limited criticisms of Mao Zedong's contribution to the Party's history.

*July 1* Sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party finds Mao's immediate successor Hua Guofeng demoted, but the victorious Deng Xiaoping still has substantial opposition within the Party.

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## Romanized Forms of Chinese Names

Pinyin

Wade-Giles

### Individuals

Chao Gai  
Chen Xilian  
Chen Muhua  
Chen Yonggui  
Chen Yun  
Deng Xiaoping  
Deng Yingchao  
Deng Zihui  
Duan Chunyi  
Guomindang  
Hong Xiuchuan  
Hu Qiaomu  
Hu Yaobang  
Hua Guofeng  
Ji Dengkui  
Jiang Qing  
Kang Sheng  
Li Desheng

Ch'ao Kai  
Ch'en Hsi-lien  
Ch'en Mu-hua  
Ch'en Yung-kuei  
Ch'en Yun  
Teng Hsiao-p'ing  
Teng Ying-ch'ao  
Teng Tzu-hui  
Tuan Ch'ün-i  
Kuomintang  
Hung Hsiu-ch'üan  
Hu Ch'iao-mu  
Hu Yao-pang  
Hua Kuo-feng  
Chi Teng-k'uei  
Chiang Ch'ing  
K'ang Sheng  
Li Teh-sheng

Li Lisan	Li Li-san
Li Xiannian	Li Hsien-nien
Lin Biao	Lin Piao
Lin Zhuangxin	Lin Chuan-hsin
Liu Bochong	Liu Po-ch'eng
Liu Shaoqi	Liu Shao-ch'i
Liu Xiangping	Liu Hsiang-p'ing
Lu Xun	Lu Hsün
Mao Yuanxin	Mao Yuan-hsin
Mao Zedong	Mao Tse-tung
Ni Zhifu	Ni Chih-fu
Nie Rongzhen	Nieh Jung-chen
Peng Dehuai	P'eng Te-huai
Peng Zhen	P'eng Chen
Pi Dingjun	P'i Ting-chün
Qiao Guanhua	Ch'iao Kuan-hua
Song Chang	Sung Ch'ang
Song Peizhang	Sung P'ei-chang
Tang Tsou	Tang Tsou
Wang Dongxing	Wang Tung-hsing
Wang Hairong	Wang Hai-jung
Wang Hongwen	Wang Hung-wen
Wang Renzhong	Wang Jen-chung
Wei Guoqing	Wei Kuo-ch'ing
Wu De	Wu Teh
Wu Guixian	Wu Kuei-hsien
Xu Shiyu	Hsu Shih-yu
Xu Xiangqian	Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien
Xu Yinsheng	Hsu Yin-sheng
Yang Zhijie	Yang Chih-chieh
Yao Wenyan	Yao Wen-yuan
Ye Jianying	Yeh Chien-ying
Yue Xiao	Yueh Hsiao
Zhang Guotao	Chang Kuo-t'ao
Zhang Hanzhi	Chang Han-chih
Zhang Chunqiao	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao
Zhang Tiesheng	Chang T'ieh-sheng
Zhang Zhixin	Chang Chih-hsin
Zhao Ziyang	Chao Tzu-yang
Zhou Enlai	Chou En-lai
Zhou Peiyuan	Chou P'ei-yuan
Zhou Yang	Chou Yang
Zhu Ping	Chu P'ing

**Cities, Provinces, and Places**

Anhui	Anhwei
Beijing	Peking
Fudan	Futan
Fujian	Fukien
Fuzhou	Foochow
Gansu	Kansu
Guangdong	Kwangtung
Guangxi	Kwangsi
Guizhou	Kweichow
Hebei	Hopei
Heilongjiang	Heilungkiang
Henan	Honan
Hubei	Hupei
Hunan	Hunan
Jiangsu	Kiangsu
Jiangxi	Kiangsi
Jilin	Kirin
Liaoning	Liaoning
Neimonggu	Inner Mongolia
Ningxia	Ningsia
Qinghai	Tsinghai
Shandong	Shantung
Shanghai	Shanghai
Shanxi	Shansi
Shaanxi	Shensi
Sichuan	Szechwan
Suzhou	Soochow
Tianjin	Tientsin
Xiang Xiang	Hsiang Hsiang
Xiangtan	Hsiang-t'an
Xinjiang	Sinkiang
Xizang	Tibet
Xunyi	Tsunyi
Yunnan	Yunnan
Zhejiang	Chekiang



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